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Zusammenfassung in Deutscher Sprache
Die vorliegende Dissertation befasst sich mit der Frage, wie vergangene Naturkatas-
trophen Verhalten in der längeren Frist verändern können und welche Arten von
Charakteristiken von Individuen zu Resilienz gegen Naturkatastrophen beitragen.
Um diese Fragen zu beantworten werden Daten von Filippinischen Küstenbe-
wohnern herangezogen, welche ein Jahr vor (2012)-, und drei Jahre nach (2016)
einem verheerenden Taifun (Yolanda/Haiyan, geschehen 2013) erhoben wurden.
Etwa die Hälfte der 1156 Personen die in diesem Datensatz erscheinen wurde
verhältnismäßig stark vom Taifun betroffen, während die andere Hälfte weitestge-
hend verschont blieb. Durch Bemühungen in 2016 gelang es, 446 Personen der
ursprünglichen Studie von 2012 wiederzufinden und Nachfolgestudien mit Ihnen
durchzuführen. Da in beiden Jahren der Datenerhebung jeweils 810 Personen
befragt wurden, stehen dieser Studie ein balanciertes Panel von 446 Personen, und
ein unausbalanciertes Panel von 1156 Personen zur Verfügung.
Für die Datenerhebung kamen ökonomische Experimente zum Einsatz, welche
unter anderem Solidarität und Risikopräferenzen von Individuen messen, sowie
Surveys, “Participatory Rural Appraisal Tools” und Interviews mit Schlüsselperso-
nen. Durch das einem natürlichen Experiment sehr ähnlichem Setting ist diese
Studie in der Lage, die kausalen Zusammenhänge, die zwischen den Kräften
eines verheerenden Ereignisses und Veränderungen im Verhalten von Menschen
bestehen, näher zu beleuchten. Weiterhin wird der Zusammenhang zwischen
der Ausstattung mit verschiedenen Formen von Kapital (Humankapital, sozialem
Kapital, und finanziellem Kapital) und der Effizienz von Erhohlungsprozessen
nach der Katastrophe untersucht.
Die Auswertung der Daten ergibt, dass ein Indikator für finanzielles Kapital im
negtiven Zusammenhang steht mit der Zeit die für Reperaturen eines Hauses
benötigt werden, während Indikatoren für soziales und humanem Kapital keine
ausreichende Erklärungskraft zeigen. Allerdings kann bei näherer Betrachtung
festgestellt werden, dass die Menge an nahen Freunden bestimmend war für
kürzere Reperaturzeiten, und das mit ähnlicher Effektgröße wie ein Indikator für
finanzielles Kapital. Ebenso wurde festgestellt, dass besonders arme Haushalte,
welche in vergangen Tagen auf Essensrationen verzichten mussten wegen man-
gelnder finanzieller mittel, substanziell mehr Zeit benötigten, um ihre Häuser
zu reparieren. Kausale Zusammenhänge zwischen der Exponiertheit zu einem
Taifun und Veränderungen in experimentell gemessener Solidarität oder Risiko-
präferenzen konnten nicht festgestellt werden.
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Abstract
This thesis investigates channels to improve individual/household disaster re-
silience and the causal relation between disaster exposure and changes in capital
endowment, social preferences and risk preferences. We use longitudinal data of
Philippine coastal villagers from the island Panay which consists of two waves
of observation. The first wave was conducted one year before, the second wave
three years after one of the most devastating typhoons which ever occurred since
meteorological recordings: typhoon Haiyan (locally known as Yolanda). Our
data-set includes observations of 1156 individuals, whereat 449 of which are
represented in both waves of observation and about half of our observed part of
the population was strongly affected by the typhoon, while the other half was
rather mildly affected, or not affected at all. We conducted a variety of methods
in both years, including incentivized experimental games such as the solidar-
ity game and risk tasks, as well as key informant interviews and focus group
discussions including participatory rural appraisal tools in the second wave of
observation. We use the collected data to identify channels which contributed
most to an effective disaster recovery process, as well as causal relations between
disaster exposure and development of human, social, and financial capital and
development in risk- and social preferences. The results of this thesis show that
investments in households financial capital may be most promising to foster faster
disaster recovery compared to other forms of capital, such as social and human
capital. We find no causal relation between disaster exposure and behavior in
incentivized risk- and social preference tasks, contrary to studies which mostly
have only cross sectional data at hand. Therefore this study makes important
implications for decision makers involved in disaster risk reduction, by providing
further understanding of what possible key determinants of households disaster
resilience are, and how capital endowment and aspects of human behavior change
over time as a consequence to a typhoon. The results of this study are furthermore
highly relevant for the Philippine population, since reports from the latest IPCC
imply that the nation may have to face increasing numbers in severe typhoons in
the future.
xx
 1. Introduction
What makes individuals resilient against disasters? And how do disasters change
the way people interact with each other? These questions seem more and more
relevant in a world that is confronted with alarming mean temperature changes
in its climate which are associated with increases in natural disasters across the
globe, be it droughts, floods, storms or else (Mirza, 2002; Adger and Brooks,
2003; Van Aalst, 2006; Li et al., 2009). Understanding the elements that protect
systems or individuals from harm to disasters is crucial to develop strategies which
foster sustainable development with regard to a radically changing environment.
However, the fundamental elements which help socio-ecological systems to adapt
and to cope with changes are not quite sufficiently understood, such that there still
exist quite a lack in know how on how to adapt and where to invest resources most
effectively to foster disaster resilience and hence ensure sustainable development.
Common strategies to cope with natural disaster vulnerability vary substantially
between global communities and recommendations for the adaption of techniques
vary between fields of study which have independently developed as a response
to increasing demand to learn more about disaster resilience (c.f. Thomalla et al.,
2006). This study seeks to improve our understanding of drivers of disaster
resilience, and to shed some light on how disasters shape the behavior of human
beings that are affected by them.
Disaster risk reduction has become quite a substantial topic in the international
field, partly as a consequence of the United Nations formulating the Sustainable
1
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Development Goals, which follow the Millennium Development Goals from 1990,
and acknowledging the link between disaster resilience and sustainable develop-
ment (United Nations, 2019). As a response to the understanding of the linkage
between disaster resilience and sustainable development, the United Nations
introduced a separate branch in order to improve disaster risk management across
the globe in 1999, the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR)
(UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2019). This is only one of many examples
for the global community realizing the need to learn how to respond to disasters.
When we look at the global community we can observe that not all regions are
uniformly affected by natural disasters and some regions are especially challenged
by extreme events. In developing countries, most of the population lives from the
land and its resources that are imbedded in it, leading to a high dependency of a
sustainable functioning of those systems. When this functioning is perpetually
threatened by disasters, we begin to understand the linkage between sustainable
development and functioning ecosystem services, and therefore global warming
and related increases in natural disasters are understood as a global challenge
for sustainable development (Todaro and Smith, 2009). Understanding disas-
ter resilience as well as understanding long term consequences of disasters on
different aspects of human life have quickly become the center of attention of
many scientists from various fields, motivated by the prominently propagated
need to find answers for the global community to be prepared against a globally
changing environment and its respective resulting changes in living conditions of
the global community. Recent exceptionally devastating disasters like the Indian
Ocean earthquake and following tsunami in 2004, Hurricane Katrina in 2005,
and the Japan earthquake and tsunami in 2011 which was followed by a nuclear
disaster surrounding Fukushima have reminded us that sometimes we have to face
tremendous destructive forces which severely affect our livelihood in ways which
lie beyond our control. Following an increasing global need to be better prepared
against natural disasters, many studies have sought understanding of what key
determinants of resilience are and how disasters will change our livelihood in
the future (see chapter 2). As a result, the importance of strengthening resilience
across the globe against natural disasters and a rapidly changing environment
is prominently recognized in the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development, the
Paris Agreement, and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and
hence the United Nations Organization calls for responsible corporate adaptation
(UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2019).
Extreme natural disasters are exogenous and sometimes unforeseeable shocks that
2
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heavily affect the livelihood of the exposed part of a population. Such events are
very often accompanied by destruction of homes and critical infrastructure and
sometimes come along with the breakdown of basic goods provision within a na-
tion, such that external aid is needed to satisfy the needs of the victims. Especially
low income regions that are repeatedly exposed to extreme natural disasters need
to know more about where to allocate their resources most effectively, since their
financial possibilities are sometimes very limited. Hence low income countries
are commonly known to be very vulnerable to natural disasters. For example,
a study by Strömberg (2007) shows that at the same rate of disaster exposure,
mortality risk for low income countries is much higher than the mortality risk in
high income countries, which underlines the need for better adaptation strategies
in low income countries.
This study investigates what the most effective asset could be to invest in to
increase disaster resilience and shows how different forms of capital, pro-social
behavior and risk attitudes may change due to natural disasters. I am using panel
data from 1156 Philippine coastal villagers which was taken two years before, and
three years after a major natural disaster: typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan). I investigate
what factors helped individuals to avoid or cope with damages that were caused
by typhoon Yolanda and also investigate, how the minimum distance to the eye
of the storm (measured by using GPS-data) correlates with changes in capital
forms, pro-social and risky behavior over time. I exploit a natural experimental
setting in which about half of our participants in surveys and experimental games
from 2012 were hit by one of the most destructive typhoons which ever occurred
and therefore am able to exclude the possibility of severe biases which usually
arise in this kind of studies, that normally have cross sectional data at hand only.
Hence we can take a detailed look at how characteristics of the balanced part (449
individuals) and unbalanced part of the panel changed over time with respect
to exposure to the natural disaster and have a profound look at what kind of
characteristics from 2012 were responsible for a more effective disaster recovery
process.
The results of this study can be summarized as follows: They suggest that invest-
ments in households social capital might not be generally effective, but rather
investments in households financial capital, since we observe that especially house-
holds which were better endowed financially before the storm had faster recovery
rates than other households, while most social capital indicators failed to be able
to explain variation in recovery time. We do find however, that individuals with
larger network sizes needed less time to recover with about the same effect size of
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a financial capital index. Additionally we reach the same conclusion as previous
studies that social capital in general is able to increase help from others in times of
need, especially from outside actors such as governmental and non-governmental
organizations, whereas trust in friends and family seems to play a special role
to receive help from friends, neighbors and family. Financial capital indicators
were also quite well explaining help from external and internal agents, and in the
case of internal help even more than social capital indicators. Quite contrary, we
find that individuals with larger networks perceive less help from friends and
family after a disaster which I interpret as a hint towards the potential for too
large networks to result in disappointment when larger parts of ones network are
expected to help, but do not do so in an emergency situation. However, probably
the main finding of this thesis is that most of our presumed connections between
forms of capital and disaster resilience have to be rejected when tested in a suffi-
cient empirical setting. Therefore we need further investigation in what the most
promising channels for disaster resilience are, what channels are most promising
to build adaptive capacity, and how the underlying mechanisms of resilience of
social ecologic systems (SES) really work.
When we look at the question how disasters change human behavior, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the events following a disaster increase general trust of
individuals who shared the same fate. But we find that this is not true for all kinds
of social preferences, since we do not find a relation between disaster exposure
and experimentally measured solidarity, trust towards institutions, or other parts
of social capital measures from this study. We find a possible negative long term
relation between disaster exposure and human capital in general, and especially
conscientiousness, which means that natural disasters might have negative long
term consequences on the way individuals function on the labor market. Further-
more we find no causal relation between long term changes in risk aversion and
disaster exposure, contrary to similar studies.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: In section 1.1 I elaborate
more on the motivation behind this study and give more information about the
natural disaster we are investigating in this study: typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan). In
chapter 2 I discuss a framework which was developed together with my supervi-
sors and external consultants and which shows the relevant channels that lead
adaptive capacities of individuals within SES to transform due to natural disasters.
Furthermore chapter 2 elaborates more on the research question and hypotheses
of this thesis. Chapter 3 explains the methods that are used in this study in detail
and provides the reader with information necessary to be able to reproduce this
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study in the same or a different context. Chapter 4 describes the data set and gives
first insights into socio-demographics of our sample and provides also further
understanding of how intensely affected individuals were due to typhoon Yolanda,
how individuals prepared and responded, how the disaster relief process was
perceived, and how key determinants of resilience developed over time. Chapter
5 then investigates the relation between suspect key determinants of disaster
resilience and the recovery time, recovery costs and further indicators for disaster
resilience of the households in our sample, and the relation between disaster expo-
sure and changes in capital, pro-social and risky behavior. The thesis is concluded
by chapter 6 which discusses probable weak points of this study and the methods
at hand, give a summary of main results and close the thesis with concluding
remarks.
1.1 Motivation
According to the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
Adaptation can contribute to the well-being of populations, the security
of assets and the maintenance of ecosystem goods, functions and services
now and in the future. Adaptation is place- and context-specific. A first
step towards adaptation to future climate change is reducing vulnerability
and exposure to present climate variability. Integration of adaptation
into planning, including policy design, and decision-making can promote
synergies with development and disaster risk reduction. Building adaptive
capacity is crucial for effective selection and implementation of adaptation
options. (Pachauri et al., 2014, p.19)
Hence in a world where the global climate is changing due to anthropogenic
climate change and resulting increases in natural disasters such as floods, droughts
or tropical storms, it becomes more and more important to understand what role
natural disasters play in human livelihood, and therefore the need to understand
what can foster disaster resilience and adaptation becomes more and more relevant
as global mean temperatures rise. While there is low confidence that the frequency
of global cyclone activity is linked to rising sea surface temperatures (Pachauri
et al., 2014), a study by Emanuel (2005) predicts that not necessarily the frequency,
but the destructiveness of hurricanes may become more severe as global sea
surface temperatures rise. Another study by Webster et al. (2005) shows that
cyclone intensity has in fact increased over the last 30 years, while the number of
5
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Figure 1.1: Map showing distribution of hazard frequency and mortality risk from tropical cyclones
for the year 2010. ((taken from: Peduzzi et al., 2012)
occurrences did not change substantially, with the exception of the North Atlantic
during the past decade.
Figure 1.1 taken from Peduzzi et al. (2012) shows the occurrences of tropical
cyclones per century and on land mortality risk for the Pacific and Indian Ocean.
It does not take a very long look to realize that especially the northern Philippines,
Taiwan and southern Japan are most frequently exposed to tropical cyclones. We
can therefore conclude that, if the predictions by the IPCC studies (Emanuel, 2005;
Webster et al., 2005) come true, especially these regions will be extraordinarily
influenced by increasing cyclone intensity. Hence the need to develop strategies
to cope with these disasters becomes even more apparent. Therefore, if mean sea
surface temperatures keep rising, it seems to be very likely that regions which
are situated in high risk areas have to come up with ideas on how to deal with
the future prospect of more frequently occurring relatively strong tropical storms
to adapt to those radical changes. But not only understanding the connection
between tropical cyclones and global warming is relevant for the global community
today, also the rapid changes SES are foregoing in general in the next few years as
a consequence of climate change will greatly influence the livelihood of countless
people. However, low income countries are especially vulnerable to the changes
since developing countries mostly do not have strong capacities to mitigate the
effects of a drastically changing environment. Usually, individuals from low
income countries rely on their social networks and external aid providers for help
after an extreme natural disaster, since other channels that have the potential to
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provide disaster relief are mostly not sufficiently developed (c.f. Cox and Jimenez,
1998; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007; Barameda and
Barameda, 2011). So far we have learned that the probability of tropical cyclones
reaching higher intensity levels is linked to rising sea surface temperatures, and
that countries in Southeast Asia are especially exposed to tropical storms. In
addition to that, the IPCC reports that mean sea surface temperatures have risen
substantially in the last century, meaning that also the number of extremely
intense tropical cyclones is likely to increase in the future, should the trend in
rising temperatures continue, which it most likely will. Figure 1.2 shows the
development of land and sea surface temperatures across the globe (parts (a)
and (b)), as well as the development of global sea level and precipitation over
the last decade. As we can see from the figure, sea surface temperatures (SST)
have increased since 1901 in Southeast Asia between 0.6-1.25 degrees Celsius
on average and the trend seems to be consistently going upwards since 1850.
Hence it becomes necessary to talk abut the consequences for countries and
respective communities which are located in areas that are especially prone to
natural disasters such as tropical cyclones, since the probability of exposure to
extremely strong events is likely to increase in the future.
Although disasters cause destruction and have severe impacts on the livelihood
of individuals, from an economic perspective the discussion seems not finished
if extreme events have negative or positive overall consequences on economic
output and development. A study by Felbermayr and Gröschl (2014) for example
uses GeoMet data and shows a substantial negative and robust average effect
of disasters on growth. The average effects they find are supposedly driven by
very large earthquakes and only some meteorological disasters. Poor countries
are more affected by geophysical disasters, while rich countries tend to be more
affected by meteorological disasters. Additionally they find that international
openness and democratic institutions reduce the adverse effects of disasters. A
milder view on the effects of natural disasters on economic output was provided
by Cavallo et al. (2013). They look at panel data and investigate the causal relation
between exposure to natural disasters and economic growth on an international
level. Their findings suggest that only extremely intense natural disasters have the
potential to significantly influence economic growth. However, this seems to be
true only for natural disasters that were followed by radical political revolutions.
Skidmore and Toya (2002) conduct an empirical cross sectional analysis by looking
at the correlation between the occurrence of natural disasters and economic
growth rates. Their findings suggest that there are diverse effects of different
7
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Figure 1.2: Figures representing global changes in surface temperatures, sea levels, sea ice extend,
and precipitation rates taken directly from Pachauri et al. (2014); part (a): land and ocean surface
temperature anomalies between 1850-2012; part (b): change in surface temperatures between
1901-2012; part (c): sea ice extend since 1900; part (d): mean sea level change between 1900-2010;
part (e): changes in precipitation over land between 1951-2010
8
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types of disasters as they find a positive correlation between climatic disasters
and economic growth, human capital investment and total factor productivity,
whereas geological disasters are negatively correlated with growth. In an analysis
of global data implementing all documented occurrences of tropical cyclones from
1950-2008, Hsiang and Narita (2012), find that countries more frequently exposed
to tropical cyclones have marginally declining numbers of deaths and damages,
implying that adaptation over time does indeed take place. However the authors
conclude that this effect seems to be rather small since only about 3% of damages
are “adapted away” by adaptation processes. Toya and Skidmore (2007) take a
look at macro data on the international level and correlate economic output per
capita, years of schooling, and other variables with the number of deaths and
damages that are caused by disasters. They find that countries with higher income,
higher educational attainment, greater openness, more complete financial systems
and smaller government experience fewer losses in terms of deaths.
As unclear as the economic consequences of disasters are, so are the effectiveness
of determinants of disaster resilience. While the concept of community disaster
resilience in the context of SES has been investigated and discussed thoroughly
(Mayunga, 2007; Norris et al., 2008), there is still a lack in knowledge on where in-
vestments are most likely to be most effective to foster disaster recovery processes.
This gap in the literature is also made apparent by Norris et al. (2008) when the
authors state at the end of their extensive review on the term resilience:
Our primary hope is to foster creative thinking about how various path-
ways between Economic Development, Social Capital, Information and
Communication, and Community Competence shape disaster readiness and
recovery: Which of these resources are most likely to be robust, meaning they
are strong and able to withstand the impact of a major disaster? Which may
be substitutable for others, thereby building redundancy? ... but no study,
to our knowledge, has examined how independently assessed community
resources influence the post disaster wellness of constituent populations.
(Norris et al., 2008, p. 144)
This study aims to close this gap by investigating the correlation between certain
pre-disaster capacities and disaster recovery indicators. Due to this analysis we
hopefully gain insight into the matter where investments in adaptive capacity
building might be most effective to increase disaster resilience.
In addition to that strand of literature it also seems beneficial to investigate how
adaptive capacities may change due to disaster exposure, and if there are dynamics
9
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which we should be especially aware about. While it has been generally accepted
in the literature that different forms of capacities, or capital, are substantial
contributors to disaster resilience (Mayunga, 2007; Gunderson, 2010), the matter
of how these capacities or forms of capital change on the micro level due to
disaster exposure has not been extensively studied in an empirical setting to my
best knowledge. At the time of writing this thesis, I am only aware of one study
by Yamamura (2016) who investigate the impact of an earthquake on changes in
aspects of social capital.
Besides to the field of disaster resilience, this study also contributes to a strand
of literature that investigated the endogeneity of preferences (Bowles, 1998) in
the context of natural disasters. As foreseeing natural disasters in the long term
is practically impossible today, studies which are closely related to experimental
economics which investigate diverse effects of natural disasters on human behavior
and preferences mostly compare cross sections of individuals and their respective
behavior in incentivized games and therefore have to rely on many assumptions
which are associated to those kinds of studies which are not taking place in a
completely controlled environment (see section 2.4). The nature of our data
greatly contributes in that regard since this it is (to my best knowledge) the first
study which integrates experimentally measured incentivized risk and social
preferences into a longitudinal study design which uses disaster exposure as
exogenous variation.
1.2 Research site
Our study takes place on the islands of Panay and Guimaras, which are located in
the Western Visayas (Region VI) in the Philippines. The island of Panay constitutes
an area of roughly 12,300 square kilometers, has a diameter of roughly 130
kilometers and is home to about 3,420,000 inhabitants. It is devided into four
provinces: Aklan, Capiz, Antique and Iloilo. Our study takes place in two of these
provinces: Antique and Iloilo, which cover roughly four fifths of Panays coastline.
We strictly conducted our study with coastal villagers since the first wave of two
waves of observations was designed to derive effects of marine protected areas on
social cohesion within communities (for details see section 3.1). Panay has three
larger cities: Iloilo, Kalibo and Roxas which provide homes for roughly 2.2 million
people. The main economic activity on Panay is primary sector production of
agricultural and mining products. Guimaras is a smaller Island to the Southeast of
Panay, constitutes an area of roughly 600 square kilometers and is home to about
10
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Figure 1.3: Regional division of the Philippines and the provinces of Panay and Guimaras ((data
from: PhilGIS, 2017)
175,000 people (Government of the Philippines, 2018).
1.2.1 Natural disasters in the Philippines
The Philippines have a long history with tropical cyclones (and natural disasters
in general) and are a region with vast experience with regular tropical storms since
the country is located on the Pacific typhoon belt. On average, the Philippines
are experiencing 20 typhoons each year, whereas approximately one fourth of
which cause damages1. Furthermore the country is not only located on the Pacific
typhoon belt, but also on the so called Pacific ring of fire, which constitutes that
earthquakes and volcanic eruptions are generally not seen as unusual events.
Additionally its geographic properties make it especially prone to tsunamis, sea
level rise, storm surges, landslides, flooding, and drought (ADRC, 2018). Hence
the Philippines rank third in a list of countries which are exposed most to natural
disasters and are viewed as one of the most vulnerable areas in Asia (Garschagen
et al., 2016).
The country is frequently exposed to numerous disasters. The data set EM-DAT
provided by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED)
(Guha-Sapir et al., 2015) provides a decent overview about the frequency and
other indicators of more severe natural disasters, since only disasters are captured
1Corporal-Lodangco and Leslie (2017) report slightly lower numbers between 1945 and 2011,
namely an average of 17 annual typhoon whereas 7 of which make landfall.
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in this database where either: a) ten or more people were reported killed; b) one
hundred or more people were reported affected; c) a declaration of a state of
emergency was made; or d) a call for international assistance has been executed. I
use this data set to look at the number of different disasters that fall in at least one
of those previously mentioned categories and to show the cumulative number of
events and associated number of affected people, deaths, and economic damages
(see Table 1.1). Therefore we can get a feeling about how important the topic of
natural disasters is in the Philippines. We can clearly see that tropical storms
contribute the most to disaster exposure, with average annual occurrences of about
three incidents. These three incidents per year cause an average yearly damage of
about US$180 million and approximately affect 1.4 million individuals, and these
are only the storms that fall into one of the four categories to even be listed in the
EM-DAT data base.
But destruction alone is not the only politically relevant topic, also displacement
and migration due to disasters play a certain role in developing strategies to
conquer the aftermath of such events. According to World Bank data (The World
Bank, 2018) the Philippines were confronted with an average of 3.7 million people
per year which were displaced because of disasters between 2009 and 2017. This
number peaked in the year of typhoon Yolanda (2013) with about 7 million
recorded displaced individuals.
Table 1.1: Occurrences of natural disasters in the Phillippines since 1900 according to Guha-Sapir
et al. (2015)
# totally affected population deaths associated damages (in million US$)
( per year) ( per year) ( per year) ( per year)
earthquake 32 5,857,237 9,975 603.52
(0.27) (49,637) (85) (5.11)
epidemic 18 149,422 1,283 n.a.
(0.15) (1,266) (11) (n.a.)
flood 150 33,510,034 3,668 3,811.36
(1.27) (283,983) (31) (32.30)
landslide 30 317,546 2,441 33.28
(0.25) (2,691) (21) (0.28)
storm 349 165,259,751 49,221 21,511.79
(2.96) (1,400,506) (417) (182.30)
volcanic eruption 27 1,881,508 2,996 235.53
(0.23) (15,945) (25) (2.00)
total: 606 206,975,498 69,584 26,195.47
(5.14) (1,754,030) (590) (222.00)
Looking at child mortality, a study by Anttila-Hughes and Hsiang (2013) finds
that especially female children in the Philippines are likely to be severely disad-
vantaged by the lack of income and resources after a natural disaster, whereas
especially female children in households with older brothers significantly are
more likely to die in the aftermath of a disaster. Generally they find that unearned
12
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Figure 1.4: Maps showing the provinces at risk of natural disasters in the Philippines (taken from:
Manila Observatory (2005))
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income and excess infant mortality outweigh the direct damages and deaths
associated with disaster exposure by a factor of fifteen.
The Manila Observatory (2005) constructed risk maps to visualize the Provinces
that are highly vulnerable and frequently exposed to different sorts of natural
disasters. We can clearly see from Figure 1.4 that the areas that are in high risk of
experiencing damages from typhoons are mainly situated in the northern parts of
the Philippines, including the densely populated Metro Manila area, whereas it is
rather unlikely for the southern parts to suffer damages from typhoons. The map
on combined risk to geophysical disasters shows aggregated information on the
risk to suffer damages from earthquakes, earthquake-induced landslides, tsunamis
and volcanic eruptions. We see that especially the North and the South are more
likely to suffer from such geophysical extreme events than the central parts. The
same relations seem to be true for the aggregated map on risk to suffer from
climate disasters, such as typhoons, temperature increases, changes in rainfall, or
to droughts that are caused by El-Niño. Again we see that the North, East and also
some southern parts of the Philippines are relatively more prone to disaster risk
than the central parts. As we can see, the area of our study where typhoon Haiyan
happened (more on Haiyan and our study site in subsection 1.2.2), namely the
Provinces of Antique, Iloilo and Guimaras, are generally considered as low risk
areas where the event of a natural disaster is relatively unlikely. However, to be
fair, at the time we were conducting our study (between July and October 2016),
we experienced two minor typhoons and one minor earthquake directly in that
area. Hence low risk should not be confused with no risk at all.
A study by Corporal-Lodangco and Leslie (2017) gives a climatological summary
about tropical typhoon activity in the Philippines by looking at tropical cyclone
data between 1945-2011. Their analysis shows that there is a clearly observable
more active season (MAS) which usually ranges from June-December with one or
more cyclones per month on average, whereas the cyclones are typically stronger
and more severe in the MAS and less so in the less active season (LAS) between
January and May (see Figure 1.5).
1.2.2 Haiyan (“Yolanda”)
Typhoon Haiyan, or locally known as Yolanda, was one of the most devastat-
ing super typhoons since climatological recordings and is ranked as the second
most deadliest typhoon which happened in the Philippines right after typhoon
Haiphong, which happened in 1881 (University of Rhode Island, 2018). Until
today, Yolanda is the second strongest typhoon that ever happened since modern
14
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Figure 1.5: Annual tropical cyclones in the Philippines (taken from: (Corporal-Lodangco and
Leslie, 2017))
meteorologic recordings, only surpassed by typhoon Tip which occurred in 1979
(Kitamoto, 2018). However, Yolanda’s track led through very densely populated
areas and ended up to be the most destructive typhoon that ever occurred in
the Philippines (Lum and Margesson, 2014; Daniell et al., 2013). Starting as a
tropical depression on November 2nd, the typhoon first made landfall on Eastern
Samar on November 8th as a full grown super typhoon with maximum mean wind
speeds up to 235kmh, whereas the storm gusts could reach up to 380kmh, making
it a class 5 super typhoon on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale (Simpson
and Saffir, 1974). Cyclones of such strength usually cause immense structural
damage and can isolate communities for longer periods by destroying critical
infrastructure, like sources of power supply and power supply lines or trans-
portation infrastructure. Especially island communities may find it hard to have
access to food and water as some of our interviewees reported. Several individuals
from the municipality Conception (part of our study site) which we interviewed
reported a complete cutoff from the main land because of the destruction of their
boats at sea. Therefore the islands were isolated from usual food and drink supply
and were reliant on deliveries by helicopters for several weeks. Because of the
immense destruction caused by Yolanda, one of the major challenges in the after-
math was to cope with the immense homelessness of people. One month after
15
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Figure 1.6: Google search queries 2004-2018 (Google Trends, 2018)
the typhoon, 4 million people were still homeless and only about 94,000 were
able to find shelter in a local evacuation center (UNICEF, 2014). The destruction
and suffering Yolanda caused was manifold. According to official reports, about
16 million people were affected by the typhoon, causing about 29,000 injured
people and 6,300 deaths. The number of damaged and destroyed houses reached
about 1,140,000, whereas half of which were totally destroyed2 (NDRRMC, 2013).
The National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council (NDRRMC) of the
Philippines estimated the total need of financial funds for recovery to a total sum
of US$2.4 billion, whereas about US$1.4 billion were insured losses (Swiss RE,
2014; NDRRMC, 2013).
The international response to Yolanda was quite exceptional. Never before has
a typhoon caused such a high degree of international attention and interest. In
Figure1.6 we present Google-trends queries from 2004 until 2018 for the words
“Yolanda”, “Haiyan”, “typhoon”, and “typhoon Philippines”. We can clearly see
that the interest in the world wide web regarding this disaster was truly excep-
2According to our key informants which we interviewed, “totally” destroyed means a destruc-
tion of more than 40% of a structure, whereas “partially” destroyed means a destruction between
20%-40% of structural components.
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tional, showing an almost 20 time increase in queries for the word “typhoon”
around November 2013. The incidence was also prominently present in main-
stream media, like CNN news reports or newspaper articles. According to Global
Media Arts Network, a Philippine media company, the top ten donor nations
delivered a sum in disaster aid of about 521 million US-dollars, whereas United
Nations Organizations provided additional 81 million US-dollars (GMA, 2015).
But international emergency aid not only consisted of the help of international
governments, the UN, military units, and NGO’s, but also of private donors and
celebrities. To mention all of them would certainly go beyond the scope of this
section. Resourceful and more interested readers can find more about the single
donors and supporters in topic related articles and web-pages (e.g. Brolin et al.,
2015; GMA, 2015; Wikipedia, 2017; The Guardian, 2017; Center for Disaster
Philatropy, 2017; Disasters Emergency Committee, 2018).
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 2. Framework & Literature
This chapter summarizes the current view of the literature on what key deter-
minants to build disaster resilience are and give an overview of relevant terms.
Within this chapter I describe the framework of this study, which was for the most
part inspired by the capital based approach offered by Mayunga (2007) to interpret
disaster resilience. I begin by giving an overview about the literature discussing
the term “resilience” and its associated components, followed by a discussion on
the capital based approach. This chapter then concludes by discussing the role
of the single components of the capital based approach (human capital, financial
capital, social capital, physical capital and natural capital) in the context of disas-
ter resilience and gives examples of empirical literature that investigate respective
relations. Following the discussion about the components of disaster resilience I
give an overview on the potential effects of natural disasters on the development of
adaptive capacities and human social and risk preferences. The chapter concludes
by formulating the research questions and respective hypotheses at hand, which I
test in the scope of this analysis.
2.1 A discussion about disaster resilience
The term “resilience” is originally a term which is commonly used in physics
which describes the ability of a system to return to its initial state after being
exposed to some sort of disturbance (Norris et al., 2008). Although scholars have
a pretty similar understanding of what disaster resilience is, actual definitions
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of disaster resilience differ substantially between fields of research and publica-
tions in general, which was shown by Bhamra et al. (2011), who find about 18
different definitions of the term in various studies, and by Mayunga (2007) who
finds 19 different definitions between various studies. Nevertheless it has been
widely acknowledged that the term was first introduced into the context of SES
by Holling (1973), who defines resilience as “The measure of the persistence of
systems and of the ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the
same relationships between state variables”. But since there is such a variety of
definitions of resilience and related key terms, I want to take some time to explain
and discuss the definitions with which I am working in this thesis.
As a result of uncertainty in the final definition of resilience there has been also
a wide range of definitions for terms which are often used in the same context,
such as the terms “adaptive capacity”, “sensitivity” and “vulnerability”. The
ongoing debate in disaster literature of what defines disaster resilience and in
how far it is distinguished from vulnerability, adaptive capacity, or other, often
synonymously used terms, is seemingly not finished and is fundamentally driven
by disagreement on how to define the relationship between those underlying key
terms (Cutter et al., 2008). This can also be seen in a publication by Murphy (2007),
where the author states that there are about 25 different understandings of the key
term “vulnerability” in disaster related literature. As a consequence, this ongoing
debate about the definition of key terms has led scholars to use those terms almost
interchangeably or as polar opposites, which sometimes caused repetitive debates
about the definition of resilience, adaptive capacity and vulnerability (Gallopín,
2006).
Although there is no single definition on which researchers have agreed on, one
of the most widely accepted understanding of vulnerability is its definition as a
function of the sensitivity of a system (the degree to which a system changes due to
external influences (Tomović, 1963)) and exposure to a disaster (a function of the
likelihood and intensity of a perturbation (Adger, 2006; Kasperson et al., 2012)1)
(Cutter et al., 2008; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change et al., 2014). This
definition already has some implications about the understanding of sensitivity.
At a first glance the distinction between vulnerability and sensitivity according
to this definition seems blurry, but the difference is simply that vulnerability
takes the probability of a perturbation into account. Sensitivity on the other
hand describes what would happen if some sort of hazard occurs (the degree
of destruction). Take an indigenous village in the rainforest and an avalanche
1As cited in (Gallopín, 2006)
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for example. Of course avalanches are not likely to occur in the rainforest, but
still an indigenous village is very sensitive to them, because an avalanche would
cause extreme damage to the village. However, the village is not vulnerable to
avalanches since their likelihood of occurring in the rainforest is practically zero.
This example shows the difference in the understanding of the terms sensitivity
and vulnerability, and I am using these interpretations of the terms.
The above definition of vulnerability has also some implications about the under-
standing of the term “exposure”, which is seen as a function of the “... degree,
duration, and/or extend in which the system is in contact with, or subject to,
the perturbation” (Gallopín, 2006, p.296). Therefore the term “exposure” can
be understood as an interaction between the probability of disasters and their
respective intensity, which ultimately relates to a continuous time-frame. At this
point I would like to exchange the term “exposure” with “hazard potential”, since
I will later relate the term “exposure” to the actual strength of impact of a single
natural disaster, while “hazard potential” better captures the continuous and
probabilistic nature of being confronted with certain threats over time.
The term “adaptive capacity” is also often substituted by the terms “coping ca-
pacity” or “capacity of response” and generally refers to attributes which allow a
system not only to mitigate damages of a potential disturbance, but also to use
opportunities and cope with immediate consequences (Gallopín, 2006). The term
generally refers to capacities, attributes or features which enhance the ability
of a system to respond to changes in a way which allows the system to keep its
desired functionality. Therefore it describes everything that helps to improve the
ability to adapt to a situation in a way such that the main functions of a system
do not fundamentally change in a negative way, or actually improve. Generally
there is also a clear distinction between adaptive capacities and adaptness - a well
adapted system is not necessarily adaptive (cf. Smit and Wandel, 2006; Walker
and Salt, 2012). A system could be well adapted to one state of nature, whereas it
might lose its functionality as soon as circumstances change. Therefore, how well
a system adapts to a changing environment is defined by its capacity to adapt,
and not its adaptness to a specific state of nature. In the literature, the relation
between adaptive capacity, resilience, and vulnerability is not well defined (cf.
Cutter et al., 2008). It has been common practice in the past to use the term
“adaptive capacity” almost interchangeable with the term “resilience” (Adger et al.,
2005; Gallopín, 2006; Cutter et al., 2008), but I see adaptive capacity rather as a
part of resilience, since the ability of a system to maintain its functionality after a
disturbance depends on more than its ability to adapt and hence adaptive capacity
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is not the only concept embedded in resilience.
Reading about the relation between terms that are related to disaster resilience is
a bit like reading discussions about the hen and the egg - or more like discussions
about the question: “Was the egg in the hen first, or the hen in the egg?”. This
circumstance has been shown quite nicely in an article by Cutter et al. (2010)
where the authors graphically show the different understandings of relations
between terms across related fields of study. Figure 2.1 shows this graphical
representation by Cutter et al. (2010). Parts (A), (B), and (C) of Figure 2.1 show
common interpretations that can be found across the global environmental change
literature, where resilience may be an integral part of adaptive capacity (part(A)),
vulnerability embeds adaptive capacity (part(B)), or adaptive capacity as a subset
of resilience, which in turn is a subset of vulnerability (part(C)). In hazards
research (parts (D), (E), and (F)), resilience may be a subset of resilience (part
(D)), adaptive capacity a subset of resilience (part (E)), or even separate concepts
which overlap in some areas (part (F))2. Hence at this point I want to integrate the
above definitions of resilience, adaptive capacity, vulnerability, sensitivity, hazard
potential and capacity of response into a framework which clarifies the relation
between the underlying key terms to avoid confusion regarding the interpretation
of the meaning of the terms I use in this thesis.
I use an understanding of the relation between aspects of resilience which is
similar to the one of Gallopín (2006), which corresponds to an understanding
which relates to part (C) of Figure 2.1, whereas I see resilience as the overall
concept which integrates aspects of adaptive capacity and vulnerability into one
common attribute. Adaptive capacity contains attributes which allow a system
to bounce back to - or even improve - its initial functionality after changes in its
environment, whereas vulnerability integrates elements which allow a system
to predict and react to changes before they are occurring (therefore drawing a
clear distinction between capacity of response and adaptive capacity). Capacity
of response therefore partly defines how exposed a system is to the forces of
a disaster by, for example, implementing mitigation or avoidance mechanisms,
which in turn define how sensitive a system is to disturbances. Therefore I see
vulnerability as a function of sensitivity (which describes the extend of changes
in the environment that occur due to a disaster of certain strength) and hazard
potential (which is the probability of a disaster of certain strength). Therefore
I am using a definition which is different from the understanding of Gallopín
(2006), who provide an extensive review on the understanding of the underlying
2For citations see Cutter et al. (2010, p. 600).
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Figure 2.1: Different understandings of the relation between resilience, adaptive capacity and
vulnerability; taken from: Cutter et al. (2010)
relations between key terms. While Gallopín (2006) separate capacity of response
and sensitivity, I see capacity of response as a part of sensitivity. The difference
between their understanding of relations and my understanding is graphically
represented in Figure 2.2.
The result of this discussion about relevant key terms should be that the reader is
able to understand what I mean when I use the above described terms, which in
turn should avoid confusion or different understandings of my interpretation of
results later on.
2.2 Resilience frameworks
Now that I have established the key term definitions I am working with through
this thesis, we are having a look at what factors actually help to establish re-
silience. There has been quite a number of frameworks which try to conceptualize
the parts of disaster resilience which help systems to adapt to changes (Mayunga,
2007; Cutter et al., 2008; Norris et al., 2008). Norris et al. (2008) for example say
that resilience is mainly composed out of networked adaptive capacities. These
adaptive capacities are in turn originating from four distinct sources: economic
development, social capital, community competence, and information and com-
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Figure 2.2: Presumed relations between the terms resilience, adaptive capacity, vulnerability,
sensitivity, hazard potential, and coping capacity; part (A): presumed relations by Gallopín (2006);
part (B): presumed relations by this study
munication (Norris et al., 2008). The core idea behind their framework is that
every system possesses attributes which make it more or less resilient against dis-
asters, and that there exist fundamental dynamics between those attributes. The
components of those adaptive capacities according to their proposed framework
can be summarized as follows (Norris et al., 2008) (see Figure 2.3):
• Information and communication: The argument for channels which provide a
fluent and functioning stream of information is that in emergencies, groups
and individuals need to communicate their needs and options of response
to each other in order to be able to select the most appropriate response.
This concept embeds not only physical infrastructure, like warning systems,
signals and the media, but also the functioning of social networks and their
respective exchange of information.
• Community competence: One major part of a systems ability to respond to
disasters is the collective ability of deciding on appropriate actions and
decision making. While a community or a group of people is faced with
incoming threats, they need to be prepared and also need to decide quickly
on appropriate action as a collective, since decisions have to be made quickly
and also implemented efficiently. One example could be drawn from efficient
planning for emergency situations and train staff and the general populace
in the execution of emergency measures.
• Social capital: Functioning reciprocal and altruistic relations between indi-
viduals and networks ensure that disaster victims can rely on each other
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Figure 2.3: Resilience as a set of networked adaptive capacities, taken from Norris et al. (2008)
in times of need and henceforth strengthen the community in its ability to
recover from disasters. Also a sense of community which is expressed by
individual contribution to- and participation in the community, as well as
place attachment contribute to the closeness of relations between stakehold-
ers and therefore increase the likelihood of sharing resources such as labor
and goods which are needed to recover.
• Economic Development: Clearly the financial possibilities of a system enhance
its ability to gain resources which are needed for an efficient disaster recovery.
But not only the absolute amount of financial assets may play a role, also
the heterogeneity in income sources may strengthen a systems ability to
function after a disturbance, since it can resort to other means of income
when one should become unavailable.
We can see that each of these adaptive capacities may embed elements of each other,
such that Norris et al. (2008) acknowledge that there exist dynamics between those
capacities which ensure their respective functioning. Furthermore Norris et al.
(2008) provide us with an understanding of the temporality of events, where we
see the visualized acknowledgment that these set of adaptive capacities and hence
the functioning of a system may very well change due to exogenous disturbances
(see Figure A1.1).
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Figure 2.4: The disaster resilience of place (DROP) model, taken from Cutter et al. (2008)
This temporality of events and the respective changes in adaptive capacities can
also be seen in another framework by Cutter et al. (2008), the “disaster resilience
of places” (DROP) model (Figure 2.4), which also embeds adaptive capacities into
the broader concept of resilience which are of economic, institutional, physical,
and social nature just like in the framework of Norris et al. (2008), but enhances
the idea by integrating a functioning natural system which ensures supply of
resources into the concept of resilience. Hence Cutter et al. (2008) acknowledge
the existence of six forms of community resilience indicators: ecological, social,
economic, institutional, infrastructure, and community competence.
One further framework by Mayunga (2007) also tries to identify candidates for
community adaptive capacity by applying the Sustainable Livelihood Framework
from the Department for International Development (DFID, 1999). Although the
Sustainable Livelihood framework was initially developed to represent necessary
factors for sustainable community development, Mayunga (2007) argues that
the capital based approach very well can be used to describe disaster resilience,
because the concept of sustainable development and resilience are inherently
linked (see Brown and Kulig, 1996; Tobin, 1999). This essentially implies that the
capital based approach offered by Mayunga (2007) gives an applicable base to
measure the broad concept of resilience where the five forms of capital (financial,
human, social, physical, and natural) play a central role. These sorts of capital can
also be found in in the frameworks offered by Norris et al. (2008) and Cutter et al.
(2008), whereas Mayunga (2007) provides us with an easy to apply measurement
of individual and community adaptive capacities.
He includes the forms of capital which also contain sets of adaptive capacities
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which define the “status”, or “functionality” of a given system, be it on the
micro or macro-level. Over the years, numerous frameworks to measure disaster
resilience, vulnerability, and adaptive capacity have been offered (cf. Birkmann,
2006). However, I decided to integrate the frameworks by Norris et al. (2008),
Cutter et al. (2008), and Mayunga (2007) into one framework, since a respective
synthesis of those is relatively easy to apply when one has access to longitudinal
data about different forms of capital and disaster exposure. The underlying
implication of this framework is that a well developed community in terms of
endowment of the five forms of capital is consequently resilient to disasters as
well (by having higher adaptive capacity). The intuition for suspecting a direct
link between the five forms of capital and disaster resilience can be explained
by looking at the potential of each of the five types of capital to increase disaster
resilience. Social capital for example could be a potential driver to facilitate
coordination and cooperation among individuals, as well as other stakeholders
like governmental and non-governmental workers. Financial capital might help
individuals to gain access to resources such as labor and essential goods needed for
daily life, but also might facilitate access to insurance and other financial services
that derogate the effects of natural disasters. Human capital broadly speaking
might increase an individual’s ability to identify risks and potential threats and
take according action, such as preparing for potential disasters. Additionally,
human capital might increase the capability to identify necessary actions and
help in prioritizing tasks after disaster struck. Physical capital, such as warning
systems and/or disaster mitigating systems (such as sea walls or dikes) help
reducing the immediate effects of natural disasters and henceforth have a direct
impact on the strength of disaster exposure. Also natural capital might increase
resilience by providing natural protection against a disaster. For example, a
densely grown forest might help a mountain village to mitigate the effects of
avalanches. Mayunga (2007) makes an additional remark on the temporality of
disaster resilience by identifying four phases of resilience: pre-disaster community
status, disaster, restoration, and long term recovery, where community status
means certain endowment with the forms of capital. Within this temporality
framework, Mayunga (2007) visualizes community status (which is defined by its
endowment with the five forms of capital) through the four phases of resilience.
Based on this view I employ this concept on a framework which was developed
with the help and collaboration of my supervisors and external advisers3.
3Björn Vollan, Bernd Hayo, Andreas Landmann, Adam Douglas Henry
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Figure 2.5: The five forms of capital and respective adaptive capacities, taken from Mayunga
(2007)
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Figure 2.6: Basic framework of this study
2.3 A synthesis of frameworks
In the case of our data we only observe two points in time: two years before,
and three years after a major disaster. For explanatory purposes I will moderate
through this framework from the perspective of an individual/household. How-
ever, I see no reason why this framework could not be applied to larger levels of
observation, such as village or country level. Figure 2.6 shows my application
of this underlying framework by Norris et al. (2008), Cutter et al. (2008), and
Mayunga (2007). This framework represents the temporal order of events and the
phases an individual might go through while being confronted with experienc-
ing a natural disaster. At this point I should mention that this framework was
explicitly developed to fit into the context of natural disasters, whereas it might
also be applied in related fields such as conflict or other man-made disasters. In
the beginning (or the “pre-state”) an individual has a certain endowment with
the different forms of capital which define its resilience to disasters. When the
individual realizes that it may be confronted with a natural disaster in the near
future it enters the second stage (“shock phase”), where the individual might still
have time to mitigate or to avoid disaster exposure (for example by reinforcing
its property or by temporary moving to safer grounds). The next station in this
framework is the immediate exposure to forces of nature (“exposure”) like in
our case strong winds, heavy rain, and floods, which in turn directly lead to per-
sonal damages, like the damaging of an individuals’ household or physical injury,
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but also psychological distress which may arise from experiencing suffering of
oneself, others, or loved-ones. This already implies the clear distinction I make
between exposure and personal damages as a consequence of disaster exposure
being a factor which is arguably exogenous in the case of this study, while personal
damage might be endogenously defined by pre-capital endowment. When an
individual survived the second stage it immediately enters the third stage, the
recovery process, which is accompanied by reconstruction and recovery efforts
by the individual, but also by external help from, for example, other villagers,
outside authorities (like NGO’s) or governmental institutions. At the end of the
recovery process the individual may be endowed with different levels of the five
forms of capital than before because of new experiences, network transformations,
transformation of financial endowment, changes in the physical environment (for
example upgraded warning systems or mitigation facilities), and transformed
natural surroundings. So far it has been acknowledged that governmental pro-
grams, targeted at improving the different forms of capital, are helpful to help
communities and households to be less vulnerable and more resilient towards
disasters (Skoufias, 2007)
In the following subsections I will discuss the role of each form of capital in form-
ing disaster resilience and also discuss the potential impact of disaster exposure
on each type of capital.
2.3.1 The role of human capital in disaster resilience
At the early phases during disaster exposure, external help is neither available nor
likely to arise in a timely manner and household heads therefore have to engage
in two roles at the same time: Firstly they are disaster victims, and secondly
they are managers of this situation, needing to prioritize action and planning
according reactions to the situation (Al-Maruf, 2017). As a result, individual
capability might play a central role when access to external help (like help from
neighbors or other outside actors) is limited. Individual human capital might also
facilitate decision making processes by making individual’s act more decisively.
But human capital does not only matter during disaster exposure, also preparing
for and anticipating the occurrence of disasters is highly dependent on individual
capability, for example by correctly interpreting early warning signs and alarm
systems (Drabek, 2013; Sharma et al., 2013). Some articles suggest that human
capital acquisition increases the cognitive abilities of individuals, which in turn
improves work effectiveness. Hence human capital should also promote effective
functioning in a setting where recovery efforts have to be prioritized. Additionally,
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the acquisition of human capital increases conscientiousness of individuals, which
leads to increasing contextual performance and hence a higher probability of
effective disaster relief. Most studies who look at human capital are mostly
looking at performance in a labor market setting, whereas the findings should
be easy to extrapolate to a post disaster setting, where individuals have to make
profound decisions and perform actions which help them to recover in an effective
and efficient manner (c.f. Hartog, 2001; Ng and Feldman, 2010).
Some studies explore the relation between different aspects of human capital and
resilience empirically, although existing empirical studies are mainly focused on
formal education (see Muttarak and Lutz, 2014).
Wamsler et al. (2012) look at the relation between formal education and hazard
potential in Brazil and El Salvador. They find that households with relatively
lower levels of education are rather located in areas with larger hazard potential.
One possible channel for this empirical observation might be that less educated
individuals are more likely to underestimate the probability of disaster exposure.
In a sample of 557 Thai individuals, Muttarak and Pothisiri (2013) investigate
the correlation between formal education and disaster preparedness. Following
interviews conducted after the Indian Ocean earthquakes from 2012, they find
that individuals with higher levels of education were more engaged in disaster
preparation measures and therefore conclude that disaster preparation education
programs are most effective when received by highly educated individuals.
In a longitudinal study, Frankenberg et al. (2013) look at the relation between
education and disaster recovery. They use survey data from roughly 3,400 In-
donesian inhabitants that were diversely affected by the Sumatra Earthquake
and the resulting Tsunami in 2004. Their data set contains observations from
four months before, and five years after the disaster. Their findings suggest that
education is predictive for males survival rate, but not for the survival rate of
females. Additionally they observe that more educated individuals were in better
general psychological shape compared to less educated individuals five years after
the tsunami and hence they conclude that education might play an important role
in contributing to individual disaster resilience.
Integrating the findings from previous studies, I identify two channels how human
capital might influence disaster resilience (Figure 2.7). The first channel consist of
a direct causal relation between human capital and realizing potential threats and
taking according action. This results in higher potential for disaster mitigation
or avoidance actions to take place and therefore has strong potential to moderate
damages or injury due to disaster exposure (reducing sensitivity). The second
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Figure 2.7: Framework of this study from a human capital perspective and associated causal
relations
channel consist of direct impacts on the disaster recovery process, since individuals
endowed with high human capital should be able to prioritize necessary action
and better plan the acquisition of resources needed for efficient disaster recovery
(increasing resilience through higher adaptive capacity).
2.3.2 The role of social capital in disaster resilience
The importance of social capital in disaster resilience and relief has been high-
lighted recently by numerous scholars of economics and behavioral sciences and
almost none of the five forms of capital has gained as much attention as social
capital (see Masten and Obradovic, 2008; Adger, 2010; Aldrich and Meyer, 2015).
Measures for social capital that are commonly used to determine the extent of
social cohesion within a certain group of individuals are mainly degrees of trusting
each other and the structure of social networks. Also voluntary engagement in
actions benefiting a social group like communities and involvement in local asso-
ciations and clubs is seen as an indicator for social engagement of an individual
(see Paldam, 2000; Aldrich and Meyer, 2015; Lin, 2017). A major focus in defining
the degree of social capital within a certain social group lies in identifying the
degree of access to resources that are allocated within a certain group. Translated
to a more simple way of understanding social capital: Social Capital is defined
by the ability of a person to access certain resources within a social structure. At
this point we should draw a particular distinction from human capital, which
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Figure 2.8: Bonding, bridging, and linking social capital (taken from: Aldrich, 2012a)
embeds elements of an individual’s ability such as education, intelligence and
know-how. This distinction is also highlighted by Burt (2000) stating that indi-
viduals with more social capital are better at seizing opportunities and using the
full potential of their human capital. Therefore I understand social capital as all
characteristics and social ties that enhance an individuals’ ability to activate its
social surroundings in a way which benefits the individual.
In the context of this study, social capital should foster the ability to access
resources (in cash or in kind) in times of need after a disaster. Such resources
could be financial relief aid provided by governmental official’s or NGO staff, or
the help and resources of friends and neighbors, such as manual labor, food and
drink, medicine... or other necessities which foster disaster recovery. Generally
the literature distinguishes between three different categories of social capital:
bonding, bridging, and linking (Aldrich, 2012b; Kawachi et al., 2004; Szreter and
Woolcock, 2004)4.
Bonding social capital describes the tendency of individuals to interact with oth-
ers who are similar to them in terms of general behavior and socio-economic
4As citet in Aldrich and Meyer (2015)
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circumstances (see Lochner et al., 1999; Putnam, 2000; Harpham et al., 2002).
Bridging social capital summarizes the ability to interact with groups and indi-
viduals that are not usually within the ordinary social structure of an individual.
Since bonding social capital by trend leads to fairly homogenous groups of peo-
ple, bridging social capital ensures interaction between differently specialized
groups and therefore ensuring productive exchange of abilities, resources, and
know-how. Bridging social capital building institutions are mostly identified
to be organizations that bring people from different backgrounds closer to each
other, like clubs and associations (Granovetter, 1983; Small, 2009). Linking social
capital differs from the other categories by highlighting the relation between two
social networks that are different in their location within the social hierarchy.
This relation accents the interaction with social networks that have some sort of
authority over the other (Szreter, 2002). Figure2.8, taken from Aldrich (2012a),
visualizes the concept. Although the theoretical connection between social capital
and resilience is well established, there is still a considerable lack of empirical
work testing this relationship.
Hawkins and Maurer (2009) provide a descriptive analysis of qualitative inter-
views to highlight the role the three categories of social capital played in the
aftermath of hurricane Katrina, which happened in 2005. From interviews with
40 household-heads from New Orleans Hawkins and Maurer (2009) show that
bonding social capital played a major role in the first moments after the storm
hit. People tended to help those who were closest to their own social network,
like friends, relatives and immediate neighbors. Bonding social capital also plays
a major role in the reaction to a natural disaster, since people tend to adapt
their own behavior to the behavior of their friends and loved ones (cf. Drabek,
2013). This insight is crucial to understand why people tend to react to disaster
in certain ways, for example by deciding if to flee or stay, or to follow or ignore
warning signals. The distinction between bridging and linking social capital was
less salient because hierarchical structures became less important as they usually
are in everyday life. However, Hawkins and Maurer (2009) give examples of
how bridging social capital benefited some African Americans by connecting to
Caucasians which had access to more information that was needed for a better
acquisition of disaster relief goods and services. Thereby the ability to overcome
social barriers and to put trust in individuals with whom a group usually does
not interact with may play a larger role in disaster relief than one may suspect,
ensuring that differently specialized groups are better able to share their abilities
and know-how if bridging social capital is well pronounced (Granovetter, 1983).
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Regarding linking social capital, Hawkins and Maurer (2009) state that the initia-
tives of local neighborhood coalitions to establish connections with out of town
governmental institutions and NGO’s was also a main driver in securing relief
efforts.
Empirical evidence regarding the importance of social capital in disaster recovery
shows that communities with strongly developed social capital have usually higher
satisfaction with disaster recovery and also a faster recovery process. One example
can be drawn from Nakagawa and Shaw (2004), who investigate how levels in
bonding, bridging, and linking social capital correlate with the recovery time of
villages after the Kobe and Gujara Earthquake. They find that villages with the
highest measured social capital indicators (such as trust, networks and community
participation) also performed best in terms of a speedy recovery and satisfaction
with town-planning.
From a case study in Bangladesh, Islam and Walkerden (2014) investigate the
role of bonding and bridging social ties in disaster recovery after cyclones. They
conducted key informant interviews and focus group discussions, as well as
individual interviews with household heads from two rural villages in Bangladesh
that were heavily affected by tropical cyclone Sidr. They conclude that especially
in the early phases after a disaster, bonding and bridging social ties have higher
importance to be able to cope with the consequences of a disaster. However, they
also conclude that over time these social ties become less prioritized by individuals
due to a lack of physical and financial capital. Additionally they observe that
bonding ties tend to be very stable, whereas bridging ties are prone to become less
important due to poverty and competition for external support.
An empirical study by (Hikichi et al., 2017) investigates the relation between social
capital and cognitive decline. By looking at balanced longitudinal survey data
from 3,566 elderly Japanese individuals from before and after a major earthquake
and following tsunami in 2011 they find that social cohesion is negatively and
significantly correlated with cognitive decline due to being affected by a natural
disaster, although the effect sizes they find are rather low.
But is social capital as part of resilience itself also potentially subject to change
because of natural disasters? Do people engage more or less in social capital
building as a response to a disaster? An empirical study by Yamamura (2016)
provides more information to answer these questions by looking at a massive
amount of survey data (n=488,223). They investigate the causal relation between
distance to the epicenter of an earthquake (Hanshin Awaji earthquake from 1995)
and the engagement in community activity with the help of a longitudinal study
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design, very similar to our own. Using difference-in-difference regression they
find that engagement in community activities increased more over time in villages
that were closer to the epicenter of the earthquake. This implies that social capital,
if it truly helps building resilience to natural disasters, might be reinforced by
disasters themselves as well.
If I apply the accumulated information I just established by looking at related
studies and theoretical concepts to the framework which I raised in section 2.2,
it seems that two channels through which social capital might influence disaster
recovery become apparent. The first channel consists of an individual being more
likely to engage external aid providers, like NGO’s or governmental agents, by
being more likely to attain information about external disaster relief processes
and therefore be more likely to attain needed resources. This increaed likelihood
might stem from either a better connectedness to local authorities or external
aid providers (linking networks), or higher levels of trust and thereby increasing
likelihood of interactions between external aid providers and disaster victims. The
same goes for the mobilization of informal networks and ties between friends, fam-
ily, neighbors and other stakeholders from the same hierarchical level (therefore
increasing resilience). These ties might to some extent be reciprocal, meaning that
households with higher levels of solidarity are more prone to receiving help from
others, which in turn could be especially true when overall levels of solidarity are
relatively high within a community. The second channel consists of the access
to information regarding potential disaster before it strikes. For example a well
networked individual might gain access to relevant information (like the location
of appropriate emergency shelters) and also access to outside help to prepare
for the disaster (for example by mobilizing labor to reinforce the structure of a
house). A not so well networked individual might have to rely solely on his/her
own human and financial capital, while well networked individuals might be able
to mobilize human and financial capital of others as well. These two channels are
represented in Figure 2.9.
2.3.3 The role of financial capital in disaster resilience
The underlying intuition behind the connection between financial capital and
disaster resilience is mostly straightforward. Individuals that are well endowed
with savings, income flows, and well functioning insurance mechanisms might
find it easier to recover from the aftermaths of natural disasters since they struggle
less to access and mobilize resources. Although provision of well targeted ex-ante
measures to alleviate the effects of natural disasters such as insurance and financial
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Figure 2.9: Framework of this study from a social capital perspective and associated causal
relations
relief in times of need has high potential to do so (Skoufias, 2003; Le Quesne
et al., 2017), access to insurance mechanisms might be highly dependent on a
households’ financial endowment and therefore poorer households tend to be
more vulnerable to disasters and also are subject to becoming even poorer because
of the effects of disasters, and therefore even more vulnerable (Morduch, 1994,
1999). Another channel which might increase resilience to shocks are the number
of sources of available income (Macours et al., 2012, 2013), which increases
an individual’s chance to still receive income when one or more of the available
sources are no longer available due to some sort of transformation of circumstances.
Another way in which financial capital might help to decrease vulnerability
is through better access to warning systems and other sources of information
(Mark and Semaan, 2008; Mark et al., 2009). Drawing from the example of the
Philippines, the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services
Administration (PAGASA) also operates through smartphone applications which
enable smartphone owners to immediately receive warnings as soon as there is
a threat of a severe tropical cyclone making landfall nearby (PAGASA, 2018).
Thereby the access to critical information might very well be determined by access
to technology and thereby financial endowment. A study which implies this
connection by Mark et al. (2009) looks at interviews from 45 individuals that
experienced the war in Iraq in the year 2003. They show that new technologies
helped the interviewed persons to connect to different religious groups and gain
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access to more and diversified information.
Some studies provide empirical verification of the previously presumed connec-
tions between financial capital, vulnerability, and resilience.
An analysis of data from the Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions (JSLC) from
roughly 210 households by Clarke and Wallsten (2003) looks at the relation of
remittances and damages due to hurricane exposure. The authors look at cash
flows that come from relatives living abroad over ten years (1989-1999) and look at
the relation between these cash flows and hurricane inflicted damages. They find
that remittances might have similar properties as insurance, alleviating roughly
25% of costs that were inflicted by the hurricane.
Another study by Skoufias (2007) looks at a poverty alleviation program in Mexico
which provides target orientated in cash transfers (which in term are provided
on the condition that recipients use those funds partly for schooling fees and
mandatory visits to public healthcare institutions) for households identified as
poor with children in school grades 3-9 and/or pregnant women and its impact
on insurance and consumption. Although the author did not find substitution
effects for formal or informal insurance, he did find however a significantly higher
resistance of food consumption to income shocks. Hence he concludes that such
in cash transfers could potentially reduce households vulnerability to hazards.
A randomized controlled trial by Macours et al. (2013) conducted in Nicaragua
with about 3,000 households investigates if and how different poverty alleviation
programs mitigate effects of droughts on household consumption. They find that
in cash transfers provide short term protection against drops in consumption
in the short term, but emphasize the long term role of grants for vocational
training, which made participants 13% more likely to engage in non-agricultural
self employment, which therefore made them less vulnerable towards droughts.
Empirical studies of the effect of disaster or bad weather insurance on disaster
resilience are not as well established as studies about take up rates of insurance
in developing countries (Macours et al., 2012). However, an empirical study by
Carter et al. (2007) shows that recovery rates of households after disaster highly
depend on initial wealth levels and therefore the authors discuss the existence
of natural disasters to be potential poverty traps. Consequently, when poorer
households had access to formal insurance to alleviate the effects of disasters they
might be less likely to get into some sort of poverty trap.
In conclusion, financial capital might operate through three distinct channels
in which it helps to increase disaster resilience (Figure 2.10). The first channel
consists of the previously mentioned access to technological means which en-
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Figure 2.10: Framework of this study from a financial capital perspective and associated causal
relations
able sooner disaster awareness and hence longer preparation time. Additionally,
individuals endowed with better access to technology might also find it easier
to access information which helps them to develop strategies to cope with the
aftermath of disasters. The second channel consists of institutions which ensure
liquidity of a disaster struck individual such as insurance and savings. These
institutions assure that an individual is still capable to mobilize the necessary
resources to recover from disaster. The third channel, although quite intuitive, is
not very much discussed in disaster literature, namely the correlation between an
individuals financial endowment and losses to disaster. Naturally, an individual
with more expensive housing might have severely higher costs of repairs if the
house is destroyed in the same relative terms as a not so expensive house (let us
say for example that a volcanic eruption made both types of houses inhabitable).
Therefore the ability to recover highly depends on the relative amount of losses
compared to the amount of liquid financial assets. A well endowed household
without according insurance mechanisms and savings might never return to its
pre-disaster status quo, whereas a poor household with similar access to insurance
and savings might recover more quickly, given both households did not fall into
the previously mentioned poverty trap. As we can see from this example, it is not
necessarily the case that more financial capital always leads to higher resilience
and the problem seems more context dependent.
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2.3.4 The role of physical capital in disaster resilience
Physical capital is broadly defined as everything man made that provides access
to easier production processes and infrastructure (DFID, 1999). In our context
this includes access to sanitation, power and transport, but also the presence of
information and warning systems. Additionally, facilities that provide protection
against direct impacts of a natural disaster, such as disaster mitigation structures,
can be administered to physical capital of a community as well. The role disaster
mitigation measures such as flood protection constructs like dykes to reduce
vulnerability to floods is essentially straight forward, since their sole purpose is
to mitigate effects of disasters. Also the physical composure and static properties
of houses determine the vulnerability of a household to disasters. However, I
would like to extend the classical definition of physical capital, being understood
as everything man made that can be accounted to the individual capital stock, by
claiming that the locality of homes, described by features like altitude or distance
to higher risk areas such as almost sea-level beaches is also relatable to physical
capital since locality is a direct consequence of individual choices where to reside.
While how and where to build disaster resilient homes is more related to structural
engineering, the question if individuals have the underlying access to resources
and know-how to build resilient structures is fundamentally an economic one.
Sustainable housing in the context of recurrent natural disasters is only achievable
if the affected population is also able to afford it. Therefore a lot of effort has
been focused on developing resilient structures which are also affordable to locals,
especially in developing countries (for examples see: Garnett and Moore, 2010;
Brown et al., 2012). At this point I also want to highlight the importance of
functioning warning systems, which has already been discussed in subsection
2.3.3.
Carefully observing hazard zones and potential effects of natural disasters is
crucial to understand how to build less vulnerable communities. Therefore the
degree to which disasters are considered in city planning is potentially also a
promising channel to increase the physical capital of cities and communities
(Burby et al., 2000).
Although warning systems have been proven to help people avoiding personal
exposure to disasters, there are cases where substantial degrees of heterogeneity
in their functionality have been shown (Drabek, 1999; Sorensen, 2000).
Sanitation and water supply plays a major role in the provision of communities
with live essentials. Especially rural areas where access to drinking water and
sanitation facilities is limited are prone to disasters destroying their access to
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clean freshwater, either by destroying facilities which provide fresh water directly,
or, for example, by the contamination of fresh water basins with saline water
because of floods (cf. Falkland, 1999). Therefore, improving fresh water access in
a sustainable manner is also one aspect of building sustainable livelihoods in a
disaster prone context (cf. Howard et al., 2010).
A meta study by Shreve and Kelman (2014) looks at studies which conduct cost-
benefit analysis to evaluate the usefulness of disaster mitigation measures. These
measures vary in their nature and extent, as well as their level of application
(household-, community-, national level). Although the authors highlight method-
ological caveats by the studies under investigation, they also highlight their re-
ported cost-benefit ratios (CBR’s), varying mostly between 2-60. Therefore this
meta-analysis shows the relative effectiveness of improving a systems physical
capital targeted to increase disaster resilience.
As previously mentioned, the two channels through which physical capital in-
creases disaster resilience is mostly straight forward. First and foremost, the
quality of physical protection against disaster impacts, such as disaster mitigation
facilities, are directly targeted to reduce the direct consequences of disasters, there-
fore reducing the sensitivity of a system. The second channel can be identified
as the provision of facilities which help individuals to avoid disasters, such as
functioning warning systems. Although most studies look at physical capital on
the community level, we should be able to infer relations between physical capital
and disaster resilience on the household level, such as that the overall structural
stability of houses might play a role in preventing damages. Figure 2.11 shows
the relation between the channels of physical capital and affectedness.
2.3.5 The role of natural capital in disaster resilience
Natural capital in the context of this study is understood as all natural assets
and resources which surround an individual and therefore consists of all natural
resources which an individual theoretically has access to (cf. Ekins, 1992; Ekins
et al., 2003). In a society which strongly depends on fishing and farming, economic
output and the overall livelihood of households is dependent on the general
condition and absorptive capacities of their surrounding natural assets. Therefore
the initial condition of natural assets plays a key role in terms of food security
and the general economic well being of a household. But not only the access
to resources relevant for economic output play a role in the context of natural
disasters, but also all assets which provide natural protection and barriers against
the forces of nature. I discussed this relation already in subsection 2.3.4. For
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Figure 2.11: Framework of our study from a physical capital perspective and associated causal
relations
example, woods provide well known protection from strong winds, protect soil
from erosion and provide substantial protection from floods by increasing the
absorptive capacity of the ground.
But not only the physical protection provided by natural assets contributes to
disaster resilience. Also their contribution to ecosystem services is of special
importance, especially when individuals living near those systems highly depend
on their functioning. For example, the livelihood of coastal fishermen highly
depends on the extraction possibilities of marine resources. If these possibilities
are sensitive to natural disasters, as a consequence the livelihood of fishermen
is also negatively influenced by natural disasters. This example can easily be
extrapolated to other areas where individuals highly depend on functioning
ecosystems. Therefore the quality and resistance of natural systems to forces of
nature is contributing to disaster resilience.
For example, mangrove forests may help in protecting communities from physical
forces of nature, while they also may provide habitat for living beings and hence
improve biodiversity. Therefore, the notion is that the more and the higher the
quality of mangrove forests, the higher their capacity to absorb direct impacts
of tidal waves and strong winds (Dahdouh-Guebas et al., 2005; Alongi, 2008).
Therefore a functioning natural system that is able to absorb the impacts of
disasters provides long term extraction opportunities and hence its own resilience
towards shocks is crucial for sustainable livelihoods. This means that not only
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the absorptive capacity of a natural system is crucial to define how vulnerable a
system is, but also the speed at which this system is able to recover from a shock
and is able to bounce back to its pre-disaster status quo (cf. McLeod et al., 2009).
Therefore, natural assets such as mangrove forests also provide physical protec-
tion against the forces of nature. For example, a study by Hochard et al. (2019)
investigates the relation between the average width5 of mangrove forests in global
communities and nighttime light production after cyclone exposure. They use
a data-set of almost 2,000 communities across 23 countries and find that com-
munities with above average mangrove forest width have higher nighttime light
production than average communities after cyclone exposure. Hence mangrove
forests may play a part in conserving economic output after a storm or flood due
to decreased sensitivity of the surrounded community.
In conclusion I define two distinct key-channels through which natural capital is
able to influence individual or household disaster resilience (see Figure 2.12). The
first channel consists of natural capital being a direct source of food and income,
which means that a more resistant natural system should provide more extraction
possibilities after a disaster than a less resistant system. As a consequence, indi-
viduals engaged in first sector production, like fishermen and farmers, should be
able to benefit more from their natural surroundings than people living near less
resistant systems. One example could be areas which are actively designed and
supported in a way which is meant to minimize the effects of a disaster on the one
hand, and provide stable sources of income on the other hand, such as mangrove
forests and marine protected areas (cf. McLeod et al., 2009). The second channel
natural capital might protect individuals from the forces of nature is simply the
protective features of intact natural surroundings, as I previously explained with
the help of mangrove forests as an example.
The previously mentioned meta study in subsection 2.3.4 by Shreve and Kelman
(2014) also includes cost benefit analyses of measures which increase the natural
capital of a system. These measures include for example the provision of hetero-
geneous seeds to farmers prone to drought, tree planting on riverbanks against
flooding and erosion and mangrove planting at the seashore. The results of the
studies that carried out the cost-benefit analyses showed that the benefits mostly
outweigh the costs of such projects.
5From land to the furthest mangrove tree in the water.
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Figure 2.12: Framework of this study from a natural capital perspective and associated causal
relations
2.4 Diverse effects on capital & behavior
A substantial number of recent studies has investigated the effect of natural
disasters on different aspects of the different forms of capital and human behavior.
There is quite a substantial body in experimental literature from all over the
world that shows long-lasting effects of natural disasters in many different aspects.
However, the results of the studies do not always reach the same conclusions
regarding the effect of natural disasters. In this section I want to discuss the most
popular findings from the literature regarding the effect of natural disasters on
different aspects. Some effects of natural disasters are quite straight forward since
their impact tends to have salient consequences on some forms of capital. For
example, forms of natural capital are most likely in a worse condition after a
disaster than before. It is hard to come up with examples where this is not the
case. The same goes for physical capital, although the short and long term effects
may very well differ substantially. If we think about disaster mitigation facilities,
it might be that disasters deal a certain degree of damage to structures which
are targeted to mitigate the strength of some sort of disaster exposure. However,
since humans tend to adapt to their natural surroundings and respond to changes
in their environment, long term adaption and therefore an increase in efforts to
improve disaster mitigation facilities and other aspects of physical capital, such as
warning systems, seems very likely. This relation is also prominently implied by
numerous studies which look at the problem on a more macro-based view (see
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Kousky, 2014, p. 589-590). Negative short term effects on financial capital are also
quite intuitive, since income possibilities and especially extraction possibilities
of natural resources, which are crucial to lowly developed communities, become
less accessible as a consequence of a severe disaster (cf. Benson and Clay, 2004).
However, if and how individuals are able to seize opportunities which arise from
this new situation and therefore financially profit from it somehow in the long
term remains subject to deeper investigation. I want to discuss the effects of
natural disasters on social capital and social preferences, as well as the effect
of natural disasters on other aspects of human behavior (such as risk and time
preferences) in sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, since these channels have been investigated
more thoroughly in the recent past and deserve to be looked at separately. Let me
say at this point already that the effects of natural disasters on social capital are
not clearly established in the empirical literature (for a more detailed discussion
see section 2.4.1). Therefore, the remaining form of capital which I have to discuss
in this section is human capital. The effects of natural disasters on human capital
are not that straight forward. Learning from experience and going through the
different phases of a disaster might help to develop the personality of an individual
in a way which allows him/her to adapt to disasters and be better prepared next
time. However, this view only incorporates all learning from experience and
excludes future learning possibilities. For example, a meta-study by Baez et al.
(2010) shows numerous studies which show that school attendance of children
declines after a natural disaster and therefore has a long term impact on next-
generation education. Also studies discussed by Baez et al. (2010) uniformly show
increases in child labor, malnutrition, morbidity and illness, as well as decreases
in mental health. Therefore, we can acknowledge the substantial negative effects
of natural disasters on human capital. However, we cannot exclude the possibility
of positive channels which help humans to adapt to difficult circumstances. To
conclude, I am not entirely able to come to any clear prediction for the causal long
term relation between disaster exposure and four forms of capital (financial, social,
human and physical), whereas the prediction for natural capital seems straight
forwardly negative. However, since an individual goes through the recovery phase,
the outcome of the five forms of capital seems to be rather unclear and therefore we
have to see what happened in the case of typhoon Yolanda to get a picture of what
outcome is possible. In any case, I can identify at least three clear causal channels
presented in Figure 2.13. The first channel consists of the mobilization of relief
efforts by either external (government, NGO’s) or internal (friends, neighbors
and family) actors which gets activated after a disaster occurred. These efforts
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Figure 2.13: Framework of this study from an exposure perspective and associated causal relations
are targeted to increase the degree of recovery. The second channel consists in
the nature of disaster exposure by causing direct damages to either personal
property or by causing injuries, whereas the speed of recovery is subject to the
degree of personal damages. The third channel consists of direct impacts on assets
of natural capital, such as (for example) destruction of crops, livestock, and/or
natural resources such as forests. The resulting effects on the different forms of
capital are as a result rather unclear, since many channels could be relevant for
their development to the “post-state”.
2.4.1 Social capital and social preferences
As a larger part of social capital, social preferences have recently received more
attention in disaster literature. Pointing out the dynamics that foster faster disaster
recovery, I have already shown arguments for social capital being one potential
driver for more cost efficient and faster disaster recovery. However, since social
capital and social preferences share a lot of common features, this section provides
a bit more detailed insights from the literature regarding specific facets of social
capital, namely social preferences like altruism, trust and reciprocity. Extreme
natural disasters significantly alter the way of life of individuals in many different
aspects. First and foremost, the individual capital stock can be severely damaged
and individuals might try to reestablish pre-disaster capital stocks. This can
happen through efforts to repair damages to houses, work materials and other
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possessions that an individual considers to be of significant relevance to their
everyday living. Efforts to increase those facets of capital in the aftermath of an
destructive event might therefore lead individuals to allocate their resources more
towards recovery than towards other aspects, like altruistic and trusting behavior.
Therefore, the hypothesis that natural disasters alter the fundamental way in
which people interact with their social environment does not seem far fetched.
Furthermore, destructive disasters also play an important role in the emotional
sphere of individuals, although the occurrence of negative or positive feelings
towards fellow villagers and/or government/NGO officials might be very context
specific and highly depend on the perceived success of recovery support and the
perception of pro- and antisocial behavior of other stakeholders.
A case study by Rodriguez et al. (2006) takes a closer look at the behavior of
victims of hurricane Katrina, which happened in 2005. In their article they say
that: “The imagery that spread around the world, through the electronic media in
particular, was of a state of anarchy; chaos; disorganization; regression to animal-
like behavior and a total collapse of social control, agencies, and personnel... The
various social systems and the people in them rose to the demanding challenges
of a catastrophe. The behaviors were overwhelmingly prosocial, making the
antisocial behavior seem relatively minor in terms of frequency and significance.”
(Rodriguez et al., 2006, p.83 & p.99) They also make implications about the
understanding of pro-sociality in general by pointing out several cases where
behavior can not per se be categorized into being “prosocial” or “antisocial”. For
example they reported locals breaking into empty houses (presumably left by
citizens that evacuated before the disaster hit) to provide the needy population of
victims with essential consumer goods. From the perspective of the owners of those
houses this might very reasonably be considered as antisocial behavior, whereas
the needy that were provided with those goods might perceive the plunderers as
saviors. Another example was mentioned where people formed armed groups
that would not be hesitant from using force against plunderers. Again, from the
perspective of a member of those armed groups it might be considered prosocial
to defend vulnerable property, whereas people in need of goods might have little
understanding why someone would protect an empty house which harbored
desperately needed goods. All the same, we can see that the long term adaption of
an individual that experiences these extreme and unusual circumstances might
highly depend on the individual perception of the pro-sociality of actions and
responses of other stakeholders.
A study by Whitt and Wilson (2007) looks at the behavior of 352 Hurricane Katrina
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Evacuees few weeks after the disaster. They recruited their sample out of the popu-
lation of certain Houston-area evacuation centers that harbored refugees that fled
from the crisis. Although they do not directly compare affected and non-affected
individuals, their findings still have some interesting implications. For example,
they find that their observed part of the population is not behaving substantially
different in standard public goods and dictator games than participants from
previous studies, where participants mainly consisted of students. However, they
also find that a main driver for transfers in the games was if participants were still
missing family members at the time the experiments were conducted. Transfers
in the public good game were lower when an individual was still unsure about
the whereabouts of close family members and a large part of contributions was
explained by that factor, which implies that people adapt their behavior according
to their emotional circumstances. This finding was true both for individuals that
were categorized through the dictator game to be egoists or altruists.
Castillo and Carter (2011, forthcoming) measure disaster exposure by measuring
monthly precipitation rates while hurricane Mitch passed through Honduras. By
playing a dictator game and trust game with local villagers, they explore differ-
ences in experimental behavior that can be attributed to differences in precipita-
tion rates. Their experimental sessions were held three years after the Hurricane,
which occurred in 1998. By exploratively looking at their data, they expose a
possible non-linear relationship between disaster exposure and transfers in the
trust-game from senders and receivers. Their results suggest that (reciprocal) trust
might be increased due to a shock, but a shock too large might cause an opposite
effect.
Fleming et al. (2011) compare trust and trust-worthiness in villages that were
either affected or not affected by an earthquake in Chile in 2010. They find no
significant differences of trust-level between affected and not affected villages,
they find however significant differences in trustworthiness.
Li et al. (2013) conducted experiments with children where they elicit altruism
through playing a dictator game before and after an earthquake in China. They
find that disasters positively influence transfers of nine year old children while
decreasing altruistic giving of six year old children in the short term, but the
authors find no evidence for long lasting effects of disasters on altruistic giving.
Ahsan (2014) compare the behavior of affected and unaffected Farmers in a trust
game and experimental risk task one year after cyclone “Aila”, which occurred
in Bangladesh in 2009. They find that farmers who were exposed to the cyclone
behave more risk averse, but do not find any correlation between sending behavior
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in the trust game or the cyclone.
An additional study by Becchetti et al. (2017) looks at giving and expected giving
in dictator games by micro-finance borrowers in Sri Lanka, seven years after a
major tsunami that hit the country in 2004. They compare individuals which
stated to have suffered some kind of destruction due to the disaster and compare
them to individuals, who claimed to have been unharmed by the tsunami. Their
results show that individuals who claimed to have suffered damages due to the
tsunami give less and also expect less giving than unharmed individuals. They
also find that disaster aid is positively correlated with giving for individuals that
suffered relatively high damages.
2.4.2 Risk preferences
In Economics, experimentally measured risk preferences are well known proxies
for the willingness to engage in risky investment decisions and are thereby often
associated with financial success, not only because it is well established that
wealth, income growth and low levels of income uncertainty are generally shown
to be positively correlated with risk seeking behavior (Riley Jr and Chow, 1992;
Shaw, 1996; Guiso and Paiella, 2008; Tanaka et al., 2010). Also, risk-preferences
are often associated with the willingness to engage in formal insurance. From a
theoretical point of view, it remains unclear whether risk preferences change in
a particular way as a response to natural disasters. This is a result of different
channels that might increase or decrease individual risk aversion. Gollier and
Pratt (1996) for example model that an increase in an unfair background risk
might lead risk vulnerable individuals to behave more risk averse. Since people
are expected to update their perception of the likelihood of the occurrence of some
risk directly after such a dramatic event, the alteration in risk preferences depends
on the perceived increase or decrease in background risk. Although theoretically
possible that perceived background risk decreases after severe shocks, studies
show that being exposed to a disaster is usually highly correlated with higher
perceptions of background risk (Cameron and Shah, 2015; Samphantharak and
Chantarat, 2015). From prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Kanehman
and Tversky, 1979) we can deduct that another direction of effect seems plausible,
where individuals use their own reference point in wealth as a comparative mark
for their situation after they experienced a severe loss. Since according to Tversky
and Kahneman (1974) reference points need a substantial amount of time to adjust
to new circumstances, people tend to be in a loss frame and might therefore be
more willing to take a risky gamble (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).
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A study that looks more at the short term influence of natural disasters on risk
preferences was done by Eckel et al. (2009), although the effect of the natural
disaster was only discussed secondary6. Eckel et al. (2009) use Bayesian network
formation to explain the link between certain emotions and behavior in a simple
risk task (Eckel and Grossman, 2002, 2008). Their sample consists of two cross-
sectional waves: hurricane Katrina evacuees shortly after the storm, and one
additional wave of observations about one month later. The authors thereby
unveil a possible relation between (what they call) “positive emotions”, like being
alert and determined, and risk aversion. Therefore the authors conclude that, since
positive emotions are less likely to be prevalent after experiencing a devastating
natural disaster, it is very likely that risk aversion decreases shortly after such an
event. They also observe that in their second wave of observations, ten months
after the hurricane, risk preferences from the hurricane Katrina evacuee sample
highly resemble those from a sample of local Houstonians.
Van Den Berg et al. (2009) conducted a study in Nicaragua after hurricane Mitch
which occurred in 1998 and devastated vast parts of Central America, especially
Nicaragua and Honduras. They interviewed 222 farmers, whereas 131 were highly
affected by the hurricane, 51 mildly affected, and 40 from resettlement areas.
By using willingness-to-pay survey items for hypothetical lotteries and actual
experimental risk games they elicit risk preferences and compare the outcome
between the three groups. They use a similar approach in Peru with 100 farmers,
looking at the correlation between past experienced natural hazards and risk
aversion. From the results of their analysis they observe a positive correlation
between risk aversion and experienced damages from natural hazards four years
after the event.
A more simplistic approach to measure risky behavior by Page et al. (2012) was
to give Australian homeowners a binary choice between a lottery scratch card
and a sure amount of money, shortly after some of them experienced damages
because of major floods in 2011. They observe that homeowners who frequently
experienced losses in terms of damages to their house are more likely to accept
the risky scratch card instead of a sure amount of money. Hence the authors
attribute their finding to a slow readjustment of the reference point in income,
which leads to a loss-frame. According to prospect theory, this should lead to
an increase in risky behavior, or as Tversky and Kahneman (1974) put it: “... [a]
person who has not made peace with his losses is likely to accept gambles that
6The primary focus of this study was to determine gender effects on risk preferences. Nev-
ertheless the study has some interesting implications on the effect of natural disasters on risk
preferences.
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would be unacceptable to him otherwise” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, p. 287).
Cameron and Shah (2015) use a risk elicitation method similar to Binswanger
(1980) and compare their results between individuals that recently suffered from
natural disasters and individuals that did not. They conducted their study in
Indonesia with about 1,550 individuals across East Java, using key informant
interview data and seismic data to measure the frequency, intensity of damages,
and the distance to epicenters of natural disasters. They find that individuals that
were recently exposed to disasters behave more risk averse in their experiment
than individuals which were not. They ascribe their finding mainly to an updating
process, which increases the perception of the likelihood of an additional natural
disaster after one just occurred.
A survey conducted by Samphantharak and Chantarat (2015) uses hypothetical
risk preferences and compares households that experienced a devastating flood
with households that were not directly affected by the flood in 2011 in Thailand.
They also find evidence for background risk updating after a devastating event
and reported higher risk aversion in households that were directly affected.
One study by Kahsay and Osberghaus (2016) also uses panel data from a German
phone survey and looks on the effect of storms on hypothetical risk preferences.
They find that risk aversion decreases after a storm and that it is not enough to
experience the storm per se to receive influences on behavior, but also damages
have to result from the storm to be behaviorally relevant.
An additional study by Cassar et al. (2017) looks at choices between two lotteries
of villagers from a cross-section of villages which were affected and non-affected
by a major tsunami in Thailand in 2004. Five years later, they conduct experiments
with 334 local villagers and follow a protocol closely to Andersen et al. (2008),
which is an adaptation of the Holt and Laury Risk-task (Holt and Laury, 2002).
The authors find evidence for higher risk aversion of individuals that stem from
affected villages, compared to villages from unaffected villages.
Another study by indicates that residents of houses with multiple levels update
their perceived background risk since they observe higher relative prices for
apartments that lie on lower levels several months after the Wenchuan earthquake
in 2008. The relative prices however bounce back to their initial levels after about
three months, indicating that the updating of perceived background risk is rather
short termed.
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2.5 Research question & hypotheses
The central aim of this thesis consists on the focus on two questions. 1.:“What form
of the measured forms of capital helped households/individuals most to recover
from the effects of Yolanda?”; and 2.:“Did Yolanda change pro-social behavior,
individual risk preferences and/or forms of capital?” Therefore the aim of this
thesis is to give an example of how to apply the framework which I developed
in section 2.2 and to see whether the attributed causal channels hold if they are
tested in an empirical setting. Due to technical limitations, I can only try to answer
these questions in some regards and also have to make elementary assumptions
about the nature about the data which was collected in the Philippines. I will
discuss the validity of these assumptions further in chapter 6. More details about
the experimental structure and methods of the study can be found in chapter 3.
First and foremost, I assume Yolanda is an exogenous shock that was in no way
caused or foreseen (in the long term) by the individuals living on the island of
Panay. I have several reasons to believe in this assumption. Anecdotal evidence
from key informants (barangay captains and municipal officers) as well as exper-
imental participants show that the path and the strength of Yolanda was rather
unexpected. Participants also repeatedly said that they were completely taken
by surprise and overwhelmed by Yolanda. These claims were supported by data
from meteorological recordings which show that Panay is relatively less prone to
tropical typhoons than northern parts of the Philippines (Manila Observatory,
2005; Kitamoto, 2018). Our survey data also shows that 94% of our participants
were within their village when the disaster made landfall, and that the average
time before people knew that Yolanda would make landfall was about 7.5 hours,
which indicates that the average individual was not able to foresee the event.
My second assumption is that key village characteristics, such as village size, the
endowment with infrastructure, ecosystem services, and general way of living
do not substantially differ from village to village. This was partly ensured by
randomizing villages from a subset of villages which had to fulfill certain criteria
(see section 3.1 for more details). This is fundamentally why I assume that natural,
as well as physical capital endowment on the community level (such as disaster
mitigation measures) are rather similar between villages and therefore I assume
physical and natural capital endowment to be rather homogenous across villages.
As a consequence, this study is not able to derive any effects of community physical
or natural capital on disaster resilience.
The third assumption relies on the experimental nature of this study. This means
that I assume that Yolanda was the only shock which influenced the villages under
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observation in different ways. Hence I assume that there were no shocks between
2012 and 2016 which could distort the results from this study in any way. After
more thorough investigation, there was one typhoon that made landfall on Panay
one year before typhoon Yolanda, typhoon Wukong. However, this typhoon was
not comparable to Yolanda, since the damages it caused were about 0.25% of
the damages Yolanda caused, and it reached maximum wind speeds of 75kmh,
whereas Yolanda reached wind speeds up to 380kmh. The exceptional strength of
Yolanda has already been shown in subsection 1.2.2. Therefore, the results I am
going to present later could be biased by this additional shock. However, I believe
that the difference in the level of intensity is substantial, such that the effects of
Wukong can be neglected. But since the path of Wukong was similar to Yolanda
(making landfall in the north of Panay and moving westward), any effects I find
later could still be slightly biased.
Under the consideration of these assumptions I am now able to formulate hypothe-
ses which are tested in this thesis. Integrating the findings from the literature
and with respect to theory, the first block of hypotheses (H1a-H3c) deals with
the question whether or not theoretical predictions of causal linkages between
different forms of capital and elements of disaster resilience hold if we test them
empirically. Due to the technical limitations of this study I am not able to test
the effects of village level natural and physical capital on disaster resilience since
both dimensions of the framework are assumed to be homogenous across villages.
Therefore the first block of hypotheses tests if there is a direct link between en-
dowment with human, financial, or social capital and aspects of disaster resilience.
The second block of hypotheses investigates effects of exposure to typhoon Yolanda
on different forms of capital and aspects of human behavior, namely experimen-
tally measured risk- and social preferences (H5a-H8a). Furthermore I investigate
whether intuitive elements of the previously constructed framework hold, such
as the claim that more affected individuals usually receive more aid and need
more time and money to recover (H4a-H4c). In section 4.4 I will talk more about
how I construct indexes and which proxies I use for different forms of capital, as
well as other variable of interest. The next chapter of this thesis contains more
information about the applied Methods of this study and should provide further
information to shed light on how this study was conducted in detail.
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Table 2.1: Respective testable hypotheses of this study
hypothesis related literature
1. The relation between different forms of capital and disaster resilience
Human capital (Figure 2.7)
H1a: Human capital is negatively correlated with recovery time
and recovery costs.
(cf. Wamsler et al., 2012; Muttarak and Poth-
isiri, 2013; Frankenberg et al., 2013)
H1b: Human capital is positively correlated with the distance
between the time individuals heard about Yolanda making
landfall and its respective time of impact.
(cf. Drabek, 2013; Sharma et al., 2013)
Social Capital (Figure 2.9)
H2a: Social capital is positively correlated with the amount of
aid an individual received.
(cf. Granovetter, 1983; Hawkins and Maurer,
2009; Aldrich, 2012b)
H2b: Social capital is positively correlated with the distance be-
tween the time individuals heard about Yolanda making
landfall and its respective time of impact.
(cf. Aldrich, 2012b; Drabek, 2013)
H2c: Social capital is negatively correlated with recovery time
and recovery costs.
(cf. Granovetter, 1983; Nakagawa and Shaw,
2004; Aldrich, 2012b)
Financial capital (Figure 2.10)
H3a: Financial capital is negatively correlated with recovery time
and positively with recovery costs
(cf. Clarke and Wallsten, 2003; Skoufias, 2003;
Carter et al., 2007; Skoufias, 2007; Macours
et al., 2012, 2013; Le Quesne et al., 2017)
H3b: Financial capital is positively correlated with the distance
between the time individuals heard about Yolanda making
landfall and its respective time of impact.
(cf. Mark and Semaan, 2008; Mark et al., 2009)
2. The relation between disaster exposure, different forms of capital, and human behavior
Damages, help & recovery (Figure 2.13)
H4a: More exposed individuals received more help after the
disaster.
H4b: More exposed individuals suffered higher structural dam-
ages.
H4c: More exposed individuals have higher recovery costs and
recovery time.
Human capital (Figure 2.13)
H5a: Human capital declines over time due to disaster exposure. (cf. Baez et al., 2010)
Social capital (Figure 2.13)
H6a: Social capital declines due to disaster exposure. (cf. Rodriguez et al., 2006; Whitt and Wilson,
2007; Castillo and Carter, 2011; Fleming et al.,
2011; Li et al., 2013; Becchetti et al., 2017)
Financial capital (Figure 2.13)
H7a: Disaster exposure leads to less financial capital. (cf. Benson and Clay, 2004; Kousky, 2014)
Risk preferences (outside the scope of the framework)
H8a: Disaster exposure increases risk aversion. (cf. Eckel et al., 2009; Van Den Berg et al.,
2009; Page et al., 2012; Cameron and Shah,
2015; Samphantharak and Chantarat, 2015;
Kahsay and Osberghaus, 2016; Cassar et al.,
2017)
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 3. Methods
This chapter is dedicated to describe the methods and experimental setting which
we apply in more detail. I begin by providing a short summary of the whole
study and continue by showing how we selected our participants and describing
the experimental setting precisely. A bigger part of this chapter is dedicated to
the different experimental and non-experimental methods which we use, hence
it provides a detailed overview of all of our applied instruments to obtain data.
After reading this chapter it will be clear how the applications of the different
tools were done and therefore it should be comprehensible to the reader how to
replicate this study.
Figure 3.1: Study site: part (A) shows the location of Region VI (western Visayas) on the Philippines;
part (B) shows the path of Yolanda in blue and the respective damaged households per municipality;
part (C) shows the relation between the minimum distance from the eye of the storm and the share
of destroyed households in a community; ((data from: PhilGIS, 2017; Kitamoto, 2018)
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We take advantage of a natural experimental setting comparing the behavior of
lowly affected and highly affected villagers both before and after typhoon Yolanda.
Our study took place in two time periods (summer 2012 and summer 20161).
The study site was the Island of Panay, which is located in the Western Visayas
(Region VI) in the Philippines. Figure 3.1 shows the Island where our research was
conducted with the respective number of damaged households that were either
partially or totally damaged by typhoon Yolanda on the municipality level. The
blue dots represent the location of the villages where we executed our experimental
workshops. The blue line represents the track of the typhoon according to GPS
data (Kitamoto, 2018). We can clearly see the potential for an experimental setting
when we look at the high discrepancy between the damaged households between
the North of the Island and the South. Concerning our selected villages however,
this discrepancy does not arise from differences in population density. On Panay,
there are three major cities: Iloilo-city, Kalibo and Roxas , but the coastal villages
where we conducted our experiments were all comparable in size and population
density and had all quite similar village characteristics. Villages were selected
randomly from a pool of pairs of coastal villages, where a pair would consist of a
village which has a marine protected area (MPA) and a village which has not. The
aim of the study in 2012 was to derive effects of marine protected areas on the
social cohesion of communities, and therefore there were no intentions to relate
the collected data to the effects of the typhoon in the beginning, since we could
not foresee this major event. Therefore we are not able to provide pre-analysis
plans to the reader, since we were - just as our participants - completely taken by
surprise by the occurrence of Yolanda. All of the applied surveys, protocols, and
decision sheets can be found in the Appendix.
3.1 Sample selection
The first study which was conducted in 2012 was led by Karla Henning under the
supervision of Björn Vollan and Andreas Landmann, who followed a sampling
procedure very close to Landmann et al. (2012), who also conducted an experiment
on the same island. The first experiments were conducted in the Western Visayas
(Region VI), in the provinces of Antique, Guimaras and Iloilo in 2012, whereas
a two-staged random sampling procedure was applied. First, they randomly
determined the experimental sites, and then they drew participants within the
selected barangay (lowest administrative level on the Philippines and often com-
1Table A2.1 which shows a timetable of when and where the study was conducted can be found
in the Appendix
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parable to a village regarding size and structure). They randomly selected pairs of
neighboring coastal villages where one village was known to have implemented a
marine protected area, and the neighboring village had not. The target population
consists of low-income households in rural areas. They therefore drew a random
sample of 15 barangay pairs whereby municipalities from the first income class
(high income) and urban locations were excluded from the sampling process. Also
very small (population below 500) and very big (population higher than 3,500)
barangays were not considered in order to make the sample more homogenous and
stratified. Permission of the punong barangay (elected village representative, or
mayor) to conduct the research was obtained in all barangays. They, as well as us,
made all possible efforts to visit also remote locations, and all 30 locations of the
sample could be reached in the end. In the second sampling stage, the households
were randomly chosen within a barangay. Their and our recruiters went to the
location some days prior to the experiments, asked the barangay officials for per-
mission to run the experiments, ensured the availability of facilities for the games
and requested a list of households from which nine households were randomly
selected. The recruiters then noted the names of the nine households and handed
out invitation letters to someone who was from the household and available at the
time, preferably the household head. They also received instructions to invite two
close friends or relatives from different households. In 2016, our main effort was
to re-invite the very same persons that participated in 2012. Whenever someone
was not available or able to show up, we would simply replace him or her with
another person from the barangay which was available at the time (appearing in
the unbalanced part of the panel). Therefore, we were able to collect data of ∼ 810
individuals each year, whereas 449 of which were present in both years.
3.2 Workshop structure and location
This section describes the locations where we held our workshops and provides a
detailed overview about the structure of each session. We held 30 workshops with
experimental games in different barangays each year which were held in the same
manner in both years. However, we extended our workshops in the second wave
(2016) by focus group discussions and key informant interviews. Figure 3.2 shows
a graphical representation of the workshop structure and the respective games
that were used in the experimental session for each year. Before we conducted
our workshops in each village, a team of assistants was sent to scout for possible
ground where we would be able to conduct our workshop. There are mainly three
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Focus Group 
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(9 participants, 
2016 only)
Key Informant 
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2016 only)
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Figure 3.2: Workshop structure: experimental games played
kinds of locations which can be found in almost every village and which we could
use for the conduction of our sessions, namely: chapels, schools and/or daycare
centers, and roofed basketball courts. One of the more challenging tasks was to
ensure the well-being of our participants during our sessions, since our workshop
was conducted around lunchtime and daily temperatures were quite high.
At the time we were on Panay, the average temperatures in the Philippines were
about 33◦C and access to comfortable air conditioned areas, like labs in universi-
ties, was not feasible. Although these temperatures are normal in the Philippines
and locals are used to have temperatures above 33◦C, we still made sure that
each session was provided with chairs, shadow (ideally fans as well), and cold
drinks and snacks that were served after the experiments were held. The first
contact to our participants occurred through our recruiters which formally in-
vited2 participants to the place where our workshops were held two weeks before
the workshops actually began. Workshops would start at 12:30pm according to
the invitation letter. However, since punctuality is seemingly not a commonly
distributed trait in the areas where we operated, we sometimes had to wait until
everybody arrived to the workshop and push our schedule a bit to the back3.
Every participant was welcomed by an assistant who led the participant to another
research assistant responsible for reception.
Each participant was equipped with an identification badge which had a number
2Formal invitation letters can be found in section A16 in the Appendix.
3Therefore, workshops would usually start at 1:00pm, sometimes even at 3:00pm. However,
we made sure that we surveyed and paid out the participants first who also arrived first to the
workshop such that they could leave a bit earlier.
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between 11-93 on it4. Seats were marked accordingly and the participants were led
to their designated seats and an assistant conducted a pre-experimental survey as
soon as the participant took his/her seat (see sections A3 and A6 in the Appendix).
We let all groups of three which arrived to our workshop sit together in one row.
We began when all seats were occupied by a participant and everyone of them
had conducted the pre-experimental survey. We also recorded who arrived first to
the session to have some sort of prioritization for the post-experimental survey.
We applied this first-come first-serve approach to make sure that each participant
spent about the same time at the workshop and to avoid frustration, since the
workshops had a minimum length of two and a half hours. Additionally, not all
participants arrived on time, which meant that some individuals had to wait a
substantial amount of time in their seats (up to two hours) before the session
began. We began the experimental games only after all seats were taken in 2016,
whereas this was not in all cases possible in 2012 and therefore we played with
less individuals in some villages in 2012.
Each session was moderated by one assistant who followed and read the protocol
(see sections A5 and A11 in the Appendix) to the participants in local language.
Each group of three people was accompanied by one assistant who was respon-
sible for recording survey-answers and experimental-decisions. Surveys were
conducted via pen and paper in 2012, and via using the tablet application KoBo-
Collect in 2016. The Experimental session began by welcoming all the participants
to the workshop and by explaining some ground rules which everybody in the
workshop had to follow. We made clear that communication with other partici-
pants was forbidden until the workshop ended and that we would not hesitate
from excluding participants from the workshop if we caught them disobeying the
rules5. We then led them through the program of the workshop which was strictly
orchestrated by the experimental protocol for each year (see Appendix). When
participants had to conduct a survey or make a decision in a game, the designated
assistant would bring the participant to a close-by area where they could not be
heard by other participants, making sure that the decision of each participant
was only audible and visible to the designated assistant. We chose this kind of
procedure to avoid problems with illiteracy and to make sure, that all questions
4We put 9 × 3 rows of chairs onto an open area. Each row of three chairs was marked
with a unique decade digit (1-9) which indicated the group identification number. The
unit digit indicated the player identification number within that group (1-3). The partic-
ipant identification number therefore consisted of a combination of those two and was ∈
{11,12,13,21,22,23,31,32,33,41,42,43,51,52,53,61,62,63,71,72,73,81,82,83,91,92,93}.
5Although we never had to exclude participants for disobeying. Sometimes we had to admonish
some participants, but after that they would follow the rules for the rest of the workshop.
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were answered (c.f. Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008). The structure of experimental
workshops was quite similar in both years, with some mentionable differences (see
Figure 3.2). Each Session began with a risk preference elicitation task. In 2012
it was a simple choice between two lotteries with a 50-50 chance to win either
a high price (medium price), or a low price (or nothing at all), whereas we used
elicitation of certainty equivalents in 20166. The risk game was followed by a
series of solidarity games7. We made clear that only one game would be payoff
relevant in the end with an equal chance to be selected.
Figure 3.2 shows the differences between the two waves of observations with
regard to the experimental workshop structure in red. As we can see, the first and
second solidarity game were conducted identically in both years, whereas there
are some mentionable differences between the third and fourth solidarity game
(see protocol for details). For example we introduced a priming stage in the second
workshop in 2016 where we activated the minds and attention of our participants
regarding the behavior of individuals during and after Yolanda using targeted
survey questions (see sections A7, A8 and A9 in the Appendix). The session in
2012 would end with an additional solidarity game, whereas the session in 2016
ended with a joy of destruction game (spite game; (Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009)).
As soon as one game had ended, assistants would bring the decision sheets to a
visually separated area for recording. After all games were finished, we would
decide which game was payoff relevant by using an opaque bag with a number of
balls in it which corresponded to the number of games that we have played. We
showed that the bag was empty and put the numerated balls into the bag in front
of our participants eyes. We then chose the participant with the ID tag 11 to draw
a ball from the bag. The number on the ball would decide which game was payoff
relevant. After that, we would continue by following the protocol, depending on
what game has been selected to be payoff relevant (for details see the protocol in
section A5 and A11 in the Appendix). After this procedure, participants would be
asked by an assistant to follow them to a remote area where they would take the
post-experimental survey.
When participants were finished with answering post experimental survey ques-
tions, the assistant would lead the participant to the payout area, which was
visually separated from the other participants. They were given their earnings
plus a show up fee of 100PHP in a roll of paper, such that it could not be seen
from the outside how much money was inside the roll. We also asked participants
6More on the Risk elicitation tasks in both years in section 3.3.2.
7More on solidarity games in section 3.3.1
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at this point to please hide the roll of paper which contains their earnings and
the show up fee in their pockets, such that other participants cannot induce the
amount of money from the size of the roll and therefore make any suspicion
about their behavior in the games. Because of time constraints, we refrained from
debriefing participants.
3.3 Experimental tools
In order to be able to answer all of our raised questions regarding the adverse
impacts of natural disasters and capital forms on disaster resilience and respective
changes of these traits, we made use of quite a multilateral toolbox for exper-
imental economics. This section is dedicated to introduce all of the methods
we applied in the field to attain data and which are relevant to investigate the
hypotheses raised in section 2.5. Some of them are rather popular in behavioral
science (e.g. incentivized games) and some of them are rather unusual to be found
in behavioral studies (e.g. time-line and other PRA tools which are part of the
focus group discussions). I begin by introducing the experimental games we used
in both years, followed by an explanation of the focus group discussions and the
survey questions which we used. I also want to seize the opportunity to clarify
the origin of each tool and how our application was conducted and to discuss
potential unique properties of our applications. In the end of this section I will
also provide a broader explanation of the origin of other data that we used, like
census data or geographic GIS-data (e.g. GPS data for the track of the typhoon).
3.3.1 Solidarity game
The experimental solidarity game was first introduced by Selten and Ockenfels
(1998). They played it with students from a German university in a double blind
setting. The game is played by three players who start with the same initial
endowment, and a random process then decides for each player if they can keep
their endowment or not. Before this random procedure, each player has to state
whether and how much they want to transfer to one losing player or two loosing
players, with the possibility to discriminate between the two losing players, in
case they themselves can keep their endowment. The height of their transfer
indicates the level of solidarity. The solidarity game is therefore similar to the
dictator game (Forsythe et al., 1994; Hoffman et al., 1994), except that it is played
by three players and that the recipient is decided by a random process after the
transfer decisions have been made.
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Our application of the solidarity game is a slight alteration of the version presented
by Selten and Ockenfels (1998). The game consists of three players and in our case
where two of the players knew each other quite well, since they were either close
friends or relatives by design. However, those two persons did not know who the
third player in their group was, since we randomly decided group compositions
using a random generator beforehand. Respectively, the third person had no clue
about the identity of the other two group members as well. Therefore we are able
to distinguish between slight in-group and out-group behavior in this game. Each
player starts with the same endowment in the beginning, namely 200 Philippine
pesos. According to our surveys, this amount corresponded to an approximate
150% daily income in 2012, and 105% daily income in 2016.
A simple random process decides which of the three players loses all of the initial
endowment and is left with no money at all. This random outcome was decided
by drawing balls from an opaque bag, which contained one red ball and two white
balls. If the solidarity game was randomly chosen to be pay out relevant in the end,
we would let each of the two players knowing each other draw one ball from the
same bag after all of the experiments had ended. If none of them drew a red ball,
it was clear that the anonymous player in the group was the one who had lost all of
the initial endowment. Therefore the draw of the two first non-anonymous players
automatically decided the outcome for the third player. This ensured that even
after the games had ended, the two players did not know who had played with
them in their group and vice versa, ensuring the anonymity of the third player.
The actual decision each player had to make was how much they would transfer
to the losing player, in case that they would draw a white ball. Additionally, each
player had to guess the height of the transfer of the other players, in case that they
themselves would draw a red ball. transfers and guesses were able to be made
between zero and seventy pesos in steps of ten. Therefore transfers and guesses
that were allowed were ∈ {0,10,20,30,40,50,60,70}. We decided to introduce the
upper bound of seventy Philippine pesos to exclude the possibility that the player
who drew the red ball was able to be better off in the end than the respective
“winners”.
Therefore our adaptation of the game shows some mentionable differences from
the initial solidarity game which was conducted by Selten and Ockenfels (1998).
First, we adapt the game in a field and not in a lab setting, in hope of heightening
the validity of our outcomes and to be able to put them into a non-student context.
Second, our random procedure excludes the occasion where none, or two or
more players lose their endowment. Hence our groups always end up with one
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“loser” and two winning players by design. Third, we do not adapt a double blind
procedure, which means that the transfer decision and guesses were told to one
of our assistants who made sure, that the decision of the serviced player was not
visible to other players from the respective village.
We had two different variants of the solidarity game. One where we only asked
about transfers and beliefs as described above. The second variant also asked
about conditional transfers of each player, meaning that we obtained a transfer
structure for each player conditional on the transfer decision of the other player8.
This procedure is helpful to attain information about reciprocal behavior in the
solidarity game and to classify individuals into groups of egoist, altruists, condi-
tional givers, and other types. The classification follows the same procedure of
Fischbacher et al. (2001). Both applications of the game were identical in both
years.
3.3.2 Risk task
Eliciting risk preferences in the field can be challenging since the outcome may
vary with the instrument that is used. This is mainly because traditional applica-
tions of risk tasks in laboratories are usually perceived as unintuitive. Although a
sample of university students is usually capable of understanding such complex
tasks, the very same tasks may be not well applicable in the field. For example,
classical adaptations of the Holt and Laury risk task (Holt and Laury, 2002), which
are popularly used in lab experiments with students, have shown to deliver high
rates of inconsistencies in field experiments (Lönnqvist et al., 2015; Charness and
Viceisza, 2012). Therefore we adapt a simpler procedure which always gives a
choice between two assets. The procedures vary between the years 2012 and 2016.
In 2012 we adapted a simple binary choice between two risky assets, similar
to Eckel and Grossman (2002) and Eckel and Grossman (2008). However, our
application of the risk task only offered a choice between two assets instead of
five, making it less complex. Every participant started with 200 Philippine pesos
and played the same lottery once. The lottery itself offered a two third chance of
keeping a high amount of money and a one third chance of keeping a low amount
of money. Before the outcome of the lottery was decided, we offered two different
outcomes to each player. The first option (option A) offered the player a two third
chance to keep the 200 pesos of the initial endowment, whereas there was a one
third chance that the player looses all of of the 200 Philippine pesos. The second
8Or to put in a bit less complicated words: We asked each player: “How much are you willing
to transfer to the other player if he/she loses, and you know that he would give you x if you lose.”
Where x is again ∈ {0,10,20,30,40,50,60,70}.
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option (option B) offered the player an “insurance” (during the instructions it
was not directly framed as insurance). Option B allowed each player to pay 40
Philippine pesos to ensure a payoff of 100 pesos in case they lose in the lottery,
which means there was a two third chance to keep 160 Philippine pesos, whereas
there was a one third chance that the player could keep 60 pesos. Therefore
the expected value of the second option was higher and should be preferred by
rational actors. However, option A offered a chance of higher winnings, which
risk-neutral and risk-seeking individuals might prefer. We let each player from
the session draw from the same opaque bag which contained 18 white balls and
nine red balls. Therefore, two third of the session would end this task as “winners”
and one third as “loosers”.
The risk preference elicitation task in 2016 differed from the procedure in 2012 by
using a more precise approach by apprehending certainty equivalents (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992; Bruhin et al., 2010; Abdellaoui et al., 2011), which was also very
similar to the approach of Van Den Berg et al. (2009). We followed a protocol very
similar to Vieider et al. (2016), who attain certainty equivalents in experiments in
Ethiopia. We played three consecutive lotteries with a 50:50 chance of winning a
high/low amount of money. For each lottery, we gave each individual the choice
between playing the lottery, or receiving a fixed amount of money instead. Using
the strategy method, we asked individuals to make multiple decisions regarding
their preference for lotteries or varying fixed amounts. Although each individual
had to make a decision for each possible fixed amount we offered, the height of
the fixed amount that was actually payoff relevant was determined by a random
procedure, selecting one fixed amount out of every amount between the low and
high payoff in steps of five pesos.
Table 3.1: Lotteries played in both waves of observation
2012 2016
Lottery 1 Lottery 2 Lottery 1 Lottery 2 Lottery 3
High payoff 200PHP 160PHP 100PHP 200PHP 200PHP
Low payoff 0PHP 60PHP 40PHP 80PHP 140PHP
Chances of
winning high
amount
66.6% 66.6% 50.0% 50.0% 50.0%
Possible fixed
amounts
- -
∈ [45,95],
steps of five
∈ [85,195],
steps of five
∈ [145,195],
steps of five
If the risk task was chosen to be paid out in the end, a player from the session
would draw a ball from an opaque bag. The bag contained three balls with the
numbers 1-3 written on them. Therefore, the ball the participant drew decided
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which lottery would be payoff relevant. After this was determined, a random
generator9 decided which certainty equivalent was applied. This procedure mainly
has the advantage of delivering more precise values for risk preferences while
keeping the task itself simple and applicable in areas with low literacy rates
(Vieider et al., 2016). Therefore we decided to implement this procedure in the
second wave of our experiments to attain more information about risk seeking
behavior after the severe typhoon.
The implementation of the second procedure has some methodological impli-
cations which we should mention at this point. Our aim still is to compare
risk-seeking behavior before and after the storm between low intensity and high
intensity areas. However, both procedures are distinct from each other in some
important aspects, which should be taken into account when interpreting the
results. First and foremost, the risk task in the first wave was framed in the loss
frame, while the risk task in 2016 was framed in the gain domain. This could
cause some severe differences between behavior in both sessions since there is
sufficient experimental evidence that people tend to be more risk seeking in the
loss-domain (Kühberger, 1998). Secondly, to be able to compare both outcomes
we have to apply similar measures for both years. Since the outcome for the first
year is binary, we have to interpret the outcomes of the second wave to be binary
as well. Therefore we defined individuals to be “rather risk neutral/seeking” if
their average risk premium across all lotteries was larger than zero. Thirdly, the
approach in the second wave allows for erratic and inconsistent behavior. From
the researchers perspective, it does not make sense to switch multiple times from
preferring the lottery or the certain amount. A subject with clear preferences
should only switch once or not at all. Therefore we excluded all observations
that gave us hints about erratic behavior by switching multiple times between
the certain amount and the lottery. Hence we obtain more observations in the
first wave than in the second wave because we were not able to check for erratic
behavior, which we consider to be an advantage of the second approach because
we can be more certain that the individuals who did not fail our criteria of single
switching understood the task.
3.3.3 Focus group discussions
As our workshops also included focus group discussions, we have more qualitative
data on the whole process individuals went through because of Yolanda. This
9We would simply assign a random number between zero and one to each fixed amount of
money. The highest random number would decide the certainty equivalent that is relevant for the
participant’s payoff in the end.
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workshop was held parallel to our experimental games and consisted of three
randomly selected business owners, three randomly selected fishermen, and three
randomly selected villagers without having a certain occupation10 per village,
which therefore results in a total number of 270 participants. The workshops were
held in a more interactive atmosphere and was led by two master students who
wrote their thesis on topics that were related to the Philippine study in general.
The workshop consisted of an incentivized guessing game, where participants
had to try to predict the average behavior of certain groups in the experimental
games. The guessing game was then followed by some PRA tools (c.f. Cavestro,
2003), including a time-line, SWOT analysis, Venn diagram and a conflict matrix.
The time line was constructed to visualize the development of certain variables
of interest over time since the harvest season of 2103, which was shortly before
Yolanda. Participants had to draw a line from the beginning of the harvest season
until today and indicate for each month on a scale of minus three to plus three the
relative condition of the variable of interest (for example average income in the
village, or average solidarity). First, each group of three individuals (either three
fishermen, three shop owners, or three random participants) had to decide on
their own how the development looked like, accompanied by one of our research
assistants. When time was up, all the groups had to agree on one chart that was
constructed by each group which they find was most representative. They would
find their decision in form of an open discussion which was lead by our research
assistants as well.
Another tool we used in the frame of the focus group discussions was the conflict
matrix, which indicated what kind of conflicts arose due to disaster relief and
which made it possible to quantify the different types of conflict that arose during
disaster relief efforts and therefore be able to get a feeling about their respec-
tive relative occurrence within a village. We offered several categories indicating
with whom conflict occurred, and about what topic the conflict was about. The
stakeholders which we offered were either household members from the same
household of the interviewee, members from this village, villagers from neighbor-
ing villages, strangers, and state officials. The types of conflict we offered were
conflicts about disaster relief goods in general (food, water..., etc.), financial aid,
reconstruction and shelter, exclusion from aid, and lack of cooperation. Addi-
tionally villagers had the opportunity to add additional sources of conflict if they
wished to do so. Additionally we offered participants of the experiments, as well
10But we would not allow village officials, since we did not want the other participants to feel
pressured or led by the responses of kagawats (councellors) or punongs (mayors).
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as participants of the focus group discussions a table where they could tell us how
they wished beneficiary selection of disaster relief goods was done, and how it
actually should be according to their own opinion. For more details about the
focus group discussions see the whole respective protocol in section A12 in the
Appendix.
3.4 Empirical strategy and methods
To elicit the relation between disaster resilience indicators and pre-capital en-
dowment of individuals, as well as to elicit the causal relation between disaster
exposure I use quite a substantial amount of statistical tools and procedures. First
and foremost, I will be looking a lot at mean differences, both to get a better
feeling about developments over time, but also about differences between high
and low intensity villages. The type of hypothesis test which I use depends on the
type of variable I am testing. For binary variable mean comparison between two
independent groups I use Chi-squared tests (Pearson, 1900), to test for differences
between means of two independent groups of continuous variables I use unpaired
T-tests (Satterthwaite, 1946), and for ranks and scores (ordinal values) I use Mann-
Whitney (Mann and Whitney, 1947) tests. Furthermore, when testing for equality
of distributions between two independent groups I use a Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test (Massey Jr, 1951).
I construct indices for different forms of capital using exploratory principal com-
ponent and factor analysis where I make use of the substantial amount of data we
have collected regarding aspects of human, social, financial, and physical capital
(see section 4.4 for details). However, this study is not able to derive any effects of
natural capital on disaster resilience since we applied a randomization protocol
that only allowed similarly endowed households into our sample. Following this
data reduction method I am using a simple OLS regression with robust standard
errors of the form:
Resi2016 = α + β1hi2012 + β2fi2012 + β3si2012 + β4pi2012 + β5Ci2012 + vj +  (3.1)
Where hi2012, fi2012, si2012 and pi2012 represent indices which I construct through
principal component or factor analysis for financial capital, human capital, social
capital, or physical capital for individual i in the year 2012. Resi2016 represents
indicators for disaster resilience, such as (1) the absolute number of days indi-
viduals needed to repair their houses, (2) the absolute amount of costs that are
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associated with the damages that occurred on houses due to the typhoon, (3)
the time individuals had between realizing that a strong tropical typhoon was
incoming and actual landfall of the tropical cyclone, (4) individual perceived
affectedness, (5) perceived help by external actors such as governmental or non-
governmental institutions, and (6) perceived help from internal actors such as
friends and neighbors of individual i in the year 2016. Ci2012 represents a vector
of control variables which include age, a dummy for gender and a dummy which
indicates if the was single for the year 2012. Hence I take a look at the relation
between different forms of capital in 2012 and resilience indicators in 2016. To
control for heterogeneity in exogenous disaster exposure and other unobserved
variables on the village level I use village fixed effects (vj) by including dummies
for each village j into the model.
Additionally I am taking a look at the explanatory power of the single components
of capital indicators from 2012 on resilience indicators in 2016 and hence use also
a model of the form:
Resi2016 = α + β1Hi2012 + β2Fi2012 + β3Si2012 + β4Pi2012 + β5Ci2012 + vi +  (3.2)
In equation 3.2, Hi2012,Fi2012,Si2012 and Pi2012 represent vectors of variables which
are part of capital indicators or closely related to them. Human capital components
used in this study are: (1) a dummy which indicates the highest educational
attainment of an individual (high school, college, or vocational training using
elementary scholars as a baseline), and (2) an index between zero and one that
indicates the relative conscientiousness of the individual compared to others in our
sample. For financial capital these components are: (1) am dummy which indicates
if the household received regular income in 2012, (2) average monthly household
income from 2012 in units of 1,000PHP , (3) a dummy which indicates if the
household possesses financial savings larger than 1,000PHP , (4) a dummy which
indicates if the household has debt larger than 5,000PHP , and (5) a dummy which
indicates if the household had to reduce food intake for some of its members
due to a lack of money. The components of social capital are: (1) An index
between zero and one which shows the relative trust towards governmental and
non-governmental institutions compared to others in our sample, (2) an index
between zero and one which shows the relative solidarity of an individual, (3)
an index between zero and one which shows the relative trust towards bonding
elements, such as friends, family and neighbors, (4) a dummy for generalized trust,
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(5) the number of memberships in clubs and social organizations, (6) the number
of days of voluntary work for the community in the last 90 days, (7) the absolute
number of individuals living in a household, and (8) the number of close friends
of the individual. Indicators for physical capital were retrospectively collected
in 2016 and are consisting of a variable that (1) indicates if the household had
implemented heavy materials, such as stone, bricks or iron sheeting in their house
before Yolanda, and (2) the distance of the household to the nearest ocean waters.
To investigate the causal relation between typhoon exposure and the development
of capital forms and risk and social preferences I exploit natural variation in the
exposure to the typhoon measured by the minimum distance between the track
of the typhoon11 and village borders of the respective barangays12 of this study.
I then used the software QGis to calculate the shortest distance between village
borders and the typhoon track. Although I received comments that usually one
would use the distance between centroids of village borders and not the borders
themselves, I kept on using the borderlines because some villages northern of the
typhoon track in our sample have administrative borders which would reach far
inland, although the village would actually be located on the shore, and hence
distort the variation in distance. Hence measurement using borders produces
less bias than measurement using centroids in my case. I then use this distance
and correlate it with reported destruction in a village measured by households
partly or totally destroyed relative to the absolute number of households. We have
already seen the correlation between the destruction caused by the typhoon and
the distance in Figure 3.1, where we see two clusters of highly affected villages
(destruction ≥ 30%) and less affected villages (destruction < 30%) with a clear
cutoff at a relative distance13 of about 0.4. For reasons of more straight forward
graphical representation of the data and results, I will mostly be using a dummy
which indicates if an individual was living in a “high intensity area”, where the
relative distance was below 0.4. I then use this dummy as my treatment variable
to represent exogenous and random exposure to typhoon Yolanda. The dummy
for living in high intensity areas is indicating if the village was hit seveerely by
Yolanda in 2016, and therefore it is also specified as one in the year 2012 if the
village belongs to high intensity areas and therefore the dummy is time invariant.
I then use First difference estimation with clustered standard errors on the village
11GPS data for the track of Yolanda were taken from (Kitamoto, 2018).
12GPS data for village borders were taken from (PhilGIS, 2017).
13Relative distance is an index between zero and one where one means “furthest away from the
typhoon track” and zero means “directly hit by typhoon track”.
69
3.4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND METHODS CHAPTER 3. METHODS
level using the balanced part of our panel data of the form:
∆Capi = α + β1∆intensj + β2Capi2012 +∆uit (3.3)
Where ∆Cap represents changes in capital indicators or their respective compo-
nents (see above, dummies for educational attainment excluded). The variable
∆intensj is an interaction between a dummy which is one if the year is 2016, and a
time invariant dummy which indicates if the villages is situated in a high intensity
area (as discussed above) and therefore the estimator β1 represents the treatment
effect of exposure to typhoon Yolanda. Cap2012 represents baseline values for
capital endowment or endowment with the respective capital component to check
whether or not regression to the mean is taking place in our sample (c.f. Barnett
et al., 2004).
I then repeat the estimation using both the balanced and unbalanced panel with
individual fixed effects panel regression with clustered standard errors on the
village level to see whether we obtain similar results as from model 3.3 by using
a different approach that looks at the within variation instead of cross sectional
variation. The model using individual fixed effects takes the form:
Capit = β1yeart + β2∆intensj +αi +uit (3.4)
Where αi includes all time invariant individual characteristics, yeart is a dummy
that is one if the year was 2016, and ∆intensj is again an interaction between
the year dummy and the dummy for living in high intensity areas. Therefore
the estimator β1 should include developments over time, while β2 captures the
differences in development that arise due to disaster exposure.
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4. Data
In this chapter I describe the data which we obtained in general and also am going
to describe some key aspects of it, and will introduce the reader to some disaster
related statistics in the context of disaster relief. I begin by giving a general
overview in section 4.1 about socio-demographics and key characteristics of our
experimental participants. This is followed by some data on how individuals
reacted to the typhoon, how intensely they were affected, and also how help by
other villagers and state officials was perceived (section 4.2). Additionally I will
look a bit deeper into the types of copnflict that occurred due to the disaster relief
process by looking at answers from surveys from experimental participants, and
participants from the focus group discussions as well (subsection 4.2.2). After
having read this chapter, the reader should have attained a general picture about
the participants which we interviewed, and also have a sufficient idea about what
followed the disaster in terms of exposure, affectedness and conflict.
4.1 Socio-demographics
In this section we will simply summarize descriptive statistics and give the reader
a better feeling for our observed part of the Philippine population. As mentioned
before, our sample consists of 27 villagers per barangay from 30 villages, leading
to a total number of 810 observations per year. In 2012 we had 15 dropouts
because sessions could not be filled with replacements for people who simply did
not show up on time, whereas in 2016 we only had seven dropouts. We will give
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Table 4.1: Socio demographics of both waves of observations (balanced & unbalanced panel)
unbalanced balanced
(I) 2012 (II) 2016 (I) 2012 (II) 2016
mean mean (II)-(I) mean mean (II)-(I)
(sd) (sd) (p-value) (sd) (sd) (p-value)
age 41.29 45.09 3.81*** 41.94 45.99 4.06***
(10.58) (11.91) (0.00) (10.25) (10.41) (0.00)
monthly income 4,039.87 5,774.53 1,734.66*** 3,819.40 5,600.59 1,781.18***
(4,242.75) (6,870.19) (0.00) (3,605.84) (5,360.82) (0.00)
years in village 31.77 34.78 3.01*** 32.71 36.24 3.53***
(16.15) (17.87) (0.00) (15.92) (16.14) (0.00)
household size 4.99 4.93 -0.06 5.08 5.16 0.08
(1.84) (2.68) (0.60) (1.84) (3.11) (0.64)
sex (female=1) 0.54 0.67 0.13*** 0.60 0.60 0.00
(0.50) (0.47) (0.00) (0.49) (0.49) (1.00)
elementary school 0.24 0.29 0.05** 0.27 0.31 0.04
(0.43) (0.45) (0.04) (0.44) (0.46) (0.21)
high school 0.52 0.52 -0.01 0.53 0.52 -0.00
(0.50) (0.50) (0.84) (0.50) (0.50) (1.00)
college 0.18 0.12 -0.06*** 0.14 0.10 -0.05**
(0.38) (0.33) (0.00) (0.35) (0.29) (0.03)
vocational training 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.01
(0.23) (0.26) (0.19) (0.24) (0.26) (0.59)
had to reduce meals 0.62 0.53 -0.09*** 0.65 0.53 -0.12***
(0.49) (0.50) (0.00) (0.48) (0.50) (0.00)
savings > 1000PHP 0.19 0.25 0.07*** 0.17 0.27 0.10***
(0.39) (0.44) (0.00) (0.38) (0.45) (0.00)
savings > 5000PHP 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.01
(0.22) (0.23) (0.66) (0.20) (0.23) (0.53)
debt > 5000PHP 0.34 0.35 0.00 0.33 0.39 0.06*
(0.48) (0.48) (0.92) (0.47) (0.49) (0.08)
fisherman 0.30 0.20 -0.11*** 0.27 0.27 -0.00
(0.46) (0.40) (0.00) (0.45) (0.44) (0.88)
n 795 803 449 449
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more information about attrition, self selection and migration in section 6.0.1,
whereas this section is simply providing a general overview about the data itself.
The balanced part of the experimental panel contains 449 people from both waves
and therefore contains 898 observations, whereas the unbalanced panel contains
1598 observations.
Table 4.1 summarizes key characteristics of our population from the experimental
workshops and shows mean values, standard deviations, as well as significant dif-
ferences between our sample from 2012 and 2016 for the balanced and unbalanced
panel. Our average participant was between 18 and 75 years old with an average
of about 41 in 2012 and 45 in 2016, whereas this increase in age makes perfect
sense since we tried to obtain the same people from 2012 four years later. Of
these roughly 40-45 years, an average person spends about 30-35 within the same
village. Monthly household income increased in those four years by approximately
1,500PHP from an average of ∼ 4,000PHP to ∼ 5,500PHP . These numbers differ
substantially from official survey data from the Philippine government, stating av-
erage monthly income for region IV (Western Visayas) to be around 17,000PHP in
2012 (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2014) and 32,000PHP in 20151 (Philippine
Statistics Authority, 2017). We cannot explain this substantial difference other
than our sample coming from a pool of rural villages with restricted size and we
cannot exclude selection of poorer people in those areas. Therefore our results
should be seen as valid for this special part of the population, rather than the
whole Philippine population. We also observe slight increases in savings, but also
in debt over time. The share of people that had to reduce meals because of a lack of
financial means to buy food decreased substantially over time from about 62% to
53% (p=0.00). Therefore we see a general improvement in the financial situation
of the average person in our part of the population since income increased about
43% whereas absolute inflation between the years 2012 & 2016 was around 11%
(The World Bank, 2018). The female part of our population was about 54% in
2012 and rose to 67% in 2016. We can only speculate about the reasons for women
to be more likely to appear in 2016. We believe that the opportunity costs for
women are generally lower since they mostly do not have an occupation or are
housewives (as is the case for 40% of our female sample). Typical jobs in our region
are farming, fishing (also occupations related to fishing like fish vendors), working
as some sort of barangay official, and manual labor. Educational proxies like the
highest degree in education show that we have some sort of measurement error,
because the percentage of people that mention college as their highest educational
1at the time of writing, official data for 2016 was not available.
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Figure 4.1: Self perception of affection across high intensity and low intensity villages. Part (A):
Distribution of damaged households across different relative distances from the storm; Part (B):
Inflicted cost of repairs due to Yolanda across high intensity and low intensity villages; Part (C):
Subjective affection across low intensity and high intensity villages
degree has dropped over time in the balanced part of the panel. This is a reminder
that survey data is not always 100% reliable and that results should be generally
interpreted with care (c.f. Deaton, 1997; Laajaj and Macours, 2017).
Household size was around 5 people in both years in the balanced and in the
unbalanced panel and corresponds roughly to the official number of 4.4 in official
survey data (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2016). Since fishermen are one
especially vulnerable group towards extreme changes in the environment and
destruction of the coastal marine life that follows an extreme natural disaster, we
decided to highlight their presence in the data a little bit. In 2012, roughly one
third of our sample consisted of fishermen, whereas this portion drops to one fifth
in 2016. Again, we speculate that there are higher opportunity costs for fishermen
to re-appear in our workshops and we attribute this drop mainly through this
channel.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of time until impact of Yolanda (in hours)
4.2 Reaction, exposure, affectedness & help
In this section I want to describe what happened to the individuals during the
“shock phase”. We will take a look at how individuals reacted when they realized
that a disaster was incoming, how intensely they were exposed, and how heavily
they were affected as a consequence. The average time between the realization
of Yolanda making landfall and the landfall actually happening was on average
7.3 hours according to our participants, whereas roughly 80% of our participants
stated that they had about eight hours or less (see Figure 4.2). We also asked where
our participants were at the time of impact. Roughly 81.5% of all interviewed
individuals from 2016 stated that they were at their own house. The remaining
18% were either in other houses within the same village (3.7%), in another village
nearby (1.5%), in an official evacuation center (7.9%), or somewhere else2 (5.3%).
We also asked them on a five point Likert scale how many people have left the
village because they knew that a storm was coming3. Although many people
from our sample stayed at home, a substantial proportion of individuals reported
that they remember many people leaving their village because of an incoming
catastrophe. Especially participants from high intensity villages said that almost
all people left the village (32.63%), whereas the proportion of people stating
the same is much smaller in low intensity villages (6.53%). This example shows
how different people perceived the reaction of others, since there is also quite a
number of people stating the opposite. Additionally, we asked village officials
2Other locations were either larger cities in the Philippines or rather vaguely specified areas
(for example:“At the mountain tops”, “On a boat”, or “Behind the mountain”)
31:“Almost none”; 2:“few”; 3:“some”; 4:“many”; 5:“Almost all”
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specifically for records that show how many people left the village temporarily
or permanently because of Yolanda. The numbers which government officials
gave us are in no way as dramatic as the perception of our surveyed participants,
since the proportion of temporal or permanent out-migrants to corresponding
village inhabitants was relatively small (see Table A2.2). Therefore either official
documents and/or statements from government officials were not complete, or
the perception of individuals was somehow biased.
Did our participants prepare for the disaster in any way? We asked in our survey
what kind of preparatory measures they took, if any. Almost all of our participants
stated that they prepared for the disaster in some way (93.8%). Although some
had more time to react than others, there was no clear correlation between the time
individuals had until time of impact and some specific kind of preparatory mea-
sure (see Table A2.3. While there were no differences between the relative share
of individuals that reinforced their house in high intensity villages (60.7%) and
low intensity villages (58.7%), we clearly observe that individuals from villages
that became closer to the eye of the storm were more likely to suffer damages (see
Figure 4.1). From part (A) of the figure we can see that the likelihood of a house to
become damaged is much higher for households that were closer to the eye of the
storm during the course of Yolanda. Costs for repairs were rough estimations from
our participants and we see that costs were on average substantially higher in high
intensity villages (∼ 13,700PHP ) than in low intensity villages (∼ 1,220PHP ).
Furthermore, the individual perception of being affected is significantly higher in
high intensity villages. This is what anyone would suspect. However, this shows
that the categorization into “low intensity” and “high intensity” on the village
level correlates well with individual affection.
For purposes of data reduction I am using an index for individual perceived
affectedness, which includes a battery of questions concerning the individual
financial and personal pressure, as well as the individual financial and personal
pressure relative to other villagers. The results of a corresponding factor analysis
can be found in Table A2.5. We can observe that the questions from this battery in
the survey correlate very well with each other and can easily be integrated into
one common indicator for individual perceived affectedness. Figure 4.3 shows
the distribution of the resulting index for all observations made in 2016 and how
the distribution differs across low intensity and high intensity villages. We can
observe that, although the categorization into low intensity and high intensity
villages seems to hold, there is still considerable variation of perceived affectedness
on the individual level. While in low intensity villages the index takes a value
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of self perception of affectedness index pooled, and across high intensity
and low intensity villages.
of 0.27 on average, the average in high intensity villages is considerably higher
(0.55, p=0.000). A Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality of distributions test also rejects
the hypothesis that the two distributions are equal for both types of intensity
(p=0.000). Therefore we see that, although there is still variation on the individual
level within both types of villages, on average individuals seem to be aware that
villages in the south were hit harder by the storm than villages in the north of the
Island.
Now I will take a look at the amount of internal and external help from others
that arose as a reaction to the destruction caused by Yolanda. However, we never
gathered hard data on actual amounts of relief goods or manual labor that was
provided by other stakeholders, such as external agents like governmental or
non governmental organizations, friends and neighbors. Therefore we tried to
be as careful and sensitive as possible, while attaining the maximum amount
of information possible. To elicit how much help arrived to a household we
asked our participants a battery of questions where they had to state on a scale of
one to seven what stakeholders provided what amount of aid, where one would
mean “no help at all” and seven means “most proficient help”. The stakeholders
that were included in the battery of questions were governmental institutions4,
non governmental institutions, and the church. Additionally we asked how
much help they were receiving from friends and neighbors. I use the individual
perception of internal (friends and neighbors) and external (governmental and
non governmental institutions) help as a proxy to determine how much help came
4National government, local government and barangay council;
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of self perception of internal and external help index pooled, and across
high intensity and low intensity villages.
from these different stakeholders. For purposes of data reduction I summarize the
variables of each category into one common index using factor analysis5. Figure
4.4 shows the distribution of internal and external help indices in the pooled data
set and across high intensity and low intensity villages. We can observe that while
there seems to be a different distribution in external help, namely a tendency
towards high intensity villages, the perception of internal help does not vary
across high intensity and low intensity villages. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for
equal distributions rejects the hypothesis that the distribution of external help was
similarly distributed across high intensity and low intensity villages (p=0.000),
but does not reject the null in the case of internal help (p=0.485). This shows
that the government and non governmental organizations were more active in the
northern regions of Panay which were hit harder by the storm than other regions.
Mean index values between high and low intensity villages are also significantly
different from each other (0.23 vs. 0.39, p=0.000). This relation however is not
true regarding the help of friends and neighbors (0.29 vs. 0.30, p=0.516). This
shows that the perception of help from friends and neighbors did probably not
depend on the level of affectedness.
Additionally we asked our participants a bit more in detail about their perception
of the fairness of external aid provision and how they felt about the relief process.
All questions could be answered on a scale between one and seven, where seven
meant “I completely disagree” and seven meant “I completely agree”. We also
asked whether or not conflicts arose because of external aid provision. To attain
some information about the quality of aid provision we asked participants if they
thought that aid provision was fair, if the amount provided was sufficient, and
if the process of aid provision was well organized. We also wanted to know if
some received more aid than they needed, if people tended to act selfish with
5The results of a factor analysis on external help variables can be found in Table A2.7 and the
results for internal help variables in Table A2.6 in section A2 the Appendix
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regard to relief goods, if conflicts arose due to a lack of aid, and if individuals felt
left alone with their problems. Lastly we also attained information about if the
participants themselves helped wherever they could and also if they feel closer to
other villagers now than before the storm. Let us have a look at how individuals
perceived the quality of aid provision between high intensity and low intensity
areas. Using two sample T-tests we can observe that the perception of quality of
aid provision is not significantly different between high and low intensity villages.
The fairness of aid distribution (4.54 vs. 4.41, p=0.353), as well as the amount of
relief goods (3.82 vs. 3.65, p=0.217) and the organization of the relief process by
external agents (4.26 vs. 4.09, p=0.207) was not perceived substantially different
between high and low intensity villages. However, what is striking is that more
emotional aspects of aid provision differed significantly between both types of
villages. In high intensity villages, people seem to have rather received more than
they needed (3.39 vs. 3.86, p=0.000), people were rather acting selfish (3.42 vs.
3.80, p=0.007), individuals rather felt left alone with their problems (3.32 vs. 3.59,
p=0.046), and the perception of conflict due to a lack of aid was significantly
higher (3.43 vs. 3.93, p=0.000). This could mean that external aid providers also
bring the potential for conflicts to a community since activity by external actors
was higher in high intensity villages and we observe higher indicators for conflict
or disappointment about the actions of other villagers. Lastly we can look at if
people themselves think that they feel closer to the people in their village than
before, which on average they seem to do, but not significantly varying between
the two intensity levels (4.95 vs. 4.85, p=0.451).
4.2.1 Perception of beneficiary selection
At one point in the experimental survey we asked individuals how disaster relief
aid was targeted, and how such efforts should be targeted according to their own
opinion. We let participants rank certain targeting criteria which represented
classic strategies how disaster relief could be targeted. First we asked to whom
disaster relief should be targeted to first according to their opinion, and then
we asked them afterwards how it was actually done by disaster aid providers.
Participants could choose among the following selection criteria:
• According to peoples exposure: The higher the suffering or damage, the higher
the amount of relief goods someone should receive.
• Egalitarian: All people should get the same amount of aid, regardless of their
respective damages they suffered.
79
4.2. REACTION, EXPOSURE, AFFECTEDNESS & HELP CHAPTER 4. DATA
Table 4.2: Mean perception of fairness, quality and conflict potential of aid provision
Variable low intensity high intensity p-value
Distribution of aid was fair 4.54 4.41 0.353
(1.95) (2.08)
Amount of aid was sufficient 3.82 3.65 0.217
(1.91) (2.01)
Aid was well organized 4.26 4.08 0.207
(1.95) (2.00)
Some received more than needed 3.39 3.86 0.000***
(1.85) (1.96)
People were acting selfish 3.42 3.80 0.007***
(1.95) (1.93)
I felt left alone 3.32 3.59 0.046**
(1.92) (1.97)
Received unexpected help from others 4.30 4.55 0.091*
(2.08) (2.08)
I tried to help wherever possible 5.70 5.68 0.836
(1.35) (1.33)
I feel closer to others now 4.95 4.85 0.451
(1.74) (1.81)
Conflicts because of lack of aid 3.43 3.93 0.000***
(1.98) (1.91)
Standard deviations in brackets.
All answers were given on a scale between one and seven.
One means “I completely disagree” and seven means “I completely agree”
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• Egalitarian towards exposed: Only people who were affected receive aid, but
everyone gets the same amount regardless of the damages they suffered.
• Priority on vulnerable victims: These are disabled persons, female headed
households and/or with majority elderly and children or households with
single source of income which is based on a vulnerable industry, whose
property was at least partly destroyed by typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda.
• Priority on victims that prepared more for the typhoon than others: (i.e. particu-
larly, only those victims who conducted all preparatory measures and who
have not (re-)built their homes in high-risk areas and in less resilient kind or
only victims with disaster insurance for their uninsured losses and whose
property was at least partly destroyed by typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda.)
• People who suffered damages, but do not receive remittances.
• First come, first serve: i.e. people, whose property was at least partly destroyed
by typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda should receive aid in the order of their claims.
• Nobody should receive aid
From Table 4.3 we can see that the actual and desired practices on average did
not differ much from each other with regard to their respective average rank. In
general, individuals wish for a targeting towards vulnerable victims, such as single
mothers, poor or elderly people that need help the most. the second priority goes
to targeting practices which give individuals the more disaster relief goods the
more they are affected by the destructive forces of natural disasters. On rank
three is egalitarian targeting which is followed by egalitarian targeting towards
exposed. This means that in general, individuals prefer that everyone gets disaster
relief, even if some unaffected individuals attain relief goods as a consequence,
over egalitarian aid distribution towards the exposed, which would leave out
the rest of the villagers. The fifth place is on average held by the criteria to
distribute relief goods towards victims who prepared themselves for the disaster.
Interestingly, individuals from the experiments preferred that no one would get
disaster relief goods over either people that receive no remittances get some, or
a first come-first serve approach. The actual practices that took place in each
village basically overlap with what individuals previously stated to be the desired
approach. Mean differences between actual and desired targeting practices were
rather low and between -0.16 and +0.24. Therefore we see that disaster relief
aid was perceived to be targeted to the more vulnerable in general, followed by
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Table 4.3: Mean desired and actual rank of targeting practices according to experimental partici-
pants
Desired
Desired
mean
rank
Actual
Actual
mean
rank
mean dif-
ference
between
actual
and
desired
ranked
1st
ranked
2nd
ranked
3rd
ranked
4th
ranked
5th
ranked
6th
ranked
7th
ranked
8th
According to exposure 3.78 2 3.73 2 0.05 123 140 110 126 153 72 42 38
Egalitarian 4.11 3 4.23 3 -0.12 95 100 128 143 133 92 72 42
Egalitarian towards exposed 4.12 4 4.24 4 -0.13 79 115 149 129 121 100 68 40
Vulnerable victims 3.28 1 3.39 1 -0.12 214 150 118 113 71 51 55 32
Victims who prepared 4.57 5 4.72 5 -0.16 60 112 108 119 127 92 97 88
No remittances 5.34 7 5.40 8 -0.06 30 75 81 71 87 175 180 107
First come first serve 5.58 8 5.34 7 0.24 121 36 41 36 58 120 133 253
Nobody should receive aid 5.33 6 5.24 6 0.09 80 76 69 67 58 99 156 196
targeting according to household exposure and egalitarian approaches. Overall
expectations by participants seem to have been met regarding the targeting of
disaster relief efforts. In the next subsection I will look at the question, if disaster
relief efforts may have led to some conflict.
4.2.2 Conflict because of disaster relief
In a time when resources are scarce and demand for basic goods for daily con-
sumption is high, the potential for conflict is inevitable. In this subsection I
explore the kinds of conflict that arose due to disaster relief efforts and provide
an overall picture of the situation with regard to conflicts by looking at data
which was provided by experimental participants and participants from focus
group discussions. We have seen above that the level of conflict was perceived
higher in high intensity villages compared to low intensity villages according to
experimental participants. We basically asked focus group discussion participants
the same question on a scale of zero to seven where one meant “no conflict in
village at all” and seven “severe amount of conflict in village”6. The mean answers
vary significantly between high and low intensity villages, whereas high intensity
levels almost experienced one standard deviation more conflict than low intensity
villages (2.12 vs. 3.62, p=0.000). This coincides with the average statements
that experimental participants made and hence we believe that especially more
exposed areas were prone to conflict. We tried to quantify the amount of conflict
that arose by offering the participants of the focus group discussions a conflict
matrix, where participants would allocate beans on a raster of different types of
conflict to indicate what type of conflict occurred and how intense it was com-
pared to other types of conflict (the more beans on one rater, the more intense
6Although we actually offered only a scale from 1-7, in some villages participants stated that
there were no conflicts at all and therefore we entered a zero when this was the case.
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the conflict), as I already described in subsection 3.3.3. The results of the conflict
matrix are visualized in Table 4.4. As we can see, conflicts tended to be perceived
more in high intensity villages than in low intensity villages, whereas in both
types of villages conflicts mainly arose from disagreements with other villagers or
village/state officials such as kagawats (councilors) or punongs (mayors). Conflict
is always substantially higher in high intensity villages, with the exception of
conflict regarding a lack of cooperation of other villagers, where the mean value is
higher in low intensity villages. The main sources of conflict seem to be financial
aid, which seemed to have caused disagreements between villagers in general
and disagreements between villagers and state officials. Also the general supply
with relief goods seems to have caused conflict, and also exclusion from aid was
apparently a topic in both high and low intensity villages. Conflicts with other
villages were rather minor compared to conflicts with other villagers from the
same village or village officials. When we asked them directly about the most
intense conflict that arose in their respective village we more or less uniformly got
the answer in both high and low intensity villages that “Financial aid and relief
goods were unevenly distributed7”. We basically observe the same pattern if we
look at the responses of participants from the experimental games. At one point
we asked participants a bit more in detail about different kinds of power abuse
that may have arose due to disaster relief efforts. They had to answer a battery
of questions on a scale of one to seven, where one meant “this never occurred”
and seven meant “this occurred all the time”. According to the answers from
our participants it sometimes happened that people with better relations to aid
providers received more than others, while the perception of this happening is
significantly higher on average in high intensity villages (3.26 vs. 3.61, p=0.005).
We can observe the same difference when we look at if it sometimes happened that
people with good relations received aid sooner than others (3.37 vs. 3.73, p=0.003).
It also happened, although rarely, that individuals claimed false affectedness to
receive aid (2.48 vs. 2.67, p=0.094) and that some individuals had to provide
goods and services to receive aid by providers (2.63 vs. 2.66, p=0.765). It also
happened more often in high intensity villages that people took at the expense
of others (2.35 vs. 2.61, p=0.019) and that individuals who were not eligible to
receive disaster aid received it nevertheless although it was needed by others (2.61
vs. 3.03, p=0.000). We also see significantly more complaints about relief goods
being of bad quality in high intensity villages (2.82 vs. 3.05, p=0.049) and that
providers kept goods for themselves instead of distributing it to the needy (2.45
7Broad summary of verbal statements from participants by the author
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vs. 2.90, p=0.000). Additionally, people felt that they had nowhere to go to if they
wanted to complain about the situation both in high and in low intensity villages,
as the share of individuals that stated that they theoretically were able to make
complaints to officials about the situation is rather small (0.17 vs. 0.18, p=0.993).
Therefore we can see mainly two things: Firstly, the disaster relief process was most
likely accompanied by negative consequences such as power abuse and corruption
and generally the perception of our participants was that many acts of power
abuse took place (although rather rarely). Secondly, we see systematic differences
between high and low intensity villages regarding the perception of conflict and
corruption and therefore I see it as additional justification to categorize villages
binary into high and low intensity villages. It seems plausible that exposure to
such experiences changes not only the perception of other stakeholders in the
long term, but also that individuals adapt their behavior according to their new
experiences and changes in values and social norms which they observe due to
this process.
4.3 Outcomes in experimental games
The outcomes of the main experimental games which are used to investigate the
research questions at hand are descriptively presented in this section. We begin
by looking at the outcomes of the solidarity games and compare them to outcomes
from studies which also implemented them. The same procedure is applied for
outcomes of the risk task which we applied in the field.
4.3.1 Solidarity games
On average, individuals contributed 30.41PHP to the anonymous losing player
in the first solidarity game, while transfers to known players were significantly
higher and amounted to about 32.95PHP on average in 2012 (p=0.000). In the
second solidarity game in 2012, individuals transferred 32.27PHP to the losing
anonymous player on average, while the transfer to the known player was also
significantly higher and about 35.40PHP (p=0.000). Therefore we see clear signs
of discrimination against unknown players in this experimental setting, which is
not uncommon to observe in experimental studies which investigate in-group and
out-group behavior (c.f. Bohnet, 1999; Fershtman et al., 2005; Dufwenberg and
Muren, 2006). The same observation holds if we look at outcomes from the second
year of observations. Transfers to anonymous players were on average 25.98PHP
in the first solidarity game from 2016, while transfers to non-anonymous players
were 33.84PHP on average (p=0.000). Transfers in the second solidarity game
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of decisions in the solidarity game 2012: part (A): transfer to anonymous
players in the first game; part (B): transfer to known group members in the first game; part (C):
difference between transfers to anonymous and non-anonymous players in the first game; part (D):
transfer to anonymous players in the second game; part (E): transfer to known group members in
the second game; part (F): difference between transfers to anonymous and non-anonymous players
in the second game
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of decisions in the solidarity game 2016; part (A): transfer to anonymous
players in the first game; part (B): transfer to known group members in the first game; part (C):
difference between transfers to anonymous and non-anonymous players in the first game; part (D):
transfer to anonymous players in the second game; part (E): transfer to known group members in
the second game; part (F): difference between transfers to anonymous and non-anonymous players
in the second game
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which was played in 2016 show the same pattern. While transfers were lower
to anonymous players (32.83PHP ), transfers to non-anonymous players were
significantly higher (34.51PHP ) and hence we keep finding discrepancies between
transfers to known and unknown players (p=0.003). The respective distribution
of transfers in both solidarity games from 2012 can be seen in Figure 4.5 and
the distribution of transfers in 2016 in Figure 4.6 respectively. Additionally we
observe a round effect in both years, since transfers seem to increase in the second
solidarity game in general. While transfers to anonymous players in the first game
were 30.41 on average in 2012, transfers increased to 32.27PHP on average in the
second round (p=0.007). The same relation can be seen when we look at transfers
to friends and relatives in 2012 (32.95PHP vs. 35.40PHP , p=0.001). If we look
at the experimental outcomes from 2016 however, we see this round effect only
for transfers to anonymous players (26.00PHP vs. 32.83PHP , p=0.000), while
transfers to non-anonymous players did not differ significantly between rounds
(33.88PHP vs. 34.51PHP , p=0.391). If we look closer at figures 4.5 and 4.6, we
can also observe that the share of individuals who give nothing at all in both
solidarity games has increased substantially. The number of individuals who give
nothing at all to anonymous players in the first game has increased from 44 to
110, while in the second game the number of individuals who give nothing at all
to losing anonymous players increased from 44 to 76. The same development can
be found in transfers to non-anonymous players. While the share of individuals
who gave nothing to known players increased from 21 to 53 in the first game, the
number of individuals increased from 21 to 71 in the second game. Hence we can
see that overall individuals are less willing to share their endowment with a losing
player in the follow up experiments, than they initially were in the first wave of
observations. If we compare the distribution of transfers to the initial solidarity
game by Selten and Ockenfels (1998) we can see that the share of individuals who
give the maximum amount possible is substantially higher in our sample than
in a sample of German students and as a consequence the share of individuals
which give nothing in the solidarity game substantially smaller (c.f. Selten and
Ockenfels, 1998, p. 519)8.
4.3.2 Risk games
In section 3.3.2 I described the risk elicitation tasks which we applied in the field.
The outcome for the binary choice between two lotteries was that a share of 440
individuals chose option A, which was indicating a preference for the riskier
8See also Ockenfels and Weimann (1999).
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Figure 4.7: Distribution of certainty equivalents in all three lotteries; part (A): distribution of
certainty equivalents for the first lottery; part (B): distribution of certainty equivalents for the
second lottery; part (C): distribution of certainty equivalents for the third lottery;
option with a lower expected value. The remaining 355 individuals “insured”
themselves against total losses by forgoing 40PHP to increase the minimum
earning in the game by 60PHP . Compared to Eckel and Grossman (2002) and
Eckel and Grossman (2008), we observe a different pattern since their samples of
American students on average prefer more risky options over similar options with
reduced losses for the costs of smaller gains9.
In 2016, we used a procedure which elicited certainty equivalents for three lotter-
ies. The resulting distributions of respective certainty equivalents can be found in
Figure 4.7. As we can see, most of our participants chose to either always play the
lottery or never. Out of 810 individuals, only relatively few participants switched
to a certain amount of money before they decided to play a lottery (84 individuals
in the first lottery, 126 in the second, and 98 in the third lottery). Although we
carefully explained the game to the participants and asked control questions in
the end to make sure they understood the consequences of their choices, we did
not reduce the choice set of individuals to consistent choices and as a consequence
we observe some individuals with multiple switching. Those individuals were
excluded from the analysis since there is no way known to me to quantify their
choices in a meaningful way. 70 individuals made inconsistent choices in the first
lottery , while 63 participants engaged in multiple switching in the second, and
29 in the third lottery respectively. I will only consider individuals which made
consistent choices in all three lotteries (N=693). Hence about 15% of individuals
show inconsistent behavior in a risk elicitation task which uses certainty equiv-
alents in our sample. This share is substantially higher than found in similar
9Compare for example outcomes in choices 4 and 5 in Eckel and Grossman (2002) on page 287
and Eckel and Grossman (2008) on page 3.
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studies which use very similar approaches in developing countries. For example,
Vieider et al. (2016) only observe that 0.6% of a sample of Ethiopians is switching
multiple times in their choice lists, and Vieider et al. (2019) find no multiple
switching at all in a Vietnamese sample. I administer the substantially higher
share of inconsistent individuals to the fact that we never explicitly mentioned
multiple switching while we were explaining the game, making sure that we did
not subconsciously direct decisions of our participants towards single switching
and hence guaranteeing free choices in the game. The remaining individuals
which only switched once at most seem to show quite consistent behavior across
lotteries in general as well, since correlation coefficients between certainty equiva-
lents of all lotteries are between 0.49 and 0.62 with respective p-values below the
one percent level.
4.4 Proxies & indices for capital forms
This sections describes what proxies and indices for the different forms of capital
are used in this study. Measuring capital forms in general is a challenging task and
scholars in economics currently struggle to construct well applicable measures for
each underlying concept. Therefore I elaborate a bit more on the variables which
are relevant in this thesis and give reasons for their application in this thesis.
Similar to Laroche et al. (1999), I define human capital as accumulated knowledge
and skills which an individual obtained throughout his/her lifetime. Although
health and personality traits (such as diligence and perseverance) are acknowl-
edged parts of human capital (c.f. Luthans et al., 2007), the most commonly
used proxies for human capital in economic literature are educational variables,
such as years of formal education or highest educational degree (cf. Castelló and
Doménech, 2002; Gennaioli et al., 2012; Jones, 2014; Goldin, 2016). Although the
focus lies clearly on educational variables in economics, psychologists may argue
that there exist fundamental personality traits which define how well an individ-
ual can function in a work-environment, thus extending the definition of human
capital by (arguably stable10) personality traits (cf. Seibert et al., 1999; Luthans
et al., 2007; Borghans et al., 2008). Therefore we also collected information about
the “Big Five” aspects of personality, which are commonly used measures in
psychology for assessing elements of an individuals’ personality (Digman, 1990;
McCrae and Costa Jr, 1999). The “Big Five” model, also referred to as the OCEAN
model11, has found its place in personality measurement among psychologists and
10(cf. McCrae and Costa Jr, 1994; Hampson and Goldberg, 2006; Debast et al., 2014)
11OCEAN stands for “openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness and neuroti-
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is more and more used by economists as well to account for aspects of personality.
However, if I apply the concept to our sample in the Philippines, we can see from
Table 4.5 that a factor analysis does not come to the conclusion that variables
which are attributable to the OCEAN model do fulfill minimum criteria to con-
struct indices for an underlying factor, with the exception of conscientiousness.
In a discussion about the external validity of the OCEAN model, Gurven et al.
(2013) find that the conceptualization of the “Big Five” does not generally apply
in every context. They apply the OCEAN model in a rural context with a Tsimane
population in Bolivia and failed to find robust support for the five factor model.
Their study showed that usually the five-factor model works quite well with an
educated sample in a laboratory setting, but fails to deliver conclusive measures
for the components of the OCEAN model when applied in a rural, less educated
population. Comparably, the five factor model for some reason was not entirely
applicable in our sample with the one exception of conscientiousness. This finding
may have some additional implications about the applicability of the five factor
model in a sample of rural villagers from the Philippines, although there were
probably and admittedly too few variables collected for each dimension of person-
ality and critique on the five factor model would be too premature. Nevertheless
we can see that variables that relate to the underlying concept of conscientiousness
correlate reasonably well with each other such that I am to a satisfactory degree
confident that I can use it as an indicator for one aspect of human capital (see
Table 4.5). Additionally, principal component analysis shows that the components
which I was suspecting to compose human capital do just sufficiently meet criteria
for index construction. However, as we can see from Table 4.5, education is only to
a minor part embedded in the index for human capital, which is why I am going
for a strategy using two approaches: see how results and respective interpretations
change if I use the index for human capital solely, or alternatively its components.
Therefore I will stick to the usual strategy of economists to measure human capital
also by simply using the highest educational degree as an indicator for individual
accumulated knowledge. Additionally I want to keep in mind that personality
as well might be an important aspect of human capital and therefore I will pay
attention to not neglect the measures for personality completely, although the
concept partly failed to be applicable in the context of this study. Unfortunately
one aspect of human capital, namely general health, was not measured by us in
the first wave of observations and therefore this study lacks data in that dimension.
Hence highest educational degree and conscientiousness seem to be the most reli-
cism”.
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able indicators for human capital which I have access to. This should be kept in
mind when interpreting results later, especially when I am also using an indicator
for overall human capital later on.
Since the first wave of observation was heavily focused on pro-social behavior and
attitudes, we collected a substantial number on social capital indicators in 2012.
I use exploratory factor analysis to derive underlying factors of different social
capital candidate variables. Table 4.6 shows the variables I use for both years to
extrapolate social capital indicators and respective factor loadings on underlying
concepts. The variables used to be candidates as social capital proxies were
decided by using a framework by Krishna and Shrader (1999) which visualizes the
different aspects of social capital on the micro and macro level. Additionally, I use
indicators for networking and community engagement which are also commonly
accepted parts of social capital (cf. Lillbacka, 2006; Chiesi, 2007; Hikichi et al.,
2017). The set of variables used in this study embeds concepts of institutional trust,
solidarity, trust in bonding elements such as family, friends or neighbors, trust in
general and additional indicators for community engagement such as voluntary
work or enrollment in clubs and associations. Each underlying concept meets
commonly used criteria to be used in a composite index according to cronbach’s
alpha (cf. Cortina, 1993). As I do not expect that social capital is a concept which
causally influences outcomes in each type of social capital indicator, but rather is a
collective composite of each underlying factor, I use principal component analysis
to derive a principal which i call “social capital”. As we can see from Table 4.6, the
loadings of each variable on the principal social capital are unevenly distributed in
favor of variables measuring elements of trust. Additionally, principal loadings are
rather small. Therefore, I suspect that the common index derived from principal
component analysis for social capital is not sufficiently constructed to measure
social capital in general and weights trust elements too heavily, although the index
itself would meet minimum criteria to be accepted as an underlying measure.
Hence for the remainder of the thesis I am going to continue by looking at the
overall index for social capital with special attention to its single components,
namely institutional trust, solidarity, trust in bonding ties, trust in general, number
of club memberships and times of voluntary community work. Unfortunately, our
measure for network size, the number of close friends, was measured differently
in 2012 and 201612, which is why I will not try to embed it in a common index
12In 2012 we asked directly: “How many close friends do you have?”, whereas in 2016 we asked
to mark persons on a list as a close friend, friends of which they expect help in times of need,
friends who helped them in times of need and friends which they helped in times of need (see
Surveys from 2016 in section A10.
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for both years, but instead look at it separately and keep the different types of
measurement in both years in mind.
Indicators for financial capital used in this study are indicators which show if
an individual receives regular income on a monthly basis, the average monthly
household income, the presence of savings larger than 1.000PHP , the presence
of debts larger than 5.000PHP , and a dummy which shows if someone in a
household had to make cuts in food intake due to a lack of money. An exploratory
principal component analysis shows a positive loading of being indebted if I
use all compnents in one common index. This may very well make sense if we
consider the possibility that only better endowed individuals may afford to engage
in indebtedness. However, since the relation between being in debt and financial
capital is not entirely clear to me, I refrain from using the variable we have for
indebtedness in an index for financial capital, and hence exclude it (see Table 4.7).
Measures for physical and natural capital on the household or individual level
were not collected in the baseline study in 2012 and therefore I cannot explore
into the relation between physical or natural capital and disaster resilience in
detail. However, we asked participants what materials they imbedded in their
housing and therefore got a vague picture of the stability of their respective
house. We openly asked participants if they would list completely what kind of
materials were used for constructing their houses. From their answers, we could
identify six kinds of materials which they used: thatch (Nipa leaves), bamboo,
wooden planks, cement, iron sheets, and stones/bricks. Figure 4.8 shows the
percentage of individuals across low intensity and high intensity villages which
use a certain type of material in their housing. I checked whether individual
households were different with regard to the material structure of their houses.
From our observations in the field we could not find substantial differences in
the structure of houses or other forms of long term adaption to cyclones. We still
asked our participants what kind of materials were implemented in their housing
before Yolanda. The results from this part of the survey can be seen in Figure
4.8. We can see that the main materials that are used for housing are bamboo,
thatch (from the Nipa palm), wooden planks, iron sheets, cement, and sometimes
bricks and stones. There were no other materials used for the main structure of
the houses of our participants. We observe that households from high intensity
villages rather had thatch (31.7% vs. 45.6%, p=0.000) and wooden planks (40.6%
vs. 56.0%, p=0.000) implemented in their housing than households from low
intensity villages, whereas low intensity households rather implemented iron
sheeting (58.0% vs. 51.5%, p=0.065).
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Table 4.7: Principal components of financial capital indicators
Variable All candidates
Financial
Capital
receives regular income 0.41 0.40
relative monthly household income 0.56 0.57
savings ≥ 1.000PHP 0.54 0.55
reduced meals last month -0.43 -0.47
debt ≥ 5.000PHP 0.22
Alpha 0.32 0.35
Eigenvalue 1.60 1.57
If we check how the usage of materials correlate, we can see that light materials,
such as thatch, bamboo and wooden planks correlate well with each other, while
they correlate negatively with heavy materials such as iron sheets and cement
and vice versa. Therefore it should be safe to say that there exist two types of
housing: the first type rather consists of light materials and the other type of rather
heavy materials (see Table A2.8). Hence we can categorize households into using
rather light materials for housing and rather heavy materials (where the criterion
for falling into using heavy materials is that a household at least used cement
and iron sheeting in their structure before Yolanda). As a result, I identify 243
households out of 810 which engaged in using rather heavy materials for building
their house and therefore we should be able to check whether the engagement
into using rather heavy materials mattered for disaster resilience. There are no
significant differences between low intensity and high intensity villages regarding
the mean engagement in using heavier materials (31.70% vs. 28.38%, p=0.318).
Unfortunately, we did not collect indicators for natural capital on the household
or individual level and therefore this study is not able to derive the importance of
natural capital on disaster resilience, or changes in natural capital due to disaster
exposure.
To get an overview of the development of the five forms of capital over time, Table
4.8 summarizes the relevant variables and indices which I use for the different
forms of capital and also shows mean values across both waves of observation for
the unbalanced panel, such that we get a picture of how the different variables
developed over time in high and low intensity areas. A corresponding table for
the balanced part of the panel can be found in the Appendix (Table A2.9). The
development of the human capital indicator was positive over time in low intensity
villages (increase from 0.68 to 0.77, p=0.000), whereas there seems to be no
significant difference over time in high intensity villages. We can observe that the
share of individuals whose highest educational attainment is elementary schooling
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Figure 4.8: Materials that were used for housing before Yolanda
has increased by eight percentage points over time in high intensity villages (from
27% to 35%), whereas the share stayed almost the same in low intensity villages
(22% vs. 23%). At this point I have to mention that our measure for education
seems fuzzy over time, since we also observe that the share of individuals that
report to have at least one college degree has shrunk more than half in high
intensity villages. Unfortunately this is also true for the balanced part of the panel.
Therefore it seems like our measure for having a college degree is somewhat
faulted, since it makes no sense that the share of individuals which attained the
highest attainable degree changes negatively within this set of individuals. If we
look at the index for conscientiousness, we see that individuals from low intensity
villages scored higher on average in the index in 2016 than in 2012 (0.80 vs. 0.74,
p=0.000). This increase corresponds roughly to a third of a standard deviation
in low intensity villages in 2012, whereas the index significantly decreased on
average by 0.02 points in high intensity villages (p=0.038). We also see substantial
changes in the endowment of financial capital on average in our sample. The index
overall developed positively both in high (0.11 vs. 0.16, p=0.000) and low intensity
areas (0.10 vs. 0.14, p=0.000) by about 4-5 index points. This development can
be mostly explained by the general improvement of index components. For
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example, the share of individuals reporting to receive regular monthly income has
increased between three fifth in low intensity villages, and three fourth in high
intensity villages, which indicates that income flows have become more stable and
predictable for individuals over time. We also observe substantial and significant
increases in self-reported monthly household income between almost 20% in low
intensity areas, and roughly 37% in high intensity villages. This shows a general
increase in the financial wealth of households, since prices in the Philippines
have increased only by roughly 11% between 2012 and 2016 (The World Bank,
2018). We also observe significant increases in the share of individuals which
report to have savings above or equal 1.000PHP in low intensity villages (17%
in 2012, 25% in 2016), whereas the 5% increase in high intensity villages is only
statistically significant in the balanced part of the panel. Additionally we can
observe that the share of individuals which claim to have debt above 5.000PHP
has significantly increased in low intensity villages, whereas this share seems to
have declined on average in high intensity villages, although not significantly. An
indicator for poverty, namely the share of individuals which claim to have had
days in the last month where they had to cut meals because of a lack of money,
has roughly stayed constant over time in low intensity villages (55% vs. 50%),
whereas we observe substantial declines in high intensity villages. While the share
of individuals which claimed to have had cuts in meals in high intensity villages
was around 70% in 2012, this number declined significantly by 14% (20% in the
balanced part of the panel). When we look at social capital, we see that in general
the index declined over time both in low intensity (0.58 vs. 0.54, p=0.001) and
high intensity villages (0.57 vs. 0.54, p=0.031) by between 3-4 index points. For
the single components of social capital we can observe that trust in institutions
has generally declined over time, both in low intensity villages (by roughly 0.04
points) and high intensity villages (0.03 points). The index for solidarity has
stayed almost constant over time (around roughly 0.61 points, both in low and
high intensity villages), whereas we see some degree of heterogeneity between the
components of the solidarity index13. Additionally we see that trust in bonding
ties was rather robust over time and around 0.61 index points on average in both
years for both types of villages. The most striking changes over time in our sample
regarding social capital indicators are changes in the share of individuals which
say that people in general can or cannot be trusted. In our data we see that whereas
13We observe that there are significant changes in transfers to anonymous players in the first
solidarity game over time, whereas there seem to be no significant changes over time of transfers
to anonymous players in the second solidarity game, and also no changes of transfers to friends or
relatives in both games over time.
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the share of individuals who said that people can be trusted in general was around
25%-30% in 2012, this share declined substantially both in high and low intensity
villages over time, namely to 7% in low intensity, and to 16% in high intensity
villages on average. The number of club memberships declined significantly in
high intensity villages by 0.15 on average, whereas the times of voluntary work in
the last 90 days stayed rather robust across time and around two days on average
both in high and in low intensity areas. Also the size of households was rather
robust across time and stayed around five persons on average in both types of
villages. Since we lack baseline data in physical capital, we can only look at the
types of materials households used for constructing their house according to their
statements in 2016. We also look at the self stated distance of households to the sea,
assuming that individuals did not change their location of residence between the
waves of observation. We see that 32% of households embedded heavy materials
in their housing in low intensity areas, and around 28% in high intensity villages.
We also observe substantial differences in both types of villages regarding their
self reported distance to the sea, indicating that randomization did not work out
as well with regard to the average perceived distance to the ocean. However, we
know for a fact that all of our villages were located directly at the sea with regard
to their village borders and almost all of them had households residing directly
at the sea (with the exception of barangay Nanding Lopez, which was situated a
bit further inland). Summarizing Table 4.8, we observe changes in capital forms
over time, whereas for human capital, individuals perceive themselves as more
conscientious on average in low intensity villages and less conscientious in high
intensity villages. The data show substantial changes in financial capital, namely
mainly increases in financial endowment and possibly more access to lending.
Indicators for social capital have shown rather negative changes over time with
some robust facets, such as household size and voluntary community engagement.
At this point I also want to remind the reader that the number of close friends was
elicited differently in both years, and therefore changes in their mean values could
be explained by the difference in elicitation. This could also be the cause why the
standard deviations for network sizes are declining substantially over time.
4.5 Clusters of capital endowment
In this section I want to check whether or not there are certain clusters of indi-
viduals which have characteristic capital endowment to be later able to check if
certain clusters have performed better in terms of disaster recovery than other
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Table 4.8: Main indicators for the five forms of capital used in this study
low intensity villages high intensity villages
Variables 2012 2016 p-value 2012 2016 p-value
Human capital 0.68 0.77 0.000*** 0.76 0.76 0.797
(0.17) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
Highest degree: elementary school 0.22 0.23 0.684 0.27 0.35 0.017**
(0.42) (0.42) (0.44) (0.48)
Highest degree: high school 0.50 0.51 0.891 0.55 0.53 0.659
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Highest degree: college 0.20 0.16 0.213 0.15 0.07 0.001***
(0.40) (0.37) (0.36) (0.26)
Highest degree: vocational training 0.08 0.09 0.395 0.03 0.05 0.352
(0.27) (0.29) (0.18) (0.21)
Conscientiousness (index from 0-1) 0.74 0.80 0.000*** 0.82 0.80 0.038**
(0.19) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
Financial capital 0.11 0.16 0.000*** 0.10 0.14 0.000***
(0.11) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11)
Receives regular income 0.25 0.41 0.000*** 0.20 0.35 0.000***
(0.44) (0.49) (0.40) (0.48)
Monthly household income 5288.47 6324.38 0.000*** 3753.53 5147.16 0.000***
(3761.30) (5237.63) (4610.29) (7998.74)
Savings ≥ 1.000PHP 0.17 0.25 0.002*** 0.21 0.26 0.121
(0.37) (0.44) (0.41) (0.44)
Dept ≥ 5.000PHP 0.32 0.38 0.099* 0.37 0.31 0.105
(0.47) (0.49) (0.48) (0.46)
Reduction of food intake 0.55 0.50 0.151 0.70 0.56 0.000***
(0.50) (0.50) (0.46) (0.50)
Social capital 0.58 0.54 0.001*** 0.57 0.54 0.031**
(0.16) (0.17 (0.15) (0.17)
Institutional trust (index from 0-1) 0.64 0.60 0.000*** 0.63 0.60 0.000***
(0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.15)
Solidarity (index from 0-1) 0.50 0.49 0.499 0.43 0.42 0.489
(0.24) (0.25) (0.23) (0.26)
Trust in bonding ties (index from 0-1) 0.62 0.61 0.440 0.60 0.61 0.607
(0.22) (0.25) (0.21) (0.25)
Generalized trust 0.29 0.07 0.000*** 0.27 0.16 0.000***
(0.45) (0.25) (0.44) (0.37)
Number of club-memberships 0.47 0.51 0.376 0.58 0.43 0.001***
(0.68) (0.78) (0.66) (0.62)
Times of voluntary work for community in last 90 days 2.54 2.72 0.701 1.87 1.87 0.980
(4.68) (8.49) (3.17) (2.97)
Household size 5.06 4.98 0.635 4.91 4.87 0.810
(1.87) (3.03) (1.80) (2.20)
Number of close friends 2.83 2.53 0.013** 2.76 2.58 0.360
(2.00) (1.40) (3.83) (1.14)
Barangay kagawat 0.15 0.12 0.237 0.15 0.12 0.189
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Physical capital
Used heavy materials in housing before Yolanda 0.32 0.28
(0.47) (0.45)
Distance of house to the ocean 1264.80 138.80
(9809.56) (391.36)
N 426 432 369 378
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clusters. The idea behind this kind of analysis is that it maybe the case that one
single type of capital may be important for building disaster resilience, but what
if an individual is completely lacking in the rest of them? Say for example an
individual has a huge amount of financial assets, but is no longer able to use them
in a meaningful manner since systems around him broke down which enabled
him to make use of those assets. Then the functioning of financial capital as a
channel to alleviate the consequences of a disaster became meaningless since it
alone is not able to function in that manner without certain structures, channels
or systems that synergize with its functionality. Hence we check whether there are
certain clusters that were especially effective in using their different endowments
of capital and see, which combination of capital forms could potentially be most
relevant. Hence we conduct a cluster analysis using the previously constructed
indices for human capital, social capital and financial capital and check if there
are some meaningful clusters of capital endowment. For easier cluster interpreta-
tion we standardize variables for the respective indices to means of zero with a
standard deviation of one. Since we are interested in the effects of being in one
cluster on resilience indicators in 2016, we only conduct this type of analysis for
the balanced part of the panel and only cluster individuals capital endowment
from 2012. We use single linkage clustering for outlier detection and follow up by
using Wards linkage to decide on the number of clusters which we use in the end.
The resulting dendograms can be seen in Figure 4.9. From part (A) of Figure 4.9
we can observe that there are about 10 observations in our balanced data set which
are quite unique in their type of capital endowment and hence continue to cluster
individuals without taking those observations into account. A Wards linkage
cluster analysis then suggests that a solution with about three clusters would
probably be most efficient in our case (part (B)). Therefore we continue by using a
k-means algorithm14 to assign individuals into three clusters and check whether
we can interpret those clusters in a meaningful way, such that it could make sense
to use them later on for analysis. The final result of this analysis can be found in
Figure 4.10. The first cluster we obtain in the end contains 179 observations and
consists on average of individuals who are endowed with very little human capital
and are also quite below average in social capital and financial capital. The second
cluster which consists of 169 individuals is on average endowed quite well with
human and social capital, but lacks a bit financial capital on average. The third
cluster, consisting of 81 individuals, is endowed with a little above average human
capital and substantially above average with financial capital, but lacks a bit social
14To obtain replicable results, we used a seed for random procedures of 11032013.
101
4.5. CLUSTERS OF CAPITAL ENDOWMENT CHAPTER 4. DATA
capital compared to the rest of our participants. Table 4.9 shows mean values of
standardized capital indicators and shows the results of tests for equality of mean
values using a two sided t-test. As we can see, cluster one, two, and three all differ
significantly from each other with regard to average social capital endowment.
The only differences that are not significantly different from zero are differences
in financial capital between clusters one and two and differences in human capital
between clusters two and three. We use these clusters later on when we discuss a
possible relation between different forms of capital endowment and performance
in disaster resilience indicators. Now the question remains if there are certain
demographic groups allocated within those clusters we just defined. We look
at this question by regressing certain characteristics of individuals on cluster
allocation. The results of this regression are shown in Table 4.10, which shows
that there essentially no explanatory power for individual characteristics such as
age, gender, relationship status or the duration an individual lives in a village on
cluster allocation, with the exception of years living in a barangay significantly
explaining allocation in cluster number two, although with quite low effect size.
An increase in living in the barangay by one standard deviation is associated with
an increase in the probability to be allocated in cluster two by about 0.06 standard
deviation, which indicates that people living longer in a barangay have a small but
significant tendency to have more social capital, since cluster two has especially
much social capital on average. The same can be said about household sizes, which
have a similar effect on the probability of being allocated in cluster two.
Figure 4.9: Dendograms after cluster analysis; part (A): dendogram after single linkage cluster
analysis for outlier detection; part (B): dendogram after Wards Linkage cluster analysis to decide
on number of clusters
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Table 4.9: Mean endowment with capital forms of clusters
clusters
mean comparison tests
p-values
1 2 3 1 vs. 2 2 vs. 3 1 vs. 3
Human capital (2012) -0.73 0.59 0.45 0.000 0.141 0.000
(0.87) (0.69) (0.75)
Financial capital (2012) -0.37 -0.45 1.33 0.156 0.000 0.000
(0.63) (0.54) (0.67)
Social capital (2012) -0.55 0.66 -0.14 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.82) (0.76) (0.85)
n 179 169 81
Table 4.10: Effect of certain demographic characteristics on cluster allocation
(1) (2) (3)
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Age -0.00 -0.04 0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Female -0.02 0.00 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Status: single -0.00 0.03 -0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Years living in village -0.02 0.06∗∗ -0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Household size -0.04 0.06∗∗ -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Fisher -0.06 0.04 0.01
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Constant 0.22∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 421 421 421
F 0.68 1.82 0.49
R2 0.02 0.01 0.01
Adjusted R2 -0.00 0.00 -0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 4.10: Clusters after k-means clustering and corresponding mean capital endowments
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5. Results
This chapter is dedicated to exploring the research questions and hypotheses at
hand by reporting the output of multivariate regression models and graphical
representations of relations between variables. The first section explores what
drivers of resilience are by testing the framework developed in section 2.2, and
give an interpretation of the results. the second part of this chapter elaborates
more on the causal relation between disaster exposure and changes in capital
forms, pro-social behavior and risk behavior due to typhoon exposure.
5.1 Influence of capital on aspects of resilience
This section looks deeper into the relation between the five forms of capital and
aspects of disaster resilience. I use simple OLS estimations of different aspects of
resilience (recovery time, recovery costs, individual perceived affectedness, the
time between people realizing that they would be hit by a storm and actual impact,
the perceived level of external help, and the perceived level of internal help from
friends and neighbors) using variables which I defined in section 4.4 that indicate
the individual or household endowment with different forms of capital before
the exposure to Yolanda (in the year 2012). I am also using village fixed effects
to control for the exposure to typhoon Yolanda on the village level and other
unobserved co-variates which might play a role in disaster recovery on the village
level (for example external disaster relieve aid). For all dependent variables which
represent parts of resilience we look at five model specifications. The first four
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are merely tests for the explanatory power of each category of capital on the
dependent variable, whereas model specification five represents a complete model
which includes all facets of capital measured. This section begins by looking at
the effect of broader measures for the forms of capital which were constructed in
section 4.4 and concludes by looking at the components of each index in more
detail. This approach allows us to find broad effects of the forms of capital on
aspects of disaster resilience and to look at the sources and the heterogeneous
impacts of index components in more detail later on.
Table 5.1: Effect of five capital forms indices on recovery time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Human capital 0.03 0.04
(0.04) (0.05)
Financial capital -0.09∗∗ -0.10∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Social capital 0.04 0.04
(0.06) (0.06)
HH used heavy materials -0.05 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
Distance to ocean 0.04 0.04
(0.03) (0.04)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.23∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Observations 433 433 433 430 430
F 2.62 2.28 2.61 2.37 1.91
R2 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.17
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
We begin by looking at Table 5.1, which shows the results of a simple OLS re-
gression of the broader measures for the capital forms on recovery time. For
easier interpretation of effect sizes, I standardized variables to have a mean of zero
and a standard deviation of one. Models (1)-(4) show the results by testing the
impact of each form of capital on the outcome variable singularly, while model
(5) shows a combined model to test whether or not any significant results we find
stay robust across a different model specification, where we include all broader
measures for the single capital forms. We can observe that most indicators for the
capital forms do not show a significant relation between recovery time (a.k.a. the
number of days households needed to repair their houses), with the exception of
the indicator for financial capital, which is inline with our expectations regarding
its singular effect, but not inline with our expectations regarding the effects of
social capital and human capital, which we also hypothesized to be prevalent
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when tested. From models (2) and (5) we can see that an increase of financial
capital by one standard deviation is correlated to a decrease in recovery time by
about 0.09 standard deviations. This effect stays robust if we also include standard
control variables into the models such as age, gender and family status (see table
A2.15 in the Appendix). This result suggests that the relative importance of the
forms of capital which we measured is not as weighted as we expected, since there
are quite strong arguments for social capital and human capital to be important
as well for a quicker disaster recovery (see section 2.2). However, at this point we
observe that rather financial capital seems to drive the recovery time of households
the most in our sample, whereas other indicators were not able to explain recovery
time significantly in a regression.
Table 5.2: Effect of five capital forms indices on recovery costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Human capital 0.04 0.03
(0.05) (0.04)
Financial capital 0.05 0.04
(0.07) (0.07)
Social capital 0.04 0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
HH used heavy materials 0.04 0.04
(0.05) (0.05)
Distance to ocean 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.42 0.45 0.43 0.44 0.42
(0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
Observations 445 445 445 445 445
F 6.16 6.26 6.35 5.90 5.27
R2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Next we look at Table 5.2 which shows the results of a regression of the broader
capital indicators on recovery costs. We can see that none of the indicators are
able to explain recovery costs in any of the model specifications. Combining this
finding with the results from Table 5.1, we can not reject the null of H1a and H2a,
since none of the broader indicators for social capital and human capital were
able to explain outcomes in neither recovery time nor recovery costs. However, we
can not completely reject the null of H3a, since we see a negative and significant
relation between financial capital and recovery time.
Next we look at Table 5.3 to investigate the relation between broader measures
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Table 5.3: Effect of five capital forms indices on time until impact
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Human capital 0.02 0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Financial capital 0.07 0.06
(0.05) (0.05)
Social capital 0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
HH used heavy materials 0.08 0.08
(0.06) (0.06)
Distance to ocean -0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.32∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Observations 446 446 446 446 446
F 1.99 1.96 1.98 1.66 1.51
R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06
Adjusted R2 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
for the forms of capital and the time individuals had between they realized a
strong disaster was incoming, and actual landfall of typhoon Yolanda. All model
specifications in this table show that there is no significant relation between our
broader measures for capital forms and the time which individuals had to react to
the storm. Hence it seems like for now we can reject hypotheses H1b, H2b, and
H3b. Therefore our results at this point suggest that none of the capital forms were
helpful in deciding the reaction time of individuals to the disaster, which indicates
that other factors may help better to shorten reaction times. However, since we do
not have a measure for functioning warning systems, we cannot say much about
this type of relation. About the relation between financial assets and social capital
however, we observe that none of which were relevant in that regard, which means
that in our sample investments in these types of capital would probably not be
very fruitful to decrease reaction times. By including standard control variables
we obtain the same results, however one probably interesting side finding is an
effect of being single on the reaction time. Singles tended to have less time to
react than non-singles by between one fourth and one fifth of a standard deviation
in reaction time (see Table A2.17 in the Appendix). This finding suggests that
married couples or individuals that live with their partner without being married
find it easier to react to a disaster and need less time to realize that something
devastating is incoming.
Table 5.4 shows how different endowments of capital in 2012 explain the indi-
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Table 5.4: Effect of five capital forms indices on individual perceived affectedness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Human capital 0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Financial capital 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Social capital 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
HH used heavy materials -0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Distance to ocean 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.42∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 446 446 446 446 446
F 12.51 12.60 13.16 12.06 12.23
R2 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.44
Adjusted R2 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.38 0.39
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
vidual perceived affectedness in 2012. It shows that there is is a possible relation
between endowment with social capital and the individual perceived affectedness.
I have shown before that the individual perceived affectedness is very well cor-
related to the actual strength of destruction within a village, and therefore this
relation seems odd, since we clearly expected a negative and significant relation
between endowment with social capital and being affected in general. However,
we observe quite the opposite: individuals with a one standard deviation higher
endowment in social capital have a 0.03 standard deviation higher perceived
affectedness on average. This result may suggest that there are channels at work
which make individuals with higher social capital more sensitive towards the
perception of being affected.
Now we look at Tables 5.5 and 5.6 which show the results of a OLS regression
of the forms of capital on the perceived external (by governmental and non-
governmental institutions) and internal help (by friends and neighbors). We see
from models (1), (2), and (3) in Table 5.5 that the broader measures for human
capital and financial capital are not able to significantly explain perceived external
help. However, we can observe that social capital might play an important role
in explaining the perception of help from governmental and non-governmental
institutions, since the coefficient for social capital shows a positive and significant
relation, where an increase in social capital by one standard deviation corresponds
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Table 5.5: Effect of five capital forms indexes on perceived external help
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Human capital -0.00 -0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
Financial capital 0.04 0.05
(0.04) (0.04)
Social capital 0.11∗∗ 0.11∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
HH used heavy materials -0.10∗∗ -0.10∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Distance to ocean -0.06 -0.06
(0.05) (0.06)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.32
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22)
Observations 446 446 446 446 446
F 6.05 6.17 6.54 6.44 6.19
R2 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.28
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.22
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5.6: Effect of five capital forms indices on perceived help by friends and neighbors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Human capital -0.03 -0.06
(0.05) (0.05)
Financial capital 0.10∗ 0.11∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Social capital 0.10∗ 0.10∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
HH used heavy materials -0.03 -0.04
(0.05) (0.05)
Distance to ocean -0.05 -0.04
(0.06) (0.06)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.34 0.34 0.30 0.31 0.35
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21)
Observations 446 446 446 446 446
F 1.22 1.40 1.35 1.16 1.47
R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09
Adjusted R2 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
110
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 5.1. INFLUENCE OF CAPITAL ON ASPECTS OF RESILIENCE
to an increase of perceived external help by about one tenth of a standard deviation.
This provides additional evidence for the assumption that social capital increases
the probability of interaction with external stakeholders which provide help
after a crisis. Additionally we observe that households that used heavy materials
perceived that they received less external help than households which only used
light materials. This might indicate that there was some sort of targeting external
help towards households with less structural integrity, which is inline with the
assumption that households that were heavier affected (in terms of destruction
of their household) received more aid by external actors. This is also indicated
by looking at regressions that include control variables (Table A2.19), where we
observe that especially women systematically perceived more external help (about
one fifth of a standard deviation more), but not more internal help than males
(see Table A2.20). If we look at Table 5.6 we see that human capital is again
not able to explain the dependent variable, which is the perceived internal help
in this case. Financial and social capital however seem to be rather relevant to
explain the perception of help by friends, family and neighbors and of about equal
importance. According to the results in Table 5.6, increases of financial capital
or social capital by one standard deviation roughly correspond to increases in
individual perceived internal help by about one tenth of a standard deviation.
I also repeat the same kind of regressions using only observations which stem
from high intensity villages. The respective tables can be found in the appendix
(Tables A2.27, A2.28, A2.29, A2.30, A2.31, and A2.32). By looking at the tables we
can see that the relation between the financial capital indicator and recovery time
stays negative and significant, whereas we do not see significant relations between
recovery time and the indicator of human capital, or the indicator of social capital.
All other relations we found using the complete data-set stay robust when we look
at the subset of highly affected individuals only.
Now I want to look at the relation between the components of capital indicators
and indicators for resilience a bit in more detail. First and foremost we take a look
at the relation between the forms of capital and the time households needed for
their houses to be completely repaired after Yolanda. Our expectations were that
indicators of human, social, and financial capital are negatively correlated with
recovery time (H1a, H2c, H3a). The results of a regression of capital indicators
and recovery time are reported in Table 5.7 on page 117. We can observe that
the five factor model does not explain much of the variation in recovery time
(R2 ≤ 0.19) and less explanatory variables than expected seem to be significantly
able to explain variations in recovery time. Model (1), which tests the relation
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between human capital indicators and recovery time, indicates that individuals
with either vocational training or a college degree need around 30 days less to
repair their houses than individuals with elementary schooling as the highest
educational degree. However, this is only significant on the ten percent level1
and not robust across different model specifications, such that the significance is
lost in the complete model in column (5). Financial capital indicators also only
barely explain variation in recovery time in our sample, but we see a significant
and robust relation between having to reduce food intake because of a lack of
money in a household and the time needed for repairs. Households that reported
to have to reduce food because of a lack of money need about 30 days more to
repair damages, which is about a fifth of a standard deviation respectively. This
observation meets our expectations since it can be the case that households which
have no financial reserves, such that they even have to reduce their food intake,
may find it harder to mobilize financial resources towards repairs of housing,
since food intake is also a fundamental need. Therefore very poor households find
themselves at a disadvantage because they do not have the freedom to prioritize
reparation efforts and have to stick to put their efforts in satisfying fundamental
needs first. Although it is well established in the literature that social capital plays
a major role in disaster recovery, we cannot empirically observe this relation in our
sample in general. From models (3) and (5) in Table 5.7 on page 117 we can see
that only the number of close friends can significantly explain recovery time. An
increase in the number of friends by one standard deviation on average leads to
declines in recovery time by about a tenth of a standard deviation. Therefore the
effect size of increasing network sizes is relatively small. We get a similar picture
if we look at the explanatory power of the five factor model on recovery costs (see
Table 5.8 on page 118), where only village fixed effects seem to be sufficiently able
to explain variation in recovery costs2.
And how was the time individuals had to prepare for the disaster affected by the
forms of capital? We look at this question by looking at the regression results from
table 5.9 on page 119. We can observe that while almost none of the variables used
in each model are able to explain variation in the time individuals had between
they realized a disaster was incoming and actual impact of Yolanda, income is
significantly able to explain this variable, but only on the ten percent level. The
effect size of the coefficient is also rather small, since the coefficient implies that
an increase of income by one standard deviation would lead to an increase in
1p=0.053 for vocational training and p=0.084 for college degree
2A regression of capital forms on recovery costs without controlling for village fixed effects
results in an R2 between 0.01 and 0.05.
112
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 5.1. INFLUENCE OF CAPITAL ON ASPECTS OF RESILIENCE
the time an individual had to repair by only about 0.12 standard deviations of
the dependent variable. The last part of disaster resilience we are looking at in
this regard is the individual perceived affectedness as defined in section 4.2. The
results of the regression models on the individual perceived affectedness can be
found in Table 5.10 on page 120. We can observe that human capital indicators are
not able to significantly explain any variation in individual perceived affectedness.
We can however observe some mild significant effect of income on the perception
of being affected, since an increase in income by one standard deviation seems
to lead to a decrease in perceived affection by about an eighth of a standard
deviation. Now have a look at model (3) in Table 5.10 on page 120. From the
results of the regression we see that individuals who claimed to be more involved in
voluntary work for the community were significantly perceiving themselves more
affected. An increase in voluntary work by one standard deviation corresponds to
increases in affectedness by about 0.7 standard deviations. This relation is rather
unexpected, since we hypothesized that parts of social capital help individuals to
reduce their affectedness, whereas we see the opposite relation in this example.
Table 5.11 on page 121 shows the estimates of a regression of capital indicators on
the individual perceived level of external help as previously defined in section
4.2. Models (1) and (5) show a positive and significant correlation between having
a high school or college degree and/or vocational training with the individual
perceived presence of external help, indicating that having a high school (college)
degree is linked to an increase in perceived help by about a tenth (two tenths)
of a standard deviation in perceived help. The effect of vocational training on
the perception of external aid is visible in models (1) and (5) and also roughly
corresponds to an increase of perceived aid by roughly a tenth of a standard devi-
ation. Financial capital as well as social capital indicators do not seem to be able
to explain variation in perceived help (model(2) and (3)). However, for physical
capital we see that households that used heavy materials in their housing were
less likely to perceive high levels of help, since we see a negative and significant
relation (model (4) and (5)) which corresponds to a decrease in perceived help
by about one tenth of a standard deviation. Lastly, Table 5.12 on page 122 shows
the output if we use the index for internal help as the dependent variable for the
five factor model. Human capital indicators as well as physical indicators do not
significantly explain variation in the individual perceived help from friends and
family. Financial capital (model (2)) show a significant relation between having
liquid savings and receiving help from others, with an effect size about a tenth
of a standard deviation and significance on the five percent level, whereas other
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financial capital indicators are not able to explain variation in perceived help from
friends and family. Unexpectedly, the number of friends shows a negative and
significant correlation with help from friends and family, although with an almost
negligible effect size, since an increase of the number of friends by one standard
deviation corresponds to a decease in perceived internal help by just a twentieth
of a standard deviation.
The results from Tables 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, 5.11and 5.12 can be summarized as
follows: From the literature we expected a clear correlation between all facets of
capital forms and indicators for disaster resilience. However, we just explored that
this is not the case per se, but that rather differentiated aspects of the capital forms
influence disaster resilience through various channels. For example, we expected
that human capital is negatively correlated with recovery time and recovery
costs, and positively correlated with the time individuals heard about a disaster
incoming and the disaster actually making landfall (H1a and H1b) (cf. Wamsler
et al., 2012; Drabek, 2013; Muttarak and Pothisiri, 2013; Frankenberg et al., 2013;
Sharma et al., 2013). However, looking at the results from the regressions we
are not able to reject the respective null hypotheses and therefore it seems that
the relative importance of education and being conscientious would be valued
too high in our example ex ante. But somewhat surprisingly we could observe
a positive relation between the perception of external help and having a higher
educational degree. This correlation could hint towards a relation of higher
educated individuals being more able to engage help providers and therefore have
a higher perception of help in general. Of course this channel is speculative and
needs further investigation, since we did not expect such a relation beforehand
(see section 2.5).
Next we look at social capital indicators and look at their explanatory power of
resilience indicators. Again, we expected that all indicators for social capital
were able to explain variation in recovery costs, recovery time, perceived help
from others, and the time between individuals realizing a storm was incoming
and actual impact (H2a-H2c) (cf. Granovetter, 1983; Nakagawa and Shaw, 2004;
Hawkins and Maurer, 2009; Aldrich, 2012b; Drabek, 2013). What we get if we
empirically test this relation is that we observe that social capital indicators in
general cannot sufficiently explain variation in resilience indicators. However, we
do find a negative and significant relation between the number of close friends
an individual has and recovery time, as well as significantly increased perceived
affectedness by individuals who had higher level of voluntary work in 2012.
Furthermore we observe that individuals with higher levels in trust in bonding
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elements perceive higher levels of internal help afterward. This relation could
stem from the potential of trust to build networks which help in turn to access
resources, as we previously hypothesized.
We also explored the relative importance of financial capital on disaster resilience.
Our expectations were that financial capital would be also negatively correlated
with recovery time, but positively with recovery costs respectively (cf. Clarke and
Wallsten, 2003; Skoufias, 2003; Carter et al., 2007; Skoufias, 2007; Macours et al.,
2012, 2013; Le Quesne et al., 2017). We see that in our regressions the coefficients
for most of the financial capital indicators are not able to explain variation in
resilience indicators, with the exception of the reduction of food due to a lack
of financial assets and monthly income. We can observe that monthly income
seems to be significantly relevant for knowing about the disaster beforehand and
self perception of affectedness. I believe that the significant increase in time that
people had to prepare for the disaster is driven by higher access to technological
means which help to foresee devastating events, such as smartphone applications
or general access to the internet (cf. Mark and Semaan, 2008; Mark et al., 2009).
However, I cannot substantiate this claim with our data and therefore simply rely
on the fact that the coefficient meets our predictions from section 2.3.3 which
already made implications about this channel. Not having sufficient financial
funds to ensure a stable food intake for a household is also positively correlated
with recovery time, which is inline with our expectations since households that
have no financial assets a fortiori have not sufficient liquid assets during a crisis,
and might therefore find themselves especially vulnerable to destructive disasters.
Additionally we observe that individuals with savings perceived that they received
more internal help from friends and family than individuals with no savings
above 1,000PHP . At his point I can only speculate why we see this relation. One
possible explanation could be that friends and family were sometimes financially
compensated for their help at reconstruction and therefore individuals with fi-
nancial reserves might have been able to mobilize workforces from their bonding
networks more easily. Another explanation could be that individuals have some
vague idea about the financial reserves of other people and therefore form some
sort of reciprocal ties rather with people with financial reserves, hoping to get
something in return in the future.
Finally we saw that physical capital indicators (which are admittedly rare in this
study) have some degree of explanatory power towards perceived help, which
could indicate that external help was primarily provided to homeowners who
used primarily light materials. However, we could not find any relation with other
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indicators for disaster resilience, such that the relative importance of having heavy
materials embedded in a structure seems only to play a minor role in general.
116
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 5.1. INFLUENCE OF CAPITAL ON ASPECTS OF RESILIENCE
Table 5.7: Effect of five capital forms components on recovery time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High school -0.03 -0.02
(0.07) (0.06)
Vocational training -0.05∗ -0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
College -0.08∗ -0.05
(0.04) (0.05)
Conscientiousness 0.04 0.05
(0.04) (0.05)
Regular income 0.02 0.02
(0.05) (0.06)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) -0.01 -0.00
(0.03) (0.04)
Savings≥ 1.000PHP -0.08 -0.09
(0.05) (0.05)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP 0.10 0.10
(0.06) (0.07)
Reduced food 0.10∗∗ 0.12∗∗
(0.04) (0.05)
Trust: institutions 0.09 0.08
(0.07) (0.08)
Solidarity 0.02 0.04
(0.06) (0.06)
Trust: bonding -0.09 -0.10
(0.07) (0.07)
Trust: general 0.03 0.04
(0.05) (0.05)
Club memberships -0.00 -0.00
(0.05) (0.06)
Voluntary work 0.04 0.03
(0.04) (0.05)
Household size 0.00 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Number of friends -0.09∗∗ -0.09∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Barangay kagawat 0.02 0.12
(0.17) (0.18)
HH used heavy materials -0.05 -0.06
(0.04) (0.04)
Distance to ocean 0.04 0.04
(0.03) (0.04)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.21∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.11)
Observations 433 433 433 430 430
F 2.12 1.95 1.91 2.37 1.32
R2 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.20
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5.8: Effect of five capital forms components on recovery costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High school -0.01 0.00
(0.07) (0.06)
Vocational training 0.03 0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
College 0.00 -0.00
(0.05) (0.05)
Conscientiousness 0.04 0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
Regular income -0.03 -0.02
(0.04) (0.05)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) 0.01 0.02
(0.05) (0.05)
Savings≥ 1.000PHP 0.03 0.02
(0.05) (0.05)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP 0.09 0.09
(0.05) (0.06)
Reduced food -0.01 -0.01
(0.05) (0.06)
Trust: institutions 0.02 0.03
(0.04) (0.05)
Solidarity 0.04 0.03
(0.07) (0.07)
Trust: bonding -0.02 -0.02
(0.05) (0.05)
Trust: general 0.06 0.05
(0.06) (0.06)
Club memberships -0.02 -0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
Voluntary work 0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.03)
Household size 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.04)
Number of friends -0.04 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
Barangay kagawat 0.06 -0.01
(0.16) (0.16)
HH used heavy materials 0.04 0.02
(0.05) (0.04)
Distance to ocean 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.02)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.43 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.44
(0.35) (0.34) (0.33) (0.35) (0.34)
Observations 445 445 445 445 445
F 5.69 5.30 4.88 5.90 3.96
R2 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.27
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.18
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5.9: Effect of five capital forms components on time individuals had to prepare for impact
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High school -0.03 -0.03
(0.06) (0.06)
Vocational training -0.02 -0.04
(0.04) (0.05)
College 0.04 0.01
(0.06) (0.06)
Conscientiousness 0.04 0.02
(0.05) (0.05)
Regular income 0.03 0.03
(0.05) (0.06)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) 0.12∗ 0.12∗
(0.07) (0.07)
Savings≥ 1.000PHP -0.07 -0.07
(0.05) (0.05)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP 0.06 0.05
(0.06) (0.06)
Reduced food -0.02 -0.01
(0.04) (0.05)
Trust: institutions 0.00 0.01
(0.06) (0.06)
Solidarity 0.02 0.01
(0.05) (0.06)
Trust: bonding 0.01 0.00
(0.06) (0.06)
Trust: general 0.03 0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
Club memberships -0.01 -0.05
(0.05) (0.05)
Voluntary work 0.06 0.05
(0.04) (0.04)
Household size 0.01 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Number of friends -0.01 -0.01
(0.03) (0.04)
Barangay kagawat 0.15 0.04
(0.16) (0.20)
HH used heavy materials 0.08 0.06
(0.06) (0.07)
Distance to ocean -0.00 0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.32∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗
(0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.13)
Observations 446 446 446 446 446
F 1.61 1.90 1.53 1.66 1.15
R2 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.08
Adjusted R2 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5.10: Effect of five capital forms components on individual perceived affectedness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High school -0.02 -0.02
(0.05) (0.05)
Vocational training 0.02 0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
College 0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
Conscientiousness 0.02 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04)
Regular income 0.00 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) -0.06 -0.09∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Savings≥ 1.000PHP 0.04 0.06
(0.04) (0.04)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP 0.03 0.02
(0.04) (0.05)
Reduced food -0.03 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Trust: institutions 0.07 0.07
(0.04) (0.04)
Solidarity -0.05 -0.06
(0.04) (0.04)
Trust: bonding 0.04 0.05
(0.04) (0.04)
Trust: general -0.01 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Club memberships 0.05 0.06
(0.05) (0.05)
Voluntary work 0.06∗ 0.07∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Household size 0.02 0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
Number of friends -0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02)
Barangay kagawat -0.01 0.00
(0.12) (0.13)
HH used heavy materials -0.02 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Distance to ocean -0.02 -0.00
(0.05) (0.06)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.11 0.07
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
Observations 446 446 446 446 446
F 12.60 11.92 11.47 12.62 9.94
R2 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.44
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.38
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5.11: Effect of five capital forms components on perceived external help
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High school 0.11∗∗ 0.12∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Vocational training 0.06 0.08∗
(0.05) (0.05)
College 0.13∗∗ 0.14∗∗
(0.05) (0.06)
Conscientiousness 0.02 0.00
(0.05) (0.05)
Regular income -0.00 -0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) -0.01 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
Savings≥ 1.000PHP 0.02 0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP 0.02 0.04
(0.04) (0.05)
Reduced food -0.04 -0.04
(0.05) (0.05)
Trust: institutions 0.07 0.06
(0.05) (0.05)
Solidarity -0.07 -0.05
(0.05) (0.05)
Trust: bonding 0.06 0.07
(0.05) (0.05)
Trust: general -0.03 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Club memberships 0.04 0.02
(0.05) (0.05)
Voluntary work -0.05 -0.05
(0.04) (0.05)
Household size 0.02 0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
Number of friends 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.03)
Barangay kagawat 0.09 0.11
(0.15) (0.17)
HH used heavy materials -0.10∗∗ -0.11∗∗
(0.04) (0.05)
Distance to ocean -0.06 -0.04
(0.05) (0.06)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.25 0.35 0.23 0.31 0.18
(0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.23)
Observations 446 446 446 446 446
F 6.29 5.74 5.99 6.44 5.74
R2 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.30
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.21
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5.12: Effect of five capital forms components on perceived internal help
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High school 0.08 0.08
(0.06) (0.06)
Vocational training 0.01 0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
College 0.06 0.06
(0.06) (0.06)
Conscientiousness 0.04 0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Regular income 0.04 0.05
(0.05) (0.06)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) -0.04 -0.06
(0.05) (0.05)
Savings≥ 1.000PHP 0.12∗∗ 0.14∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP -0.01 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Reduced food -0.01 -0.03
(0.06) (0.06)
Trust: institutions -0.01 -0.00
(0.06) (0.06)
Solidarity 0.01 0.01
(0.06) (0.06)
Trust: bonding 0.13∗∗ 0.13∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Trust: general -0.02 -0.04
(0.05) (0.05)
Club memberships 0.09∗ 0.07
(0.05) (0.06)
Voluntary work -0.02 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Household size 0.02 0.04
(0.05) (0.05)
Number of friends -0.06∗ -0.07∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Barangay kagawat -0.21 -0.29∗
(0.16) (0.16)
HH used heavy materials -0.03 -0.01
(0.05) (0.06)
Distance to ocean -0.05 -0.04
(0.06) (0.06)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.26 0.31 0.40∗ 0.31 0.34
(0.22) (0.21) (0.23) (0.21) (0.23)
Observations 446 446 446 446 446
F 1.22 1.44 1.51 1.16 1.66
R2 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.12
Adjusted R2 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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5.1.1 Performance of capital clusters
In this subsection we will investigate whether we can find differences in the per-
formance of clusters which are endowed differently with three types of capital,
namely human, financial and physical capital3. We use clusters which we con-
structed as a result of cluster analysis which was described in sub-section 4.5. We
begin by looking at the mean performance of each cluster for each indicator for
disaster resilience which we use in this study. We explore the relation between
clusters of capital to see if we can derive a certain combination of capital which
was especially effective in disaster resilience indicators. We begin by looking at
mean values for each resilience indicator per cluster, and if those proxies differed
significantly between clusters, for which we use a two sided t-test. Figure 5.1
graphically represents the differences in performance for the different clusters in
capital endowment in recovery time, recovery costs, time that was left to react,
individual perceived affectedness, perceived external help, and perceived internal
help. We can observe from the figure that all clusters perform quite similarly
in general with respect to resilience indicators. There are only some exceptions
where the graphic implies significant differences: In the case of time until impact
and individual perceived affectedness. We take a closer look at differences in
performance by looking at mean comparison tests between each cluster. We look
at the differences between the clusters in a bit more detail in Table 5.13, which
shows summary statistics of each cluster regarding performance in resilience
indicators and the result of a two sided t-test between each cluster. We can observe
that by purely looking at mean differences the first cluster, which represents the
one with very low human capital and a bit below average social and financial
capital. Cluster two, which represents the cluster of individuals with relatively
high human and social capital and comparably low financial capital, performs
almost half as good as cluster one in recovery speed. At the same time, cluster two
performs almost thrice as bad as cluster three in recovery time and also perceives
itself on average more affected than cluster three. Cluster three and cluster one do
not perform significantly different in neither of the resilience indicators. These
results so far present findings which are completely against our expectations,
since we expected at least that more of each form of capital would lead to better
performance in disaster resilience indicators, but cluster one, which is endowed
weakly with financial and especially human capital, seems to perform comparably
3I advise the reader to have Table 4.9 and Figure 4.10 somewhere nearby while reading this
sub-section, which should help to get a better feeling for the clusters and the respective results
which we find.
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good to the other two clusters. Moreover, we see almost half the recovery time for
cluster one compared to cluster two, while it has less human and social capital
than cluster two. The cluster with the least recovery time is also the one with
the most financial capital and a bit above average human capital. However, it
does not perform significantly better than cluster one, which is relatively poorly
endowed with all kinds of capital. We test whether or not these findings hold in a
OLS regression controlling for village fixed effects and therefore for unobserved
co-variates that are related to typhoon exposure. Tables 5.14, A2.39 and A2.40
show the results of these regressions. When we look at the tables we can see
that most relations that we previously found via mean comparison testing are
no longer significant when we control for village fixed effects in a multivariate
regression. About the only striking thing we observe is that all clusters apparently
perform differently from each other with regard to their respective recovery time.
We can see that clusters one and two both need substantially more time to recover
than cluster three, namely between 25 (cluster one) and 55 (cluster 2) days. Addi-
tionally, cluster two needed about one month longer than cluster one, which is
again completely against our expectations. So could a combination of strongly
developed human and social capital be a potentially promising channel to foster a
faster recovery after disaster? If so, then we would observe that cluster two had
faster recovery rates than cluster one, which is not the case, so this presumption
does not seem plausible any longer. Could it be that human capital in fact has the
potential to foster a faster recovery, but is in need for sufficient financial funds
to do so? This explanation seems more plausible, since we observe significantly
faster recovery rates of cluster three, which is similarly endowed with human
capital as cluster two, but is substantially better endowed with financial capital.
Therefore it seems appropriate to conclude that especially financial capital plays a
major role regarding recovery after a disaster.
5.1.2 Multicollinearity and robustness
Since the five forms of capital are linked to each other our estimations could have
a higher probability of type two error, since our explanatory variables may be
collinear. Therefore I check whether the OLS estimations are sufficiently efficient
by using auxiliary regressions on all explanatory variables and check how well
they explain each other. The results of these auxiliary regressions can be found
in tables A2.10, A2.11, A2.12, A2.13, and A2.14 in the Appendix. All of these
auxiliary regressions result in a variance inflated factor of below 1.5, indicating
that collinearity should play no major role for the efficiency of our estimators
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Table 5.13: Mean performance in disaster resilience indicators of clusters of capital endowment
clusters mean comparison tests p-values
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 1 vs. 2 2 vs. 3 1 vs. 3
Recovery time 36.01 68.66 21.01 0.061* 0.031** 0.322
(126.26) (188.20) (64.91)
Recovery costs 5,862.22 7,537.02 8,893.95 0.276 0.588 0.155
(11,797.08) (16,421.00) (22,234.91)
Time until impact 7.75 6.79 9.10 0.475 0.223 0.449
(11.90) (13.09) (15.65)
Individual perceived affectedness 3.30 3.76 3.33 0.015** 0.083* 0.897
(1.62) (1.91) (1.75)
Perceived external help 0.28 0.32 0.32 0.119 0.923 0.233
(0.22) (0.27) (0.27)
Perceived internal help 0.32 0.29 0.32 0.857 0.373 0.279
(0.27) (0.27) (0.32)
n 179 169 81
Table 5.14: Effect of different combinations of capital endowment on performance in resilience,
baseline=cluster 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Time of
repairs
Costs of
repairs
Time until
impact
Perceived
affected-
ness
Perceived
external
help
Perceived
internal
help
Cluster 2 29.57 219.58 -0.13 0.05∗ 0.01 -0.01
(18.49) (1706.79) (1.43) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Cluster 3 -25.27∗ 2461.74 1.70 0.01 0.03 0.03
(13.75) (2314.86) (2.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Distance to ocean 6.88 128.65 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(4.97) (220.67) (0.45) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
HH used heavy materials -5.67 718.56 0.94 -0.01 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.01
(5.53) (769.62) (0.76) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.04 13659.78∗∗ 3.46∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(14.65) (5836.08) (1.66) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 411 425 426 426 426 426
F 1.80 5.17 1.48 10.77 6.65 1.26
R2 0.17 0.26 0.05 0.43 0.28 0.07
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.19 -0.03 0.38 0.22 -0.00
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 5.1: Performance of each cluster of capital endowment on different resilience indicators;
part (A): differences in recovery time; part (B): differences in recovery costs; part (C): differences in
time unil impact; part (D): differences in individual perceived affectedness; part (E): differences in
perceived external help; part (F): differences in perceived internal help
since traditionally one would only speak of a high problem with collinearity if the
variance inflated factor is above 10 (c.f. Hayo, 2018). Additionally I check whether
blocks of explanatory variables have sufficient explanatory power using F-tests
for joint significance. The strategy I followed consists of testing all variables for
joint significance which showed no singular significance on their own. All of the
resulting tests rejected the hypothesis that tested bundles of variables are jointly
explaining variation in the dependent variable significantly. To check whether
or not the results which we found survive in different model specifications, I
tried to use more efficient modeling by simply using all variables which showed
significance for each complete model (model (5) for each dependent variable, see
tables A2.10, A2.11, A2.12, A2.13, and A2.14), and by executing a general to
specific algorithm (see Hoover and Perez, 1999; Clarke, 2014) to see whether the
results hold accross these different specified models. The results of the resulting
regressions can be found in Table 5.15 on page 128. If we look at the time needed
for repairs on houses (models (1) and (2)), we observe that the effect of households
having to reduce meals due to a lack of liquid financial assets survives both
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model specifications and varies between about a fourth and a third of a standard
deviation increase in recovery time. Although a general to specific algorithm
concludes that conscientiousness and having a college degree also explain quite a
substantial bit of variation in the time needed for repairs, I am hesitant to interpret
too much into variables that “survive” the general to specific algorithm despite
not being significant beforehand, since the algorithm also excludes parts of village
fixed effects and therefore might miss some critical information. Therefore I use
the general to specific algorithm rather to check whether or not variables that were
significant before “survive” the algorithm, and would not interpret much on the
resulting models. Next we look at variables that may or may not explain recovery
costs. Although none of the selected capital indicators showed significance for
explaining recovery costs, having debt above 5,000PHP was not still the variable
with the lowest p-value and I therefore check what happens if we include it solely
into a model. Despite significantly explaining recovery costs (model(3)) it does not
survive the general to specific algorithm (model(5)). If we continue with looking at
model (5) and (6) we can observe that the effect of monthly household income on
the time between individual’s realizing that a disaster was incoming and the actual
time of impact does survive the general to specific algorithm, and therefore I will
consider this finding robust. Next we look at models (7) and (8) and conclude that
trust in institutions seems to robustly explain variation in individual perceived
affectedness. The perception of external help seems to be robustly explained
by households having used heavy materials for their housing (models (9) and
(10)). Furthermore, the variables which explained internal help significantly also
survive different model specifications (models (11) and (12)).
Since the degree of heterogeneity in exposure is quite substantial, but is clustered
in two kinds of extremes, I also want to take a closer look at the sub-sample
of highly affected individuals to check whether some results may be dampened
due to a lack of variation in affectedness in low intensity areas, and therefore
meet concerns that the results may not be representative for a general population,
since we actually look at two sub-populations: lowly affected islanders and highly
affected islanders. Therefore I check whether the results we see in previous
regressions hold if we exclude low intensity area inhabitants from our sample.
The results of these regressions can be found in Tables A2.27, A2.33, A2.28, A2.34,
A2.29, A2.35, A2.30, A2.36, A2.31, A2.37, A2.32, and A2.38 in the Appendix.
What we observe is that the effect of financial capital on recovery time stays robust
and even gains effect size when we look at the sub-population of highly affected
villagers, and additionally we can observe that households further away from the
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Table 5.15: More efficient and general to specific modeling for all dependent variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Time of
repairs
Time of
repairs
Costs of repairs Costs of repairs
Time
until
impact
Time
until
impact
Affected-
ness
Affected-
ness
Ext. help Ext. help Int. help Int. help
High school 0.11∗∗
(0.05)
Vocational training 0.02∗ 0.08∗
(0.01) (0.05)
College -0.07∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05)
Conscientiousness 0.10∗∗
(0.04)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) 0.12∗ 0.12∗∗ -0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.01)
Savings≥ 1.000PHP 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP 0.09∗
(0.05)
Reduced food 0.13∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Trust: institutions 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Trust: bonding 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04)
Number of friends -0.09∗∗ -0.06∗
(0.04) (0.03)
Barangay kagawat -0.20
(0.15)
HH used heavy materials -0.11∗∗ -0.10∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Distance to ocean
vil2 -0.02 -0.90∗∗∗ -0.90∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -1.05∗∗∗ -0.83∗∗∗ -0.77∗∗∗ -0.49∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.34) (0.12) (0.25) (0.08) (0.05) (0.25) (0.13) (0.28) (0.17)
vil3 0.63∗ -0.26 0.08 -0.02 -0.21 -0.35
(0.37) (0.45) (0.15) (0.10) (0.37) (0.40)
vil4 0.03 -0.86∗∗ -0.83∗∗∗ 0.24 -0.11 -0.66∗∗ -0.38∗∗ -0.25
(0.07) (0.35) (0.12) (0.18) (0.07) (0.27) (0.17) (0.28)
vil5 0.29 -0.09 -0.01 0.24∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.09 -0.14
(0.19) (0.47) (0.10) (0.07) (0.04) (0.30) (0.32)
vil6 0.06 -0.89∗∗∗ -0.89∗∗∗ 0.34 -0.16 -0.85∗∗∗ -0.56∗∗ -0.38
(0.09) (0.34) (0.12) (0.30) (0.10) (0.31) (0.23) (0.41)
vil7 0.01 -0.91∗∗∗ -0.88∗∗∗ 0.39 -0.06 -0.62 0.32
(0.08) (0.35) (0.12) (0.35) (0.10) (0.43) (0.40)
vil8 0.11 -0.45 -0.41∗∗ 0.60 0.17∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ -0.35 -0.13
(0.17) (0.37) (0.17) (0.58) (0.09) (0.06) (0.31) (0.33)
vil9 0.94∗∗∗ -0.02 0.21 0.36∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ -0.30
(0.35) (0.38) (0.23) (0.09) (0.06) (0.31) (0.22) (0.32)
vil10 0.37∗ -0.05 0.06 0.12 0.17∗∗∗ -0.07 -0.54∗
(0.19) (0.41) (0.12) (0.09) (0.06) (0.30) (0.30)
vil11 -0.05 -0.35∗∗∗ -0.83∗∗ -0.86∗∗∗ 0.39 -0.15 -0.22 -0.50
(0.07) (0.09) (0.34) (0.12) (0.25) (0.09) (0.49) (0.49)
vil12 -0.00 -0.82∗∗ -0.88∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗ -0.18∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.48 -0.33
(0.07) (0.33) (0.12) (0.44) (0.08) (0.06) (0.43) (0.40)
vil13 -0.09∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗ -0.78∗∗ -0.81∗∗∗ 0.16 -0.18∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.66∗∗ -0.43∗∗ -0.26
(0.05) (0.08) (0.33) (0.12) (0.14) (0.07) (0.04) (0.29) (0.20) (0.32)
vil14 -0.02 -0.79∗∗ -0.84∗∗∗ 0.25∗ -0.17∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.68∗∗ -0.48∗∗ -0.71∗∗ -0.43∗∗
(0.06) (0.33) (0.13) (0.15) (0.08) (0.05) (0.29) (0.20) (0.29) (0.19)
vil15 0.99∗∗ 0.30 0.51 0.35∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.18 0.43∗∗ -0.61∗∗ -0.41∗∗
(0.49) (0.63) (0.46) (0.09) (0.06) (0.30) (0.21) (0.29) (0.19)
vil16 0.19 -0.26 0.13 0.01 0.23 -0.11
(0.13) (0.40) (0.24) (0.09) (0.32) (0.34)
vil17 0.02 -0.30∗∗∗ -0.69∗∗ -0.71∗∗∗ 0.29 -0.11 -0.64∗∗ -0.50∗∗∗ -0.36
(0.07) (0.10) (0.34) (0.14) (0.22) (0.08) (0.25) (0.14) (0.29)
vil18 0.05 -0.84∗∗ -0.89∗∗∗ 0.37 -0.17∗ -0.40 -0.15
(0.08) (0.33) (0.12) (0.24) (0.10) (0.43) (0.41)
vil19 0.86 1.21 0.11 0.16 0.21∗∗∗ 0.41 0.61∗∗∗ -0.20
(0.58) (0.88) (0.16) (0.10) (0.08) (0.29) (0.20) (0.32)
vil20 0.05 -0.63∗ -0.64∗∗∗ 0.38 -0.03 -0.25 -0.08
(0.06) (0.35) (0.14) (0.26) (0.09) (0.29) (0.35)
vil21 0.36 -0.66∗ -0.65∗∗∗ 0.51 -0.04 -0.40 -0.37
(0.43) (0.35) (0.14) (0.46) (0.10) (0.29) (0.33)
vil22 1.50∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗ 0.90∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ -0.07 0.32∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ -0.32
(0.57) (0.55) (0.43) (0.30) (0.10) (0.08) (0.06) (0.36) (0.30) (0.36)
vil23 0.72 -0.47 -0.50∗∗∗ 0.35 0.02 -0.16 -0.41
(0.49) (0.36) (0.18) (0.25) (0.09) (0.29) (0.32)
vil24 0.07 -0.86∗∗ -0.88∗∗∗ 0.41∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.84∗∗∗ -0.54∗∗ -0.56∗
(0.08) (0.33) (0.12) (0.21) (0.08) (0.05) (0.31) (0.23) (0.32)
vil25 1.09∗ -0.35 0.07 0.05 -0.26 -0.56∗
(0.57) (0.40) (0.15) (0.08) (0.35) (0.33)
vil26 0.02 -0.81∗∗ -0.81∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗ -0.17∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.96∗∗∗ -0.82∗∗∗ -0.34
(0.08) (0.35) (0.13) (0.25) (0.07) (0.03) (0.28) (0.18) (0.39)
vil27 0.03 -0.88∗∗∗ -0.90∗∗∗ 0.49∗ -0.14 -0.08 -0.52
(0.08) (0.34) (0.12) (0.29) (0.09) (0.51) (0.42)
vil28 0.02 -0.87∗∗ -0.87∗∗∗ 0.14 -0.27∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.58∗ -0.85∗∗∗ -0.56∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.34) (0.12) (0.19) (0.08) (0.05) (0.32) (0.28) (0.17)
vil29 0.28∗∗ -0.29 0.18 0.40∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 0.22
(0.14) (0.36) (0.28) (0.10) (0.08) (0.31) (0.22) (0.38)
vil30 0.04 -0.87∗∗∗ -0.90∗∗∗ 0.47 -0.11 -0.51 -0.44
(0.08) (0.33) (0.12) (0.35) (0.08) (0.32) (0.34)
Constant -0.27∗∗∗ 0.01 0.44 0.45∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.00 0.41∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.26 0.04 0.37∗ 0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.34) (0.12) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.21) (0.06) (0.22) (0.05)
Observations 433 433 445 445 446 446 446 446 446 446 446 446
F 2.11 5.27 5.89 . 1.98 4.10 12.61 22.40 7.02 13.67 2.17 6.21
R2 0.17 0.07 0.26 0.20 0.06 0.01 0.45 0.42 0.28 0.24 0.10 0.06
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.06 0.21 0.16 -0.01 0.01 0.40 0.39 0.22 0.21 0.03 0.05
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Models (1), (3), (5), (7), (9), and (11) show the results of more efficient modeling using only significant variables from previous estimations.
Models (2), (4), (6), (8), (10), and (12) show models which contain variables that “survive” a general to specific modeling algorithm.
The variables “vil1”-“vil30” are village dummies.
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shoreline were also able to recover more quickly. If we look at the more detailed
version of the regression model, we see that the significance of a reduction in meals
due to a lack of financial assets is no longer significantly explaining recovery time
in the high intensity villages, although having debt above 5,000PHP becomes
significant (see Table A2.33). Although the effect of a reduction in meals is not
robust in the sub-sample, the interpretation of the results stays quite similar,
namely that individuals with a lack of financial opportunities may be less likely
to be able to invest in the recovery of their housing, if liquid financial assets are
not available. Hence the conclusion remains similar, namely that financial capital
(or more specifically: financial opportunities) may play a more important role
in disaster recovery than is usually argued in related literature. The results for
recovery costs stay the same if we look at the sub-sample and use broader capital
measures for model specification (see Table A2.28) and also if we look at the
corresponding more detailed model which uses the components for each capital
form (Table A2.34), whereas also individuals with debt higher than 5,000PHP
had significantly higher recovery costs. Tables A2.29 and A2.35 show if the results
regarding the effect of the different forms of capital hold if we look at the sub-
sample only. We can observe that individuals who lived closer to the shoreline had
a tendency to report that they knew earlier that a devastating storm was incoming,
if they were from high intensity villages. The finding that higher monthly income
is associated with faster reaction times is also no longer true if we look at the results
for the sub-sample (Table A2.35). Individual perceived affectedness remains to be
positively and significantly influenced by social capital (Table A2.30), but is no
longer driven by trust in institutions or educational attainment in the sub-sample
(Table A2.36). External help is also not significantly explained by households
being equipped with heavy materials in their structure, but rather financial and
social capital seem to play a more important role in high intensity villages (Table
A2.31), whereas Table A2.37 still shows a positive relation between having used
heavy materials and additionally shows a positive and significant relation of the
perception of external aid and the reduction of meals due to a lack of financial
assets. Therefore signs of targeting external help towards more vulnerable groups
by external actors seem to remain. In Table A2.32 we see that the significance of
social capital to explain internal help drops, and only the significance of financial
capital remains in high intensity villages. Therefore it seems that being in a
better financial position has mattered more to gain help from internal networks
than social capital, and additionally we see from Table A2.38 that the higher
the number of friends in 2012 was, the lower the perceived internal help. This
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combined seems to hint towards the suspicion that the role of social capital in
disaster resilience could be worthwhile to reinterpret.
We conclude this section by summarizing the results we obtained from the re-
gression models that stayed robust and interpret them in the general context of
this thesis. Table 5.16 visualizes the relations that we could not reject through
hypothesis testing and also those which just barely failed one of the robustness
tests. Probably the most striking observation is that financial capital remains a
robust explanatory factor for recovery time, meaning that financially better off
households found it easier to recover from the disaster, which is quite straight for-
ward and inline with our expectations. Additionally, we observe that individuals
who had to reduce food intake because of a lack of money needed significantly
more time to repair their houses than individuals who had not that kind of worry.
Households which had to reduce food intake due to a lack of money took between
30 and 40 days more on average to repair their houses than households who did
not reduce food intake. This corresponds roughly to an effect size between a fifth
and a third of a standard deviation in time needed for repairs. As previously pre-
sumed, this effect might stem from the inability of individuals with lacking liquid
assets to allocate resources towards disaster recovery, since they probably struggle
with the fulfillment of more fundamental needs, such as nutrition. Therefore very
poor households might find themselves at a severe relative disadvantage than
other villagers, since the destruction of their houses could lead them into some
kind of poverty trap (c.f. Carter et al., 2007). Hence stakeholders that take part
in disaster relief efforts should keep in mind that some individuals might need
more help than others (relatively speaking) and that an egalitarian distribution
of relief goods might still leave some parts of the population at a severe relative
disadvantage. However what is striking is that we do not observe that people
relatively well endowed with social capital found it easier to recover more quickly,
but still contrary we find that people with larger networks tended to have less
recovery time needed than individuals with smaller social networks. Costs of
repairs could not be explained by our observed measures for the capital forms.
This hints towards that investments in the five forms of capital were not able to
decrease the sensitivity of the affected households towards this kind of strong trop-
ical typhoon. Hence investments to decrease recovery time seem more fruitful due
to this results than investments in decreasing household sensitivity. Additionally,
none of our indicators robustly explain the time between individuals realizing
a storm would hit their homes and actual impact. Although we do observe that
income could be related to the time individuals have between realizing a storm
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would hit the island and the actual impact of Yolanda. We previously argued
that this relation might exist since financially better endowed individuals might
have better access to technological means which help them to attain information
beforehand (cf. Mark and Semaan, 2008; Mark et al., 2009). However, this relation
seems relatively weak since an increase in 2012 income by one standard deviation
(∼ 3,600PHP corresponds to roughly an increase in the time individuals had to
prepare about 12% of a standard deviation (∼ 1.1hours). When we look at the
sub-sample of highly individuals only, it seems like individuals that lived closer
to the shore realized that their homes were at risk later than individuals further
away from the shore, which means that individuals who were even more sensitive
to the disaster due to their closer distance to the water found it probably harder to
accept that something devastating was coming. When we look at the individual
perceived affectedness, only social capital seems to robustly explains variation,
where an increase in social capital by one standard deviation is associated with
an increase in perceived affectedness by about 0.03 standard deviations, which is
according to common rule of thumbs a rather small effect size (c.f. Sawilowsky,
2009). Apart from social capital, educational variables are weakly robust towards
different model specifications and positively explain individual perceived affect-
edness, whereas income shows a negative relation with perceived affectedness.
Regarding external and internal help, we can observe from our regression results
that it was likely that individuals with higher social capital received more help
from external actors, whereas with regard to internal help, the results are a little
contradictory. While individuals with higher trust towards bonding elements did
receive more help from others, also individuals with larger networks perceived
less help. This could mean that people had higher expectations from others if their
network size was larger and that the perception of less internal help is a result
of frustration since those expectations have not been met. To summarize, we can
say that financial capital played a larger role with regard to the recovery time of
households, which hints towards the assumption that financial possibilities are
more important for disaster recovery than social bonds. However, we also have to
acknowledge that social capital significantly increases perceived external and in-
ternal help from others, which in term results in a sense of protection from others
in times of need, which in turn is also a part of life quality in a social structure.
If those social safety nets fail to function after crisis, the resulting frustration by
stakeholders may be a critical factor regarding sustainable and cooperative living
conditions.
Admittedly, the framework for disaster resilience which we used as an application
131
5.1. INFLUENCE OF CAPITAL ON ASPECTS OF RESILIENCE CHAPTER 5. RESULTS
Table 5.16: Robust relations between explanatory and dependent variables and corresponding
approximate effect sizes
Time of
repairs
Costs of
repairs
Time
until
impact
Affected-
ness
Ext. help Int. help
Human capital
High school
Vocational training
College
Conscientiousness
Financial capital
Regular income
Monthly income (∗1000PHP )
Savings≥ 1.000PHP
Debt≥ 5.000PHP
Reduced food
Social capital
Trust: institutions
Solidarity
Trust: bonding
Trust: general
Club memberships
Voluntary work
Household size
Number of friends
Barangay kagawat
Physical capital
HH used heavy materials
Distance to ocean
Legend:
negative
relation
negative,
not
robust
relation
no
relation
positive,
not
robust
relation
positive
relation
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of the DFID framework for sustainable community development in the context of
disaster resilience offered by Mayunga (2007) in section 2.2 seems to fail in many
regards if we test the underlying relations empirically. Human capital indicators
were neither able to explain households capacity to realize threats and take action,
nor the speed or the efficiency of disaster recovery (c.f. Table 5.16 and Figure
2.7). Therefore I reject H1a and H1b and accept that there seems to be no relation
between individual ability, or psychological capacity of a person to significantly
avoid disaster exposure, nor foster disaster recovery in a meaningful manner.
Social capital also was not able to explain households ability to avoid or earlier
react to the disaster as previously assumed, but shows definitely potential for
increasing the amount of help received by external ind internal actors, although
this increase in help did apparently not lead to significantly better recovery times,
nor significantly less recovery costs. Especially trust seems to play a major role
with regard to help from friends, family and neighbors, which shows that tight
and closely connected social networks have the potential to alleviate psychological
pressure from disaster victims. Hence we cannot completely reject H2a, since we
do observe significant relations between social capital indicators and perceived
external and internal help, whereas we have to acknowledge that not all parts
of social capital work in the same way as we expected. We can see this again
by looking at the relation between the number of close friends and perceived
internal help, which indicates that frustration with low engagement from large
networks to help individuals with large number of friends was at play. However,
we have to reject H2b and H2c, since we see no noteworthy relation between
Social capital indicators and the time people had to react, nor recovery time and
recovery costs. We even observe that people with larger networks tended to have
longer recovery times than others, indicating that large social networks may not
be the holy grail in increasing disaster resilience as one might presume (c.f. Table
5.16 and Figure 2.9). Regarding financial capital, we can only partly reject H3a,
since we do see a robust relation between financial capital and recovery, meaning
that financially better endowed households probably were better able to seize
opportunities and to repair their homes in a quicker manner. Additionally we see
a weakly robust positive relation between a lack of financial funding for food and
recovery time, which means that especially financially worse off individuals tend
to have higher recovery times and targeting disaster relief towards financially
disadvantaged households might be a promising channel to decrease recovery
times of communities on average. Although our results point into the direction
that disaster resilience is clearly a multi-faceted problem, we do see that financial
133
5.1. INFLUENCE OF CAPITAL ON ASPECTS OF RESILIENCE CHAPTER 5. RESULTS
capital seems to be the most promising candidate for in investing in more effective
disaster recovery, whereas our framework fails to provide a more holistic view on
disaster resilience. Hence we need further investigate the matter what the most
effective channels to alleviate damages are on the individual level, and how we
can develop policies to alleviate costs that arise from exposure to natural disasters.
5.1.3 Financial coping strategies
At one point in 2012, we asked participants if they have experienced certain
shocks in the last two years (between 2010 and 2012). They openly told us if
they either were affected by illness or accident, death of a family member, bad
weather conditions heavily affecting agricultural or fishing activity, bad weather
conditions affecting their own property, or other shocks. About 62% (n=499) said
that a family member was ill during that time, 27% (n=220) had a death incident
in their family, 64% (n=518) said that bad weather conditions were affecting
their agricultural or fishing activities, and 48% (n=387) said that their property
was affected by bad weather conditions. Following that part of the survey, we
let participants rank financial coping mechanisms which they used if they were
harmed by a shock according to their importance.
When we look at how they usually cope with such dramatic events financially,
the top ranked mechanism is using their own savings to cope with the situation.
The second most important financial coping mechanism seems to be to borrow
money from other villagers, while the third most important mechanism seems to
be to reduce the consumption of goods. Thereby we clearly see a pattern of how
individuals usually cope with shocks - first they use all their financial liquid assets,
then they try to borrow money, and finally they tend to reduce their consumption.
This prioritization of financial coping mechanism seems quite clearly established
when we look at how participants ranked the relative importance of financial
coping mechanisms (see Table 5.17). Therefore we can say with some degree of
confidence that insurance or other substitutes for liquid financial assets did not
play a major role in the minds of our participants to cope with socks.
5.1.4 Income and using sturdier materials for housing
Were financially well endowed individuals affording better housing and therefore
more resistant against disaster exposure? I look at this question by correlating
the available financial resources in 2012 with the materials people used for their
housing before the storm. As we can see from Table A2.8, financial income seems
to correlate quite well with more stable materials, whereas there is a negative
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Table 5.17: Coping strategies regarding shocks between 2010 and 2012
Illness of a
family
member
Death of a
family
member
Bad weather
conditions
affecting
agricul-
ture/fishing
Bad weather
conditions
affecting
own
property
Most important coping mechanism
own money
(83.97%)
own money
(76.36%)
own money
(76.23%)
own money
(72.97%)
borrow
money
(10.82%)
gift - village
(11.82%)
borrow
money
(11.63%)
borrow
money
(16.02%)
gift - village
(1.20%)
borrow
money
(7.27%)
consume less
(4.13%)
consume less
(4.25%)
Second most important coping mechanism
borrow
money
(65.64%)
borrow
money
(53.85%)
borrow
money
(61.22%)
borrow
money
(57.42%)
gift - village
(9.03%)
gift - village
(26.44%)
consume less
(17.78%)
consume less
(19.07%)
consume less
(6.83%)
gift -
govt./NGO
(8.17%)
gift - village
(9.91%)
gift - village
(9.53%)
Third most important coping mechanism
consume less
(33.78%)
gift - village
(38.76%)
consume less
(52.42%)
consume less
(49.20%)
gift - village
(20.48%)
gift -
govt./NGO
(15.73%)
gift - village
(12.64%)
gift - village
(15.51%)
sell assets
(10.11%)
sell assets
(12.36%)
gift -
govt./NGO
(7.06%)
borrow
money
(10.70%)
n 499 220 387 518
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Figure 5.2: Damages caused by Yolanda to more or less stable households relative to monthly
income across high and low intensity villages and monthly income
correlation between income and lighter materials, such as bamboo and thatch
(nipa leaves). Therefore it seems likely that financially better endowed households
tend to invest in more stable structures, which should in turn prevent damages
through strong winds. However, this correlation is no longer prevalent if we
only look at the sub-sample of high intensity villages. Therefore it seems like
financially better endowed individuals are more engaging in stabler household
materials if they stem from low intensity villages. This is still true if we only look
at a sub-sample of individuals whose monthly household income was below the
third quartile, therefore ignoring the rather rich and excluding the possibility
that this observation comes purely from having more rich households in the
southern region. Hence some other co-variates may explain the engagement in
stabler structural components instead of income. If we compare individuals
from households that embedded stable materials in their housing with the costs
per monthly household income inflicted by Yolanda, we observe that more solid
households had significantly less damages inflicted relative to their income if they
were located in low intensity areas (0.16 vs. 0.64, p=0.029). However, this is not
true for high intensity villages, as we can see in Figure 5.2. I test whether or not
this observation holds in a multivariate probit regression with robust standard
errors. We can observe that there is a significant interaction between income
and living in low intensity areas (Table A2.4). However, both the effect sizes of
income and the interaction of income and living in low intensity areas are almost
negligible, since marginal effects after probit show that an increase in income in
low intensity areas by one standard deviation results in a higher likelihood to
build more stable houses by only 11.75 percentage points. Therefore, although
it seems like richer individuals from low intensity villages invested significantly
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Figure 5.3: Changes in capital indicators by intensity (balanced part of the panel, n=449); parts
(A) and (D): changes in financial capital ; parts (B) and (E): changes in human capital; parts (C)
and (F): changes in social capital
more in more stable housing, this relation is relatively weak. But still, from Figure
5.2 we can see that more stable houses were more likely to result in less damages
relative to household income as long as the shock is not too large for the houses
to absorb the forces of nature. As a consequence, households from high intensity
villages with more stable and cost intensive housing do not perform better in
terms of relative losses to their income due to repairs caused by a strong tropical
storm.
Table 5.18: Correlation between income and materials used to build houses before Yolanda
income
(2012)
thatch bamboo wood cement iron sheets
stone
/bricks
income (2012) 1.000
thatch -0.118*** 1.000
bamboo -0.193*** 0.351*** 1.000
wood -0.045 0.025 0.007 1.000
cement 0.127*** -0.197*** -0.437*** -0.002 1.000
iron sheets 0.064* -0.320*** -0.152*** 0.122*** 0.339*** 1.000
stone/bricks 0.162*** -0.101*** -0.134*** -0.044 0.117*** 0.096*** 1.000
5.2 Effects of exposure on capital forms
In this section we will explore the relation between the development of different
indicators for the five forms of capital over time and interpret the results in their
respective context. Therefore we begin by looking at the development of the
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chosen capital indicators (see section 4.4) over time and intensity level. We can
observe from Figure 5.3 that the overall endowment with financial capital has
slightly and significantly improved on average by about 0.05 points, which corre-
sponds to an increase in financial capital by roughly half of a standard deviation
over time (p=0.000). This increase was not substantially different between high
and low intensity villages, and therefore at this point we could conclude that three
years after Yolanda the financial situation has not only returned to normality in
high intensity vilalges, but also improved slightly over time. Hence there seem
to be channels at work which ensured that long term financial development con-
verged towards a similar mean as in low intensity villages. We will support this
claim later in chapter 6, where we compare our findings with results from the
focus group discussions. Human capital, which consists in large parts of compo-
nents which reflect psychological capacity of individuals, shows a heterogeneous
development over time between high and low intensity villages. We can observe
that while in low intensity villages the overall indicator for human capital has
significantly increased by roughly a third of a standard deviation (p=0.000), the
development in high intensity areas was negative and not significantly different
from zero (p=0.121). Hence it seems like typhoon Yolanda has left some psycho-
logical scars in the minds of our participants even three years after the typhoon
happened, which means that the impact of the typhoon might have also long
term consequences on their behavior and overall functionality in the labor market.
Parts (c) and (F) in Figure 5.3 show the development of the social capital index
over time and intensity. We see that overall the development of social capital was
negative and dropped from a score of 0.57 to 0.54 on average (p=0.003), which
corresponds to a drop of roughly a fifth of a standard deviation in social capital.
However, this decline in social capital does not substantially differ between high
and low intensity villages, where the mean changes do not differ significantly
from each other (-0.04 vs. -0.02, p=0.405). Hence it seems that overall, exposure
to the typhoon did not influence the endowment of individuals with social capital.
We will look at these relations in more detail when we look at the development
of the single capital indicator components in the next few pages. For now, we
continue by testing the relation between disaster exposure and the development
of the capital indicators over time in a first difference and individual fixed effects
regression.
Table 5.19 shows the results for a first difference regression of living in high
intensity areas on the three capital indexes available. We use a dummy which
indicates if the participant lives in a high intensity area and control for baseline
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Table 5.19: Effect of intensity on changes in capital indicators
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Financial capital ∆ Human capital ∆ Social capital
High intensity 0.00 -0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Baseline¶ -0.54∗∗∗ -0.89∗∗∗ -0.86∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant 0.10∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
Observations 449 446 436
F 36.80 175.76 172.37
R2 0.21 0.49 0.39
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.49 0.38
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
¶ for simplicity, coefficients for baseline values were put into the same row.
values from 2012, to take regression to the mean effects into account (see Barnett
et al., 2004) and cluster standard errors on the village level. The results from this
regression suggest that that there is no significant difference in the development
over time between high and low intensity villages for each capital indicator. A
more conservative estimation that uses indidvidual fixed effects and clustered
standard errors on the village level however concludes, same as we see in Figure
5.3, that there is a significant relation between the development of human capital
over time and exposure to typhoon Yolanda. Table 5.20 shows the results for these
regressions. As we can see from models (1) and (2), there seems to be no difference
in the development of financial or social capital indicators over time accross
different types of intensity. However, model (2) suggests that individuals from
villages that are in high intensity areas score -0.08 points less in the human capital
indicator than villagers from low intensity areas in 2016, which corresponds to an
effect size of approximately half of a standard deviation in human capital. Hence
we see hints that there is a connection between the development of human capital
and natural disasters.
Figure 5.4 compares the means of the development of each selected capital indi-
cator component over time between low intensity and high intensity areas. We
can observe that the index for conscientiousness significantly increases in low
intensity areas (+0.07, p=0.000), while it decreased in high intensity areas (-0.02,
p=0.107). We can see from the graph that the development of being conscientious
is rather asymmetrical between low and high intensity villages. The development
of financial capital indicators shows that in general the financial situation of our
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Table 5.20: Effect of intensity on capital indicators, fixed effects regression
(1) (2) (3)
Financial capital Human capital Social capital
Year (2016=1) 0.05∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
(High intens.) X (year) 0.01 -0.09∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.10∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 898 895 885
F 37.03 9.67 4.03
R2 0.17 0.09 0.02
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.09 0.02
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Figure 5.4: Changes in capital indicator components by intensity (balanced part of the panel,
n=449); part (A): change in human capital indicators (conscientiousness); parts(B)-(F): change in
financial capital indicators (regular income, monthly household income, savings, debt, and lack of
financial endowment to ensure daily food intake); parts (G)-(N): change in social capital indicators
(solidarity, trust in bonding ties, general trust, club memberships, voluntary community work,
household size, and number of close friends)
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participants improved over time. More people receive regular income, monthly
incomes have increased, the share of individuals with savings above 1,000PHP
has increased, and less individuals struggle to finance their daily food intake.
From the graph we can see that this development differed between high and low
intensity villages in two regards: Firstly, while the development of the share of
individuals having dept higher than 5,000PHP is significantly positive in low
intensity areas (+0.13, p=0.001), we do not see a clear development in high in-
tensity areas (-0.01, p=0.737). Both means are significantly different from each
other on the five percent level (p=0.011). Secondly, being able to provide daily
food intake for the whole household decreased substantially less in low intensity
villages than in high intensity villages (-0.05 vs. -0.19, p=0.015). However, the
starting point of the share of individuals having to reduce meals due to a lack
of liquid financial assets in low intensity villages was much lower in 2012, com-
pared to high intensity villages (0.57 vs. 0.74, p=0.000). Trust in institutions has
significantly declined by roughly a fourth to a third of a standard deviation over
time (p=0.000), whereas the development did not substantially differ between
low and high intensity areas (-0.05 vs. -0.04, p=0.514). The rest of social capital
indicators show no striking developments, with the exception of generalized trust.
We can observe that trust in general declined substantially over time, declining
by about a half to two third of a standard deviation over time (p=0.000). This
development seems to be not that dramatic in high intensity villages, where the
share of individuals which stated that people can be trusted in general shrank by
only -0.10, whereas in low intensity areas the share shrank by -0.26, which is more
than double the value from high intensity areas (p=0.002). If we check whether
we get the same results by looking at the unbalanced part of the panel, we get the
very same picture overall (see Figure A1.3 in the Appendix). Hence we can see
that there are indeed some potential effects of exposure to a natural disaster on
certain aspects of human capital (conscientiousness), financial capital (debt and
food intake), and aspects of social capital (generalized trust).
The next step is to check whether these relations between disaster exposure and
capital hold in a multivariate regression. Table 5.21 shows the results for a first
difference regression of living in high intensity areas on differences of capital
indicators over time. Model (1) shows the result for being conscientious (an
indicator that represents part of human capital), models (2)-(6) show the results
for financial capital indicators (regular income, household income, savings, debt,
and lack of funds for regular food consumption)), and models (7)-(14) show the
results for social capital indicators (institutional trust, solidarity, trust in bonding
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∆
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-0.01
-0.03
-0.21
0.00
-0.10 ∗∗
-0.01
0.00
-0.05
0.02
0.09 ∗∗
-0.10
-0.40
-0.09
0.10
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.54)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.09)
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-0.63 ∗∗∗
-0.74 ∗∗∗
-0.81 ∗∗∗
-0.91 ∗∗∗
-0.86 ∗∗∗
-0.82 ∗∗∗
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ties, general trust, number of club memberships, voluntary work, household size,
and number of close friends). As we can see, only the coefficients in model (5)
and (10) show a significant impact of disaster exposure on the development of
the dependent variable. More specifically we see that debt did not increase as
much as in low intensity areas and the difference in development of the variable is
a bit more than a fifth of a standard deviation in the share of individuals being
indebted above 5,000PHP in 2012, and between a fifth and a sixth of a standard
deviation in development over time. The other variable which is significantly
explained by disaster exposure generalized trust (model(10)), while other changes
in aspects of social capital cannot be explained by being exposed. While trust in
general severely declined over time, the model predicts that it does less in high
intensity areas by about a fourth to a third of a standard deviation of the share of
individuals who trust others in general from 2012, and about a fifth to a sixth of a
standard deviation in the development of trust. A more conservative individual
fixed effects regression (Table 5.20 in the Appendix) confirms the direction of
these relations and additionally we see that also the reduction of meals due to a
lack of meals has declined about a fourth of a standard deviation more in high
intensity villages than in low intensity villages.
Therefore we provide evidence that natural disasters do alter first of all human
capital, and second of all that especially being conscientious seems to decline
due to a disaster, which could point towards psychological pressure still being
present three years after the disaster. This indicates that disasters have long term
consequences on the functioning of human beings in their everyday life, since
they influence the fundamentals of our personality. Additionally we see that
debt has declined more in high intensity villages, which means that there could
have been some channels at work which helped high intensity villagers to relief
some financial pressure from them. We have heard anecdotes about villagers
living in high intensity areas whose debts have been canceled due to the typhoon,
such that their fundamental livelihood is not harmed for long term periods. This
observation is inline with the result that the share of individuals who had to reduce
meals due to a lack of financial funds declined more in high intensity villages,
which shows that probably the social safety nets at place and governmental and
non-governmental institutions succeeded in targeting low income families with
regard to disaster relief. Furthermore we observe that trust declines in general,
but did less so in high intensity villages. This finding could be a result of putting
individuals that suffer from the same kind of problem in the same boat and
therefore increasing bonding elements. Individuals from high intensity villages
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Figure 5.5: Changes in solidarity over time and intensity (balanced part of the panel, n=449); part
(A): distribution of solidarity index in 2012; part(B): distribution of solidarity index in 2016; part
(C): mean solidarity over time and intensity
did also not only suffer damages - they experienced help from outside actors and
internal actors such that they probably formed reciprocal ties not only with each
other, but also with individuals from other levels of the social hierarchy. This
suspicion is connected to the observation that the perception of external help
was almost double as high, and the help from friends and neighbors was also a
little bit higher in high intensity villages. Therefore one side effect of disaster
relief aid could be that social cohesion is fostered simply by the act of helping
others in times of need, even if the help comes from outside actors. However, we
have to admit at this point that the positive influences on trust were not able to
completely dampen the negative development of trust over time, but nevertheless
significantly helped to keep trust levels a bit higher thatn without those channels
that resulted from the disaster.
5.2.1 Effects of exposure on experimentally measured solidarity and risk prefer-
ences
This subsection explores the relation between the exposure to the typhoon and
changes in the behavior of our participants in experimental solidarity game and
risk tasks. Experimentally measured outcomes are generally seen as “better
practice” in science than survey measures, since their reliability is acknowledged
to be more prevalent. Therefore we will look at them a bit in more detail in
this subsection We begin by looking at how the behavior of our participants in
experimental games alters over time and intensity levels.
Figure5.5 shows the distribution of the solidarity index for both years, as well
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as mean outcomes for each year and level of intensity. From Figure 5.5 we can
see that solidarity neither developed substantially over time, nor did it develop
substantially different between high and low intensity villages. While the average
solidarity score in 2012 was 0.46 in 2012, it almost stayed constant over time and
only decreased slightly to 0.45 in 2016. If we test for equality of distributions
in each year using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we observe that that the null of
unequal distributions cannot be rejected (p=0.036 in 2012, p=0.005 in 2016). A
two sided T-test also rejects the hypothesis that there are no substantial differ-
ences in means of solidarity between high and low intensity villages (p=0.015
in 2012, p=0.016 in 2016). High intensity villages tend to have lower scores in
solidarity in both years (0.49 vs. 0.43 in 2012, 0.48 vs. 0.42 in 2016). However,
if look at the development of solidarity with respect to level of intensity, we can
observe that changes in solidarity between high and low intensity villages do not
substantially differ (see also Figure A1.4). This observation is also mostly true if
we look at each component of the solidarity index separately, with the exception
of transfers to anonymous players in the first solidarity game. These transfers
significantly declined over time from an average from 30.42PHP to 25.98PHP
(p=0.000), which corresponds to a decline of roughly a fourth of a standard devia-
tion in transfers to anonymous players. Nevertheless we do not observe significant
declines of transfers over time in transfers to known group members in the first
solidarity game, and transfers to anonymous and non-anonymous players in the
second solidarity game (see Figures A1.5, A1.6, A1.7, and A1.8). Transfers to non-
anonymous players in the first game stayed rather constant at about 33.00PHP
over time (32.95PHP in 2012, 33.84PHP in 2016, p=0.401), as well as transfers
to anonymous players (32.27PHP in 2012, 32.83PHP in 2016, p=0.586) and non-
anonymous players(35.40PHP in 2012, 34.51PHP in 2016, p=0.391) in the second
solidarity game. Since neither the solidarity index nor its respective components
show consistent and significant changes over time, we can overall conclude that
solidarity in general seems to have stayed rather constant over time. In a further
step we look at the differences between transfers to known group members and
anonymous group members (Figures A1.9 and A1.10). On average, participants
consistently and significantly gave between 2PHP − 8PHP more to their known
group members on average than to anonymous players in the solidarity game
(p-values ≤ 0.002), which corresponds to a difference of about a tenth to two fifth
of a standard deviation of transfers in the solidarity game (standard deviations
were between 19.80 and 22.37). The development of the difference between trans-
fers to anonymous and non-anonymous players shows inconsistencies between
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the first and second solidarity game over time, since we observe a significant
increase in the difference in the first game (from 2.53PHP to 7.86, p=0.000) and
a significant decrease in the second game (from 3.13PHP to 1.68PHP , p=0.036).
Therefore I cannot reach a conclusion regarding the development of in-group
behavior of participants, since it does not seem to be consistent across the two
different specifications of the solidarity game. Now we take a look at the relation
between changes solidarity transfers in the experimental games over time and
living in high intensity areas using regression models. Table 5.22 shows the results
of a simple OLS regression on changes in solidarity indicators, using clustered
standard errors on the village level. Models (2)-(4) show the results using observa-
tions from the first solidarity game and models (5)-(7) use observations from the
second solidarity game which was the same in nature, but followed by conditional
choice list after the transfer decision (for details see section 3.3.1 or the protocols
from 2012 and 2016 in the Appendix). Model (1) simply uses the previously
constructed solidarity index as a dependent variable. We see from model (1)-(7)
that overall neither changes in the solidarity index or its components, nor the
resulting measure for in-group bias are significantly explained by living in high in-
tensity areas. If we include standard control variables into each model, we obtain
similar results (see Table A2.42 on page XXXVIII in the Appendix). Additionally, a
more conservative estimation using panel regression with individual fixed effects
shows no significant effects of exposure on individual transfer decisions and the
solidarity index, neither by using the balanced nor-unbalanced panel data set (see
tables A2.43 and A2.44 in the Appendix).
Table 5.22: Effect of intensity on changes in solidarity and in-group behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆solidarity
∆transfer
anonymous
(1)
∆transfer
friend (1)
∆ingroup
bias (1)
∆transfer
anonymous
(2)
∆transfer
friend (2)
∆ingroup
bias (2)
High intensity -0.05 -3.10 -3.08 0.14 -3.93 -4.19 -0.47
(0.03) (2.27) (2.60) (1.54) (2.56) (2.62) (1.56)
Baseline¶ -0.86∗∗∗ -0.87∗∗∗ -0.90∗∗∗ -0.89∗∗∗ -0.90∗∗∗ -0.85∗∗∗ -0.99∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Constant 0.41∗∗∗ 22.75∗∗∗ 32.01∗∗∗ 8.24∗∗∗ 30.95∗∗∗ 31.25∗∗∗ 2.49∗∗
(0.03) (2.37) (2.08) (1.12) (2.38) (2.86) (1.11)
Observations 448 449 449 449 448 448 448
F 74.26 122.24 130.72 109.99 117.24 73.66 141.18
R2 0.37 0.43 0.37 0.40 0.41 0.36 0.34
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.42 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.36 0.34
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
¶ for simplicity, coefficients for baseline values were put into the same row.
Now we take a look at the second solidarity game, which was a repetition of the
first one, but included a list that asked about conditional transfers, meaning that
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we asked a battery of question like: “If player X transfers Y PHP to you if you
lose, how much would you transfer in case this player loses instead?”. Therefore
we can check how important conditionality is for each individual with regard
to the solidarity game and say more about fairness concerns. We use the results
of this second solidarity game to classify individuals into “egoists”, “altruists”,
“conditional cooperators”, and “other types” similar to citetFischbacher2001. As
a reminder, possible transfers were between 0 − 70PHP in steps of 10, with all
possible conditional transfer combinations between those. The condition for
someone falling into the category of counting as a conditional cooperator is either
if the individual decides to place transfers exactly on the 45 degree line, or the
correlation coefficient between the transfer of the individual and the 45 degree
line is at least 0.84 and the maximum and minimum conditional transfer do not
have a difference larger than 30. Someone would be considered egoistic, if the
transfers on the sheet would always be below 20, and altruistic if transfers would
be always above 50. Hence the remaining individuals that could not be categorize
into these types of cooperators would fall into the “other type” category. The share
of egoists dropped from 23.39% to 18.04% between 2012 and 2016 (p=0.048),
similar to the share of altruists (24.94% vs. 19.60%, p=0.054). The share of
conditional cooperators in the second solidarity game increased from 43.65% to
50.33% (p=0.044). Overall, consistency in the types of conditionality is rather low,
since merely 36% of individuals from the balanced panel are classified into the
same category in both years. Figure 5.6 visualizes the inconsistencies over time by
plotting the sum of all conditionality types for all consistent4 participants. As we
can see, distributions of types look fairly similar each year on average and indeed,
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions never rejects the null, and
hence we could conclude that preferences were rather stable over time. However,
from Figure 5.6 we can clearly see that this is not the case and stability of each
type within individuals tends to be below 50%. The question which remains is if
these types of inconsistencies are also linked to disaster exposure. Therefore I test
if changes in preference types can be explained by living in high intensity areas in
a individual fixed effects regression using the balanced part of the panel data set.
Table 5.23 shows the results of individual fixed effects panel regression of a year
dummy and an interaction of the year dummy with a dummy which indicates
if individuals live in high intensity villages. The results indicate that over time,
there was no significant development in low intensity areas, with the exception of
4By “consistent” I mean in this case participants, which had the same kind of seat assigned in
the experiments, meaning that they had the same role in both years either playing as an anonymous,
or non-anonymous player.
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Figure 5.6: Changes in preference types
148
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 5.2. EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE ON CAPITAL FORMS
other types, which increased in low intensity areas over time. We can observe that
high intensity areas had a significantly lower increase in the share of individuals
that fell into the other types by about −0.08. However, the number of inconsistent
participants was not significantly higher in high intensity villages compared to
low intensity villagers. This relation can also be shown graphically by Figure
5.7, where we can observe that the overall significant changes over time which
we find in the whole balanced data set do not occur when we look at the sub-
samples of low and high intensity villagers, where there are almost no significant
developments, with the exception of other types (as can be seen in the regression
above) and the share of conditional cooperators, which significantly increased in
high intensity villages from 44.34% to 56.11% (p=0.013). Although this could be
a sign that in high intensity villages reciprocal ties have strengthened over time,
this does not necessarily mean that this change can be attributed to the events that
followed the typhoon, since this difference is not significantly different from the
development in low intensity areas.
Table 5.23: Effect of intensity on changes in conditionality types, fixed effects regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Egoist Altrusit
Conditional
cooperator
Other type
Consistent
in both years
year (2016=1) -0.04 -0.05 0.02 0.10∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
high intens. X year(2016=1) -0.03 -0.00 0.10 -0.08∗∗ 0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05)
Constant 0.23∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 898 898 898 898 898
F 1.89 1.44 2.40 5.41 156.98
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.36
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.36
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
To summarize this section, we do not observe substantial relations between dis-
aster exposure and changes in-group or outgroup solidarity transfers, as well as
development of in-group bias or changes in conditionality transfers over time.
Therefore I conclude that solidarity as the underlying concept behind the solidar-
ity game is not influenced by disaster exposure and hence we can partly reject
H6a, which stated that social capital declines due to disaster exposure. rather
we see some results that point into the opposite direction: generalized trust has
declined less in high intensity areas, and therefore it seems like bonding between
villagers was taking place due to the disaster, which put everyone into the same
boat, sometimes maybe literally.
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Figure 5.7: Changes in preference types over time and intensity; part (A): development of the
share of egoists; part (B): development of the share of altruists; part (C): development of the share
of conditional cooperators; part (D): development of the share of other types; part (E): share of
consistent participants which fell into the same category in 2012 and 2016
Risk-preferences
This sub-section is dedicated to shed some light on the the relation between
disaster exposure and risk-preferences of exposed individuals. As stated in sub-
section 2.4.2, many scholars have sought to understand more about the impact
of disaster exposure on risk preferences in the long term. Many studies show
a probable long term relation between disaster exposure and increases in risk
aversion (cf. Eckel et al., 2009; Van Den Berg et al., 2009; Page et al., 2012; Cameron
and Shah, 2015; Samphantharak and Chantarat, 2015; Kahsay and Osberghaus,
2016; Cassar et al., 2017). We look at this question by comparing outcomes from
the risk experiments in each year and acheck whether or not our results hold if
we use survey measured items instead of experimentally, financially incentives
ones. We begin by looking at the outcomes of the first game in each year, the
risk task, which was a binary choice in 2012 between a a fifty-fifty chance of
winning 200PHP or nothing versus a fifty-fifty chance of winning160PHP and
40. Hence we categorize people to be rather risk averse if they choose the second
option. To make the outcomes of both risk games comparable to each other
we first elicit the risk premium for all individuals per lottery that was played
in 2016 and categorize individuals into being rather risk averse if the average
risk premium for all three lotteries is larger or equal than zero. Therefore we
can now compare the share of relatively risk averse individuals from 2012 with
the share in 2016 and see, if the development over time is related to typhoon
exposure. This procedure of course has a mentionable caveat, namely that we
cannot really interpret absolute variable values, since both measures are very
different between both years. However, we should still be able to derive treatment
effects for being exposed, since the experimental nature of the study is designed
to exclude that other than treatment effects should be responsible for significant
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differences in development over time. Additionally we use the information we
collected from surveys where we asked participants how willing they are in
general to take risks. We also used different scales in both years (a five point
Likert scale in 2012 and a scale from 0-10 in 2016) and therefore rescale the
values for both variables between zero and one for each year and compare their
development over time. The results of this comparison can be found in Figure
5.8. We observe that the share of relatively risk averse individuals has declined
over time from 0.45 to 0.36 (p=0.009), whereas this development does not seem
to be substantially different between both high intensity and low intensity areas.
We observe that the development was significantly negative in low intensity areas
(p=0.014), whereas it did not significantly decline in the sub-sample of high
intensity villagers (p=0.214). The results for survey measured risk aversion point
in another direction, which I suspect is the result of experimentally measured
values not representing the “true” development over time. In general individuals
perceived themselves as more risk averse in 2016 compared to 2012 (0.47 vs.
0.33, p=0.000), whereas this development seems to be true for both types of
villages, since risk aversion seems to have increased in low intensity areas by
roughly 0.15 (about half of a standard deviation, p=0.000) and increased in high
intensity areas by 0.13 (also about half of a standard deviation, p=0.000). Again,
we check whether or not developments over time were distorted by the exposure
to the typhoon. Therefore we check whether differences in the share of risk
averse individuals or average survey measured risk aversion can be explained
by disaster exposure in a individual fixed effects panel regression. Let me state
again that I will refrain from interpreting absolute values of his analysis and
merely focus on testing whether or not significant differences in the development
of risk aversion can be attributed to living in high intensity areas, and therefore
to the typhoon. The results of this regression can be found in Table 5.24. The
results suggest that there is no significant relation between being affected by the
typhoon and developments of risk aversion, neither if we test for the development
of experimentally risk aversion nor survey measured risk aversion. We get the
same results if we repeat the same test with the unbalanced part of the panel (see
Table A2.45 in the Appendix). Hence we can conclude that there seems to be no
long term changes of risk preferences that were caused by typhoon Yolanda, and
we can reject the respective hypothesis (H8a).
Changes in optimism
Now I want to take a short look at how experiencing a natural disaster affects the
way individuals perceive future opportunities in general, and hence how their
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Figure 5.8: Changes in the share of relatively risk averse individuals across time and intensity,
balanced panel (n=449); part (A): differences in the development of experimentally measured risk
aversion with monetary incentives; part (B): differences in the development of survey measured
risk aversion
Table 5.24: Effect of intensity on risk aversion, fixed effects regression
(1) (2)
risk aversion -
incentivized
risk aversion -
survey
measured
year (2016=1) -0.08 0.15∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.03)
high intens. X year(2016=1) 0.04 -0.02
(0.08) (0.04)
Constant 0.44∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01)
Observations 837 895
F 1.41 24.35
R2 0.01 0.11
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.11
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Figure 5.9: Changes in survey measured optimism; part (A): differences across years and intensity
(unbalanced panel; N=1156); part (B): differences in the development of optimism (balanced panel,
N=449)
optimism changes.
First, let us take a look at Figure 5.9, which shows the development of mean
answers regarding general optimism. Participants were asked by us to rank on a
scale of one to five how optimistic they feel regarding the future, where one meant
“not optimistic at all”, and five meant “completely optimistic”. The mean values of
survey measured optimism differ substantially between years. For example, if we
look at the unbalanced panel (N=1156), we can see that the mean of optimism is in
2012 was 3.88, whereas it dropped to 2.93 in 2016 (p=0.000) We see the same kind
of development if we strictly look at the balanced part of the panel (N=449), where
the mean level of optimism significantly drops on average by about -0.99 scale
points (p=0.000). However, the figures imply that the development of answers
regarding optimism is not related to typhoon exposure, since there are no visible
differences between the development of optimism, neither in the balanced, nor the
unbalanced panel. further check if I can see some significant explanatory power
of being exposed to the typhoon on optimism. Thereby I explore the relation
between the answers of survey participants regarding optimism and exposure to
Yolanda the same way I did before using FD and FE regression. The results of
these regressions can be found in Table 5.9, which basically confirms what we
optically see in the graphs, namely that there seems to be no relation between
changes in optimism and exposure to the typhoon.
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Table 5.25: Effect of intensity on changes in optmism
(1) (2) (3)
FE - unbalanced FE - balanced FD
Year (2016=1) -0.93∗∗∗ -0.93∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11)
(year)*(high intensity) -0.11 -0.11
(0.12) (0.12)
High intensity -0.01
(0.09)
Baseline optimism -0.82∗∗∗
(0.06)
Constant 3.90∗∗∗ 3.88∗∗∗ 2.19∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.24)
Observations 1601 895 446
F 264.58 264.32 95.33
R2 0.37 0.37 0.31
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.37 0.30
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
¶ for simplicity, coefficients for baseline values were put into the same row.
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In this chapter I discuss the results in the context of related literature and will try
to check the robustness of results. Furthermore I discuss potential sources of bias
and give respective interpretations that follow from that investigation. I begin
by discussing the results by comparing them to the findings from similar studies
which I have mentioned in chapter 2 and continue by exploring potential bias that
could arise from self selection, attrition and migration in subsection 6.0.1. We are
also going to explore potential learning effects that could influence the behavior
of our participants in subsection 6.0.2.
We found evidence of declining conscientiousness as a result of typhoon exposure,
which indicates that individuals suffer long term setbacks in the development
of their mental capacities. This result is inline with the findings from the meta
study of Baez et al. (2010), which shows that studies uniformly report declines
in mental health of study participants. We also observe this relation, but more
with regard to a mental capacity, and not mental health in general. However, we
do not find that individuals endowed with better education are better prepared
for disaster as the study by Muttarak and Pothisiri (2013) states and additionally
we were not able to conclude that formal education was a promising channel to
reduce the time or costs of disaster recovery and hence find contradicting results
to Frankenberg et al. (2013). However, we saw that especially high school and
college graduates perceived higher levels of external help by governmental and
non-governmental institutions. Hence it seems plausible to assume that higher
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educated individuals were better at communicating with individuals in charge of
disaster relief efforts and therefore had comparative advantages to receive disaster
relief goods.
Regarding social capital, I also find an overall positive effect on perceived external
help, but was unable to explicitly link this relation to bridging social capital since
we did not observe a positive relation between trust in governmental and non-
governmental institutions and perceived help by those institutions. Additionally I
do not see an overall negative relation between recovery time and social capital
in general as Nakagawa and Shaw (2004), but see that network sizes were able to
alleviate some of the recovery time of individuals, which indicates that individuals
with larger networks tend to be faster in disaster recovery, which could be a result
of the ability of individuals to help each other out after disaster. However, this
relation seems to come with a minor caveat: We observed that individuals with
larger networks tended to perceive less help from friends and neighbors that
individuals with smaller networks. Therefore it could be that individuals with
larger networks, although they clearly performed better than individuals with
smaller networks, tend to underestimate the strength of their networks capacity
to help them, especially when members of their network have to take care of their
own needs as well. Therefore I conclude that not necessarily social capital in
general increases disaster resilience (we even observe that individuals endowed
with higher social capital perceive themselves as more affected than others), but
rather that investments in network building would be effective to lower recovery
time after a disaster. Hence social capital seems to be a potential driver to increase
access to external help, but in general the most relevant channel to decrease
recovery times seems to be network size (with almost equal effect size as financial
capital). Hence efforts to increase inclusiveness and community participation
might be promising to network individuals and households with each other and
hence drive effects of risk sharing. One channel which therefore may greatly
contribute to the resilience of communities is inclusion of the general public in
disaster mitigation planning in regular meetings, which has been identified as a
promising channel before(Berke et al., 1993; Pearce, 2003).
The most robust finding we can present from the data in the Philippines is that
overall, especially financial capital ensured quicker disaster recovery time and
is also related to higher perception of internal help by friends and neighbors.
Especially individuals who lacked financial funds to ensure daily food consump-
tion for every member of the household needed longer to repair their households,
which indicates that they found it harder to allocate their efforts towards disaster
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recovery while still struggling to be able to provide basic needs for their family
members. Therefore Disasters could end up being poverty traps as discussed by
Carter et al. (2007) and (Morduch, 1994). I find no robust relation between having
access to financial funds and better reaction times and hence conclude that differ-
ences in financial capital endowment do not necessarily lead to better access to
warning systems as previously presumed (c.f. Mark and Semaan, 2008; Mark et al.,
2009). Additionally we saw that households rather invested in heavy materials
for constructing their houses if they were in low intensity areas, and especially
these households suffered lower costs compared to their monthly income than
households which did not invest in heavy materials. Also, looking at clusters en-
dowed with different forms of capital revealed that especially the cluster endowed
with relatively high financial capital performed best with regard to recovery time.
Altogether the financial capital index and its components had highest explanatory
power of recovery time, and therefore it seems like investments in institutions
which ensure access to financial assets seem most promising to reduce the time
households need to recover. Hence we believe that better access to micro insurance
could be a potential channel which improves adaptive capacities of households,
especially for the poor (Clarke and Grenham, 2013).
Physical capital indicators poorly explain resilience indicators, with the exception
of households having imbedded heavy materials in their structure, which was
negatively correlated with perceived external help. Hence it seems like some
sort of targeting by disaster relief efforts was taking place and that especially
households which previously only used light materials were favored by external
relief efforts.
When we look at the question, how capital endowment of individuals changed
due to the typhoon and how behavior was affected respectively, we found that
almost none of our capital indicators and behavioral measures seem to be signifi-
cantly explained by typhoon exposure, with the exception of conscientiousness
and generalized trust. We found no evidence for individuals updating their risk
preferences in contrast to a manifold body in the literature (cf. Eckel et al., 2009;
Van Den Berg et al., 2009; Page et al., 2012; Cameron and Shah, 2015; Samphan-
tharak and Chantarat, 2015; Kahsay and Osberghaus, 2016; Cassar et al., 2017), no
impact of disaster exposure on solidarity, also in contrast to other studies which
investigate the connection between disasters and social preferences (cf. Whitt
and Wilson, 2007; Castillo and Carter, 2011; Fleming et al., 2011; Li et al., 2013;
Becchetti et al., 2017), and also mostly no long term impact of typhoon exposure
on overall financial and social capital. Therefore, although many studies find
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long term impacts of disaster exposure on risk or social preferences using cross
sectional studies, we do not reach the same conclusion with our longitudinal
design. However, the external validity of results is in question when we look at the
special cultural context in which we operate. The Philippines have a well known
tradition which represents a long term adaption to typhoons which is in local
language called “bayanihan” and “damayan” as expressions of “pakikipagkapwa”1
(Barameda and Barameda, 2011), which represent expressions that are tradition-
ally held high in the Philippines during times of crisis. These social norms make
sure that Filipinos tend to help wherever they can in times of need, such that
victims of disaster are usually able to count on their friends, family and neighbors
in times of need. However, since pakikipagkapwa is known to be present in times
of need, conversely it declines after times of need are over. Hence it may be that
especially in times of need solidarity occurs, while they return to normal levels
when things have returned to normality. From the time-lines which the partici-
pants from focus group discussions drew we can see that this assumption indeed
seems to be somewhat true. Figure 6.1 represents the results of the time-line
and shows the average development of solidarity and average income over time
since shortly before Yolanda occurred (the line starts in October 2013). According
to the focus group discussion participants, income dropped substantially right
after Yolanda, whereas it seemed to return to previous levels quite quickly in low
intensity villages (after about 2-3 months after the disaster), while high intensity
villages needed substantially longer to return to pre-Yolanda levels (about eleven
months). Both high and low intensity villages show the same pattern regarding
the seasonality of income, which indicates that the time-line itself worked quite
well and individuals engaged in meaningful participation during the discussion.
If we look at the development of average solidarity in the villages, we can observe
that in the month when Yolanda was happening solidarity peaked highly, but
also quickly returned to normal levels. Hence we see that even the participants
themselves do not believe that their solidarity and respective social norms have
changed due to or after Yolanda. We also see that solidarity was higher in high
intensity villages compared to low intensity villages on average. This shows that
the effects on solidarity which we do not find in our multivariate regressions could
be explained by the well adapted culture of bayanihan and damayan which lead to
short term increases in solidarity, but also do not let developments in solidarity
happen over time, even after such a strong typhoon such as Yolanda.
1The terms can be broadly translated to “heroic assistance”, “solidarity” and “humanism”
(Barameda and Barameda, 2011).
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Figure 6.1: Mean development of solidarity and income over time between high and low intensity
villages, results from the focus group discussions
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Now that I have provided an overview of the results I continue by exploring the
potential for bias in the results which I find (or do not find) in the scope of this
study.
6.0.1 Attrition, self-selection and migration
In this section I discuss if the results we find could be biased by attrition (c.f.
Hausman and Wise, 1979), self selection (c.f. Heckman, 1979, 1990a,b) or mi-
gration. I begin by looking at differences in key characteristics of returnees and
non-returnees of this study and try to explore if there are certain characteristics
which determined if an individual returned to our workshops in 2016 or not. Next
we will take a look at exposure variables and see, if they can be explained by some
of the key-characteristics and variables of interest in this study. Hence I want to
test whether self selection was occurring due to concerns that there are differences
in characteristics between high intensity area residence and low intensity area
residents. Following a short discussion on migration after the typhoon, I will
check if there is a connection between answering behavior in the second wave of
observation and remembering the workshop from 2012. Table 6.1 shows mean
summary statistics of key characteristics of returnees and non-returnees from low
intensity and high intensity villages and respective mean comparison tests which
indicate if returnees and non-returnees differed significantly in some of their
characteristics. We observe that the key variables of interest, such as financial
capital, human capital, and social capital, do not differ significantly between
returnees and non-returnees and therefore we can assume that attrition bias plays
an almost non existent role in this study. However, if we look at age, gender
and the absolute number of years a person lives in its respective village, we find
that rather women returned to our workshop in 2016, which seems to be true
for both high intensity and low intensity villages. Additionally we observe that
rather elderly individuals and individuals which live longer in a village return to
our workshops if they stem from low intensity areas. In high intensity areas we
observe a higher likelihood of individuals returning if they were lacking financial
funds for food consumption in 2012. If we look a bit closer into the connection
between key characteristics and returning to our workshop in 2016 in a regression
(Table 6.2) we can observe that indeed living longer in a village seems to be able
to explain returning to our workshop, although the effect size is rather small since
an increase in living in a village by one year is associated with increases in the
likelihood to return by below one percent. However, we also can see that being
female has quite a substantial impact on returning to the workshop, where females
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were about 21% likelier to return to our workshop if they were from high intensity
villages. Therefore it could be that females are a bit overrepresented in our sample
of 2016 and our results should be taken with care when interpreting the results.
Overall the share of females was higher than the share of males in both waves of
observations (54.21% in 2012 and 67.20% in 2016). However, the main variables
of interest show no noteworthy difference between returnees and non-returnees
and therefore the respective interpretation of the results regarding them should
be unbiased by attrition, but we are still careful about assuming external validity
of results since we operate in a very special cultural context and also observe
differences between males and females returning behavior.
Now I want to check whether key characteristics can determine if someone was
affected or not by Yolanda, and hence see if some sort of self selection was going
on in our sample. Theoretically, there could be certain characteristics which
determine if individuals tend to locate themselves in more high-risk areas, such as
risk preferences or financial restrictions. Hence I test whether key characteristics
determine the geographical location of participants when Yolanda was happening,
namely the minimum distance of each village to the storm and the respective
classification in high and low intensity villages. The results of this regression
can be found in Table 6.3. Additionally we apply mean comparison tests using
the sub-sample of villagers from 2012 out of the unbalanced panel. The results
suggest that the randomization procedure in 2012 did not work out as planned as
there are apparently some differences between northern and southern islanders
regarding their overall endowment with financial assets, their human capital, and
also some demographics. For example, we observe a substantially higher share
of individuals who have vocational training (7.75% vs. 3.25%, p=0.008) in low
intensity villages, while the number of individuals with a college degree is a bit
lower in high intensity villages (19.72% vs. 15.45%, p=0.136). This finding is
inline with what Wamsler et al. (2012) find, namely that individuals with less
education tend to be located in high risk areas. We can see from Table 6.3 that the
difference in the number of college graduates becomes relevant if we look at the
sub-sample of villagers who were present in both waves of observations, where
having a college degree is associated with a about 20% lower probability to live
in high intensity villages. Conscientiousness also seems to differ substantially
between high and low intensity villages in 2012 (0.82 vs. 0.74, p=0.000), which
represents a difference of about half a standard deviation. As a result we also
observe significant explanatory power of the human capital indicator. Regarding
financial capital, we observe that household income was rather lower in high
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Table 6.1: Summary statistics of key variables across returnees and non-returnees in high and low
intensity villages
low intensity villages high intensity villages
Variables return=0 return=1 return=0 return=1
mean mean p-value mean mean p-value
(sd) (sd) (sd) (sd)
Human capital 0.67 0.68 0.502 0.75 0.76 0.308
(0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.13)
Financial capital 0.12 0.10 0.204 0.11 0.09 0.133
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Social capital 0.59 0.57 0.297 0.56 0.57 0.949
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15)
Solidarity 0.51 0.49 0.247 0.43 0.43 0.960
(0.25) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Age 40.18 42.33 0.042** 40.80 41.53 0.502
(11.23) (10.48) (10.58) (10.02)
Monthly household income (*1,000PHP ) 4.49 4.11 0.399 4.11 3.52 0.140
(5.17) (4.07) (4.63) (3.03)
Years living in village 29.96 33.15 0.042** 31.35 32.25 0.603
(16.32) (15.96) (16.49) (15.90)
Risk aversion (surveys) 0.37 0.35 0.459 0.30 0.30 0.835
(0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26)
Risk aversion (experiments) 0.39 0.47 0.143 0.50 0.44 0.287
(0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Gender 0.52 0.62 0.049** 0.41 0.58 0.002***
(0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50)
Elementary school 0.22 0.22 0.907 0.20 0.31 0.016**
(0.41) (0.42) (0.40) (0.46)
High school 0.50 0.50 1.000 0.54 0.55 0.832
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Vocational training 0.06 0.09 0.277 0.04 0.03 0.554
(0.24) (0.29) (0.20) (0.16)
College 0.22 0.18 0.393 0.22 0.11 0.003***
(0.41) (0.39) (0.42) (0.31)
Reduction of food intake 0.53 0.57 0.380 0.65 0.74 0.081*
(0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.44)
Debt ≥ 5,000PHP 0.34 0.31 0.533 0.39 0.36 0.511
(0.47) (0.46) (0.49) (0.48)
N 198 228 148 221
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Table 6.2: Explanatory power of key characteristics from 2012 on returning to workshop in 2016
(1) (2) (3)
whole sample low intensity high intensity
Human capital 0.20 0.08 0.27
(0.17) (0.26) (0.20)
Financial capital 0.07 -0.34 0.29
(0.22) (0.29) (0.34)
Social capital -0.12 -0.18 0.04
(0.12) (0.19) (0.15)
Solidarity -0.02 -0.09 0.12
(0.12) (0.14) (0.16)
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) -0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Years living in village 0.00∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Survey measured risk aversion -0.03 -0.08 0.03
(0.08) (0.14) (0.08)
Relative risk aversion 0.02 0.08 -0.06
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
Female 0.14∗∗∗ 0.10 0.21∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
High school -0.04 0.03 -0.09
(0.05) (0.08) (0.06)
Vocational training 0.01 0.13 -0.19
(0.11) (0.14) (0.21)
College -0.15∗∗ -0.03 -0.28∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
Reduced food 0.07 0.02 0.10
(0.05) (0.07) (0.09)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP -0.04 -0.07 -0.05
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Constant 0.35∗ 0.42 0.25
(0.18) (0.28) (0.29)
Observations 776 416 360
F 3.77 4.86 87.18
R2 0.05 0.05 0.09
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.01 0.05
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
163
CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
intensity villages (3,754PHP vs. 4,288PHP , p=0.076) and households which lack
liquid assets to finance food intake are rather situated in high intensity areas
(62.95% vs. 52.40%, p=0.000). However, individuals with saving larger than
1,000PHP are rather living in high intensity areas (21.14% vs. 16.67%, p=0.121)
and we can see explanatory power of having savings in the regression both in the
balanced and unbalanced panel. Overall financial capital also correlates quite
well with living in high intensity areas, whereas individuals endowed with low
financial assets are rather living in the north of the island. Social capital also seems
to be lower in the north of the island, although social capital is only able to explain
variance in relative distance to the typhoon in the unbalanced part of the pane.
The findings above suggest that there are substantial differences between high
and low intensity villagers before Yolanda hit them respectively, and therefore we
cannot exclude the possibility of self selection taking place, whereas I can only
speculate about the origins of this differences, since we were quite certain that
there are no cultural differences between the villages we visited. The island has a
diameter of about 100km and we made sure that only rural small scale villages
were taken into the randomization procedure (see section3.1). However, it seems
that even with our careful randomization we were not able to find comparable
samples between villages. Therefore it seems that the results we find should be
taken with a grain of salt since we cannot exclude selection effects and be 100%
certain about the external validity of our results regarding effects of the typhoon
over time. This might explain why first difference and fixed effects estimation lead
us to different conclusions regarding the effect of typhoon exposure on human
capital. In Table 5.19 we found no significant effect of typhoon exposure on human
capital, while Table 5.20 suggested otherwise. Paired with the observation that
human capital was substantially larger and already quite high in high intensity
villages in 2012 (0.76 vs. 0.68, p=0.000), and that human capital did not develop
substantially in high intensity villages and only increased in low intensity villages
to reach higher levels in 2016 (0.77 vs. 0.76, p=0.226), it seems that we can no
longer exclude the possibility that the results from fixed effects regression are
biased by regression to the mean effects and that the effect of the typhoon on
human capital is an artifact of this development.
Now we are going to have a look at migration and avoidance of the typhoon and
the following events that occurred because of it. At one point in 2012 we collected
migration lists with the help of village kagawats. We checked whether or not
people migrated away from their villages somewhere between our two waves
where we conducted our study. Five of our participants migrated away from their
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Table 6.3: Explanatory power of key characteristics from 2012 on distance to Yolanda and living in
high intensity areas
unbalanced panel balanced panel unbalanced panel balanced panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative
distance
High
intensity
Relative
distance
High
intensity
Relative
distance
High
intensity
Relative
distance
High
intensity
Human capital -0.41∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ -0.38∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.13)
Financial capital 0.31∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗ -0.59∗∗
(0.11) (0.16) (0.16) (0.23)
Social capital 0.16∗ -0.28∗∗ 0.13 -0.23
(0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.16)
Age 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.05∗∗ -0.06∗ 0.02 -0.03 0.06∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗ 0.02 -0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Status: single 0.04 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
High school 0.04 -0.02 0.07∗∗ -0.07
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Vocational training 0.11∗∗ -0.17∗∗ 0.15∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10)
College 0.08∗ -0.09 0.15∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Conscientiousness -0.35∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12)
Regular income 0.04 -0.07 0.08∗ -0.12∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Savings≥ 1.000PHP -0.08∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP -0.05∗∗ 0.06∗ -0.05 0.08∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Reduced food -0.12∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Trust: institutions -0.03 -0.10 -0.05 -0.03
(0.09) (0.13) (0.12) (0.17)
Solidarity 0.16∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ 0.08 -0.14
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
Trust: bonding 0.14∗∗ -0.12 0.12 -0.09
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12)
Trust: general 0.02 -0.01 0.05 -0.08∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Club memberships -0.08∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗ 0.08∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Voluntary work 0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗ -0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Household size 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Number of friends -0.00 0.00 -0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.61∗∗∗ 0.18 0.58∗∗∗ 0.19 0.57∗∗∗ 0.24∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.12
(0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.17) (0.10) (0.15) (0.14) (0.20)
Observations 777 777 439 439 770 770 434 434
F 7.87 12.14 4.36 8.23 6.78 8.45 6.25 9.17
R2 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.22
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.19
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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villages after 2012, four of them returned before 2016. This means that only
one person from our sample from 2012 was no longer available in the village for
reasons which I am not able to reenact. In the literature it has been argued that
there is a higher chance of people migrating away due to disasters (Brock and Paul,
2003; Blaikie et al., 2004; Mallick and Vogt, 2012), but in our sample there was
almost no migration similar to a study by Paul (2005) conducted in Bangladesh
where no migration was occurring at all after a strong tornado. Since it seems that
people only migrate away permanently after a disaster if their possibilities for a
sustainable livelihood are taken away completely (cf. Afifi and Warner, 2008), it
does not seem exceptionally that we do not observe permanent migration in our
sample. As we have described before in section 4.2, avoidance of the typhoon was
apparently not feasible, since most of our participants stayed in the same village
when the typhoon made landfall. Hence we can safely assume that avoidance by
the typhoon does not distort our results in any way.
6.0.2 Remembering the last workshop
In this subsection i want to explore if individual behavior in the experiments
was influenced by remembering the last session. We asked individuals after the
experiments if they remember playing these games before and also some probably
sensitive questions about how they coped to keep their payout secret, and how
other villagers treated them after the games. From the participants which returned
to our workshop in 2016, about 68% remembered the games quite well, whereas
the remaining 32% could no longer remember the content of the games from last
time (3.44 vs. 1.36, p=0.000)2. About 41% of our participants which remembered
the games at least quite well said that they could at least quite well remember the
amount of money they earned last time and average satisfaction with the amount
of money that was paid last time was also relatively high on average (4.23)3, which
indicates that the incentive that was provided in the experiments was sufficient
to motivate behavior. About 14% of returnees regretted their behavior in the last
session in some way. About two thirds of our returnees believed in the anonymity
of the experimental decisions in 2012, whereas a share of about one third had
doubts about our trustworthiness regarding the privacy of their behavior in the
games. We also wanted to check if participants felt like we were expecting them to
behave in certain ways during the games. About 70% claimed that they did not feel
2Answers were given on a five point Likert scale, where one meant “I do not remember the
games at all” and five meant “I remember them very well”.
3Answers were given on a five point Likert scale, where one meant “I was completely dissatisfied”
and five meant “I was completely satisfied”.
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pressured by us to act in certain ways, whereas about 30% indicated that they felt
we expected them to decide in certain ways. This could be a sign that individuals
were too aware of our presence, which could be a direct result of us leading
questionnaires directly by assistants to ensure illiteracy would not be a problem
in our study (c.f. Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008). After individuals received their
payout, we emphatically advised them to not talk about their earnings in the games
to make sure, our presence would not cause conflicts over money or behavior in
the experiments, since some of them are surely loaded by moral concerns or
social norms regarding solidarity. However, we find that according to self stated
behavior about 31% of individuals recalled to have talked to their friends about
the amount of money they earned in the games afterward, whereas 69% said that
they kept the amount rather secret. We also directly asked if there was some sort
of harassment due to their earnings in the games, and about 13% claimed that
they were harassed by others because of their decisions in the experiment from
2012. Altogether we see that participation in 2012 might cause individuals to
reconsider their behavior from last time and also provides them with some sort of
comparative advantage over new participants, since they might have a better idea
about the average behavior of others in the games we played. Therefore I want
to check whether or not remembering the games has explanatory power over the
overall behavior in the solidarity game and risk task in 2016 and hence if caution
is needed when we draw results from the unbalanced part of the panel, since
results could be distorted by learning effects. I do this by regressing survey items
which indicated if people remember the games on the outcomes of the games
respectively. The results of these regressions can be found in Table 6.4. Models
(1) and (2) show the impact of remembering games on the risk premium which
we elicited from the three lotteries, models (3) and (4) the impact on the transfer
to anonymous players in the first solidarity game, (5) and (6) on the transfers to
anonymous players in the second solidarity game, models (7) and (8) the impact on
the transfer to friends in the first solidarity game, (9) and (10) on the transfers to
friends in the second solidarity game, and (11)-(18) the impact on the classification
of the players in the third game according to our criteria which we described in
subsection 5.2.1. The results suggest that there is almost no explanatory power
of remembering the games and experimental behavior. We do observe some
significant relationships, such as having felt pressure by the experimenter and
transfers to anonymous players in the first game (β = −1.61, p ≤ 0.05), but do not
see this relation for the same kind of transfer in the second solidarity game. Also
the effect size is rather small, since an increase by feeling pressure by one point on
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the Likert scale is associated with a decrease in transfers by about 1.61PHP, which
corresponds to about a twelfth of a standard deviation in transfers. The same goes
for the relation between the satisfaction of the amount of money won, perceived
harassment due to the amount of money, and the probability of being am altruist
or a conditional cooperator in 2016. We observe significant relationships here
as well, but effect sizes and overall explanatory power of the variables which
indicate remembering the games is rather low, such that we should be able to
safely conclude that remembering the games did not influence the behavior of our
participants significantly and we can exclude the possibility of learning effects
biasing our results at this point.
6.0.3 Priming Yolanda
In 2016, we repeated the solidarity game after activating the minds of our partici-
pants towards certain events which may or may not have occurred after Yolanda,
as explained in section 3.2. The respective open survey questions which we used
to prime our participants can be found in the Appendix in section A7 and the
following pages. We randomly selected groups of three to be either primed pos-
itively, neutrally, or negatively towards Yolanda. Positive priming would mean
us asking about individuals helping each other after the catastrophe, negative
priming meant that we asked about conflict or corruption, and neutral priming
consisted of open questions regarding the events of the day which happened until
the workshop. We made sure that in each village there would be three groups
each that were either positively, negatively or neutrally primed. Hence we ob-
tained nine positively, nine negatively and nine neutrally primed individuals per
village respectively. Now we compare if primed individuals behaved differently
in the solidarity game than in the rounds before and also compare the behavior
between primed groups. Therefore we should be able to see whether activating
the memories of our participants towards Yolanda leads to differences in behavior.
Table 6.5 shows the results of a simple OLS regression of priming dummies on
transfers in the solidarity game, using individuals which were neutrally prime
as a baseline. We can observe that priming seems to have influenced individuals
from high and low intensity villages in different ways than we had expected.
While we observe that being primed positively is associated with lower transfers
to anonymous players in the solidarity game when an individual stems from low
intensity villages (models (1) and (5)), we see a reverse effect of priming in high
intensity villages (models (9) and (13)). Additionally, while there seems to be no
difference between the behavior of neutrally and negatively primed individuals in
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low intensity villages, there seems to be a positive effect on transfers of negative
priming in high intensity villages on transfers to friends and anonymous players
(models (10), (13), and (14)). We also look at the within variation in transfers by
looking at the difference between mean transfers in the first and second solidarity
game and transfers in the primed solidarity game. We see that positive priming led
to higher transfers to known players compared to transfers in the first and second
game if an individual was primed positively in low intensity villages (models
(4) and (8)), while there are only significant differences in the transfers towards
anonymous players compared to the baseline in high intensity villages (models
(11) and (15)).
These results show that although we see no causal long term effects of disaster
exposure on solidarity transfers over time, there is still some effect prevalent
when we purposely activate the memories of our participants towards Yolanda.
This could mean that the typhoon caused long term psychological “scars” which
influence individuals on a subconscious level.
6.0.4 Limitations
In this section I want to discuss a little bit about possible limitations of this study.
First and foremost, I want to point out the special context in which this study
operates, namely strictly looking at coastal villagers from the Philippines, with a
very distinct set of cultural and social identities. I already discussed for example
the concept of “pakikipagkapwa” which might be already a long term adaption
to natural disasters, and maybe there is no more room for long term adaption
in other places since Filipinos have already a cultural heritage with regard to
natural disasters in general. Therefore it could be that the results which I find in
this study are distinctly attributable to these type of villagers in this social and
cultural context, while a similar study conducted in other regions of the world
might find somewhat different results. Another limitation of this study is that it
looks solely at one distinct event - typhoon Yolanda, which was extraordinary in
its path and intensity. The question I want to raise at this point is: Was Yolanda too
strong to observe significant contributions of some adaptive capacities to disaster
resilience indicators? If that is the case, the conclusions of this study might be
flawed in a sense that I cannot attribute benefits for some adaptive capacities,
while those benefits might very well be existent if a disaster is not as strong as
Yolanda. Therefore it might be that some of the measured adaptive capacities
might function better if the shock which we look at is not too large. But due to
the nature of our data we cannot extrapolate such relations. Furthermore, due
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CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
to the explorative nature of this analysis we lack dimensions which would have
been nice to measure beforehand, for example general health of participants, more
information about the physical structure of their housing, or their endowment
with natural capital. Hence we might oversee some important factors which
contribute to disaster resilience. All of these limitations should provide further
ground for potential upcoming studies in this field.
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6.1 Conclusion
I conducted a study which investigates the relation between pre-disaster adap-
tive capacities in the form of human, financial, and social capital and disaster
resilience, and also investigates the relation between exogenous disaster exposure
and development of capital forms over time. Additionally this study contributes
to the literature which investigates the influence of natural disasters on human
risk- and social preferences. We made use of a natural experimental setting in
the Philippines, where roughly half of our observed part of the population was
severely exposed to a strong natural disaster (typhoon Yolanda) while the other
half suffered from minor exposure. We collected data about capital forms and
incentivized behavior in economic games two years before, and three years after
the typhoon. We make use of panel data with 1598, where the balanced part of
the panel consists of 449 individuals (895 observations).
Our results provide evidence for the relative importance of financial capital to
build disaster resilient households and therefore promote increasing efforts in
access to micro-finance and insurance schemes in developing countries, which
should enhance households adaptive capacity to bounce back to their initial status.
An additional channel which seems promising according to our data is promot-
ing increases in networks of individuals, for example by increasing community
participation in general or by including individuals in disaster mitigation and
action planning. However, our data shows that individuals with larger networks
were also perceiving less help from friends and neighbors despite having needed
less recovery time, which may indicate that individuals with larger networks
had higher expectations towards parts of their networks with regard to sharing
help after a disaster. In general, the largest part of adaptive capacities which
we tested for their predictive power of resilience indicators fail to explain the
respective dependent variables. Hence I conclude that we need to reconsider our
assumptions of those adaptive capacities, since not all of them have played an
important role in the disaster recovery process in the Philippines.
Regarding the effect of natural disasters on adaptive capacities and human risk
and social preferences we see that I could not identify a causal relation between
changes in experimentally measured behavior in a risk game, as well as behavior in
an incentivized solidarity game. We find negative effects on the conscientiousness
of individuals, although those results can only be interpreted with low confidence
since I cannot exclude regression to the mean or selection effects biasing this
result. The same goes for positive effects of typhoon exposure on generalized trust.
Therefore I could not find sufficient evidence for causal relations between changes
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in adaptive capacities, risk or social preferences and disaster exposure.
The results of this study show important implications for planners of disaster risk
reduction and show where investments to build disaster resilience may be most
promising. One caveat of this study is the lack on information about physical
or natural capital and hence can only really say something about the relative
importance of human, financial and social capital to increase adaptive capacity.
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A1. GRAPHS AND FIGURES CHAPTER 7. APPENDIX
A1 Graphs and figures
Figure A1.1: The temporality of events and the role of adaptive capacities in disaster resilience,
taken from Norris et al. (2008)
II
CHAPTER 7. APPENDIX A1. GRAPHS AND FIGURES
Figure A1.2: A Photograph of a typical experimental session
Figure A1.3: Changes in capital indicators by intensity (balanced part of the panel, n=1151);
part (A): change in human capital indicators (conscientiousness); parts(B)-(F): change in financial
capital indicators (regular income, monthly household income, savings, debt, and lack of financial
endowment to ensure daily food intake); parts (G)-(N): change in social capital indicators (solidar-
ity, trust in bonding ties, general trust, club memberships, voluntary community work, household
size, and number of close friends)
III
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Figure A1.4: Changes in solidarity over time and intensity (balanced part of the panel, n=449);
part (A): distribution of changes in solidarity index over time; part(B): mean changes in solidarity
over time over intensity
Figure A1.5: Changes in transfer to anonymous players in first solidarity game over time and
intensity (unbalanced part of the panel, n=449); part (A): distribution of changes in transfer
to anonymous players in first solidarity game over time; part(B): mean changes in transfer to
anonymous players in first solidarity game over time over intensity
IV
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Figure A1.6: Changes in transfer to known players in first solidarity game over time and intensity
(balanced part of the panel, n=449); part (A): distribution of changes in transfer to known players
in first solidarity game over time; part(B): mean changes in transfer to known players in first
solidarity game over time over intensity
Figure A1.7: Changes in transfer to anonymous players in second solidarity game over time and
intensity (balanced part of the panel, n=449); part (A): distribution of changes in transfer to
anonymous players in second solidarity game over time; part(B): mean changes in transfer to
anonymous players in second solidarity game over time over intensity
V
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Figure A1.8: Changes in transfer to known players in second solidarity game over time and
intensity (balanced part of the panel, n=449); part (A): distribution of changes in transfer to known
players in second solidarity game over time; part(B): mean changes in transfer to known players in
second solidarity game over time over intensity
Figure A1.9: Changes in in-group bias in first solidarity game over time and intensity (balanced
part of the panel, n=449); part (A): distribution of changes in in-group bias in first solidarity game
over time; part(B): mean changes in in-group bias in first solidarity game over time over intensity
VI
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Figure A1.10: Changes in in-group bias in second solidarity game over time and intensity (balanced
part of the panel, n=449); part (A): distribution of changes in in-group bias in second solidarity
game over time; part(B): mean changes in in-group bias in second solidarity game over time over
intensity
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A2 Tables
Table A2.1: Timetable of workshops of both waves of observation
Date Village Date Village Date Village
August 22nd 2012
August 20th 2016 Baras
September 6th 2012
September 20th 2016 Polopina
September 20th 2012
September 8th 2016 Batonan-Sur
August 23rd 2012
August 17th 2016 Sinogbuhan
September 7th 2012
September 23rd 2016 Talotoan
September 21st 2012
September 9th 2016 Maramig
August 25th 2012
August 18th 2016 Tapikan
September 8th 2012
September 22nd 2016 Maliogliog
September 22nd 2012
September 12th 2016 Paz
August 27th 2012
August 19th 2016 Bucaya
September 9th 2012
August 26th 2016 Nanding Lopez
September 23rd 2012
September 12th 2016 Pucio
August 28th 2012
August 22nd 2016 Santa Rita
September 11th 2012
August 30th 2016 Suclaran
September 24rd 2012
September 16th 2016 Bulanao
August 29th 2012
August 21st 2016 Calampitao
September 13th 2012
August 31st 2016 Sagua
September 25th 2012
September 13th 2016 San Roque
August 30th 2012
August 25th 2016 Paloc Bique
September 14th 2012
September 1st 2016 Lisub-A
September 26th 2012
September 15th 2016 Pajo
August 31st 2012
August 23rd 2016 Cata-An
September 17th 2012
August 24th 2016 Igcondao
September 27th 2012
September 14th 2016 Cubay
September 1st 2012
September 2nd 2016 Paciencia
September 18th 2012
August 29th 2016 Igcawayan
September 28th 2012
September 11th 2016 Igcagay
September 5th 2012
September 21st 2016 Dungon
September 19th 2012
September 7th 2016 Balac-Balac
September 29th 2012
September 3rd 2016 Igdalaguit
Table A2.2: Out-migration (either permanent or temporal) according to official documents from
village officials
low intensity
villages out-migration
population
(2007 census)
high intensity
villages out-migration
population
(2007 census)
Baras 0 1017 Balac-Balac 5 668
Bucaya 15 1648 Batonan-Sur 11 663
Calampitao 0 691 Bulanao 1 327
Cata-An 5 1230 Cubay 2 830
Igcawayan 3 1081 Dungon 0 476
Igconao 16 445 Igcagay 18 539
Igdalaguit 0 1144 Maliog-Liog 0 517
Lisub-A 13 729 Maramig 0 328
Nanding Lopez 2 1315 Pajo 0 538
Paciencia 0 1018 Paz 0 644
Paloc Bigque 0 1017 Polopina 0 3382
Sagua 5 1057 Pucio 0 539
Santa Rita 0 1601 San Roque 4 1028
Sinogbuhan 0 1604 Talotu-An 2 2470
Suclaran 5 1662
Tapikan 0 317
Total 49 27
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Table A2.3: correlation between time left until impact and preparatory measures
reinforcing
house
bring
property to
safer place
store
additional
food
store
additional
medicine
other
time until
impact
-0.0326 0.0025 0.0218 0.0864 0.0605
Table A2.4: Effect of income and living in high intensity areas on building stabler housing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(I) income 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00)
(II) high intensity 0.11 -0.10
(0.14) (0.09)
(I)x(II) -0.00* 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.75*** -0.71*** -0.48*** -0.53***
(0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Observations 802 802 806 802
Prob > chi2 0.01 0.00 0.31 0.83
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
Table A2.5: Factor loadings of individual perceived affectedness indicators
Variable Affectedness
Personal pressure 0.85
Relative personal pressure 0.89
Financial pressure 0.81
Relative financial pressure 0.87
Alpha 0.92
Eigenvalue 2.92
Table A2.6: Factor laodings of internal help indicators
Variable Internal help
Neighbors helped 0.83
Friends helped 0.83
Alpha 0.87
Eigenvalue 1.38
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Table A2.7: Factor laodings of external help indicators
Variable External help
National government helped 0.83
Local government helped 0.83
Barangay council helped 0.77
National NGO helped 0.87
International NGO helped 0.77
Church helped 0.73
Alpha 0.91
Eigenvalue 3.85
Table A2.8: Correlation between income and materials used to build houses before Yolanda
income
(2012)
thatch bamboo wood cement iron sheets
stone
/bricks
income (2012) 1.000
thatch -0.118*** 1.000
bamboo -0.193*** 0.351*** 1.000
wood -0.045 0.025 0.007 1.000
cement 0.127*** -0.197*** -0.437*** -0.002 1.000
iron sheets 0.064* -0.320*** -0.152*** 0.122*** 0.339*** 1.000
stone/bricks 0.162*** -0.101*** -0.134*** -0.044 0.117*** 0.096*** 1.000
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Table A2.9: Main indicators for the five forms of capital used in this study, balanced panel
low intensity villages high intensity villages
Variables 2012 2016 p-value 2012 2016 p-value
Human capital 0.68 0.77 0.000*** 0.76 0.76 0.887
(0.17 (0.15) (0.13 (0.14
Highest degree: elementary school 0.22 0.23 0.739 0.31 0.38 0.134
(0.42) (0.42) (0.46) (0.49)
Highest degree: high school 0.50 0.52 0.708 0.55 0.53 0.633
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Highest degree: college 0.18 0.14 0.310 0.11 0.05 0.012**
(0.38) (0.35) (0.31) (0.21)
Highest degree: vocational training 0.09 0.10 0.873 0.03 0.05 0.308
(0.29) (0.30) (0.16) (0.21)
Conscientiousness (index from 0-1) 0.74 0.80 0.000*** 0.82 0.80 0.067*
(0.18) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13)
Financial capital 0.11 0.15 0.000*** 0.09 0.15 0.000***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.09 (0.11)
Receives regular income 0.27 0.41 0.002*** 0.18 0.37 0.000***
(0.45) (0.49) (0.39) (0.48)
Monthly household income 4112.81 6324.38 0.000*** 3516.70 5323.86 0.000***
(4073.35) (5166.03) (3029.11) (5552.77)
Savings ≥ 1.000PHP 0.13 0.26 0.001*** 0.21 0.29 0.062*
(0.34) (0.44) (0.41) (0.45)
Dept ≥ 5.000PHP 0.31 0.43 0.005*** 0.36 0.34 0.765
(0.46) (0.50) (0.48) (0.48)
Reduction of food intake 0.57 0.52 0.259 0.74 0.54 0.000***
(0.49) (0.50) (0.44) (0.50)
Social capital 0.57 0.54 0.018** 0.57 0.54 0.085*
(0.16) (0.18) (0.15) (0.16)
Institutional trust (index from 0-1) 0.64 0.59 0.001*** 0.63 0.60 0.006***
(0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.15)
Solidarity (index from 0-1) 0.49 0.48 0.760 0.43 0.42 0.590
(0.23) (0.25) (0.23) (0.27)
Trust in bonding ties (index from 0-1) 0.60 0.59 0.757 0.60 0.60 0.686
(0.22) (0.26) (0.21) (0.24)
Generalized trust 0.34 0.07 0.000*** 0.26 0.16 0.007***
(0.47) (0.26) (0.44) (0.37)
Number of club-memberships 0.49 0.55 0.364 0.52 0.46 0.298
(0.72) (0.82) (0.67) (0.61)
Times of voluntary work for community in last 90 days 2.91 2.51 0.498 1.87 2.11 0.435
(5.61) (7.02) (3.14) (3.30)
Household size 5.06 4.98 0.635 4.91 4.87 0.810
(1.87) (3.03) (3.15) (3.30)
Number of close friends 2.62 2.62 0.978 2.95 2.71 0.457
(1.81) (1.57) (4.61) (1.21)
Barangay kagawat 0.18 0.14 0.257 0.12 0.15 0.406
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Physical capital
Used heavy materials in housing before Yolanda 0.32 0.28
(0.47) (0.45)
Distance of house to the ocean 1701.06 115.81
(13427.25) (330.65)
N 228 228 221 221
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Table A2.10: Auxiliary regression on human capital components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High school Vocational training College Structuredness
High school -0.38∗∗∗ -0.50∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Vocational training -0.32∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ 0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
College -0.47∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Conscientiousness 0.01 0.07 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Observations 449 449 449 449
F 59.32 23.19 46.75 0.90
R2 0.29 0.14 0.24 0.01
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.13 0.23 -0.00
VIF 1.01 1.15 1.05 1.29
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A2.11: Auxiliary regression on financial capital components
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Regular income Monthly income Savings≥ 1.000PHP Debt≥ 5.000PHP Reduced food
Regular income 0.16∗∗∗ 0.01 0.10∗∗ -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) 0.19∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Savings≥ 1.000PHP 0.01 0.28∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP 0.10∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Reduced food -0.03 -0.15∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Constant -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 449 449 449 449 449
F 6.82 25.25 25.81 9.12 11.73
R2 0.06 0.19 0.19 0.08 0.10
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.18 0.18 0.07 0.09
VIF 1.15 1.08 1.08 1.14 1.13
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.12: Auxiliary regression on social capital components
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Trust - institutions Solidarity Trust - bonding Trust - general Club memberships Voluntary work Household size Number of friends
Trust: institutions 0.04 0.37∗∗∗ 0.09∗ 0.06 -0.01 0.07 -0.00
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Solidarity 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.08∗ 0.08∗ 0.08∗ -0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Trust: bonding 0.37∗∗∗ 0.01 0.07 0.09∗ -0.02 0.02 -0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Trust: general 0.07∗ 0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.03
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Club memberships 0.06 0.09∗ 0.08∗ -0.03 0.26∗∗∗ -0.05 0.08
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Voluntary work -0.01 0.08∗ -0.02 0.04 0.26∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗ -0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Household size 0.06 0.08∗ 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.10∗∗ 0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Number of friends -0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.07 -0.00 0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449
F 12.52 2.08 12.21 1.34 7.10 6.38 1.71 0.51
R2 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.03 0.01
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.01 -0.01
VIF 1.05 1.09 1.05 1.09 1.07 1.07 1.09 1.10
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A2.13: Auxiliary regression on physical capital components
(1) (2)
HH used heavy materials Distance to ocean
HH used heavy materials -0.02
(0.05)
Distance to ocean -0.02
(0.05)
Constant 0.00 -0.00
(0.05) (0.05)
Observations 446 446
F 0.20 0.20
R2 0.00 0.00
Adjusted R2 -0.00 -0.00
VIF 1.00 1.00
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.15: Effect of five capital forms indices on recovery time with control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Human capital 0.03 0.04
(0.04) (0.05)
Financial capital -0.10∗∗ -0.10∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Social capital 0.04 0.04
(0.06) (0.06)
HH used heavy materials -0.05 -0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
Distance to ocean 0.04 0.05
(0.03) (0.04)
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Status: single 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.38 -0.40 -0.39 -0.40 -0.48∗
(0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.26) (0.29)
Observations 433 433 433 430 430
F 2.33 2.09 2.33 2.14 1.77
R2 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.16: Effect of five capital forms indices on recovery costs with control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Human capital 0.04 0.03
(0.05) (0.04)
Financial capital 0.05 0.04
(0.07) (0.07)
Social capital 0.04 0.04
(0.05) (0.05)
HH used heavy materials 0.04 0.04
(0.05) (0.05)
Distance to ocean 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Status: single -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.31 0.29
(0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.39) (0.40)
Observations 444 444 444 444 444
F 5.71 5.62 5.74 5.49 4.98
R2 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.17: Effect of five capital forms indices on time until impact with control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Human capital 0.02 0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Financial capital 0.07 0.06
(0.05) (0.05)
Social capital 0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
HH used heavy materials 0.07 0.07
(0.06) (0.06)
Distance to ocean 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.04)
Age 0.01∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗ 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Status: single -0.23∗∗ -0.24∗∗ -0.22∗∗ -0.22∗∗ -0.23∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Constant -0.65∗∗∗ -0.61∗∗∗ -0.66∗∗∗ -0.57∗∗ -0.58∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Observations 445 445 445 445 445
F 1.95 1.94 1.89 1.67 1.50
R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07
Adjusted R2 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.18: Effect of five capital forms indices on individual perceived affectedness with control
variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Human capital 0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Financial capital 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Social capital 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
HH used heavy materials -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Distance to ocean 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Status: single 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 0.43∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Observations 445 445 445 445 445
F 11.21 11.30 11.78 10.79 10.99
R2 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.44
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.39
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.19: Effect of five capital forms indices on perceived external help with control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Human capital 0.00 -0.02
(0.05) (0.05)
Financial capital 0.05 0.06
(0.04) (0.05)
Social capital 0.10∗∗ 0.10∗∗
(0.04) (0.05)
HH used heavy materials -0.08∗ -0.09∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Distance to ocean -0.07 -0.06
(0.05) (0.06)
Age -0.01∗ -0.01∗ -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.19∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.18∗ 0.18∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Status: single -0.10 -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Constant 0.55∗ 0.57∗∗ 0.51∗ 0.48∗ 0.46
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29)
Observations 445 445 445 445 445
F 5.97 6.00 6.35 6.16 5.84
R2 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.20: Effect of five capital forms indices on perceived internal help with control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Human capital -0.02 -0.05
(0.05) (0.05)
Financial capital 0.10∗∗ 0.11∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Social capital 0.09∗ 0.09∗
(0.05) (0.05)
HH used heavy materials 0.00 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Distance to ocean -0.05 -0.05
(0.06) (0.06)
Age -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Female 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Status: single 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.14
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Constant 0.78∗∗ 0.81∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 0.77∗∗ 0.78∗∗
(0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33)
Observations 445 445 445 445 445
F 1.43 1.75 1.59 1.41 1.74
R2 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.21: Effect of five capital forms components on recovery time, controlling for vulnerable
groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High school -0.02 -0.02
(0.07) (0.06)
Vocational training -0.05∗ -0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
College -0.08∗ -0.05
(0.04) (0.05)
Conscientiousness 0.04 0.05
(0.04) (0.05)
Regular income 0.01 0.02
(0.05) (0.06)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) -0.01 -0.00
(0.03) (0.04)
Savings≥ 1.000PHP -0.08 -0.09
(0.05) (0.05)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP 0.09 0.10
(0.06) (0.06)
Reduced food 0.10∗∗ 0.12∗∗
(0.04) (0.05)
Trust: institutions 0.09 0.08
(0.07) (0.08)
Solidarity 0.02 0.04
(0.06) (0.06)
Trust: bonding -0.08 -0.10
(0.07) (0.07)
Trust: general 0.03 0.05
(0.05) (0.05)
Club memberships -0.01 -0.01
(0.06) (0.06)
Voluntary work 0.04 0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
Household size -0.00 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Number of friends -0.09∗∗ -0.09∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Barangay kagawat 0.01 0.11
(0.17) (0.19)
HH used heavy materials -0.05 -0.06
(0.04) (0.04)
Distance to ocean 0.04 0.04
(0.03) (0.04)
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Female 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.04
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
Status: single 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.04
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.33 -0.35 -0.36 -0.40 -0.36
(0.26) (0.26) (0.29) (0.26) (0.26)
Observations 433 433 433 430 430
F 1.97 1.81 1.74 2.14 1.25
R2 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.21
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.10
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 XXI
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Table A2.22: Effect of five capital forms components on recovery costs, controlling for vulnerable
groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High school 0.00 0.01
(0.07) (0.06)
Vocational training 0.04 0.04
(0.05) (0.05)
College 0.00 0.00
(0.05) (0.05)
Conscientiousness 0.04 0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
Regular income -0.03 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Savings≥ 1.000PHP 0.04 0.03
(0.04) (0.05)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP 0.08 0.08
(0.05) (0.05)
Reduced food -0.01 -0.00
(0.05) (0.06)
Trust: institutions 0.02 0.03
(0.04) (0.05)
Solidarity 0.04 0.03
(0.07) (0.07)
Trust: bonding -0.01 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Trust: general 0.06 0.05
(0.06) (0.06)
Club memberships -0.02 -0.04
(0.05) (0.05)
Voluntary work 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03)
Household size 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.04)
Number of friends -0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
Barangay kagawat 0.05 -0.01
(0.17) (0.17)
HH used heavy materials 0.04 0.01
(0.05) (0.04)
Distance to ocean 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.02)
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.04
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
Status: single -0.13 -0.10 -0.09 -0.12 -0.09
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.27 0.35 0.27 0.31 0.29
(0.38) (0.40) (0.40) (0.39) (0.38)
Observations 444 444 444 444 444
F 5.32 4.96 4.60 5.49 3.84
R2 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.27
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.18
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.23: Effect of five capital forms components on time individuals had to prepare for impact,
controlling for vulnerable groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High school -0.02 -0.03
(0.06) (0.06)
Vocational training -0.01 -0.04
(0.04) (0.05)
College 0.04 0.01
(0.06) (0.06)
Conscientiousness 0.04 0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
Regular income 0.04 0.04
(0.06) (0.06)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) 0.11∗ 0.11
(0.07) (0.07)
Savings≥ 1.000PHP -0.06 -0.07
(0.05) (0.05)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP 0.05 0.04
(0.06) (0.06)
Reduced food -0.02 -0.02
(0.04) (0.05)
Trust: institutions 0.00 0.01
(0.06) (0.06)
Solidarity 0.02 0.01
(0.06) (0.06)
Trust: bonding 0.02 0.01
(0.06) (0.06)
Trust: general 0.03 0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
Club memberships -0.02 -0.05
(0.05) (0.05)
Voluntary work 0.06 0.06
(0.05) (0.05)
Household size -0.01 -0.02
(0.05) (0.05)
Number of friends -0.01 -0.01
(0.03) (0.04)
Barangay kagawat 0.13 0.04
(0.16) (0.20)
HH used heavy materials 0.07 0.06
(0.06) (0.07)
Distance to ocean 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.04)
Age 0.01∗ 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.05
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
Status: single -0.23∗∗ -0.21∗∗ -0.24∗∗ -0.22∗∗ -0.22∗∗
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.64∗∗∗ -0.50∗∗ -0.60∗∗∗ -0.57∗∗ -0.48∗∗
(0.23) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
Observations 445 445 445 445 445
F 1.58 1.98 1.51 1.67 1.16
R2 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08
Adjusted R2 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.24: Effect of five capital forms components on individual perceived affectedness, control-
ling for vulnerable groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High school -0.02 -0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
Vocational training 0.02 0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
College 0.03 0.04
(0.04) (0.05)
Conscientiousness 0.02 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04)
Regular income 0.00 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) -0.06 -0.09∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Savings≥ 1.000PHP 0.04 0.06
(0.04) (0.04)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP 0.03 0.02
(0.04) (0.05)
Reduced food -0.03 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Trust: institutions 0.07 0.07∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Solidarity -0.05 -0.06
(0.04) (0.04)
Trust: bonding 0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
Trust: general -0.01 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Club memberships 0.06 0.07
(0.05) (0.05)
Voluntary work 0.06∗ 0.06∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Household size 0.03 0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
Number of friends 0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Barangay kagawat 0.00 0.01
(0.12) (0.14)
HH used heavy materials -0.02 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Distance to ocean -0.02 0.00
(0.05) (0.06)
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Status: single 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.02
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.21 0.20 0.23 0.18 0.22
(0.30) (0.29) (0.30) (0.29) (0.32)
Observations 445 445 445 445 445
F 11.53 10.88 10.55 11.43 9.30
R2 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.44
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.37
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 XXIV
CHAPTER 7. APPENDIX A2. TABLES
Table A2.25: Effect of five capital forms components on perceived external help, controlling for
vulnerable groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High school 0.09∗ 0.10∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Vocational training 0.06 0.07
(0.05) (0.05)
College 0.11∗ 0.12∗
(0.06) (0.06)
Conscientiousness 0.03 0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Regular income -0.00 -0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) -0.00 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Savings≥ 1.000PHP 0.02 0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP 0.02 0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
Reduced food -0.05 -0.04
(0.05) (0.05)
Trust: institutions 0.07 0.06
(0.05) (0.05)
Solidarity -0.06 -0.05
(0.05) (0.05)
Trust: bonding 0.05 0.06
(0.05) (0.05)
Trust: general -0.03 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Club memberships 0.03 0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Voluntary work -0.02 -0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
Household size 0.01 0.02
(0.04) (0.05)
Number of friends 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.03)
Barangay kagawat 0.14 0.13
(0.15) (0.16)
HH used heavy materials -0.08∗ -0.10∗∗
(0.04) (0.05)
Distance to ocean -0.07 -0.04
(0.05) (0.06)
Age -0.01 -0.01∗ -0.01∗ -0.01 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.17∗ 0.19∗ 0.15 0.18∗ 0.13
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Status: single -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.08
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.42 0.59∗∗ 0.51∗ 0.48∗ 0.28
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.33)
Observations 445 445 445 445 445
F 5.96 5.59 5.73 6.16 5.30
R2 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.30
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 XXV
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Table A2.26: Effect of five capital forms components on perceived internal help
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High school 0.05 0.06
(0.06) (0.07)
Vocational training 0.00 0.01
(0.05) (0.06)
College 0.04 0.03
(0.06) (0.06)
Conscientiousness 0.04 0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Regular income 0.04 0.05
(0.05) (0.05)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) -0.03 -0.05
(0.05) (0.05)
Savings≥ 1.000PHP 0.12∗∗ 0.13∗∗
(0.06) (0.05)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP 0.00 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Reduced food -0.02 -0.03
(0.06) (0.06)
Trust: institutions -0.01 -0.00
(0.06) (0.05)
Solidarity 0.02 0.01
(0.06) (0.06)
Trust: bonding 0.11∗∗ 0.12∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Trust: general -0.02 -0.04
(0.05) (0.05)
Club memberships 0.09∗ 0.07
(0.05) (0.06)
Voluntary work -0.01 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04)
Household size 0.03 0.04
(0.05) (0.06)
Number of friends -0.07∗∗ -0.07∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Barangay kagawat -0.15 -0.24
(0.16) (0.16)
HH used heavy materials 0.00 0.01
(0.05) (0.06)
Distance to ocean -0.05 -0.04
(0.06) (0.06)
Age -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Female 0.12 0.14 0.07 0.12 0.09
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Status: single 0.16 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.14
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.69∗∗ 0.75∗∗ 0.86∗∗ 0.77∗∗ 0.71∗
(0.34) (0.33) (0.34) (0.33) (0.37)
Observations 445 445 445 445 445
F 1.42 1.69 1.68 1.41 1.75
R2 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.13
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.27: Effect of five capital forms indices on recovery time - high intensity only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Human capital 0.07 0.06
(0.12) (0.12)
Financial capital -0.21∗∗ -0.21∗∗
(0.08) (0.09)
Social capital 0.10 0.09
(0.13) (0.12)
HH used heavy materials -0.06 -0.05
(0.08) (0.08)
Distance to ocean 1.74∗ 1.72∗
(1.00) (0.92)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.25∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ 0.18 0.08
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.24) (0.25)
Observations 205 205 205 205 205
F 2.22 1.99 2.16 1.84 1.46
R2 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.14
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.06
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A2.28: Effect of five capital forms indices on recovery costs - high intensity only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Human capital 0.10 0.07
(0.13) (0.12)
Financial capital 0.10 0.09
(0.14) (0.14)
Social capital 0.08 0.06
(0.09) (0.09)
HH used heavy materials 0.11 0.10
(0.10) (0.10)
Distance to ocean -0.08 -0.10
(0.34) (0.34)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.39 0.46 0.42 0.42 0.38
(0.35) (0.34) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
Observations 220 220 220 220 220
F 3.04 3.03 3.15 2.82 2.35
R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.29: Effect of five capital forms indices on time until impact - high inensity only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Human capital -0.06 -0.07
(0.08) (0.08)
Financial capital 0.07 0.07
(0.08) (0.08)
Social capital 0.02 0.04
(0.06) (0.06)
HH used heavy materials 0.07 0.06
(0.10) (0.10)
Distance to ocean -0.25∗ -0.25∗
(0.14) (0.15)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.28∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11)
Observations 221 221 221 221 221
F 1.06 0.99 1.05 0.86 0.72
R2 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05
Adjusted R2 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A2.30: Effect of five capital forms indices on individual perceived affectedness - high
intensity only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Human capital 0.03 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Financial capital 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
Social capital 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
HH used heavy materials -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
Distance to ocean -0.01 -0.03
(0.07) (0.08)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.41∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Observations 221 221 221 221 221
F 5.79 6.43 7.23 5.22 6.97
R2 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.26 0.30
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.21 0.23
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.31: Effect of five capital forms indices on perceived external help - high intensity only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Human capital -0.05 -0.10
(0.08) (0.08)
Financial capital 0.10 0.12∗
(0.07) (0.07)
Social capital 0.10 0.12∗
(0.06) (0.07)
HH used heavy materials -0.08 -0.09
(0.06) (0.06)
Distance to ocean 0.14 0.12
(0.47) (0.52)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.35 0.35 0.30 0.36 0.40
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.24) (0.25)
Observations 221 221 221 221 221
F 3.46 3.70 3.73 3.44 3.58
R2 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.21
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.14
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A2.32: Effect of five capital forms indices on perceived help by friends and neighbors - high
intensity only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Human capital -0.11 -0.15∗
(0.08) (0.09)
Financial capital 0.15∗ 0.16∗∗
(0.08) (0.08)
Social capital 0.02 0.05
(0.06) (0.07)
HH used heavy materials -0.03 -0.04
(0.07) (0.07)
Distance to ocean 0.29 0.29
(0.31) (0.31)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.38∗ 0.35 0.32 0.39∗ 0.49∗∗
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
Observations 221 221 221 221 221
F 1.38 1.62 1.07 1.04 1.65
R2 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.09
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.33: Effect of five capital forms components on recovery time - high intensity only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High school -0.05 0.04
(0.12) (0.12)
Vocational training -0.16∗∗ -0.01
(0.06) (0.08)
College -0.20∗∗ -0.15
(0.10) (0.11)
Conscientiousness 0.07 0.07
(0.11) (0.14)
Regular income 0.03 0.06
(0.13) (0.14)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) -0.04 -0.03
(0.09) (0.08)
Savings≥ 1.000PHP -0.12 -0.16
(0.09) (0.10)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP 0.20 0.19
(0.12) (0.12)
Reduced food 0.24∗∗ 0.26∗∗
(0.11) (0.12)
Trust: institutions 0.18 0.17
(0.14) (0.14)
Solidarity 0.06 0.14
(0.12) (0.12)
Trust: bonding -0.18 -0.19
(0.14) (0.14)
Trust: general 0.07 0.13
(0.10) (0.10)
Club memberships 0.03 -0.01
(0.11) (0.12)
Voluntary work 0.16 0.18
(0.22) (0.23)
Household size 0.03 -0.02
(0.09) (0.08)
Number of friends -0.10∗ -0.12∗∗
(0.05) (0.06)
HH used heavy materials -0.06 -0.08
(0.08) (0.07)
Distance to ocean 1.74∗ 1.60
(1.00) (0.99)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.19∗ -0.34∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗ 0.18 0.04
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.24) (0.31)
Observations 205 205 205 205 205
F 1.70 1.46 1.35 1.84 1.03
R2 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.23
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.09
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.34: Effect of five capital forms components on recovery costs - high intensity only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High school -0.02 0.01
(0.12) (0.10)
Vocational training 0.20 0.22
(0.18) (0.17)
College 0.00 -0.02
(0.11) (0.13)
Conscientiousness 0.08 0.10
(0.12) (0.12)
Regular income -0.06 -0.00
(0.10) (0.12)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) 0.06 0.05
(0.14) (0.14)
Savings≥ 1.000PHP 0.04 0.05
(0.08) (0.08)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP 0.18∗ 0.19∗
(0.10) (0.10)
Reduced food -0.03 -0.00
(0.13) (0.14)
Trust: institutions 0.04 0.07
(0.08) (0.09)
Solidarity 0.10 0.10
(0.14) (0.15)
Trust: bonding -0.05 -0.10
(0.09) (0.08)
Trust: general 0.13 0.09
(0.12) (0.13)
Club memberships -0.01 -0.04
(0.09) (0.09)
Voluntary work -0.01 -0.06
(0.10) (0.09)
Household size 0.06 0.07
(0.08) (0.09)
Number of friends -0.03 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04)
Barangay kagawat 0.10 -0.11
(0.29) (0.29)
HH used heavy materials 0.11 0.07
(0.10) (0.09)
Distance to ocean -0.08 0.01
(0.34) (0.38)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.41 0.49 0.48 0.42 0.47
(0.37) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.37)
Observations 220 220 220 220 220
F 2.60 2.66 2.33 2.82 1.77
R2 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.18
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.04
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.35: Effect of five capital forms components on time individuals had to prepare for impact
- high intensity only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High school -0.01 -0.01
(0.09) (0.09)
Vocational training 0.01 -0.01
(0.04) (0.05)
College 0.06 0.02
(0.12) (0.11)
Conscientiousness -0.02 -0.05
(0.07) (0.07)
Regular income 0.04 0.04
(0.10) (0.13)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) 0.08 0.07
(0.09) (0.09)
Savings≥ 1.000PHP -0.06 -0.06
(0.07) (0.07)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP 0.06 0.05
(0.09) (0.10)
Reduced food -0.08 -0.08
(0.07) (0.07)
Trust: institutions 0.02 0.02
(0.10) (0.09)
Solidarity 0.04 0.04
(0.09) (0.10)
Trust: bonding -0.06 -0.05
(0.10) (0.10)
Trust: general 0.07 0.07
(0.08) (0.10)
Club memberships 0.05 0.02
(0.08) (0.07)
Voluntary work 0.10 0.09
(0.11) (0.11)
Household size 0.05 0.06
(0.08) (0.08)
Number of friends 0.02 0.02
(0.05) (0.06)
Barangay kagawat 0.13 0.08
(0.22) (0.32)
HH used heavy materials 0.07 0.03
(0.10) (0.12)
Distance to ocean -0.25∗ -0.19
(0.14) (0.22)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.31∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗ -0.28∗
(0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.16)
Observations 221 221 221 221 221
F 0.77 0.78 0.69 0.86 0.50
R2 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06
Adjusted R2 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.10
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.36: Effect of five capital forms components on individual perceived affectedness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High school -0.01 -0.01
(0.07) (0.07)
Vocational training 0.07 0.03
(0.07) (0.08)
College -0.01 0.00
(0.07) (0.07)
Conscientiousness 0.04 -0.01
(0.07) (0.07)
Regular income -0.04 -0.08
(0.07) (0.07)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) -0.02 -0.02
(0.07) (0.08)
Savings≥ 1.000PHP 0.02 0.04
(0.06) (0.07)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP -0.01 -0.00
(0.06) (0.07)
Reduced food -0.11 -0.11
(0.08) (0.08)
Trust: institutions 0.12∗ 0.11
(0.07) (0.07)
Solidarity -0.05 -0.05
(0.07) (0.08)
Trust: bonding 0.07 0.08
(0.07) (0.07)
Trust: general -0.06 -0.06
(0.06) (0.07)
Club memberships -0.01 0.00
(0.07) (0.08)
Voluntary work 0.14∗ 0.13∗
(0.08) (0.08)
Household size 0.02 0.05
(0.07) (0.07)
Number of friends 0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.03)
Barangay kagawat 0.01 0.05
(0.19) (0.22)
HH used heavy materials -0.05 -0.05
(0.06) (0.07)
Distance to ocean 0.18 0.19
(0.29) (0.35)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.10 0.18 0.03 0.16 0.15
(0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.26)
Observations 221 221 221 221 221
F 4.46 4.72 4.44 4.52 3.48
R2 0.23 0.24 0.27 0.23 0.29
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.16
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.37: Effect of five capital forms components on perceived external help - high intensity
only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High school 0.13∗ 0.12
(0.07) (0.07)
Vocational training 0.10 0.11
(0.10) (0.11)
College 0.14∗ 0.15∗
(0.08) (0.08)
Conscientiousness -0.04 -0.08
(0.08) (0.09)
Regular income 0.02 0.00
(0.08) (0.09)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) 0.01 -0.02
(0.08) (0.08)
Savings≥ 1.000PHP 0.01 0.01
(0.06) (0.06)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP 0.05 0.07
(0.06) (0.07)
Reduced food -0.13 -0.16∗
(0.08) (0.08)
Trust: institutions 0.07 0.06
(0.06) (0.06)
Solidarity -0.03 -0.02
(0.08) (0.07)
Trust: bonding 0.02 0.05
(0.07) (0.07)
Trust: general 0.00 0.01
(0.07) (0.07)
Club memberships 0.11 0.09
(0.07) (0.08)
Voluntary work -0.08 -0.09
(0.09) (0.09)
Household size 0.01 0.04
(0.07) (0.07)
Number of friends 0.03 0.04
(0.02) (0.03)
Barangay kagawat 0.02 0.04
(0.21) (0.25)
HH used heavy materials -0.08 -0.12∗
(0.06) (0.07)
Distance to ocean 0.14 0.14
(0.47) (0.52)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.27 0.39∗ 0.29 0.36 0.36
(0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) (0.27)
Observations 221 221 221 221 221
F 3.52 2.96 2.71 3.44 2.88
R2 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.25
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.38: Effect of five capital forms components on perceived internal help - high intensity
only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High school 0.12 0.13
(0.08) (0.09)
Vocational training 0.08 0.14
(0.12) (0.14)
College 0.02 0.02
(0.08) (0.09)
Conscientiousness -0.05 -0.08
(0.08) (0.09)
Regular income 0.04 0.08
(0.09) (0.09)
Monthly income (∗1000PHP ) -0.02 -0.03
(0.08) (0.08)
Savings≥ 1.000PHP 0.10 0.11
(0.07) (0.07)
Debt≥ 5.000PHP 0.06 0.08
(0.07) (0.07)
Reduced food -0.06 -0.06
(0.09) (0.09)
Trust: institutions -0.06 -0.04
(0.08) (0.07)
Solidarity 0.07 0.08
(0.08) (0.09)
Trust: bonding 0.09 0.10
(0.08) (0.08)
Trust: general -0.04 -0.03
(0.08) (0.08)
Club memberships 0.13 0.10
(0.08) (0.09)
Voluntary work -0.03 -0.04
(0.10) (0.09)
Household size -0.02 0.01
(0.08) (0.08)
Number of friends -0.06∗ -0.07∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Barangay kagawat -0.36∗ -0.51∗∗
(0.22) (0.24)
HH used heavy materials -0.03 -0.03
(0.07) (0.08)
Distance to ocean 0.29 0.24
(0.31) (0.34)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.29 0.35 0.51∗∗ 0.39∗ 0.58∗∗
(0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.22) (0.26)
Observations 221 221 221 221 221
F 1.18 1.41 1.42 1.04 1.78
R2 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.15
Adjusted R2 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.39: Effect of different combinations of capital endowment on performance in resilience,
baseline=cluster 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Time of
repairs
Costs of
repairs
Time until
impact
Perceived
affected-
ness
Perceived
external
help
Perceived
internal
help
Cluster 1 -29.57 -219.58 0.13 -0.05∗ -0.01 0.01
(18.49) (1706.79) (1.43) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Cluster 3 -54.83∗∗∗ 2242.15 1.83 -0.04 0.02 0.04
(19.45) (2704.31) (2.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Distance to ocean 6.88 128.65 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(4.97) (220.67) (0.45) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
HH used heavy materials -5.67 718.56 0.94 -0.01 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.01
(5.53) (769.62) (0.76) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 29.61∗∗∗ 13879.37∗∗∗ 3.33∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
(10.66) (5301.09) (1.30) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 411 425 426 426 426 426
F 1.80 5.17 1.48 10.77 6.65 1.26
R2 0.17 0.26 0.05 0.43 0.28 0.07
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.19 -0.03 0.38 0.22 -0.00
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A2.40: Effect of different combinations of capital endowment on performance in resilience,
baseline=cluster 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Time of
repairs
Costs of
repairs
Time until
impact
Perceived
affected-
ness
Perceived
external
help
Perceived
internal
help
Cluster 1 25.27∗ -2461.74 -1.70 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03
(13.75) (2314.86) (2.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Cluster 2 54.83∗∗∗ -2242.15 -1.83 0.04 -0.02 -0.04
(19.45) (2704.31) (2.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Distance to ocean 6.88 128.65 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(4.97) (220.67) (0.45) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
HH used heavy materials -5.67 718.56 0.94 -0.01 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.01
(5.53) (769.62) (0.76) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -25.23 16121.52∗∗ 5.17∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(16.39) (6312.67) (2.13) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 411 425 426 426 426 426
F 1.80 5.17 1.48 10.77 6.65 1.26
R2 0.17 0.26 0.05 0.43 0.28 0.07
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.19 -0.03 0.38 0.22 -0.00
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.42: Effect of intensity on changes in solidarity and in-group behavior including standard
control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆solidarity
∆transfer
anonymous
(1)
∆transfer
friend (1)
∆ingroup
bias (1)
∆transfer
anonymous
(2)
∆transfer
friend (2)
∆ingroup
bias (2)
High intensity -0.04 -2.11 -2.14 0.05 -3.51 -3.51 -0.10
(0.03) (2.28) (2.69) (1.59) (2.58) (2.57) (1.59)
Baseline¶ -0.87∗∗∗ -0.89∗∗∗ -0.91∗∗∗ -0.89∗∗∗ -0.91∗∗∗ -0.86∗∗∗ -1.00∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Age 0.00 0.07 0.22∗∗ 0.15∗ 0.04 0.04 0.01
(0.00) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.06)
Female -0.00 -1.06 2.28 3.40∗ -0.74 -1.32 -0.63
(0.03) (2.11) (2.91) (2.00) (2.49) (2.69) (1.35)
High school 0.02 2.12 0.62 -1.52 1.26 2.05 0.94
(0.02) (1.98) (1.90) (1.55) (2.09) (2.49) (1.89)
Vocational training -0.02 -0.31 -3.98 -3.79∗ -0.69 0.56 1.47
(0.04) (3.02) (2.96) (1.93) (3.73) (4.08) (2.30)
College 0.09∗∗ 9.64∗∗∗ 6.77∗∗ -3.15 3.50 6.10∗ 3.22
(0.04) (2.76) (2.90) (2.39) (3.86) (3.31) (2.81)
∆Household income 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.21 0.19 -0.01
(0.00) (0.21) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.11)
Constant 0.34∗∗∗ 18.07∗∗∗ 19.71∗∗∗ 0.78 28.36∗∗∗ 28.58∗∗∗ 1.46
(0.08) (5.93) (5.69) (4.46) (6.11) (7.23) (3.02)
Observations 447 448 448 448 447 447 447
F 26.18 40.92 52.59 30.75 41.68 23.23 43.36
R2 0.38 0.44 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.37 0.35
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.43 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.36 0.33
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on village level;
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
¶ for simplicity, coefficients for baseline values were put into the same row.
Table A2.43: Effect of intensity on changes in solidarity and in-group behavior - Fixed effects
regression, balanced panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
solidarity
transfer -
anonymous
(1)
transfer -
friend (1)
ingroup bias
(1)
transfer -
anonymous
(2)
transfer -
friend (2)
ingroup bias
(2)
Year (2016=1) -0.01 -4.91∗ 1.49 6.40∗∗∗ 0.88 -0.18 -1.06
(0.03) (2.49) (2.54) (1.65) (2.12) (1.79) (1.56)
(year)*(high intensity) -0.01 0.43 0.27 -0.16 -0.88 -1.05 -0.16
(0.05) (3.45) (3.66) (2.07) (3.88) (3.85) (1.93)
Constant 0.46∗∗∗ 29.80∗∗∗ 32.03∗∗∗ 2.23∗∗∗ 31.77∗∗∗ 35.18∗∗∗ 3.41∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.86) (0.92) (0.52) (0.96) (0.95) (0.48)
Observations 897 898 898 898 897 897 897
F 0.08 3.71 0.40 20.15 0.09 0.07 0.80
R2 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adjusted R2 -0.00 0.03 0.00 0.08 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on village level;
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table A2.44: Effect of intensity on changes in solidarity and in-group behavior - Fixed effects
regression, unbalanced panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
solidarity
transfer -
anonymous
(1)
transfer -
friend (1)
ingroup bias
(1)
transfer -
anonymous
(2)
transfer -
friend (2)
ingroup bias
(2)
Year (2016=1) -0.01 -4.91∗ 1.49 6.40∗∗∗ 0.88 -0.18 -1.06
(0.03) (2.49) (2.54) (1.65) (2.12) (1.79) (1.56)
(year)*(high intensity) -0.01 0.43 0.27 -0.16 -0.88 -1.05 -0.16
(0.05) (3.45) (3.66) (2.07) (3.88) (3.85) (1.93)
Constant 0.47∗∗∗ 30.55∗∗∗ 32.58∗∗∗ 2.03∗∗∗ 32.32∗∗∗ 35.29∗∗∗ 2.97∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.88) (0.93) (0.53) (0.96) (0.94) (0.50)
Observations 1601 1602 1602 1602 1601 1601 1601
F 0.08 3.71 0.40 20.17 0.09 0.07 0.80
R2 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adjusted R2 -0.00 0.03 0.00 0.08 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on village level;
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Table A2.45: Effect of intensity on risk aversion - unbalanced panel, fixed effects regression
(1) (2)
Risk aversion -
incentivized
Risk aversion -
survey
measured
Year (2016=1) -0.08 0.15∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.03)
(year)*(high intensity) 0.04 -0.02
(0.08) (0.04)
Constant 0.44∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01)
Observations 1488 1601
F 1.41 24.38
R2 0.01 0.11
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.11
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table A2.46: Effect of risk aversion on self selection and effect of living in high intensity villages
on risk aversion in 2016
(1) (2)
Relative
distance
Risk
aversion -
incentivized
2016
High intensity 0.04
(0.07)
Relative risk aversion 2012 -0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.05)
Constant 0.50∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.04)
Observations 795 388
F 0.06 0.17
R2 0.00 0.00
Adjusted R2 -0.00 -0.00
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Player number: __________ 
 PRE 1 
QUESTIONNAIRE BEFORE THE EXPERIMENT 
 
 
Date:    ______________________ 
Barangay :   ______________________ 
Participant’s name: ___________________________________ 
Interviewer name: ___________________________________ 
 
 Please fill 
in here 
Age  
Sex (1=M, 2=F)  
Educational attainment (1=Elementary, 2=High School, 3=Vocational 
Training, 4=College, 5=Master’s Degree) 
 
Household Head (1=Head, 2 = Spouse)  
Current Marital Status (1=Single, 2=Married; 3=Separated, 
4=Widowed) 
 
How many people stay permanently (more than 6 months per year) in 
your household? 
 
Number of years living in this Barangay?  
 
Do you receive regular income? (0=No, 1=Yes)  
On average, how much does your household earn per month? (PhP)  
During the last year, how much did you earn on an average good 
month? 
 
During the last year, how much did you earn on an average bad 
month? 
 
In the last month, did anybody in the household reduce meals because 
there was not enough money for food? 
 
Do you have savings of more than 1000 pesos? (0=No, 1=Yes)  
Do you have savings of more than 5000 pesos? (0=No, 1=Yes)  
Do you owe money, labor or something else to somebody with a total 
value higher than 5000 Pesos? (0=No, 1=Yes) 
 
If yes, whom do you owe mainly? (1=to a bank/microfinance/money 
lender, 2=friend, 3=relatives, 9=other) 
 
 
 
 
Are you currently engaged in fishing?  Yes   No  
What percentage of your income comes from fishing? ____________% 
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Please list all groups or organizations, committees, councils, associations, 
cooperatives to which you belong? These could be formally organized groups or just 
groups of people who get together regularly to do an activity or talk about things. 
Name of the group: Type of group 
(1=women 
group, 
2=farmer/fisher 
association, 
3=…) 
Do you have a 
leading position 
in this group? If 
yes, which 
one? 
How often 
per year 
do 
meetings 
take 
place? 
How 
often per 
year do 
you go 
to the 
meetings 
Do you pay 
membership 
fee? 
(if yes, note 
monthly 
amount) 
How many 
hours per 
week do 
you 
engage in 
activities 
of this 
group? 
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
How many days, in the past 3 months, have you worked with others in your 
community to do something for the benefit of the community? Please only think of 
community services that took at least half a day. ______________ 
  
 
Did you vote in the last of the following elections: 
Barangay    Yes   No  
Municipal  Yes   No 
Provincial  Yes   No 
National   Yes   No 
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 POST 1 
  QUESTIONNAIRE AFTER THE EXPERIMENT 
 
 
Which sentence characterizes the behavior of the people in your barangay best? (choose 
one) 
People are always busy and don’t help so much.. .................................... 1  
People help first of all their family and friends when help is needed . .... 2  
People help only those people they know will also help them  ............... 3  
People help each other whenever somebody needs help  ....................... 4  
  
Don’t know ............................................................ 9 
 
 
 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be 
very careful in dealing with people?   
 Most people can be trusted.  
 Need to be very careful. 
 
Compared with other barangay, how much do people in this barangay trust each other in 
matters of lending and borrowing? 
 More trust than in other barangay 
 Same as in other barangay 
 Less trust than in other barangay 
 
About how many close friends do you have these days? These are people you feel at ease 
with, can talk to about private matters, or call on for help    ___ 
Please identify your friends on the household list  (this information will remain confidential): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 How many of your close friends are fishermen?   ___ 
How many of your close friends are barangay officials? ___ 
Apart from the people you live with, how many relatives that you feel close to live within a 
15–20 minute walk, if any? ___________ 
 
People react to unfair situations in very different ways. In the following I would like to ask you 
how you would react in unfair situations. I will now read you several statements. Please tell 
Player number: ________ 
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me to what extent each of these statements apply to you. If you have never experienced 
such a situation yourself, try to imagine how you would react if you were in such a situation. 
 
First, we will look at situations to the advantage of others and to your own disadvantage. 
 doesn't 
apply 
at all 
applies 
slightly 
 
applies 
moderately 
 
applies 
mostly 
 
applies 
completely 
I am upset when others are better off than 
me. 
     
I am upset when others are 
undeservingly better off than me.      
I feel good when I sacrifice for others      
 
Now, we will look at situations in which you notice or learn that someone else is being 
treated unfairly, put at a disadvantage, or used. 
 doesn't 
apply 
at all 
applies 
slightly 
 
applies 
moderately 
 
applies 
mostly 
 
applies 
completely 
I am upset when someone is 
undeservingly worse off than others. 
     
I feel pity when someone is undeservingly 
worse off than others. 
     
 
Now, we will look at situations that turn out to your advantage and to the disadvantage of 
others. 
 
doesn't 
apply 
at all 
applies 
slightly 
 
applies 
moderately 
 
applies 
mostly 
 
applies 
completely 
I feel guilty when I am better off  than 
others. 
     
I feel guilty when I am undeservingly 
better off  than others. 
     
 
 
Finally, we look at situations in which you treat someone else unfairly, discriminate against 
someone or exploit them. 
 
doesn't 
apply 
at all 
applies 
slightly 
 
applies 
moderately 
 
applies 
mostly 
 
applies 
completely 
I feel guilty when I enrich myself at the cost 
of others. 
     
I feel clever when I use tricks to achieve 
something while others have to struggle for 
it  
     
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There are many different organizations or group of people involved in important aspects of 
your life, ranging from the federal government to your neighbouring cooperatives and NGOs. 
In general, when thinking about each organization below, would you say you completely 
distrust them, completely trust them, or are you somewhere in between? 
 
Organization: Completely 
distrust 
Distrust 
 
Neither 
trust nor 
distrust  
Trust Completely 
trust 
Would you ask for advice 
to these groups in case 
you have a problem? 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] Yes No 
National Government               
Provincial Government               
Municipal/ City government 
officials (LGU)               
Barangay captain               
Barangay kagawats               
People from your barangay               
Fishers from your barangay                
Fishers from the neighboring 
barangay               
NGOs               
Courts and judges               
FARMC               
               
               
               
               
               
 
Do you think that politicians on different levels are sincere when they implement projects 
and laws; do they at least try to keep their promises? 
 
 
doesn't 
apply 
at all 
applies 
slightly 
applies 
moderately 
applies 
mostly 
applies 
completely 
At the national level?           
At the provincial level?            
At the municipal/city level? 
(LGU)           
 
Irrespective of their intentions, are politicians on different levels able to achieve their goals 
when they implement projects and laws? 
 
 
doesn't 
apply 
at all 
applies 
slightly 
applies 
moderately 
applies 
mostly 
 
applies 
completely 
At the national level?           
At the provincial level?            
At the municipal/city level? 
(LGU)           
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 Have any of the following 
shocks happened to you or 
other household members 
in the last 2 years (since 
2010 till today)? 
 
 
 
 
Rank the three most important 
financial coping mechanism you 
used immediately after the 
incident happened?  
1 – own money 
2 – borrow 
3 – gift (village) 
4 – gift (govt./NGO) 
5 – sell asset 
6 – insurance 
7 – consume less 
8 – other (specify) 
9 – don’t know 
yes no Write 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
1 
Illness/accident of family 
member (at least visit to a 
doctor needed) 
   
2 Death of family member     
3 
Bad weather conditions heavily 
affecting agricultural or fishing 
production.  
   
4 
Bad weather conditions 
affecting your property.     
5 
Other:____________________
_________________________    
 
 
 
 
Are you covered by any insurance? (insurance means that you pay in advance and if anything 
happens you receive a claim payment)  
Phil Health sponsored    Yes   No 
Phil Health individual paying   Yes   No 
Phil Health public/private employee  Yes   No 
Other Health     Yes   No 
Life Insurance     Yes   No 
Social Security System (SSS)   Yes   No 
Other insurance _________________ Yes   No 
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To what extend do you believe you would receive support in case of emergency by the 
following people/institutions on a scale from 1 to 5 (with 1 being “doesn’t apply at all” and 5 
being “applies completely”)? 
 
 
doesn't 
apply 
at all 
applies 
slightly 
applies 
moderately 
applies 
mostly 
applies 
completely 
Did you turn to these 
groups in case you 
needed financial 
support in an 
emergency situation? 
Yes No 
Relatives within 
Barangay               
Friends within 
Barangay               
Fishermen within 
Barangay               
Neighbors               
Barangay Captain               
Barangay kagawats               
My Bank               
My insurance 
provider               
FARMC               
               
               
               
               
 
 
 
Do you travel outside the Barangay for work?     Yes   No 
How many nights per months do you stay away from your barangay? _____ 
 
How many members of the household have migrated for work or marriage outside your 
barangay? _________ 
On how many of those who migrated can you rely in times of need? ________ 
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****** ONLY FOR 2010 KAGAWARD CANDIDATES ****** 
 
How happy were you with the number of votes you obtained in the last election 
Completely 
dissatisfied 
Mostly 
dissatisfied 
Somewhat 
dissatisfied 
Neither 
satisfied or 
dissatisfied 
Somewhat 
satisfied 
Mostly 
satisfied 
Completely 
satisfied 
       
 
If you are kagawat since the elections 2010, is this your first, second or third term? 
_______ 
 
If you are not kagawat since the elections 2010. How many terms did you serve 
before? ________ 
 
What committee positions do/did you have in the council (if any, e.g. chairman, 
committees, task force, …)? 
 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
_____________________ 
________________________ 
 
What did you do and how much in order to become elected?  
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________ 
Do you think it is personally rewarding to be kagawat?____________ 
Do you think it is financially rewarding to be kagawat? ___________ 
Which political party do you belong to (if any)? ___________ 
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Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if 
any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to three! 
 Independence 
 Hard work 
 Feeling of responsibility 
 Imagination 
 Tolerance and respect for other people 
 Determination, perseverance 
 Religious faith 
 Help people in need 
 Unselfishness 
 Obedience 
 Self-expression 
 Thrift, saving money and things 
 
 
Most important quality:  
Second most important quality  
Third most important quality  
 
 
The following statements may apply more or less to you. To what extent do you think each 
statement applies to you personally? 
 doesn't 
apply 
at all 
applies 
slightly 
 
applies 
moderately 
applies 
mostly 
 
applies 
completely 
I can rely on my own abilities in difficult 
situations.      
I am able to solve most problems on my 
own.      
Sometimes I do things impulsively that I 
shouldn't do.      
I sometimes do things to cheer myself up 
that I later regret.      
I usually think carefully before I act.      
I always bring to an end what I have 
started.      
I plan my schedule so that I get 
everything done on time.      
I am willing to take risks.      
I am happy to take chances.      
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Whether at work or in my private life: 
What I do is mainly determined by others.      
Fate often gets in the way of my plans.      
I respect the majority's wishes in groups  
of which I am a member      
Without competition it is not possible to 
have a good society      
I feel good when I co-operate with others      
Most people can learn to be leaders- it’s 
not a matter of birth.        
Our leaders know what is best for us      
Young people today do not have enough 
respect for traditional values      
Schools should teach children to obey 
authority      
I see myself as someone who is reserved      
I see myself as someone who tends to be 
lazy      
I see myself as someone who is relaxed, 
handles stress well      
I see myself as someone who is outgoing, 
sociable      
I see myself as someone who tends to 
find fault with others      
I see myself as someone who does a 
thorough job      
I see myself as someone who gets 
nervous easily      
I see myself as someone who has an 
active imagination      
 
 
The next question deals with optimism. Optimists are people who look to the future with 
confidence and who mostly expect good things to happen. How would you describe yourself? 
How optimistic are you in general? 
Not optimistic 
at all 
 
a bit optimistic 
 
Somewhat 
optimistic 
 
Mostly optimistic 
 
Completely 
optimistic 
     
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General Information about Fishing Activity 
 
What kind of gear do people in your community currently use for fishing? 
 Net / what mesh size do most people use? ___ 
  Spear gun 
  Hook and line 
  other – please specify: _______________ 
  other – please specify: _______________ 
  other – please specify: _______________ 
 
Most of the year the income from fishing in this barangay is more or less uncertain than in 
other barangays on Panay?  
  less uncertain    same   more uncertain  
 
Do you currently fish in a group of people?      Yes      No 
If yes:   
do you share the catch?       Yes      No 
do you get paid in cash?       Yes      No 
other means of payment – (please specify): ________________________ 
how many fishers are you when you go fishing? ___ 
 
Who owns the boat, boat motor and fishing gear you currently use? 
Myself   Another fisherman  
Fish buyer     Cooperative  
Other: ______________________ (specify) 
 
Do you see other the fishermen from your barangay rather as  
 friends / or  
 partners / or  
 competitors?   
 
Do you see other the fishermen from neighboring barangay rather as  
 friends / or  
partners / or  
competitors?   
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Are there any marine resources (certain fish species, corals, mangroves) that you think 
diminished in abundance over the last few years? 
 Yes      No 
If yes: 
Which one? 
___________________________________________ 
 
Why do you think so? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Are there any marine resources (certain fish species, corals, mangroves) that you think have 
recovered over the last few years? 
 Yes      No 
If yes: 
Which one? 
  __________________________________________ 
 
Why do you think so? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
I will read you a list of issues that may or may not affect fisheries in the area. For each, could 
you tell me if it is a problem, and if it is, how important is it? 
 
Problem 
Not a 
problem 
 
[1] 
Almost not 
a problem 
 
[2] 
Problem 
 
 
[3] 
Important 
problem 
 
[4] 
Very 
important 
problem 
[5] 
Corruption within local 
government units      
Lack of adequate laws      
Lack of monitoring      
Lack of support for monitoring      
Competition with industrial 
fisheries      
Competition with recreational 
fisheries or tourism activities      
Competition with fishers from 
other states      
Too many fishermen      
Lack of zoning      
Marine pollution      
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Lack of organization among 
fishermen      
fishermen do not define and 
respect rules      
Bad prices of fish      
Lack of economic alternatives      
Lack of technical support      
Disputes among fishermen      
Lack of togetherness between 
fishermen      
Stealing or vandalism e.g. 
destruction of fishing gear      
Violence between fishermen      
Banks do not give credit to 
invest in fishing business      
Uncertain catch due to bad 
weather      
 
 
In the recent years, has the level of trust between fishers in your neighborhood improved, 
worsened, or stayed the same? 
Worsened    Stayed the same    Improved   
 
In the recent years, has the level of trust between fishers in this and the neighboring 
barangay improved, worsened, or stayed the same? 
Worsened    Stayed the same    Improved   
 
In the recent years, has the level of trust between fishers and other community members 
improved, worsened, or stayed the same? 
Worsened    Stayed the same    Improved   
 
Which of the following rules and regulations about fishing exist in your area? 
Regulation  
 
 
 
Do you 
think this 
rule is 
good? 
Have you been 
consulted 
regarding the 
creation of this 
rule? 
In percent, how many 
fishers in your 
community adhere to 
the rules and 
regulations for 
fishing?   
 
 Yes No Yes No Yes No  
Areas where you are not allowed to 
fish at all       
 
Prohibited to use specific fishing gear 
like ___________________________       
 
Player number: ________ 
 POST 12 
Prohibited to use specific fishing gear 
like ___________________________       
 
Prohibited to use specific fishing gear 
like ___________________________       
 
Seasonal restrictions to fish 
      
 
Certain species you are not allowed to 
fish       
 
 
How many times have you participated in some type of inspection and enforcement 
activities in the past year in the  
 1-5 times  
 6-10 times  
 11-20 times  
 More than 20  
 Never  
 
Have you ever made a complaint about other fishermen? 
 Yes      No 
Do you think that the leaders of the fishing groups can represent your interests as a fisher? 
 Yes      No 
 
Did you change your fishing practices in the last 10 years?  
I did not change my fishing practices  
I changed my fishing practices very little  
I moderately changed my fishing practices  
I changed my fishing practices a lot  
If you changed can you tell me why you did so? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
**** NEW**** 
 
We are interested in learning more about the reasons why you would—or would not—
choose to fish with another person. Imagine that a potential partner has the following 
characteristics—would each characteristic make you more likely to work with them, less 
likely to work with them, or would it make no difference?  
 
 More likely to 
work together 
Less likely to work 
together 
It would make no 
difference 
This person has resources 
such as fishing gear, boats, 
etc. 
   
We are from the same 
village.    
This person knows fishing 
techniques that I don’t know.    
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This person has less 
experience than I do.    
We have worked well 
together one time before.    
Everyone I know says that 
this person is trustworthy.    
This is an important person in 
my village.    
We share the same religion.    
We had an argument in the 
past.    
We are cousins.    
We have different political 
opinions.    
A close friend says that this 
person is not trustworthy.    
We are related by marriage.    
This person has a reputation 
for helping others.    
We are distant relatives (e.g., 
second cousins)    
This person supports the 
MPA.    
We are neighbors.    
 
 
We are interested in learning more about your fishing partners. Please think of the 
individuals that you work with most closely, and list their first name or initials in the spaces 
below. List up to five partners, and then tell us more about each of these people by 
answering the questions that follow. 
  
__________ 
1st partner 
 
__________ 
2nd partner 
 
__________ 
3rd partner 
 
__________ 
4th partner 
 
__________ 
5th partner 
 
Is this person male or 
female? 
 male 
 female 
 male 
 female 
 male 
 female 
 male 
 female 
 male 
 female 
About how many 
years have you 
known this person?  
     
 
About how often 
have you fished with 
this person in the last 
year? 
 
 more than 
20 times 
 11-20 times 
 6-10 times 
 2-5 times 
 more than 
20 times 
 11-20 times 
 6-10 times 
 2-5 times 
 more than 
20 times 
 11-20 times 
 6-10 times 
 2-5 times 
 more than 
20 times 
 11-20 times 
 6-10 times 
 2-5 times 
 more than 
20 times 
 11-20 times 
 6-10 times 
 2-5 times 
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 1 time only  1 time only  1 time only  1 time only  1 time only 
 
Would you say that 
this person tends to 
have more fishing 
partners than you, 
fewer partners, or 
about the same? 
 more 
partners 
 fewer 
partners 
 about the 
same 
 more 
partners 
 fewer 
partners 
 about the 
same 
 more 
partners 
 fewer 
partners 
 about the 
same 
 more 
partners 
 fewer 
partners 
 about the 
same 
 more 
partners 
 fewer 
partners 
 about the 
same 
Do you work with this 
person by choice?  yes 
 no 
 yes 
 no 
 yes 
 no 
 yes 
 no 
 yes 
 no 
Does this person 
work with any of your 
other fishing partners 
on a regular basis? 
 yes, all of 
them 
 yes, some 
of them 
 
 none of 
them 
 yes, all of 
them 
 yes, some 
of them 
 
 none of 
them 
 yes, all of 
them 
 yes, some 
of them 
 
 none of 
them 
 yes, all of 
them 
 yes, some 
of them 
 
 none of 
them 
 yes, all of 
them 
 yes, some 
of them 
 
 none of 
them 
 
Are you likely to work 
with this person in 
the future?  
 definitely 
yes 
 
 probably 
yes 
 
 probably no 
 
 definitely 
no 
 definitely 
yes 
 
 probably 
yes 
 
 probably no 
 
 definitely 
no 
 definitely 
yes 
 
 probably 
yes 
 
 probably no 
 
 definitely 
no 
 definitely 
yes 
 
 probably 
yes 
 
 probably no 
 
 definitely 
no 
 definitely 
yes 
 
 probably 
yes 
 
 probably no 
 
 definitely 
no 
 
 
Open-ended questions  
 
Under what circumstances, if ever, do you have no choice but to work with a particular 
person as a fishing partner? 
 
 
 
Under what circumstances, if ever, would you refuse to work with another person as a 
fishing partner? 
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Under what circumstances would you be very likely to choose a particular person as a fishing 
partner? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***** Please fill in if your fishing practices are influenced by an MPA in your area ****** 
 
Did you change your fishing practices since the establishment of MPAs in your area?  
I did not change my fishing practices  
I changed my fishing practices very little  
I moderately changed my fishing practices  
I changed my fishing practices a lot  
 
Which of the following statements describes the best your involvement in the process of 
MPA implementation in your area: 
I was never invited to attend the implementation meeting(s)  
I was in a position to attend the implementation meeting(s)  
I attended at least one meeting  
I contributed my knowledge of and/or views about theMPA 
 
Which of the following statements describes the best the local community involvement in 
the process of MPA implementation in your area: 
 The local community did not contribute to the creation of MPA 
 Local community members attended the meetings  
Local community members influenced final decision about the size and location of MPA 
 Local community members decided on their own the size and location of the MPA 
 
Do you agree with the following statements: 
 
Situation Strongly 
agree 
[1] 
Agree 
 
[2] 
Disagree 
 
[3] 
Strongly 
disagree 
[4] 
Neutral 
 
[5] 
I think MPA helps to increase fish yields 
     
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I think that MPA protects fish stocks 
     
I think that MPA provides alternative sources 
of income      
I think that enforcement in the MPA works well 
     
I think that no-take zones in the MPA should be 
opened for fishing      
 
Could you tell me which of the following statements describes the best your position at the 
time that MPA was created? 
I strongly supported the creation of the MPA  
I supported the creation of the MPA  
I opposed the creation of the MPA  
I strongly opposed the creation of the MPA  
I had a neutral position 
 
Could you tell me which of the following statements describes the best your position about 
the MPAtoday? 
I strongly support the MPA  
I support the MPA  
I oppose the MPA  
I strongly oppose the MPA  
I have a neutral position  
 
Let us suppose that the MPA was never implemented. What do you think the status of the 
marine resources would have been in that case when compared to the present situation? 
Much better  
Slightly better  
The same  
Worse  
Much worse  
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EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL 
TEMPLATE FOR ALL TREATMENTS/VARIANTS 
 
When participants arrive 
[Participants answer the pre-questionnaire.] 
[Each participant arriving gets a random player number.] 
[Participants are assigned a seat according to the player number.] 
Basic instructions 
Thank you all for coming today. My name is Victoria and this is Karla. Karla is a researcher 
at a university in Germany. In this game today, we want to play some games where you can 
earn a considerable amount of money that you are permitted to keep and take home. In these 
games you will have to make decisions that will influence your personal earning, but each of 
you will be given a show-up fee of 100 Pesos at the end for sure. [Show a 100 Peso bill.] The 
whole procedure will last around 3 hours. Thank you in advance for your effort and time. 
Karla is working together with other researchers who are carrying out similar games all 
around the world.  
1. If at any time you find that this is something that you do not wish to participate in for any 
reason, you are of course free to leave whether we have started the game or not. But if you 
feel uncomfortable already now, or you already know that you will not be able to stay 
for the three to four hours, then you should tell us now. 
2. It is very important that you understand the games. Therefore we will check your 
understanding by asking each of you test questions about the rules. If you do not understand 
the rules you may always ask the assistants to explain them. But if you cannot answer the 
test questions after explaining them again, we will have to exclude you from the game 
and you receive only the show-up fee of 100 Pesos. But don’t worry, we will do our best to 
help you understand. 
3. Before you get handed out your money at the end of the workshop, you are asked to answer 
a questionnaire. It is very important for our research, that you answer all questions seriously. 
You will receive your payment only after completing the questionnaire. 
After knowing these rules, is there anybody who does not like to participate anymore? 
 [Wait some moments.] 
There will be five games that are slightly different. At the beginning of each game, each of 
you will be given 200 Pesos [Show money]. You will make your decision on a sheet of paper. 
In each game you might lose some of this 200 Pesos. What you are able to keep from the 
initial 200 Pesos will be important for your final earnings. How much you keep in each game 
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depends on your decisions, decisions of others and luck. The 100 Pesos for coming to the 
workshop are always untouched. 
We will draw a ball at the end to determine which of the five games will be paid out to you.  
Just one of the five games is finally paid out. [Show 5 balls with numbers] This is why the 
outcomes in one game have no influence on the other games. So if you play a game, don’t 
worry what happened in the games before. Just take each game seriously on its own, 
because it might be the one that is paid out.  
In the games you have to make decisions about small sums of money. Each decision you 
make is as good – there are no wrong decisions. Your decisions will be kept in private, so just 
choose the option YOU like best! After you played the games and answered your 
questionnaire at the end, one by one will come to Karla, who will hand out these earnings plus 
the show-up fee to you and you sign the receipt.  
You all received a plastic bag with player number already. The player number is your 
personal number. You keep this number for all five games of the workshop and have to show 
them at the end in order to get paid. So always remember to take the plastic bag with your 
player number with you. After we have read aloud the instructions for the first game of the 
workshop, we will call you by your player number. Please follow the assistant if you are 
called. 
There are some more rules for communication. During the game talking is strictly prohibited. 
You cannot ask questions or talk about the rules of the game to other participants while we are 
in the process of playing. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and wait until 
someone comes to answer your question in private. If you do not follow the rule you cannot 
participate in the game anymore and get no earnings from the games. 
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1
st
 game 
Let’s start with the first game. All of you have 200 Pesos at the beginning of the game. We 
use play money to illustrate that the decisions that you take here are about real money. 
[Show money] 
In this game you can keep your 200 Peso or lose money. This will depend partly on your 
choices and partly on your luck. We here have an opaque bag with 27 balls in it. This means 
that there are as many balls in the bag as we have players today. Each player will have to 
draw one ball. Out of the 27 balls there are 18 white and 9 red balls. If you draw a white ball 
you can keep your 200 pesos. If you draw a red ball you lose all 200 pesos. That means that 
one of three players will lose and two out of three will not lose.   
In Option A your earnings, 200 or 0, depend on chance. In Option A you can keep your 200 
Peso when you draw a white ball; but you receive 0 Peso in the unfortunate case you draw a 
red ball.  
Instead, you may also choose option B. You also have to draw a ball from the same opaque 
bag with 18 white and 9 red balls, but in option B you only lose 100 pesos if you draw a red 
ball. In return you have to pay a price of 40 pesos. 
 [show the following example with two assistants (one A, one B), deducting the 
relevant amounts] 
Example: “For example if you chose option B, then you lose only 100 pesos if 
you draw a red ball and you would be left with 60 pesos, because you 
have to pay the price of 40. If you draw a white ball you lose nothing 
and you are left with 160 pesos, because you also have to pay the price 
of 40 pesos. 
If you chose option A on the other hand you would lose everything 
with a red ball and you would be left with 0 pesos. With a white ball 
you would lose nothing and you would be left with 200 pesos.” 
[SHOW PARTICIPANT THE PAYOFF TABLE make sure that the player is looking, seeing, 
and concentrating]. 
 
Option A 
(pay 0) 
 
□   or   □ Option B 
(pay 40) 
 
○ ○ 
White ball 
(lose 0) 
 
● 
Red ball 
(lose 200) 
 
 ○ ○ 
White ball 
(lose 0) 
 
● 
Red ball 
(lose 100) 
 
keep 
200 
keep 
0 
 keep 
160 
keep 
60 
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You will receive this sheet where you have to mark your decision. 
Before we start, let me quickly explain how you will be paid for in this game. You will be 
paid based on your selected decision. After you have made your decision, everybody has to 
draw a ball from the opaque bag. Depending on the option you chose and whether you draw a 
white or red ball, you can keep or you will lose money as shown in the table before.  
 [Ask participants how much they would have left in each of the four cases] 
These were the instructions of the procedure of the first game. Are there any questions or 
points that remained unclear and shall be explained in more detail? We will  start with the test 
questions now. The assistants will afterwards ask you whether you prefer option B or option 
A. 
 [Call participants individually, distribute 200 pesos play money, ask test questions, let 
participants decide option, deduct price if option B] 
 [in big group draw balls and deduct money] 
 
5 
 
2
nd
 Game 
Let’s start with the second game. Again all of you have 200 Pesos at the beginning of the 
game. Now you have no play money any more. You will make your decisions on a sheet of 
paper only, but the decisions that you take are still about real money. For the rest of the game 
we have formed groups, each consisting of 3 players. Each of the originally invited [point to 
the left side where originally invited sit] brought along two friends. One sits on the right side 
and will play with you [point to the right side]. The other sits in the middle and will not be in 
the same group. Instead, the third player in your group will be someone from the middle, but 
you will never know who it is exactly. And the ones in the middle will never know the two 
other group members they play with. From now on we will call the unknown players “Player 
X”. 
Whether you can keep your 200 Peso or lose money will depend partly on your choices and 
partly on your luck. For each group we now have an opaque bag with 3 balls in it. This means 
that there are as many balls in the bag as we have players in a group. Each player will have to 
draw one ball. Out of the 3 balls there are 2 white and 1 red ball. If you draw a white ball you 
can keep your 200 pesos. If you draw a red ball you lose all 200 pesos. That means that one of 
the three players in each group will lose everything and two out of three will not lose 
anything. There is no Option B like in the last game. 
In this game the two winners can give money to the loser. Before knowing which ball you 
draw, all of you will be asked whether and how much they would like to send to the other two 
players of their group in case they will draw a red ball and lose 200 Peso. Remember that 
exactly one of you three will lose for sure. Remember also that you are not the only one who 
can transfer since there will always be two players with 200 Peso in your group. You can 
transfer between 0 and 70 of your 200 pesos to the loser. We will ask you to write down on a 
worksheet how much you would give to the other players. Amounts are in steps of 10 Peso. 
You can also transfer zero. So transfers are 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 or 70. Each transfer 
decision you make is as good – there are no wrong decisions. Your transfers will be kept in 
private, so just choose the amount YOU like best! Remember it’s real money. 
From now on we will call the group member you know ______ and the unknown group 
member _Player X_. For the players sitting in the middle [point] there will be two unknown 
players Player X and Player Y. So imagine you keep your 200 Peso and _Player X_loses his 
entire 200 Peso. We will ask you to write down on the worksheet how much you give to 
_Player X_in this case (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 or 70). Now imagine you keep your 200 Peso 
and ______ loses his entire 200 Peso. We will ask you to write down on the worksheet how 
much you give to ______ in this case (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 or 70). 
We also want you to think about the transfer of the other winner in your group to the loser. 
Please guess the amounts that will be transferred. If you guessed correctly you will earn 10 
pesos extra for each guess. 
Lastly, it might also be that you draw the red ball and lose. For this case we ask you to guess 
how much ______ and _Player X_would give to you in this case. We will never tell you 
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whether you were right. But Karla will look at the choice actually made by ______ and 
_Player X_and compare their choices to your guess. If you guessed correctly you will earn 10 
pesos extra for each guess. The best thing you can do to increase your payoff is to truthfully 
state what you think ______ and _Player X_would do. 
[SHOW AND EXPLAIN PARTICIPANT FORM make sure that the player is 
looking, seeing, and concentrating] 
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○ 
no loss 
GUESS TRANSFER OF   
______ ○  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
 
DECIDE TRANSFER TO  
Player X ●  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
            
○ 
no loss 
GUESS TRANSFER OF  
Player X ○  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
 
DECIDE TRANSFER TO  
______ ●  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
            
●  
lose 200 
GUESS TRANSFER OF  
______ ○  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
 
GUESS TRANSFER OF 
        
Player X ○  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
 
Your earnings in this game will depend on the colour of the ball you draw, the money you 
transfer or receive and your guess of the other transfers. If you draw a white ball you keep 200 
Peso but might give some of it to the group member who lost. If you draw a red ball you lose 
all money and have nothing but you might get money from both group members. It is very 
important that you understand that we will not tell you in this game or any of the following 
games how much the other players give to you and who the anonymous group members are. 
The two group members that know each other will draw their balls first and then the bags with 
one ball left will be brought to Karla. Only she knows from which bag the people in the 
middle have to draw their ball. Did you understand everything? Will you [point to left and 
right side] know one member of your group? [Wait for an answer.] Will you know the other 
member? [Wait for an answer.] Will you [point to middle] know one member of your group? 
[Wait for an answer.] Will you know after this game what your group members gave you? 
[Wait for an answer.] Will you know it after the third game? [Wait for an answer.] Do you 
want me to explain this again? 
These were the instructions of the procedure of the second game. Are there any questions or 
points that remained unclear and shall be explained in more detail? We will start with the test 
questions now. The assistants will afterwards let you fill in your decision sheet. For the two 
cases where you draw a white ball please write down how much you would give to the two 
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group members, respectively. For the case where you draw a red ball and lose everything, 
guess how much each of the other group members would give you. 
 [Call participants individually, ask test questions and let participants fill out forms] 
 [Let pairs draw balls, bring bags back to Karla, call anonymous players and let them 
draw from the corresponding bag (only Karla knows which one)] 
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 3
rd
 Game 
Let’s turn to the third game. The groups are the same as in the last round and again all of you 
have 200 Pesos at the beginning of the game. The first transfer decision in the game is similar 
to the game before. The second transfer decision which we call conditional transfer list is 
new. You have to make both decisions but you will not know which one is relevant for you in 
the end.  From the two winners in each group one will transfer the unconditional transfer and 
for the other winner, Karla will use his/her conditional transfer list. In the transfer list you will 
chose your transfers conditional on what the loser is willing to give you.  
In the conditional transfer list we ask you to decide how much you want to give to the loser 
conditional on what he/she decided to transfer to you. However, since you will not be told 
how much Pesos the loser would give to you we ask you to decide dependent on all possible 
transfers the loser could make. Only the relevant one will be your conditional transfer. 
[show the following on poster]  
For example we will ask you what you give to the loser, knowing that the loser would give for 
example 50 Peso to you when you lost your 200 Peso in this game. In the sheet we give you 
some examples and you can pick one of them. But if you don’t like the examples and want to 
react differently to the possible transfers of your group member, just fill out the last column 
with your own numbers. 
[explain on one poster all decisions that need to be taken by the participant] 
After all participants in one group made their entries each of you will draw one ball to 
determine the person who lost his 200 Peso.  
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○ 
______ 
______ 
 
 
Player X 
○ 
 
● 
  
      
 
I TRANSFER TO Player X                       
 
 
______ 
 
IF Player X DECIDED TO GIVE YOU…. 
(CONDITIONAL) 
       …    0,  DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 
       …  10,  DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 
       …  20,  DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 
       …  30,  DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 
       …  40,  DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 
       …  50,  DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 
       …  60,  DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 
        … 70,  DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 
 
 
□ 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
□ 
 
70 
70 
70 
70 
70 
70 
70 
70 
 
□ 
 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
 
□ 
 
40 
40 
40 
40 
40 
40 
40 
40 
 
□ 
 
__ 
__ 
__ 
__ 
__ 
__ 
__ 
__ 
 
                  
○ 
______ 
Player X 
 
 
______ 
○ 
 
● 
  
      
 
DECIDE TRANSFER TO ______  
 
 
 
______ 
IF ______  DECIDED TO GIVE YOU….  
(CONDITIONAL) 
       …    0,  DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 
       …  10,  DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 
       …  20,  DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 
       …  30,  DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 
       …  40,  DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 
       …  50,  DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 
       …  60,  DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 
        … 70,  DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 
 
□ 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
□ 
 
70 
70 
70 
70 
70 
70 
70 
70 
□ 
 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
□ 
 
40 
40 
40 
40 
40 
40 
40 
40 
□ 
 
__ 
__ 
__ 
__ 
__ 
__ 
__ 
__ 
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Do you have any questions? These were the instructions of the procedure of the third game. 
Are there any questions or points that remained unclear and shall be explained in more detail? 
We will now show the procedure again. 
[Call participants and ask test questions] 
We will distribute the decision sheets now. For the two cases where you draw a white ball 
please write down how much you would give to the two group members, respectively. For the 
case where you draw a red ball and lose everything, guess how much each of the other group 
members would give you. 
[Let participants fill out form separated by screens and draw balls] 
 
4
th
 Game: Soli + Trust 
[play and explain game like in game 2] 
4
th
 Game: Soli + Trust + Low Risk  
[play and explain game like in game 2, but change payoffs] 
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4
th
 Game: Soli + Trust + Insurance  
Let’s turn to the fourth game. The groups are the same as in the last round and again all of you 
have 200 Pesos at the beginning of the game. 
This game is slightly different from the one before. It combines parts of game 1 and game 2. 
As in game one you can choose between option A and option B and additionally you can also 
make transfers to your group members as in game 2. 
In Option A you can keep your 200 Peso when you draw a white ball; but you receive 0 Peso 
in the unfortunate case you draw a red ball.  
In option B you also have to draw a ball from the same opaque bag with 2 white and 1 red 
balls, but in option B you only lose 100 pesos if you draw a red ball. In return you have to pay 
a price of 40 pesos.  
Example: “For example if you chose option B, then you lose only 100 pesos if 
you draw a red ball and you would be left with 60 pesos, because you 
have to pay the price of 40. If you draw a white ball you lose nothing 
and you are left with 160 pesos, because you also have to pay the price 
of 40 pesos. 
If you chose option A on the other hand you would lose everything 
with a red ball and you would be left with 0 pesos. With a white ball 
you would lose nothing and you would be left with 200 pesos.” 
After you have decided whether you prefer option A or option B the decision will be told to 
the other members of the group. As in game 2 the two winners can give money to the loser. 
Therefore, before knowing which ball you draw, all of you will be asked whether and how 
much they would like to send to the other two players of their group in case they will draw a 
red ball and lose 200 or 100 Peso. For example, the loser will lose 200 pesos with option A 
and 100 pesos with option B. How much your group members lose might be important for 
your transfer decision, this is why we tell you the decision. Remember that exactly one of you 
three will lose for sure. Remember also that you are not the only one who can transfer since 
there will always be two players with 200/160 Peso in your group. You can transfer between 0 
and 70 of your 200/160 pesos to the loser. We will ask you to write down on a worksheet how 
much you would give to the other players. Amounts are in steps of 10 Peso. Note that your 
transfer amounts will never be told to the others. 
Example: “So imagine you chose option B and draw a white ball. You keep 160 
Peso and one group member loses his entire 200 Peso. We will ask you 
to write down on the worksheet how much you give to this group 
member in this case (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 or 70). Now imagine you 
keep 160 Peso and the other group member only loses 100 Peso and 
pays 40 as a price for the option B. We will ask you to write down on 
the worksheet how much you give to this other group member in this 
case (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 or 70).” 
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Lastly, it might also be that you draw the red ball and lose. For this case we ask you to guess 
again how much your two group members would give to you in this case. We will never tell 
you whether you were right. But Karla will look at the choice actually made by the other two 
group member and compare their choices to your guess. If you guessed correctly you will 
earn 10 pesos extra for each guess. The best thing you can do to increase your payoff is to 
truthfully state what you think your group members would do. 
[SHOW AND EXPLAIN PARTICIPANT FORM make sure that the player is 
looking, seeing, and concentrating] 
○ 
you pay __ 
GUESS TRANSFER OF   
________(   ) 
___________ 
 
○  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
 
DECIDE TRANSFER TO  
Player X (   ) 
___________ ●  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
            
○ 
you pay __ 
GUESS TRANSFER OF  
Player X (   ) 
___________ ○  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
 
DECIDE TRANSFER TO  
________(   ) 
___________ 
●  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
            
●  
you lose ___ 
and pay __ 
GUESS TRANSFER OF  
________(   ) 
___________ ○  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
 
GUESS TRANSFER OF 
        
Player X (   ) 
___________ ○  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
 
Do you have any questions? These were the instructions of the procedure of the fourth game. 
Are there any questions or points that remained unclear and shall be explained in more detail? 
[Call participants, ask test questions and let them decide about option A/B] 
[Karla tells assistants the decisions of the group players, then players decide about 
transfers] 
We will distribute the decision sheets now. For the two cases where you draw a white ball 
please write down how much you would give to the two group members, respectively. For the 
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case where you draw a red ball and lose everything, guess how much each of the other group 
members would give you. 
[Let participants fill out form separated by screens and draw balls] 
EGG Game 
Now we would like to play a different game with you. For this game you will be again 
assigned to groups consisting of three players. The group member you already know from the 
previous games will stay the same, while the third group member will be newly assigned to 
your group. This member will NOT be the anonymous member of your group from the game 
before but someone else. 
[Karla announces the new group formations, player x.1 and x.2 stay in the same group and a 
new NON Anonymous player is assigned to them] 
[Assign groups, continue with instructions for the Egg game and implement game] 
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5
th
 Game: Soli + Trust + Insurance 
[play and explain game like in game 4: Soli + Trust + Insurance] 
 
5
th
 Game: Soli + Trust + Insurance + Communication 
Let’s turn to the fifth game. The groups are the same as in the egg game and again all of you 
have 200 Pesos at the beginning of the game. 
This game combines elements of game 1 and game 2. For each group we now have an opaque 
bag with 3 balls in it. This means that there are as many balls in the bag as we have players in 
a group. Each player will have to draw one ball. Out of the 3 balls there are 2 white and 1 red 
ball. If you draw a white ball you can keep your 200 pesos. If you draw a red ball you lose all 
200 pesos. 
In Option A your earnings, 200 or 0, depend on chance. In Option A you can keep your 200 
Peso when you draw a white ball; but you receive 0 Peso in the unfortunate case you draw a 
red ball.  
Instead, you may also choose option B as in game 1. You also have to draw a ball from the 
same opaque bag with 2 white and 1 red balls, but in option B you only lose 100 pesos if you 
draw a red ball. In return you have to pay a price of 40 pesos.  
Example: “For example if you chose option B, then you lose only 100 pesos if 
you draw a red ball and you would be left with 60 pesos, because you 
have to pay the price of 40. If you draw a white ball you lose nothing 
and you are left with 160 pesos, because you also have to pay the price 
of 40 pesos. 
If you chose option A on the other hand you would lose everything 
with a red ball and you would be left with 0 pesos. With a white ball 
you would lose nothing and you would be left with 200 pesos.” 
This time you have the possibility to discuss within your group whether option A or option B 
is the better decision. But you can still decide on your own which option you prefer. 
After you have decided whether you prefer option A or option B the decision will be told to 
the other members of the group. As in game 2 the two winners can give money to the loser. 
Therefore, before knowing which ball you draw, all of you will be asked whether and how 
much they would like to send to the other two players of their group in case they will draw a 
red ball and lose 200/100 Peso. For example, the loser will lose 200 pesos with option A and 
100 pesos with option B. How much your group members lose might be important for your 
transfer decision, this is why we tell you the decision. Remember that exactly one of you three 
will lose for sure. Remember also that you are not the only one who can transfer since there 
will always be two players with 200/160 Peso in your group. You can transfer between 0 and 
70 of your 200/160 pesos to the loser. We will ask you to write down on a worksheet how 
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much you would give to the other players. Amounts are in steps of 10 Peso. Note that your 
transfer amounts will never be told to the others. 
Example: “So imagine you chose option B and draw a white ball. You keep 160 
Peso and one group member loses his entire 200 Peso. We will ask you 
to write down on the worksheet how much you give to this group 
member in this case (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 or 70). Now imagine you 
keep 160 Peso and the other group member only loses 100 Peso and 
pays 40 as a price for the option B. We will ask you to write down on 
the worksheet how much you give to this other group member in this 
case (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 or 70).” 
Lastly, it might also be that you draw the red ball and lose. For this case we ask you to guess 
again how much your two group members would give to you in this case. We will never tell 
you whether you were right. But Karla will look at the choice actually made by the other two 
group member and compare their choices to your guess. If you guessed correctly you will 
earn 10 pesos extra for each guess. The best thing you can do to increase your payoff is to 
truthfully state what you think your group members would do. 
[SHOW AND EXPLAIN PARTICIPANT FORM make sure that the player is 
looking, seeing, and concentrating] 
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○ 
you pay 40 
GUESS TRANSFER OF   
______(B) 
pays 40_ 
 
○  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
 
DECIDE TRANSFER TO  
 _____ (A) 
_loses 200_ ●  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
            
○ 
you pay 40 
GUESS TRANSFER OF  
_____ (A) 
pays 0__ ○  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
 
DECIDE TRANSFER TO  
_______(B) 
loses 100+40 ●  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
            
●  
you lose 100 
and pay 40 
GUESS TRANSFER OF  
____ (A) 
_pays 0__ ○  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
 
GUESS TRANSFER OF 
        
______B) 
Pays 40 ○  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
 
Do you have any questions? These were the instructions of the procedure of the fifth game. 
Are there any questions or points that remained unclear and shall be explained in more detail? 
[Call participants, ask test questions] 
[Let them talk for some time and then individually decide about option A/B] 
We will distribute the decision sheets now. For the two cases where you draw a white ball 
please write down how much you would give to the two group members, respectively. For the 
case where you draw a red ball and lose everything, guess how much each of the other group 
members would give you. 
[Let participants fill out form separated by screens and draw balls] 
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5
th
 Game: Soli + Trust + Insurance (Group) + Communication 
Let’s turn to the fifth game. The groups are the same as in the last round and again all of you 
have 200 Pesos at the beginning of the game. 
This game combines elements of game 1 and game 2. For each group we now have an opaque 
bag with 3 balls in it. This means that there are as many balls in the bag as we have players in 
a group. Each player will have to draw one ball. Out of the 3 balls there are 2 white and 1 red 
ball. If you draw a white ball you can keep your 200 pesos. If you draw a red ball you lose all 
200 pesos. 
In Option A your earnings, 200 or 0, depend on chance. In Option A you can keep your 200 
Peso when you draw a white ball; but you receive 0 Peso in the unfortunate case you draw a 
red ball.  
Instead, you may also choose option B as in game 1. You also have to draw a ball from the 
same opaque bag with 2 white and 1 red balls, but in option B you only lose 100 pesos if you 
draw a red ball. In return you have to pay a price of 40 pesos.  
Example: “For example if you chose option B, then you lose only 100 pesos if 
you draw a red ball and you would be left with 60 pesos, because you 
have to pay the price of 40. If you draw a white ball you lose nothing 
and you are left with 160 pesos, because you also have to pay the price 
of 40 pesos. 
If you chose option A on the other hand you would lose everything 
with a red ball and you would be left with 0 pesos. With a white ball 
you would lose nothing and you would be left with 200 pesos.” 
You can only get option B if all three of you decide to take it. To discuss within your group 
whether option A or option B is the better decision you some time to talk. Then we will ask 
you individually which option you prefer. If all of you decide to take option B, all of you will 
get it. Otherwise nobody will get it. After you have decided whether you prefer option A or 
option B the group will be told if option B was jointly chosen or not.  
As in game 2 the two winners can give money to the loser. Therefore, before knowing which 
ball you draw, all of you will be asked whether and how much they would like to send to the 
other two players of their group in case they will draw a red ball and lose 200/100 Peso. For 
example, the loser will lose 200 pesos with option A and 100 pesos with option B. How much 
your group members lose might be important for your transfer decision, this is why we tell 
you the decision. Remember that exactly one of you three will lose for sure. Remember also 
that you are not the only one who can transfer since there will always be two players with 
200/160 Peso in your group. You can transfer between 0 and 70 of your 200/160 pesos to the 
loser. We will ask you to write down on a worksheet how much you would give to the other 
players. Amounts are in steps of 10 Peso. Note that your transfer amounts will never be told to 
the others. 
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Example: “So all of you took option B and you draw a white ball. You keep 160 
Peso and one group member loses his entire 100 Peso plus pays a price 
of 40 pesos. We will ask you to write down on the worksheet how 
much you give to this group member in this case (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 
60 or 70). Now imagine you keep 160 Peso and the other group 
member only loses 100 Peso and pays 40 as a price for the option B. 
We will ask you to write down on the worksheet how much you give to 
this other group member in this case (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 or 70).” 
Lastly, it might also be that you draw the red ball and lose. For this case we ask you to guess 
again how much your two group members would give to you in this case. We will never tell 
you whether you were right. But Karla will look at the choice actually made by the other two 
group member and compare their choices to your guess. If you guessed correctly you will 
earn 10 pesos extra for each guess. The best thing you can do to increase your payoff is to 
truthfully state what you think your group members would do. 
[SHOW AND EXPLAIN PARTICIPANT FORM make sure that the player is 
looking, seeing, and concentrating] 
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○ 
you pay 40 
GUESS TRANSFER OF   
______(B) 
pays 40_ 
 
○  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
 
DECIDE TRANSFER TO  
______ (B) 
loses 100+40 ●  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
            
○ 
you pay 40 
GUESS TRANSFER OF  
_____ (B) 
pays 40_ ○  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
 
DECIDE TRANSFER TO  
________(B) 
loses 100+40 ●  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
            
●  
you lose 100 
and pay 40 
GUESS TRANSFER OF  
______ (B) 
_pays 40_ ○  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
 
GUESS TRANSFER OF 
        
_____(B) 
Pays 40 ○  
□ 
0 
□ 
10 
□ 
20 
□ 
30 
□ 
40 
□ 
50 
□ 
60 
□ 
70 
 
Do you have any questions? These were the instructions of the procedure of the fifth game. 
Are there any questions or points that remained unclear and shall be explained in more detail? 
[Call participants, ask test questions] 
[Let them talk for some time, then individually decide about option A/B and reveal 
group choice] 
We will distribute the decision sheets now. For the two cases where you draw a white ball 
please write down how much you would give to the two group members, respectively. For the 
case where you draw a red ball and lose everything, guess how much each of the other group 
members would give you. 
[Let participants fill out form separated by screens and draw balls] 
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Questionnaire and Payout 
After having played all the five games we will now determine which one to pay out. We will 
put 5 numbered balls into the plastic bag from 1...5, and blindly draw one of those balls to 
determine which game everybody will be paid for. 
Please recall the payment rules. There is a show-up fee of 100 Pesos plus we will draw one of 
five balls from the bag to determine the round we will pay out.  
The result applies to all of you.  
 [Draw one ball. Alternatively, one of the participants can do it] 
The result is… So you will later be paid out game … 
Now please fill out the questionnaire that is handed out by the assistants. Then you are 
separately led to a private room where you get your final payments. You give the 
questionnaire to the instructor and sign a receipt to approve your received money and 
participation. The money consists of the show up fee, the money left after you transferred to 
others in game and the transfers you received from others in game. 
 
A5. EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL 2012 CHAPTER 7. APPENDIX
Materials From 2016
LXXXIV
CHAPTER 7. APPENDIX A6. PRE EXPERIMENTAL SURVEY 2016
A6 Pre experimental survey 2016
LXXXV
Player number: __________ 
 PRE 1 
QUESTIONNAIRE BEFORE THE EXPERIMENT 
 
 
Date:    ______________________ 
Barangay :   ______________________ 
Participant’s name: ___________________________________ 
Interviewer name: ___________________________________ 
 
 Please fill 
in here 
Age  
Sex (0=M, 1=F)  
Educational attainment (1=Elementary, 2=High School, 3=Vocational 
Training, 4=College, 5=Master’s Degree) 
 
    
Do you receive regular income? (0=No, 1=Yes)  
Income sources 
Name of income 
source 
Average income per 
month 
Income in a good 
month 
Income in a bad 
month 
Main occupation 
1.    
Additional occupation 
2.    
3.     
4. Fishery    
Do you have other sources of income? 
5.    
6. Remittances    
    
On average, how much does your household earn per month? (PhP)  
Household Head (1=Head, 2 = Spouse) 
 
 
Current Marital Status (1=Single, 2=Married; 3=Separated, 
4=Widowed) 
 
How many people stay permanently (more than 6 months per year) in 
your household? 
 
How many people in your 
household are… 
…0-6 years old?  
…7-12 years old?  
…13-17 years old?  
…18-60 years old?  
…>60 years old?  
Number of years living in this Barangay?  
In the last month, did anybody in the household reduce meals because 
there was not enough money for food? 
 
Do you have savings of more than 1000 pesos? (0=No, 1=Yes)  
Do you have savings of more than 5000 pesos? (0=No, 1=Yes)  
Do you owe money, labor or something else to somebody with a total 
value higher than 5000 Pesos? (0=No, 1=Yes) 
 
If yes, whom do you owe mainly? (1=to a bank/microfinance/money 
lender, 2=friend, 3=relatives, 9=other) 
 
Player number: __________ 
 PRE 2 
Please list all groups or organizations, committees, councils, associations, 
cooperatives to which you belong? These could be formally organized groups or just 
groups of people who get together regularly to do an activity or talk about things. 
Name of the group: Type of group 
(1=women 
group, 
2=farmer/fisher 
association, 
3=…) 
Do you have a 
leading 
position in 
this group? If 
yes, which 
one? 
How 
often per 
year do 
meetings 
take 
place? 
How 
often per 
year do 
you go 
to the 
meetings 
Do you pay 
membership 
fee? 
(if yes, note 
monthly 
amount) 
How 
many 
hours 
per week 
do you 
engage 
in 
activities 
of this 
group? 
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
How many days, in the past 3 months, have you worked with others in your 
community to do something for the benefit of the community? Please only think of 
community services that took at least half a day. ______________ 
 
 
 
A7. NEUTRAL PRIMING CHAPTER 7. APPENDIX
A7 Neutral priming
LXXXVIII
H_Survey Participant 0 
 
Date:_______________ Village:________________ Player number:________________ 
 
We now would like to know a little bit more about what you already did today. Could you please 
answer the following questions as truthfully as possible? 
1. What have you eaten for breakfast today? (Ask for details, sorts of dishes, if it was 
homemade or cooked by a person outside of the household, e.g. in a restaurant or sari sari,… 
etc.) 
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________ 
2. What have you been doing after breakfast until now? (Ask for details, kind of activities, 
was it work or leisure activities, etc…) 
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
A8. POSITIVE PRIMING CHAPTER 7. APPENDIX
A8 Positive priming
XC
H_Survey Participant +1 
 
Date:_______________ Village:________________ Player number:________________ 
 
   
We would like to know more about a specific disaster (typhoon Yolanda/Hayan) that occurred in 
November 2013. Please try to remember the incident and answer the following questions as truthfully 
as possible. 
1. We would like to know more about behavior of people after such a disaster. 
Can you remember reports or personally witnessed incidents where people 
have helped each other after typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda hit the island? 
 
□Yes   □No 
2. If yes, what sorts of incidents were you thinking about specifically? (read the question loudly 
and record on recording device) 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
3. Could you imagine other sorts of incidents that show that good things happen even though a 
disaster just occured, and if yes, what may they be? (read the question loudly and record on 
recording device) 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
4. On a scale of 1-10, where one means “not likely at all” and ten means “very likely”, how likely 
do you think is it that a catastrophe like Haiyan results in a better togetherness of people? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
A9. NEGATIVE PRIMING CHAPTER 7. APPENDIX
A9 Negative priming
XCII
H_Survey Participant -1 
 
Date:_______________ Village:________________ Player number:________________ 
 
   
We would like to know more about a specific disaster (typhoon Yolanda/Haiyan) that occurred in 
November 2013. Please try to remember the incident and answer the following questions as truthfully 
as possible. 
1. We would like to know more about behavior of people after such a disaster. Can 
you remember any conflicts that happened because of Haiyan/Yolanda? This can 
be situations where people enriched themselves at the cost of others, became 
criminal, or behaved in other sorts of unwanted behavior. 
 
□Yes   □No 
2. If yes, what sorts of incidents were you thinking about specifically? (read the question loudly 
and record on recording device) 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
3. Could you imagine other sorts of incidents that show that more bad things happen because of 
disasters, and if yes, what may they be? (read the question loudly and record on recording 
device) 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
4. On a scale of 1-10, where one means “not likely at all” and ten means “very likely”, how likely 
do you think is it that a catastrophe like Haiyan results in a better togetherness of people? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
A10. POST EXPERIMENTAL SURVEY 2016 CHAPTER 7. APPENDIX
A10 Post experimental survey 2016
XCIV
Player number: ________ 
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  QUESTIONNAIRE AFTER THE EXPERIMENT 
 
1. On a scale of 1-10, where one means “not likely at all” and ten means “very likely”, how likely 
do you think is it that a catastrophe like Haiyan results in a worse togetherness of people? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
Time Preferences 
[Start with the 1st question. Depending on whether the participant chooses the earlier or the delayed 
option, go to the respective next question. This procedure is repeated four times.] 
 
Suppose you were given the choice between the following: receiving a payment today or a payment 
in 12 months. We will now present to you five situations. The payment today is the same in each of 
these situations. The payment in 12 months is different in every situation. For each of these 
situations we would like to know which you would choose. 
 
1. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1538 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today => go to question 17 
□ in 12 months => go to question 2 
2. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1254 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today => go to question 10 
□ in 12 months => go to question 3 
3. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1124 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today => go to question 7 
□ in 12 months => go to question 4 
4. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1061 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today => go to question 6 
□ in 12 months => go to question 5 
5. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1030 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today end 
□ in 12 months end 
6. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1092 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today end 
□ in 12 months end 
7. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1188 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today => go to question 8 
□ in 12 months => go to question 9 
8. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1221 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today end 
□ in 12 months end 
9. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1156 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today end 
□ in 12 months end 
10. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1392 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today => go to question 14 
□ in 12 months => go to question 11 
11. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1323 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today => go to question 13 
□ in 12 months => go to question 12 
12. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1288 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today end 
□ in 12 months end 
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13. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1357 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today end 
□ in 12 months end 
14. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1464 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today => go to question 16 
□ in 12 months => go to question 15 
15. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1428 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today end 
□ in 12 months end 
16. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1501 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today end 
□ in 12 months end 
17. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1850 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today => go to question 18 
□ in 12 months => go to question 25 
18. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
2016 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today => go to question 22 
□ in 12 months => go to question 19 
19. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1932 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today => go to question 20 
□ in 12 months => go to question 21 
20. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1974 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today end 
□ in 12 months end 
21. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1891 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today end 
□ in 12 months end 
22. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
2103 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today => go to question 23 
□ in 12 months => go to question 24 
23. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
2146 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today end 
□ in 12 months end 
24. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
2059 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today end 
□ in 12 months end 
25. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1690 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today => go to question 29 
□ in 12 months => go to question 26 
26. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1613 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today => go to question 28 
□ in 12 months => go to question 27 
27. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1575 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today end 
□ in 12 months end 
28. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1651 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today end 
□ in 12 months end 
29. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1769 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today => go to question 31 
□ in 12 months => go to question 30 
30. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1729 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today end 
□ in 12 months end 
31. Would you rather receive 1000 pesos today or 
1809 pesos in 12 months? 
□ today end 
□ in 12 months end 
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1. Please tell me, in general, how willing or unwilling you are to take risks. Please tell us on a 
scale of 0-10, where 0 means “completely unwilling to take risks” and a 10 means you are 
“very willing to take risks”. 
 
completely unwilling to 
take risks 
     very willing to take 
risks 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
2. On a scale of 0-10, where 0 means “completely unwilling to do so” and 10 means “ very 
willing to do so”, how willing are you to give up something that is beneficial  for you today in 
order to benefit more from that in the future? 
 
completely unwilling to do 
so 
     very willing to do so 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
3. Do you remember having played some of the games you played with us 
today before? (If you did not play them before just answer “not at all”)  
 
Not at all 
□ 
Very vaguely 
□ 
Somewhat 
□ 
Well 
□ 
Very well 
□ 
  
4. If well, or very well: Do you remember the exact year/month when you 
played them? What year was it? 
__________ 
 
5. If well, or very well: Do you remember how much money you received last 
time? If you cannot remember exactly, please guess. 
 
 
__________ 
6. How certain are you about this amount? 
 
Not at all 
□ 
very little 
□ 
Somewhat 
□ 
rather certain 
□ 
Very certain 
□ 
 
7. Please tell us on a scale of one to five, where one means “I do not agree at all” and five 
means “I agree completely”, to what extent you agree to the following statements 
regarding your behaviour in the games from the last session in 2012: 
 I do not 
agree at 
all 
I slightly 
agree 
 
I somewhat 
agree 
 
I mostly 
agree 
 
I agree 
completely 
 I don’t 
know 
I was satisfied with the amount 
of money that I received last 
       
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time. 
I think I will get more money 
this time than last time. 
       
Last time I made decisions, 
which I regretted for some 
time. 
       
I believed in the anonymity 
of the experiment. 
       
I felt under pressure to 
behave in a certain way 
       
I talked to my friends about 
the amount of money I 
earned. 
       
I was harassed afterwards 
for my decisions in the 
experiment. 
       
 
8. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be 
very careful in dealing with people?   
 Most people can be trusted.  
 Need to be very careful. 
 
9. On the household list provided, please indicate other people in the village you have certain 
relationships with—whether you are friends, count on each other for support, or have given 
or received actual help after the 2013 typhoon. Please mark each name with the following 
letter of you have the following relationships with them (this information will remain strictly 
confidential): 
 
F: Please put an F next to the names of people you consider to be a close friend (these are 
people you feel at ease with, or can talk to about private matters).  
 
S: Please put an S next to the names of people you would rely on for help when needed, for 
example to borrow money or get advice when needed. 
 
R: Please put an R next to the names of people you have actually received help from after 
the 2013 typhoon, e.g., to borrow money or resources. 
      G: Please put a G next to the names of people you actually gave help to after the 2013  
      typhoon, e.g., to loan money or resources. 
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The following statements may apply more or less to you. To what extent do you think each 
statement applies to you personally? 
 doesn't 
apply 
at all 
applies 
slightly 
 
applies 
moderately 
applies 
mostly 
 
applies 
completely 
I can rely on my own abilities in difficult 
situations.      
I am able to solve most problems on my own.      
Sometimes I do things impulsively that I 
shouldn't do.      
I sometimes do things to cheer myself up 
that I later regret.      
I usually think carefully before I act.      
I always bring to an end what I have started.      
I plan my schedule so that I get everything 
done on time.      
Whether at work or in my private life: 
What I do is mainly determined by others.      
Fate often gets in the way of my plans.      
I respect the majority's wishes in groups  of 
which I am a member      
Without competition it is not possible to 
have a good society      
I feel good when I co-operate with others      
Most people can learn to be leaders- it’s not 
a matter of birth.        
Our leaders know what is best for us      
Young people today do not have enough 
respect for traditional values      
Schools should teach children to obey 
authority      
I see myself as someone who is reserved      
I see myself as someone who tends to be lazy      
I see myself as someone who is relaxed, 
handles stress well      
I see myself as someone who is outgoing, 
sociable      
I see myself as someone who tends to find 
fault with others      
I see myself as someone who does a 
thorough job      
I see myself as someone who gets nervous 
easily      
I see myself as someone who has an active 
imagination      
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The next question deals with optimism. Optimists are people who look to the future with 
confidence and who mostly expect good things to happen. How would you describe 
yourself? 
 
How optimistic are you in general? 
Not optimistic 
at all 
 
a bit optimistic 
 
Somewhat optimistic 
 
Mostly optimistic 
 
Completely optimistic 
     
 
  
 
People react to unfair situations in very different ways. In the following I would like to ask you how 
you would react in unfair situations. I will now read you several statements. Please tell me to what 
extent each of these statements apply to you. If you have never experienced such a situation 
yourself, try to imagine how you would react if you were in such a situation. 
 
10. First, we will look at situations to the advantage of others and to your own disadvantage. 
 doesn't 
apply 
at all 
applies 
slightly 
 
applies 
moderately 
 
applies 
mostly 
 
applies 
completely 
I am upset when others are better off than me.      
I am upset when others are undeservingly 
better off than me. 
     
I feel good when I sacrifice for others      
 
11. Now, we will look at situations in which you notice or learn that someone else is being 
treated unfairly, put at a disadvantage, or used. 
 doesn't 
apply 
at all 
applies 
slightly 
 
applies 
moderately 
 
applies 
mostly 
 
applies 
completely 
I am upset when someone is undeservingly 
worse off than others. 
     
I feel pity when someone is undeservingly 
worse off than others. 
     
 
 
 
12. Now, we will look at situations that turn out to your advantage and to the disadvantage of 
others. 
 
doesn't 
apply 
at all 
applies 
slightly 
 
applies 
moderately 
 
applies 
mostly 
 
applies 
completely 
I feel guilty when I am better off than others.      
I feel guilty when I am undeservingly better off 
than others. 
     
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13. Now, we look at situations in which you treat someone else unfairly, discriminate against 
someone or exploit them. 
 
doesn't 
apply 
at all 
applies 
slightly 
 
applies 
moderately 
 
applies 
mostly 
 
applies 
completely 
I feel guilty when I enrich myself at the cost of 
others. 
     
I feel clever when I use tricks to achieve 
something while others have to struggle for it  
     
 
14. Finally, please fill in the table below: 
 doesn't 
apply 
at all 
applies 
slightly 
 
applies 
moderately 
 
applies 
mostly 
 
applies 
completely 
I like to gossip at times.      
There have been occasions when I 
took advantage of someone. 
     
I’m always willing to admit it when I 
make a mistake. 
     
I always try to practice what I preach.      
I sometimes try to get even rather 
than forgive and forget. 
     
At times I have really insisted on 
having things my own way. 
     
There have been occasions where I 
felt like smashing things. 
     
I never resent being asked to return a 
favour. 
     
I have never been irked when people 
expressed ideas very different from 
my own. 
     
I have never deliberately said 
something that hurt someone’s 
feelings. 
     
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15. There are many different organizations or group of people involved in important aspects of 
your life, ranging from the federal government to your neighbouring cooperatives and 
NGOs. In general, when thinking about each organization below, would you say you 
completely distrust them, completely trust them, or are you somewhere in between? 
 
Organization: Completely 
distrust 
Distrust 
 
Neither 
trust nor 
distrust  
Trust Completely 
trust 
Would you ask for advice 
to these groups in case 
you have a problem? 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] Yes No 
National Government               
Provincial Government               
Municipal/ City government 
officials (LGU)               
Barangay captain               
Barangay kagawats               
People from your barangay               
Fishers from your barangay                
NGOs               
FARMC               
MPA committee               
fishermen association               
Church               
 
 
16. To what extent do you believe you would receive support in case of emergency by the 
following people/institutions on a scale from 1 to 5 (with 1 being “doesn’t apply at all” and 
5 being “applies completely”)? 
 
doesn't 
apply 
at all 
applies 
slightly 
applies 
moderately 
applies 
mostly 
applies 
completely 
Did you turn to these 
groups in case you 
needed financial 
support in an 
emergency situation? 
Yes No 
Relatives within 
Barangay               
Friends within 
Barangay               
Fishermen within 
Barangay               
Neighbors               
Barangay Captain               
Barangay kagawats               
My Bank               
My insurance 
provider               
FARMC               
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General Information about Fishing Activity 
 
01: What kind of gear do you currently use for fishing? 
 Net   if yes: what mesh size do you use? ___ 
  Spear gun 
  Hook and line 
  other – please specify: _______________ 
  other – please specify: _______________ 
  other – please specify: _______________ 
 
02: Do you currently fish together with a group of people?     Yes      No 
03: How many fishers (including yourself) are you when you go fishing? ___ 
04: Who owns the boat, boat motor and fishing gear you currently use? 
Myself   Another fisherman  
Fish buyer     Cooperative  
Other: ______________________ (specify) 
 
If it is not your own boat:   
05: do you get paid in cash, fish or both?    cash    fish   both 
 
If it is your own boat:   
06: do you pay others in cash, fish or both?    cash    fish   both 
 
07: Do you see other fishermen from your barangay rather as  
 friends / or  
 competitors?   
 or both?   
 
 
08: Do you see other the fishermen from neighboring barangays rather as  
 friends / or  
competitors?   
or both? 
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09: Are there any marine resources in your community (certain fish species, corals, 
mangroves) that you think diminished in abundance over the last few years? 
 Yes      No 
 
10: If yes: Which one? 
 Corals  Fish Mangroves 
 Algae / Seaweed  Other: ______________________________________________ 
 
11: Why do you think so? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
12: Are there any marine resources in your community (certain fish species, corals, 
mangroves) that you think have recovered over the last few years? 
 Yes      No 
 
13: If yes: Which one? 
 Corals  Fish Mangroves 
 Algae / Seaweed  Other: ______________________________________________ 
 
14: Why do you think so? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
15: I will read you a list of issues that may or may not affect fisheries in the area. For each, 
could you tell me if it is a problem, and if it is, how important is it? 
 
Problem 
Not a 
problem 
 
[1] 
Almost not 
a problem 
 
[2] 
Problem 
 
 
[3] 
Important 
problem 
 
[4] 
Very 
important 
problem 
[5] 
Corruption within local 
government units      
Lack of adequate laws      
Lack of monitoring      
Lack of support for monitoring      
Competition with industrial 
fisheries      
Competition with recreational 
fisheries or tourism activities      
Competition with fishers from 
other states      
Too many fishermen      
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Lack of zoning      
Marine pollution      
Lack of organization among 
fishermen from this barangay      
fishermen from this barangay 
do not respect rules      
fishermen from other 
barangays do not respect rules      
Bad prices for fish      
Lack of alternative income 
possibilities      
Lack of technical support      
Disputes among fishermen      
Lack of togetherness between 
fishermen      
Stealing or vandalism e.g. 
destruction of fishing gear      
Violence between fishermen      
Banks do not give credit to 
invest in fishing business      
Uncertain catch due to bad 
weather      
 
16: Which of the following rules and regulations about fishing exist in your area? 
Regulation  
 
 
 
Do you 
think this 
rule is 
good? 
Have you been 
consulted 
regarding the 
creation of this 
rule? 
In percent, how many 
fishers in your 
community adhere to 
the rules and 
regulations for 
fishing?   
 
 Yes No Yes No Yes No  
Areas where you are not allowed to fish 
at all       
 
Prohibited to use Cyanide 
      
 
Prohibited to use Dynamite 
      
 
Prohibited to use specific mesh sizes 
      
 
Seasonal restrictions to fish 
      
 
Certain species you are not allowed to 
fish       
 
Is there another rule that was not 
mentioned in the list?       
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Other: 
_______________________________ 
 
 
17: How many times have you participated in some type of inspection and enforcement 
activities in the past year?  __________ 
 
18: How often have you made an official complaint about other fishermen in the last two 
years? _____________  
 
19: To which authority do you normally go to complain? ___________________ 
 
20: On a scale of one to five, where one means very badly and five means very well, how 
well do the leaders of the following groups from your village represent your interests as a 
fisher? 
 
Very 
badly 
 
[1] 
badly 
 
 
[2] 
Neither 
well nor 
badly 
[3] 
well 
 
 
[4] 
Very 
well 
 
[5] 
 I do not 
know 
BFARMC        
Fishermen organization        
MPA committee        
Other:_____________        
Other:_____________        
 
 
21: Did you change your fishing practices in the last 10 years?  
I did not change my fishing practices  
I changed my fishing practices very little  
I moderately changed my fishing practices  
I changed my fishing practices a lot  
 
If you changed, what did you change specifically? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
If you changed can you tell me why you did so? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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**** NETWORKS (ONLY FOR FISHERMEN) **** 
 
We are interested in learning more about your fishing partners. Please refer to the 
household list and list the numbers next to the names of the fishing partners you work with 
most closely. If their name does not appear on the list provided, write their name on the line 
below. You may list up to five partners.  
  
After listing your fishing partners, tell us more about each of these people by answering the 
questions that follow. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________ 
1st partner 
 
__________ 
2nd partner 
 
__________ 
3rd partner 
 
__________ 
4th partner 
 
__________ 
5th partner 
About how many 
years have you 
known this person?  
     
 
About how often 
have you fished with 
this person in the last 
year? 
 
 more than 
20 times 
 11-20 times 
 6-10 times 
 2-5 times 
 1 time only 
 more than 
20 times 
 11-20 times 
 6-10 times 
 2-5 times 
 1 time only 
 more than 
20 times 
 11-20 times 
 6-10 times 
 2-5 times 
 1 time only 
 more than 
20 times 
 11-20 times 
 6-10 times 
 2-5 times 
 1 time only 
 more than 
20 times 
 11-20 times 
 6-10 times 
 2-5 times 
 1 time only 
 
Would you say that 
this person tends to 
have more fishing 
partners than you, 
fewer partners, or 
about the same? 
 more 
partners 
 fewer 
partners 
 about the 
same 
 more 
partners 
 fewer 
partners 
 about the 
same 
 more 
partners 
 fewer 
partners 
 about the 
same 
 more 
partners 
 fewer 
partners 
 about the 
same 
 more 
partners 
 fewer 
partners 
 about the 
same 
Do you work with this 
person by choice? 
 yes 
 no 
 yes 
 no 
 yes 
 no 
 yes 
 no 
 yes 
 no 
Does this person 
work with any of your 
other fishing partners 
on a regular basis? 
 yes, all of 
them 
 yes, some of 
them 
 
 none of 
them 
 yes, all of 
them 
 yes, some of 
them 
 
 none of 
them 
 yes, all of 
them 
 yes, some of 
them 
 
 none of 
them 
 yes, all of 
them 
 yes, some of 
them 
 
 none of 
them 
 yes, all of 
them 
 yes, some of 
them 
 
 none of 
them 
Does this person 
share your views 
about issues in your 
village/ MPA? 
 yes, 
completely 
 yes, 
somewhat 
 no 
 don’t know 
 yes, 
completely 
 yes, 
somewhat 
 no 
 don’t know 
 yes, 
completely 
 yes, 
somewhat 
 no 
 don’t know 
 yes, 
completely 
 yes, 
somewhat 
 no 
 don’t know 
 yes, 
completely 
 yes, 
somewhat 
 no 
 don’t know 
Does this person have 
access to resources, 
 yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
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such as gear or 
knowledge, that you 
do not have? 
 no  no  no  no  no 
If you were in need, 
would you rely on this 
person for help (e.g., 
to borrow money)? 
 yes 
 no 
 yes 
 no 
 yes 
 no 
 yes 
 no 
 yes 
 no 
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01: Are your fishing practices influenced by an MPA      Yes      No 
 
If yes, continue:  
 
02: In your own opinion, what kind of advantages are there to have a marine protected area 
in your community? 
 
 MPA increases fish 
yields 
 MPA protects fish 
stocks 
MPA provides alternative income 
sources 
 Other: 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
03: In your own opinion, what kind of disadvantages are there to have a marine protected 
area in your community? 
 No-take zones (should be opened for 
fishing) 
 enforcement does not work well  
 Other: 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
04: Do you agree with the following statements: 
 
Situation Strongly 
disagree 
[1] 
Disagree 
 
[2] 
Neutral 
 
[3] 
Agree 
 
[4] 
Strongly 
agree 
[5] 
I think MPA helps to increase fish yields 
     
I think that MPA protects fish stocks 
     
I think that MPA provides alternative sources 
of income      
I think that enforcement in the MPA works well 
     
I think that no-take zones in the MPA should be 
opened for fishing      
 
05: Could you tell me which of the following statements describes your position about the 
MPA today the best? 
I strongly support the MPA  
I support the MPA  
I oppose the MPA  
I strongly oppose the MPA  
I have a neutral position  
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****** ONLY FOR 2013 KAGAWARD CANDIDATES ****** 
 
1. How happy were you with the number of votes you obtained in the last election 
Completely 
dissatisfied 
Mostly 
dissatisfied 
Somewhat 
dissatisfied 
Neither 
satisfied or 
dissatisfied 
Somewhat 
satisfied 
Mostly 
satisfied 
Completely 
satisfied 
       
 
 
2. If you are kagawat since the elections 2013, is this your first, second or third 
term 
 
 
_______ 
 
3. If you are not kagawat since the elections 2013. How many terms did you 
serve before? 
 
 
_______ 
 
4. Did you make any promises while you were running for kagawat?  Yes  No 
5. If yes, could you keep them? 
 
 Yes  No 
6. Which of the following characteristics did you want the voters to identify you most with? 
(choose only one)  
 honest and incorrupt  having good knowledge 
 good connections and influential  having high status  
 being very religious  helping others’  
 being sociable  others: _____________ 
 
7. Do you think it is personally rewarding to be kagawat? 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
8. Do you think it is financially rewarding to be kagawat? 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
9. Would you have run for kagawat if there was no additional payment? 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
10. Were you disappointed by the number of votes you obtained and 
therefore reduced your involvement into the community? 
 
 
 Yes 
 
 
 No 
 
11. Did you apply for any other political position besides kagawat? 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
12. If yes, which one?                                               _____________________________ 
 
13. Are you running for kagawat in 2016? 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
14. Which political party do you belong to (if any)? _____________________________ 
 
 
 
Player number: ________ 
 POST 17 
A: exposure to Yolanda/Haiyan 
We would like to know more about a specific disaster (typhoon Yolanda/Hayan) that occurred in 
November 2013. Please try to remember the incident and answer the following questions as truthfully 
as possible. 
1. Where have you been at the time when the typhoon hit the Philippines? 
□ in my house 
□ another house in the village 
□ in another village 
□ in an evacuation center 
□ other (please specify):__________________________________________ 
 
2. How many hours before typhoon Yolanda/Haiyan hit the Island did you realize 
that this would happen? 
 
___________ 
 
3. How many people from your village left the village because they knew that a storm was 
coming? 
 
almost none little some many almost all 
□ 
 
□ □ □ □ 
4. Did you take any preparatory measures? □ Yes □ No 
 
5. If you answered with yes, what kind of preparatory measures did you take? 
 
□ reinforced the house 
□ brought my property to a safer place 
□ stored additional food and drink 
□ other (please specify):____________________________________________________________ 
□ other (please specify):____________________________________________________________ 
□ other (please specify):____________________________________________________________ 
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6. Please fill in the table below with information concerning the various types of material 
harms/damages that were caused by the typhoon. Please tell us, which of the following were 
harmed/damaged because of the typhoon and how much time and money it took them to be 
repaired/recovered. (Leave blank if the mentioned item was not there before the typhoon) 
 Damaged How many days 
did it take to 
repair/recover? 
How much 
money (PHP) 
did it cost you 
to 
repair/recover? 
How is the item from the list 
today? Is it in the same, a better or 
a worse condition than before the 
storm?  
my house □ 
Yes 
□ 
No 
    □ same □ better  □ worse  
my 
motorbike 
□ 
Yes 
□ 
No 
    □ same □ better □ worse 
my car □ 
Yes 
□ 
No 
    □ same □ better □ worse 
my boat □ 
Yes 
□ 
No 
    □ same □ better □ worse 
material I 
need for 
work 
□ 
Yes 
□ 
No 
    □ same □ better □ worse 
my crops □ 
Yes 
□ 
No 
    □ same □ better □ worse 
 
7. Please fill in the table below concerning harms to cattle, friends and family members that were 
caused by the typhoon. Please tell us on a scale of one to seven (where one means “not 
harmed at all” and seven means “maximum amount of harm”) the level of harm for each item 
in the list. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Neighbors □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
friends from this village □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
family members from 
this village 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
friends from other 
villages 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
family members living in 
other villages 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
cattle and big farm 
animals 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
chicken and small farm 
animals 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
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8. On a scale from one to seven, where one means “no pressure at all” and seven means 
“maximum amount of pressure”, how much pressure was caused by the typhoon… 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
…financially? □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
…personally? □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
9. On a scale from one to seven, where one means “much worse off than others” and seven 
means “much better off than others”, how much pressure was caused by the typhoon relative 
to other people in your barangay… 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
…financially? □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
…personally? □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
10. What kind of materials was your house made of before the storm? 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. How far, in meters, is your house away from the ocean? _________ meters 
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B: Rehabilitation after Yolanda/Hayan 
 
1. Were you in need of aid after typhoon Haiyan? □ Yes □ No 
 
2. Please fill in the table below with information concerning people and/or organizations that 
helped with reconstruction or financial aid after typhoon Yolanda hit the Island. Please tell us, 
on a scale of one to seven (where one means “no help at all” and seven means “most proficient 
help”) how much the following groups and organizations helped YOU or other people in your 
barangay. 
Organization/group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
friends □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
neighbors □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
National government □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Local government □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Barangay council □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
National/local NGOs □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
International NGOs □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
church □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Other:____________________ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Other:____________________ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Other:____________________ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
3. Below is a list of statements. Please tell us on a scale from one to seven, where one means “I 
do not agree at all” and seven means “I agree completely”, to what extent the following 
statements are true according to your opinion. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The distribution of aid was fair. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
The amount of aid was 
sufficient. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
The distribution of aid was well 
organized. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Some members of the 
community received more aid 
than they needed. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
People were trying to get aid 
for themselves and did not 
consider other people in need. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
I felt left alone with my 
problems. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
I received help from people 
that I would not have thougt to 
help me. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
I tried to help wherever I could. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
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 I feel closer to the people in 
my barangay than before 
“Haiyan”. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
There was a large amount of 
conflict between people 
because of a lack of aid. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
4. Did you rebuild your house at the same spot? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
□ Yes □ No 
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5. Below is a table with a list of practices to provide aid to different groups of people in 
different sorts of ways.  
 
On the left hand side, rank the following practice from 1-9, where “1” reflects the 
practice that should be primarily used and “9” reflects the least important. You can only 
use each number from 1-9 once. (fill out this part completely, then proceed) 
 
On the right hand side, please tell us which practice was actually used according to your 
opinion, where “1” reflects the practice that was primarily used and “9” reflects the least 
applied strategy. You can only use each number from 1-9 once. (If one item from the list 
was not applied in this barangay, enter 9) 
 
(DESIRED PRACTICE] 
…shall be…  
(ACTUAL PRACTICE] 
…how it actually happened…  
  According to people’s exposure. The higher the suffering 
or damage, the higher the relief. 
 
  Egalitarian. This means all people from the Barangay 
receive the same amount of aid, regardless their losses. 
 
  Egalitarian towards exposed. This means all people that 
lost something because of the typhoon receive the same 
amount of aid, regardless if some suffered more or less. 
People that are not affected receive nothing. 
 
  Priority on people that had a difficult life before the 
typhoon already (i.e. only highly vulnerable victims such as 
disabled persons, female headed households and/or with 
majority elderly and children or households with single 
source of income which is based on a vulnerable industry) 
 
  Priority on people that prepared more for the typhoon 
than others. (i.e. particularly, only those victims who 
conducted preparatory measures and who have not (re-)built 
their homes in high-risk areas, or individuals with disaster 
insurance) 
 
  People who do not receive remittances.  
 First come first serve.  
  No-one receives aid.  
  Other (please specifiy): 
____________________________________ 
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[CORRUPTION] 
  
1. Please tell us on a scale 
of one to seven how 
often the following 
scenarios happened in 
your Barangay. Keep in 
mind that everything 
you say is anonymous 
and will not be traceable 
to you. 
Likelihood 1 to 7 
Rank how likely this 
is to occur: 
1 = never occurred 
2 = very seldom 
3 = seldom 
4 = sometimes 
5 = often 
6 = very often 
7 = all the time 
I do 
not 
know 
Do you perceive this 
as corruption?   
Have you ever 
seen this 
happening 
personally? 
People that had better 
relations to the persons 
responsible for aid provision 
received higher amounts of 
goods and services. 
 
□  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
People that had better 
relations to the persons 
responsible for aid provision 
received goods and services 
sooner than others. 
 
□  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
People registered more than 
once for assistance and/or 
falsely claimed vulnerability 
in order to receive more aid. 
 
□  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
People had to provide goods 
and services (either in cash 
or in kind) to receive aid. 
Otherwise they were 
excluded from receiving aid. 
 
□  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
Affected people tried to 
receive relief goods that 
were entitled to other 
people in the village. 
 
□  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
Affected people took at the 
expense of others because 
they did not receive enough 
aid after the typhoon. 
 
□  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
Recipients were given less 
aid as was promised to 
them. 
 
□  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
Individuals or groups of 
people received financial aid 
and/or relief goods despite 
not being entitled to it. 
 
□  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
People shared their part of 
received aid assistance with 
those excluded from aid 
 
□  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
Goods and services (e.g. 
reconstruction) that were 
 
□  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
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provided as aid were out of 
date or below promised 
quality. 
People responsible for aid 
distribution kept goods 
meant for aid distribution 
for themselves. 
 
□  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
Women were excluded from 
goods and services. 
 
□  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
People responsible for aid 
provision had an 
extravagant life-style during 
their assistance 
 
□  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
RESPONSE TO MENTIONED INCIDENTS: Were people able to make official complaints if they thought 
that there was anything wrong with the selection of who would get aid or how it was distributed? 
□ Yes  
□ No 
 
Filing official complaints if 
people responsible for aid 
provision misbehaved.  
 
□  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
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For this study, we use the following definition of corruption: 
Corruption as abuse of entrusted power for its private gain, financial mismanagement and fraud. 
Private gain might refer to persons but also to families, a village, groups of people and others. Power 
can also be abused in many other ways, such as favouring family members, sexual exploitation and 
giving aid to people that are not in need of it on purpose. 
1. On a scale from one to seven, where one means “no corruption” and seven means “highest 
level of corruption possible”: How do you perceive corruption... 
Corruption Perception 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
I 
don’t 
know 
…in Your barangay in 
2012? □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
 □  
…in Your barangay 
today? □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
 □  
…of Barangay leaders 
today? □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
 □  
Municipal leaders □  □  □  □  □  □  □   □  
Provincial Government □  □  □  □  □  □  □   □  
National Government □  □  □  □  □  □  □   □  
NGOs □  □  □  □  □  □  □   □  
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EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL 
TEMPLATE FOR ALL TREATMENTS/VARIANTS 
 
[…] Contents of brackets are only for orientation. Do not read out loudly. 
 
[When participants arrive] 
Hello and thank you for coming. Before we start with our workshop for today, I would like to 
give you your personal gamer tag [ID-card]. Please keep this tag always with you until the 
end. It will be important for you at the end of our session to receive your earnings of the 
games today.  
[Each participant gets the same player number he or she received the last time they 
participated in the experiments (see namelist).] 
 
[After a person received his/her gamer-tag] Please follow our assistant now to your designated 
seat. After you have found your seat, we would like to ask you some questions before we 
begin. We will start our workshop when everybody invited today has arrived at his or her 
designated seat. Please stay seated until be begin to receive further instructions. 
 
[Participants are assigned a seat according to their player numbers.] 
[Participants answer the pre-questionnaire.] 
 
[When all participants have been seated and answered the pre-questionnaire, please proceed] 
[Basic instructions] 
Thank you all for coming today. My name is XX [NAME OF ASSISTANT MODERATING 
THE EXPERIMENT] and this is Lukas. In this session today, we want to play some games 
where you can earn a considerable amount of money that you are permitted to keep and take 
home. In these games you will have to make decisions that will influence how much you will 
actually earn. However, irrespective of the outcome of the games, everyone will be given a 
show-up fee of 100 pesos at the end of our session. [SHOW A 100 PESO BILL] The whole 
procedure will last around 4 hours. Thank you in advance for your time and effort.  
1. You are free to leave whenever you want and no matter whether we have started the session 
or not. However, when you leave while the workshop is in progress, we will not be able to 
pay you for participation. Please tell us now if you already feel uncomfortable or you 
already know that you will not be able to stay here for at least four hours. 
2. It is very important that you understand the games. Therefore we will check your 
understanding by asking each of you test questions about the rules. If you do not understand 
the rules please ask the assistants who are happy to explain them to you. But if you cannot 
answer the test questions after we have explained them again, we will have to exclude 
you from the game and you receive only the show-up fee of 100 pesos. But don’t worry, 
we will do our best to help you understand the rules of the games!  
3. Before you get handed out your money at the end of the workshop, you are asked to answer 
a questionnaire. It is very important for our research that you answer all questions seriously. 
You will receive your payment only after completing the questionnaire.  
After having heard these rules, is there anybody who does not want to participate anymore? 
[Wait some moments.]  
We will play six slightly different games today. In each game you will have to indicate your 
decisions on a sheet of paper. In each game, you might win or lose some money. How much 
you earn depends on your decisions, the decisions of others, and luck. However, the 100 pesos 
you receive in the end will be untouched by the course of the games. 
Only one of the six games you are going to play leads to an actual pay-out. At the end of 
our session, we will randomly draw a ball to determine which of the six games will be used to 
compute how much is paid out to you. [Show 6 balls with numbers] The outcome of one 
game has no influence on the outcomes of the other games. So if you play a new game, 
don’t worry about what happened in the previous games. Just take each game seriously 
on its own, because it might be the one that determines your pay-out. In the games you 
have to make decisions about the allocation of money. Each decision you make may be as 
good as any other decision – there are no obviously wrong or right decisions. Your 
decisions will not be made public, so please choose the option YOU like best! After you 
played the games and answered the questionnaire at the end, please come to Lukas, who will 
hand out these earnings plus the show-up fee to you. Remember to sign the receipt for the 
money.  
You already received an ID-tag with a player number printed on it. The player number is your 
personal identification number for today. You keep this number for all six games of the 
workshop. Please show the number to Lukas at the end in order to get paid. So always 
remember to take the ID-tag with your player number with you. After we have given you 
the instructions for the first game of the workshop, we will call you by your player number. 
Please follow the assistant if you are called. 
There are some rules regarding communication. Talking is strictly prohibited during the 
games. You are not allowed to ask questions or talk about the rules of the game to other 
participants while we are in the process of playing. If you have any questions, please raise 
your hand and wait until someone comes to answer your question in private. If you do not 
follow these rules, we have to exclude you from the session, which implies that you do not get 
any earnings from the games.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1st game (Risk) 
Let’s start with the first game. In this game you decide between getting a fixed amount of 
money and playing a risky lottery which might lead to even more money. You can only 
select one of these two options. If you choose the fixed amount of money, you will be paid 
out the respective sum for certain, at least if this game is later randomly selected as the one 
determining your winnings. If you decide to play a lottery instead, you might win even more 
money. However, there is a hook: in the case of bad luck you might get considerably less 
money.  
The lottery looks as follows: We have an opaque bag containing five red and five white 
balls. [SHOW BALLS AND OPAQUE BAG]. At the end of all the games played today, the 
person sitting in the front row on my right hand side will draw a ball from this bag. If the ball 
is white, all of you win the higher amount of money from the lottery. If the ball is red, all of 
you win the lower amount of money from the lottery.  
On the decision sheets we will hand out shortly, you will have to decide if you want to play 
the lottery or rather receive a fixed sum for sure. You have to make this decision for more 
than one case per decision sheet. 
Let us show you an example. [SHOW EXAMPLE DECISION SHEET ON POSTER] 
  
Example 
 
Nr. Option A  Option B 
1: □ Lottery or 0 for sure □ 
2: □ Lottery or 200 for sure □ 
 
Win 200 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Win 0 ● ● ● ● ● 
 
In this example, you win 200 pesos if we draw a white ball, whereas you win nothing if we 
draw a red ball. You can see the payoff for each event on the left side of the decision sheet. 
For visualization, you also see how many red and white balls are in the bag.  
You can always decide between two options. Option A means that you want to play the 
lottery. Option B means that you will take a certain amount of money instead. Therefore, if 
you pick Option B, the outcome of the lottery no longer influences your earnings from this 
game.  
In this example, you have to make two decisions. In decision number one you decide between 
playing the lottery or receiving zero for sure. The second decision is about playing the lottery 
or receiving 200 pesos for sure. You simply cross the box in each line which you think will be 
best for you. You can only cross one box per line. There could be more than two decisions to 
make for each lottery. Note that we randomly choose which decision will be paid out in the 
end and you will be paid according to your answer. Put differently, if, by chance, this game is 
selected as the one determining your winnings, we will randomly select the specific decision 
used to compute your pay-out.  
We play three different lotteries today. Remember, only one of these three lotteries will 
randomly be selected to be paid out at the end of our session today.   
Now, to make sure that you understand the game, we would like to go to each one of you now 
and ask some test questions. 
[TEST QUESTIONS: EACH ASSISTANT ASKS INDIVIDUALS OF THE RESPECTIVE 
GROUP SEPARATELY. PROCEED IF ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOW THAT THEY 
UNDERSTAND THE GAME AND CAN ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS 
CORRECTLY]  
 
How much money can you earn in the lottery by drawing a white ball 
in this example? 
[ANSWER: 200] 
How much money can you earn in the lottery by drawing a red ball in 
this example? 
[ANSWER: 0] 
Look at the first decision to make on this example sheet. What would 
you earn by choosing option B? 
[ANSWER: 0] 
Look at the second decision to make on this example sheet. What 
would you earn by choosing option B? 
[ANSWER: 200] 
 
Are there any questions regarding our first game? [WAIT SOME SECONDS AND 
PROCEED IF ALL QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN ANSWERED; REMOVE POSTER].  
 
We will now distribute the decision sheet for the first of the three lotteries. In this lottery, you 
can win either 100 pesos if we draw a white ball or 40 pesos if we draw a red ball. On our 
decision sheet, you have to decide 11 times if you prefer playing the lottery or receiving an 
amount of money for certain. Please cross the boxes for each decision reflecting what you 
believe is best for you. When you have made a decision for each line, please put your pencil 
down. [DISTRIBUTE THE DECISION SHEETS FOR THE FIRST LOTTERY AND 
COLLECT THE SHEETS WHEN EVERYBODY IS FINISHED WITH CROSSING 
BOXES] 
 
We will now distribute the decision sheet for the second of the three lotteries. In this lottery, 
you can win either 200 pesos if we draw a white ball or 80 pesos if we draw a red ball. On our 
decision sheet, you have to decide 23 times if you prefer playing the lottery or receiving an 
amount of money for certain. Please cross the boxes for each decision reflecting what you 
believe is best for you. When you have made a decision for each line, please put your pencil 
down. [DISTRIBUTE THE DECISION SHEETS FOR THE SECOND LOTTERY AND 
COLLECT THE SHEETS WHEN EVERYBODY IS FINISHED WITH CROSSING 
BOXES] 
 
We will now distribute the decision sheet for the third of the three lotteries. In this lottery, you 
can win either 200 pesos if we draw a white ball or 140 pesos if we draw a red ball. On our 
decision sheet, you have to decide 11 times if you prefer playing the lottery or receiving an 
amount of money for certain. Please cross the boxes for each decision reflecting what you 
believe is best for you. When you have made a decision for each line, please put your pencil 
down. [DISTRIBUTE THE DECISION SHEETS FOR THE THIRD LOTTERY AND 
COLLECT THE SHEETS WHEN EVERYBODY IS FINISHED WITH CROSSING 
BOXES]  
 
Lottery 1 
 
Nr. Option A  Option B 
1: □ Lottery or 45 for sure □ 
2: □ Lottery or 50 for sure □ 
3: □ Lottery or 55 for sure □ 
4: □ Lottery or 60 for sure □ 
5: □ Lottery or 65 for sure □ 
6: □ Lottery or 70 for sure □ 
7: □ Lottery or 75 for sure □ 
8: □ Lottery or 80 for sure □ 
9: □ Lottery or 85 for sure □ 
10: □ Lottery or 90 for sure □ 
11: □ Lottery or 95 for sure □ 
 
Win 100 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Win 40 ● ● ● ● ● 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lottery 2 
 
Nr. Option A  Option B 
1: □ Lottery or 85 for sure □ 
2: □ Lottery or 90 for sure □ 
3: □ Lottery or 95 for sure □ 
4: □ Lottery or 100 for sure □ 
5: □ Lottery or 105 for sure □ 
6: □ Lottery or 110 for sure □ 
7: □ Lottery or 115 for sure □ 
8: □ Lottery or 120 for sure □ 
9: □ Lottery or 125 for sure □ 
10: □ Lottery or 130 for sure □ 
11: □ Lottery or 135 for sure □ 
Win 200 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 12: □ Lottery or 140 for sure □ 13: □ Lottery or 145 for sure □ 
Win 80 ● ● ● ● ● 
14: □ Lottery or 150 for sure □ 
15: □ Lottery or 155 for sure □ 
 16: □ Lottery or 160 for sure □ 
17: □ Lottery or 165 for sure □ 
18: □ Lottery or 170 for sure □ 
19: □ Lottery or 175 for sure □ 
20: □ Lottery or 180 for sure □ 
21: □ Lottery or 185 for sure □ 
22: □ Lottery or 190 for sure □ 
23: □ Lottery or 195 for sure □ 
Lottery 3 
 
Nr. Option A  Option B 
1: □ Lottery or 145 for sure □ 
2: □ Lottery or 150 for sure □ 
3: □ Lottery or 155 for sure □ 
4: □ Lottery or 160 for sure □ 
5: □ Lottery or 165 for sure □ 
6: □ Lottery or 170 for sure □ 
7: □ Lottery or 175 for sure □ 
8: □ Lottery or 180 for sure □ 
9: □ Lottery or 185 for sure □ 
10: □ Lottery or 190 for sure □ 
11: □ Lottery or 195 for sure □ 
 
Win 200 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Win 140 ● ● ● ● ● 
 
2nd Game (soli + beliefs) 
Let’s start with the second game. All of you have 200 pesos at the beginning of the game. 
You will make your decisions on a sheet of paper only, but the decisions that you take are still 
about real money. For the rest of the game we have formed groups, each consisting of 3 
players. Each of the originally invited participants [point to the left side where originally 
invited participants sit] brought along two friends. One sits in the middle and will play with 
you [point to the middle]. The other one who is sitting on the right-hand side will not be in the 
same group. Instead, the third player in your group will be someone from the right-hand side 
of the room, but you will never exactly know who it is. And the ones on the right-hand side 
will never know the two other group members they play with. From now on we will call the 
unknown players “Player X”.  
Whether you can keep the 200 peso given to you or lose them again will depend partly on 
your choices and partly on your luck. Remember, only one of the games will be randomly 
selected for the computation of the pay-out at the end of our session. For each group, we now 
have an opaque bag with 3 balls in it. This means that there are as many balls in the bag as we 
have players in a group. Each player draws one ball. Out of the 3 balls, there are 2 white balls 
and 1 red ball. If you draw a white ball you can keep your 200 pesos. If you draw a red ball 
you lose the 200 pesos you had at the start of the game. This means that one of the three 
players in each group will lose everything and two out of three will lose nothing.  
[Hang up poster with example decision sheet on it] 
In this game, the two winners can give money to the loser. Before you draw a ball, all of the 
players will be asked whether and how much they would like to transfer to the other two 
players in their group in case that they are unlucky, i.e. they draw a red ball and lose 200 
pesos. Remember that one of the three players will lose for sure. Remember also that there 
will always be two players in your group who still have their 200 pesos. You can transfer 
between 0 and 70 of your 200 pesos to the unlucky person in your group. We will ask you to 
write down on a worksheet how much you would be willing to give to the losing player. 
Amounts are given in steps of 10 pesos. You can also decide to transfer nothing. Hence, 
possible transfers are 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 or 70. Every transfer decision you make is as 
good as any other – there are no wrong decisions. Your transfers will be kept in private, so 
just choose the amount YOU like best! But remember: it is going to be a transfer of real 
money. From now on, we will call the group member you know by his or her name (______) 
[ASSISTANTS ENTER THE NAME OF NON-ANONYMOUS PARTNER HERE] and the 
unknown group member Player X. For the players sitting on the right-hand side [point] there 
will be two unknown players Player X and Player Y. So imagine you keep your 200 pesos and 
Player X loses his 200 pesos. We will ask you to write down on the worksheet how much you 
would be willing to give to Player X in this case (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 or 70). Now 
imagine you keep your 200 pesos and the friend you came here with and plays with you in 
your group loses his or her 200 pesos. Please write down on the worksheet how much you 
would be willing to give to him or her in this case (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 or 70).  
We also want you to think about the transfer of the other winner in your group to the loser. 
Please guess the amounts that will be transferred. You will earn 10 pesos extra for each 
correct guess.  
Lastly, it is, of course, possible that you draw the red ball and lose. We would like you to 
guess how much your friend in your group and Player X would be willing to give to you in 
this case. We will never tell you whether you were right or not. But Lukas will look at the 
choices made by your friend and Player X and compare their choices to your guess. You will 
earn 10 pesos extra for each correct guess. The best thing you can do to increase your payoff 
is to truthfully state what you think y and Player X would do.  
[SHOW AND EXPLAIN PARTICIPANT FORM make sure that the player is looking at the 
form and appears to be sufficiently concentrated] 
 
For non-anonymous players: 
 
 
For anonymous Players: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before we start playing the game, we would like to ask you some questions to see if you 
understand the game. 
What is the maximum amount of money you 
can earn in this game? 
[ANSWER: 220] 
What is the minimum amount of money you 
can win in this game? 
[ANSWER: 0] 
What is the highest amount you can transfer 
to the other player? 
[ANSWER: 70] 
What is the least amount of money you can 
transfer to the losing player? 
[ANSWER: 0] 
How much does the losing player earn, if the 
other two other players transfer nothing? 
[ANSWER: between 0, 10 or 20] 
 
Now we will distribute the decision sheets for the second game. 
[Distribbute decision sheets, collect them and bring them to Lukas when every participant is 
finished with filling them out.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3rd Game (conditional soli) 
Let’s turn to the third game. The groups are the same as in the last game and again all of you 
get 200 pesos at the beginning of the game. The first transfer decision in the game is similar to 
the one in the game before. The second transfer decision, which we call conditional transfer 
list, is new. You will have to make two decisions, but you do not know which one is going to 
be relevant for you in the end.  
[Hang up and show poster with decision sheet for third game] 
Of the two winners in each group, the first one will give the unconditional transfer to the 
loser, whereas for the second one, Lukas will use his/her conditional transfer list. In the 
conditional transfer list, you will choose your transfers conditional on what the loser is willing 
to give you. Hence, we ask you to decide how much you want to give to the loser conditional 
on what he/she decided to transfer to you. However, since you will not be told how many 
pesos the loser would be willing to give to you, we ask you to make your decision dependent 
on all possible transfers the loser could make. However, only the relevant one will be your 
conditional transfer. [show the following on poster] For example, we might ask you about 
what you would be willing to give to the loser, knowing that the loser would give 50 pesos to 
you in case you lost your 200 pesos in this game. In the sheet, we give you some examples 
and you can pick one of them. But if you don’t like the examples and want to react differently 
to the possible transfers of your group member, just fill out the last column with your own 
numbers. [explain on one poster all decisions that need to be taken by the participant] Each 
group member will again draw a ball at the end of our session to determine who lost his initial 
200 pesos. As before, we have one red ball and two white balls in our opaque bag. The player 
that draws the red ball is determined as the player that loses his or her 200 pesos.  
These were the instructions for the third game. Are there any questions or points that remain 
unclear and shall be explained in more detail? We would now like to ask you some questions 
to see if you understand the game [GO TO EACH PLAYER AND ASK TEST QUESTIONS. 
PROCEED WHEN EVERYBODY UNDERSTANDS THE GAME  
 
What is the maximum amount of money you 
can make in this game? 
[ANSWER: 200] 
What is the least amount of money you can 
make in this game? 
[ANSWER: 0] 
Between how many options can you choose 
from in the conditional transfer list? [POINT 
TO POSTER] 
[ANSWER: 5] 
Wrong or right? “If I choose the third option 
in the conditional transfer list, I always 
transfer nothing to the other player, no matter 
what he or she decides to transfer to me.” 
[ANSWER: WRONG] 
 
[When participants show that they have understood the game] We will now distribute the 
decision sheets for the third game. 
 
 
[Let participants fill out form separated by screens] 
For non-anonymous players: 
 
○ 
no 
loss 
 
_______     ○ 
 
 
Player X    ● 
 
I TRANSFER TO Player X 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
IF Player X DECIDED TO GIVE YOU… 
(CONDITIONAL) 
 □ □ □ □ □ 
… 0 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 0 40 ___ 
… 10 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 10 40 ___ 
… 20 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 20 40 ___ 
… 30 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 30 40 ___ 
… 40 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 40 40 ___ 
… 50 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 50 40 ___ 
… 60 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 60 40 ___ 
… 70 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 70 40 ___ 
 
 
○ 
no 
loss 
 
Player X     ○ 
 
 
________     ● 
 
I TRANSFER TO _________ 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
IF __________ DECIDED TO GIVE YOU… 
(CONDITIONAL) 
 □ □ □ □ □ 
… 0 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 0 40 ___ 
… 10 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 10 40 ___ 
… 20 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 20 40 ___ 
… 30 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 30 40 ___ 
… 40 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 40 40 ___ 
… 50 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 50 40 ___ 
… 60 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 60 40 ___ 
… 70 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 70 40 ___ 
 
 
 
[For anonymous players]: 
 
○ 
no 
loss 
 
Player X1     ○ 
 
 
Player X2     ● 
 
I TRANSFER TO Player X2   
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
IF Player X2 DECIDED TO GIVE YOU… 
(CONDITIONAL) 
 □ □ □ □ □ 
… 0 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 0 40 ___ 
… 10 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 10 40 ___ 
… 20 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 20 40 ___ 
… 30 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 30 40 ___ 
… 40 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 40 40 ___ 
… 50 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 50 40 ___ 
… 60 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 60 40 ___ 
… 70 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 70 40 ___ 
 
 
○ 
no 
loss 
 
Player X2     ○ 
 
 
Player X1     ● 
 
I TRANSFER TO Player X1     
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
IF Player X1 DECIDED TO GIVE YOU… 
(CONDITIONAL) 
 □ □ □ □ □ 
… 0 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 0 40 ___ 
… 10 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 10 40 ___ 
… 20 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 20 40 ___ 
… 30 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 30 40 ___ 
… 40 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 40 40 ___ 
… 50 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 50 40 ___ 
… 60 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 60 40 ___ 
… 70 DECIDE YOUR TRANSFER 0 70 70 40 ___ 
 
 
 
 
4th game (soli + shock) 
 
####... control group 
####... treated group 
We will now start with the fourth game. It is the very same as the second game, which we 
played before. 
[Hang up Poster with decision sheet of second game again] 
Everyone starts with 200 pesos in the beginning. Again, we have a bag with two white balls 
and one red ball in it. Each member of a group of three people will draw a ball from this bag. 
The player that draws the red ball, loses 200 pesos.  
We would ask you again to decide your transfer if your friend draws the red ball and your 
transfer if Player X draws the red ball. We would also like you to guess how much they would 
transfer to you, if you draw the red ball. You will receive 10 pesos extra for each correct 
guess.  
Are there any questions regarding the fourth game? [WAIT SOME SECONDS AND 
ANSWER QUESTIONS] 
Now we would like to ask you some questions to see if you understand the game. 
What is the maximum amount of money you 
can earn in this game? 
[ANSWER: 220] 
What is the minimum amount of money you 
can win in this game? 
[ANSWER: 0] 
What is the highest amount you can transfer 
to the other player? 
[ANSWER: 70] 
What is the least amount of money you can 
transfer to the losing player? 
[ANSWER: 0] 
How much does the losing player earn, if the 
other two other players transfer nothing? 
[ANSWER: between 0, 10 or 20] 
 
[PROCEED WHEN PARTICIPANTS SHOW THAT THEY HAVE UNDERSTOOD THE 
GAME] 
We now distribute the decision sheets for the fourth game. 
The fourth game is similar to the second game that we played earlier. But this time, the group 
of three persons starts with a total amount of 400 pesos. However, there is a two-thirds 
chance, i.e. two out of three times, of losing 200 pesos of this initial amount. Whether the 
group can keep the 400 pesos for the rest of the game is decided by drawing balls from the 
opaque bag. This time, there are two red balls and one white ball in the bag. I will now go to 
each group of three people and the person sitting on the far left side draws a ball for the whole 
group. If this person draws a red ball, the group loses 200 pesos and starts with 200 pesos 
instead of 400 pesos. If, instead, this person draws a white ball, the group starts with 400 
pesos. After this procedure, some groups will commence the actual game with 400 pesos and 
others with 200 pesos. Each group has the same chance of losing the 200 pesos in the 
beginning, as I always put the ball back into the bag. Note that I cannot influence the outcome 
of the draw. We will now begin drawing balls for each group. 
[GO TO EACH GROUP AND DRAW A BALL VISIBLY FOR ALL GROUP MEMBERS. 
MAKE SURE THEY REALIZE THAT THE DRAW WAS CONDUCTED IN A FAIR 
WAY. REAPEAT THIS PROCEDURE FOR ALL GROUPS OF THREE PEOPLE IN THE 
ROOM. GIVE NON-ANONYMOUS PLAYERS A RED PIECE OF PAPER SO THAT 
THEY REMBER THAT THEY START THE GAME WITH 200 PESOS. A WHITE PEACE 
OF PAPER INDICATES THAT THEY START THE GAME WITH 400. ANONYMOUS 
PLAYERS DO NOT RECEIVE A PIECE OF PAPER, SINCE THEY DO NOT KNOW 
WITH HOW MUCH MONEY THEY START THE GAME.] 
Now that we have finished drawing balls from the bag, there are some groups that start with 
400 pesos in this game, and some that start with 200 pesos. There is one thing to mention. The 
anonymous players do not know in what group they are. [point to left-hand side where 
anonymous players sit] Therefore they also do not know if they start the game with 200 or 
with 400 pesos. We now continue like in the second game. 
[Hang up Poster with decision sheet of second game again] 
Again, we have a bag with two white balls and one red ball in it. Each member of a group of 
three people will draw a ball from this bag. The player that draws the red ball, will lose 200 
pesos. So, when you start with 200 pesos in this game and draw a red ball, you begin with 
zero pesos. When you started with 400 pesos and draw a red ball, you commence with 200 
pesos. We would ask you again to decide your transfer if your friend draws the red ball and 
your transfer if Player X draws the red ball. We would also like you to guess how much they 
would transfer to you, if you draw the red ball. You will receive 10 pesos extra for each 
correct guess.  
Are there any questions regarding the fourth game? [WAIT SOME SECONDS AND 
ANSWER QUESTIONS] 
Now we would like to ask you some questions to see if you understand the game. 
What is the maximum amount of money you 
can earn in this game? 
[ANSWER: 220 if group drew red ball, 420 
if group drew white ball] 
What is the minimum amount of money you 
can win in this game? 
[ANSWER: 0 if group drew red ball, 200 if 
group drew white ball] 
What is the highest amount you can transfer 
to the other player? 
[ANSWER: 70] 
What is the least amount of money you can 
transfer to the losing player? 
[ANSWER: 0] 
How much does the losing player earn, if the 
other two other players transfer nothing? 
[ANSWER: between 0, 10 or 20 if red ball, 
200, 210 or 220 if group drew white ball] 
 
[PROCEED WHEN PARTICIPANTS SHOW THAT THEY HAVE UNDERSTOOD THE 
GAME] 
We now distribute the decision sheets for the fourth game. 
 
[Priming Stage] 
Now our Assistants will come to you to conduct a short questionnaire. 
[Priming will be randomly assigned at group level (groups of three people) and involves 
conducting a short survey. We have three questionnaires: positive priming, negative priming 
and neutral priming.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5th game (primed soli + beliefs) 
We will now start with the fifth game. It is the very same as the second game, which we 
played before. 
[Hang up Poster with decision sheet of second game again] 
Everyone starts with 200 pesos in the beginning. Again, we have a bag with two white balls 
and one red ball in it. Each member of a group of three people will draw a ball from this bag. 
The player that draws the red ball, loses 200 pesos.  
We would ask you again to decide your transfer if your friend draws the red ball and your 
transfer if Player X draws the red ball. We would also like you to guess how much they would 
transfer to you, if you draw the red ball. You will receive 10 pesos extra for each correct 
guess.  
Are there any questions regarding the fourth game? [WAIT SOME SECONDS AND 
ANSWER QUESTIONS] 
Now we would like to ask you some questions to see if you understand the game. 
What is the maximum amount of money you 
can earn in this game? 
[ANSWER: 220] 
What is the minimum amount of money you 
can win in this game? 
[ANSWER: 0] 
What is the highest amount you can transfer 
to the other player? 
[ANSWER: 70] 
What is the least amount of money you can 
transfer to the losing player? 
[ANSWER: 0] 
How much does the losing player earn, if the 
other two other players transfer nothing? 
[ANSWER: between 0, 10 or 20] 
 
[PROCEED WHEN PARTICIPANTS SHOW THAT THEY HAVE UNDERSTOOD THE 
GAME] 
We now distribute the decision sheets for the fifth game. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6th game (primed spite) 
In this game, you are no longer in the same groups you were before. Now you will be playing 
with a random participant from this room, but not one of your friends you came here with 
initially. In this game, you will be called Player A and the other player will be called player 
B.  
[EXPLAIN AND SHOW WITH HELP OF DECISION SHEET ON POSTER] 
 
You and Player B both receive 200 pesos in the beginning. In this game, you can decide to 
reduce Player B’s income or not. The reduction of player B’s income will cost one peso per 
four peso you want to reduce his or her money. This time you can decide between three 
options, 1, 2 and 3. You can either reduce Player B’s income by zero pesos at the cost of zero 
pesos (Option 1), reduce Player B’s income by 40 pesos at the cost of 10 pesos (Option 2) or 
reduce Player B’s income by 160 pesos at the cost of 40 pesos (Option 3). Remember that 
both of you make the same type of decision and thereby influence each other’s income. For 
example, if both of you choose Option 1, both of you will earn 200 pesos in this game. If both 
of you choose Option 2, both of you get 150 pesos in this game (because each player has to 
pay 10 pesos, minus the reduced income of 40 pesos). If both of you choose Option 3, both of 
you will get no money from this game (because each player has to pay 40, minus the income 
reduction by 160). You do not know Player B’s decision and Player B does not know yours.  
 
It is very important to keep in mind that the decisions are absolutely private and that 
your decision will not be shown to anybody else. 
 
We would also like to ask you what you believe which option the other player picks. If you 
guess correctly, you will receive 10 pesos. 
Before we hand out the decision sheets, we would like to ask you some questions to see if you 
have understood the game. 
 
[TEST QUESTIONS: EACH ASSISTANT ASKS MEMBERS OF THE RESPECTIVE 
GROUP SEPARATELY. PROCEED IF ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOW THAT THEY 
UNDERSTAND THE GAME AND CAN ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS 
CORRECTLY]  
 
 
 
Which option do you prefer? 
 
I want to choose… Option 1 □ Option 2 □ Option 3 □ 
 
which reduces Player B’s income by: 
 
0 40 160  
 
which costs me: 
 
0 10 40 
According to your opinion, what option does 
the other player pick? 
Option 1 □ Option 2 □ Option 3 □ 
How much do you have to pay in option 1? [ANSWER: 0] 
How much does the other player lose if you choose 
option 1? 
[ANSWER: 0] 
How much do you lose, if your co-player chooses 
option 2? 
[ANSWER: 40] 
How much do both players get from this game, if 
both choose option 3? 
[ANSWER: 0] 
How much do you receive for guessing the other 
persons decision correctly? 
[ANSWER: 10] 
 
Randomization of show-up fee 
 
We have now finished with our games for today. Now we would like to give you a present. As you 
may recall, you receive 100 pesos for showing up today, regardless of your decisions in the games. We 
would like to increase this show-up fee. However, the size of the increase is determined by a random 
generator. You can get an additional amount between 0 and 50 pesos in steps of ten. This means that 
your show up fee is going to be somewhere between 100 pesos and 150 pesos. 
 
Survey and pay-out 
 
We will now determine the games that we will use to compute the money that you will get. Therefore, 
we draw balls from the opaque bag again. The balls have numbers from 1 to 6 on them. The number 
we draw determines which game is relevant for your earnings today. [SHOW BAG AND BALLS 
AND DRAW BALLS VISIBLE TO EVERYBODY] 
 
[IF GAME ONE IS DETERMINED TO BE PAID OUT] 
We will now determine which of the three lotteries will be paid out. Therefore, we use our opaque bag 
again and balls with numbers from 1 to 3 on them [SHOW BALLS AND BAG AGAIN AND 
DRAW]. Now we will determine, which of the decisions you made regarding this lottery will be used 
to determine the pay-out. We use a random generator that selects the relevant line of the lottery 
choices. [USE RANDOM GENERATOR TO DETERMINE RELEVANT LINE] 
 
[IF GAME 2-5 IS DETERMINED TO BE PAID OUT] 
We will now determine the losing player of each group. Our assistants will go to each group and let 
every participant draw one ball from the opaque bag. The person that draws a red ball, is determined to 
be the one that loses 200 pesos. Remember, there are two white balls, and one red ball in the bag. 
[SHOW BALLS AND PUT THEM IN THE BAG]. We will now start drawing balls from the bag.  
 
Now we would like to conduct a survey with you. [Assistants conduct surveys individually] 
 
We will now give you your earnings. Please stay seated for now and wait until your player number is 
called, then come to see Lukas at the front of the room. Please take your tag with the player number on 
it with you and give it back to us. Make sure that you take all your belongings with you when you 
depart from the room.  
 [Call each participant separately to the front to receive winning. Let participant sign a receipt and put 
the receipt somewhere safe. Put the money in an envelope, close it, and hand it to the participant. 
Make sure the participants leave the area and do not witness the pay-off given to other participants.] 
[Thank everyone and say goodbye] 
A12. FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION PROTOCOL CHAPTER 7. APPENDIX
A12 Focus group discussion protocol
CXL
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- Focus Group Discussion – 
(approx. 2.5 hours) 
For the assistants: 
Text in red: Instructions for the assistants, not to be read out loud 
Text in black: To be read out loud to the participants 
Text in green: Title of PRA Tool  
 
[Focus group 
In total, 9 people attend this workshop. At the beginning, 3 groups are formed, each consisting 
of 3 randomly chosen individuals from specific social groups: 
- 3 fishers 
- 3 shop owners 
- 3 individuals (randomly chosen residents, except kagawads) 
The participants answer the pre-questionnaire at the beginning (approx. 5 min)] 
 
[When participants arrive: Before the welcoming, each assistant should assign a player 
number to her participants (fishers: 1-3, shop owners: 4-6, randomly chosen participants: 7-9)] 
Hello and thank you for coming. Before we start with our workshop for today, I would like to 
give you your personal gamer tag [ID-card]. Please keep this tag always with you until the end. 
It will be important for you at the end of our session to receive your earnings today.  
[Please ask each participant whether he or she is a fisher, shop owner or not.] 
[Each participant gets the player number.] 
[After a person received his/her gamer-tag]  
Please follow our assistant now to your designated seat. We will start our workshop when 
everybody invited today has arrived at his or her designated seat. Please stay seated until be 
begin to receive further instructions. 
[Participants are assigned a seat according to their player numbers.] 
  
Basic Instructions 
 
Thank you all for coming today. My name is […] 
In this workshop today, we would like to learn from you and also learn with you about various 
topics that come along with natural disasters.  
We are, particularly, interested in what changed for you and your Barangay after typhoon 
Yolanda hit the island in 2013. Changes might be related to your livelihood, income or 
relationships with others in your Barangay. We also would like to get your perspective on how 
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you perceive help coming from outside as well as how you – as a community – dealt with the 
destruction.  
We are excited to learn from your experience and hope to encourage some discussions among 
the group. In any case, we depend on your active participation in order to gain insight. Each of 
you will be given a show-up fee of 100 Pesos at the end for sure. [Show a 100 Peso bill.] 
In the first part you will have to make your own decisions and thereby, work on your own. Here, 
you can earn an additional amount of money that you are permitted to keep and take home. 
Whereas, in the following parts, you will work in groups and therefore, share your opinion and 
experiences with others.  
The whole discussion will last around 3 hours. Thank you in advance for your effort and time.  
1. If at any time you find that this is something that you do not wish to participate in for any 
reason, you are of course free to leave whether we have started the discussion or not. But if 
you feel uncomfortable already now, or you already know that you will not be able to 
stay for the two to three hours, then you should tell us now. 
2. It is very important that you understand the questions and tools that will be applied. 
Therefore, at some points, we will present some exemplary questions to explain the tools. If 
you do not understand the tools you may always ask the assistants to explain them.  Don’t 
worry, we will try to explain all questions as easy and understandable as possible.  
3. You get handed out your money at the end of the workshop. It is very important for our 
research, that you answer all questions seriously. You will receive your payment only after 
completing all tasks and questions.  
4. WHAT IS SAID IN THIS ROOM STAYS HERE. The information you will give us is strictly 
confidential and no one will bother you in any way about what you say concerning the questions 
we ask you. 
5. Everything that is said in this group, will be recorded. However, we will not track what is said 
by which person, but rather we are only interested in the content. 
After knowing these rules, is there anybody who does not like to participate anymore?  
[Wait some moments] 
We would like to start with a brief questionnaire. Please wait while the assistants will come to 
you one after another.  
[Use the paper questionnaires to conduct the pre-questionnaires titled “A. PRE-
QUESTIONNAIRE | Part I – General Information” – approx. 5 minutes/person] 
 
 
  
 3 
 
- A. PRE-QUESTIONNAIRE (separately) - 
Date:  ______________________         Barangay:   _______________________ 
ID Number: ___________        Name: ___________________________ 
 
 Please fill in 
here 
Age  
Sex (0=M, 1=F)  
Educational attainment (1=Elementary, 2=High School, 3=Vocational 
Training, 4=College, 5=Master’s Degree) 
 
    
Do you personally receive a regular income? (0=No, 1=Yes)  
Income sources 
Name of income 
source 
Average income per 
month 
Income in a good 
month 
Income in a bad 
month 
Main occupation 
1.    
Additional occupation 
2.    
3. Fishery    
4.     
Do you have other sources of income? 
5.    
6. Remittances 
(household) 
   
    
On average, how much does your household earn per month? (PhP)  
Household Head (1=Head, 2 = Spouse) 
 
 
Current Marital Status (1=Single, 2=Married; 3=Separated, 4=Widowed)  
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How many people stay permanently (more than 6 months per year) in 
your household? 
 
How many people in your 
household are… 
…0-6 years old?  
…7-12 years old?  
…13-17 years old?  
…18-60 years old?  
…>60 years old?  
Number of years living in this Barangay?  
In the last month, did anybody in the household reduce meals because 
there was not enough money for food? (0=No, 1=Yes; if yes, how often?) 
 
Do you have savings of more than 1000 pesos? (0=No, 1=Yes)  
Do you have savings of more than 5000 pesos? (0=No, 1=Yes)  
Do you owe money, labour or something else to somebody with a total 
value higher than 5000 Pesos? (0=No, 1=Yes) 
 
If yes, whom do you owe mainly? (1=to a bank/microfinance/money 
lender, 2=friend, 3=relatives, 9=other, n.a.= not applicable) 
 
 
01  How strongly was your household affected by the typhoon Yolanda? Please determine 
the degree, to which your home was destroyed or your personal livelihood was 
destructed, on a scale from one to seven, where one means “not affected at all” and 
seven means “extremely affected”. 
Disaster 
Loss 
1 
Not 
affected 
at all w/ 
no 
damage 
2 
 
Negligible 
damages  
(e.g. to 
house, 
crops, etc.) 
3 
 
Minor 
damages 
(e.g. to 
house, 
crops, etc.)  
4 
 
Moderate 
damage 
(e.g. house 
partly 
desroyed, 
crops, etc.) 
5 
 
Severe 
damage  
(e.g. house 
partly 
desroyed, 
crops, 
income 
source 
partly lost, 
etc.)   
6 
 
Devastating 
damage 
(e.g. 
significant 
damage to 
house, 
injured, 
income 
source 
completely 
lost, etc.)   
7 
Extremely 
affected 
w/ 
incredible 
damage  
(i.e. 
complete 
destruction 
of house, 
income 
source, 
casualties, 
etc.) 
Your 
household 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  
 
02 Would you say that your household was rather more or less affected by the typhoon than 
most other households in your Barangay? 
□ More 
□ Same  
□ Less 
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03  Following the destruction caused by the typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda, how much support did 
you receive by others? Please tell us about the degree of support you got from 
neighbours and friends on the one hand and relief organisations and public authorities on 
the other hand? Please determine the degree on a scale from one to seven, where one 
means “not supported at all” and seven means “significantly supported”. 
Support 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Help received by 
neighbours and friends 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  
Help received by 
organisations/authorities 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  
 
04 When comparing your situation with that of others in your Barangay, do you believe that 
you have you received more, less or the same amount of aid? 
□ More 
□ Same  
□ Less 
 
05  Please list all groups or organizations, committees, councils, associations, cooperatives to 
which you belong. These could be formally organized groups or just groups of people who get 
together regularly to do an activity or talk about things. 
Name of the 
group: 
Type of group 
(1=women 
group, 
2=farmer/fisher 
association, 
3=governmental, 
4=…) 
Do you have 
a leading 
position in 
this group? 
If yes, which 
one?  
(if yes = 
note 
position; if 
no = n/a) 
How 
often per 
year do 
meetings 
take 
place? 
How 
often per 
year do 
you go 
to the 
meetings 
Do you pay 
a 
membership 
fee? 
(if yes = 
note 
monthly 
amount; if 
no = n/a) 
How 
many 
hours 
per week 
do you 
engage 
in 
activities 
of this 
group? 
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Part I – Social norms  
[1st Decision Tool] 
 In the following part, you can earn a bonus of PHP 50 in addition to your show-up fee which 
depends on the decisions you make now. There will be four main questions in this part. At the 
end, only the answer to one of these questions will be paid out. The question will be randomly 
chosen and checked for its correctness. Based on your performance in this random question, 
you are generally able to receive the additional payment [show PHP 50]. 
In case you have questions at any point in time, please raise your hand and wait until someone 
comes to answer your question in private. Please do not talk, exclaim, or try to 
communicate with other participants during the experiment. Participants intentionally violating 
the rules may be asked to leave the experiment and may not be paid.  
At the moment, another group in this Barangay is participating in some experimental games. 
In each game they need to make decisions. In each game they might win or lose some money. 
Let me explain the experimental games to you. 
 
[Solidarity Game] 
[Present the solidarity game by using a bag with 2 white balls and one red ball inside]  
AT THE SAME TIME, PLEASE READ OUT THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS]  
In order to play the game, each of the participants receives PHP 200 [show 200 PHP] at the 
beginning. For the rest of the game, there are always groups of 3 players.  
They have a bag with 3 balls in it. This means that there are as many balls in the bag as we 
have players in a group. Each player will have to draw one ball. Out of the 3 balls there are 2 
white and 1 red ball.  
[Show the balls inside the bag one after another and show the illustration of the three players 
participating in the game.] 
If a person draws a white ball [show white ball], he or she can keep the PHP 200. If a person 
draws a red ball [show red ball], he or she loses all PHP 200. That means that one of the 
three players in each group will lose everything and two out of three will not lose.  
[DISTRIBUTE THE DECISION SHEETS titled “Part I – Social norms | 1st GAME” FOR THE 
FIRST SESSION AND COLLECT AFTER EVERYONE FINISHED WITH CROSSING THE 
BOXES] 
[Jacqueline, Carla, Razel: Please make sure that each participants filled in his player number! 
Make sure that all columns and lines are filled out.]  
In this game the two players who could keep their PHP 200 can transfer some money to the 
loser. Before the participants even know which ball they draw, they are firstly asked 
whether and how much they would like to send to the loser of their group. Each of the 
three has to decide to transfer between 0 and 70 of his or her PHP 200 to the loser. Amounts 
are in steps of PHP 10. So transfers are 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 or 70. They make the 
decision on a decision sheet. 
Each of the player states which amount he wants to transfer to the others at the beginning 
before they know who will lose. In the end, the loser will or will not receive a transfer from 
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both winning players. These transfers are anonymous and will be kept confidential 
throughout the whole game.  
If all players decide to transfer zero peso to the others, the loser will end up with zero peso, 
whilst the others can keep the initial PHP 200. However, if all players decide to transfer the 
maximum amount of PHP 70 to the others, the loser will end up with PHP 140 in total. Each of 
the winning player can keep the remaining amount of PHP 130. It could also be that both 
winning player have decided to give different amounts to the loser.  
Now we want you to make a guess! Imagine the situation in the experiment that currently 
takes place in this Barangay. What do you believe most of the other participants decide to 
transfer to an unknown player who lost his PHP 200? Remember it is real money. For this 
question, please only look at the left hand side of the table in your decision sheet. 
[SHOW WITH HELP OF DECISION SHEET ON POSTER – Point on column on the left hand 
side of the table] 
 First, please state what most of the normal Barangay residents would transfer to an 
unknown player.  
 What would Barangay Council Officials transfer to an unknown player.  
 What would a candidate that run for office in 2013 without being elected, transfer?  
 What would people that were heavily affected by the typhoon Yolanda transfer? Heavily 
affected means that their home and property were completely destroyed.  
 What would people decide to transfer if they were heavily affected by the typhoon Yolanda 
and if they received help by other neighbours and friends. This help can be related to 
reconstruction assistance and sharing of relief goods within the community.  
 What would people decide to transfer if they were heavily affected and if they received 
humanitarian aid by any organisation in the aftermath of the typhoon Yolanda. This help 
coming from outside the community can be related to financial and reconstruction 
assistance and the distribution of relief goods. 
In case you guess correctly what the participants in the other experiment have decided to 
transfer, you receive an additional amount of PHP 50. Of course your guess can be wrong, in 
case it is PHP 10 higher or lower than the amount most people actually decided to transfer in 
the game, you will still receive an additional payoff of PHP 30 instead of PHP 50. In case the 
respective Barangay residents are not present in the experiment, another sub-game will be 
randomly chosen. 
[Wait some minutes until all participants filled out the left side of the table. After everyone 
finished, inform the moderator and continue:] 
[SHOW WITH HELP OF DECISION SHEET ON POSTER] 
Now we would like to move to the right hand side of the table in your decision sheet. 
In this step, we would like you to state the amount you would have expected the participants 
to transfer to an unknown player from a socially correct perspective. A socially correct 
choice is consistent with moral or proper social behaviour. Most people agree that this is the 
"correct" or "ethical" thing to do. For example, in case of a socially inappropriate choice, most 
of the other participants might be angry. Your payoff now depends on the actual option most 
of the people in this room choose to be socially the most appropriate one. So to put it in other 
words: this figure does not necessarily represent what the participants actually decided to 
transfer but rather what they should have transferred, namely the option you consider to be 
the socially most appropriate one in your Barangay. Just imagine you find a wallet on a table. 
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You need to decide what to do. Are you taking the wallet? Ask others nearby if it belongs to 
them or leave it where it is. What would be morally correct to do? 
Just take each question seriously on its own, because it might be the one that is paid 
out. The best thing you can do is to increase your payoff by PHP 50 is to truthfully state 
what you think most of the people in this Barangay would do or what you would have 
expected them to do from a socially correct perspective.  
Your decisions will be kept in private, so just choose the option YOU think is the one 
actually chosen by most of the people!  
[Assistants will EXPLAIN PARTICIPANT FORM – if necessary, make sure that the player is 
looking, seeing, and concentrating] 
[wait approx. 10 minutes] 
 
[DISTRIBUTE THE DECISION SHEETS titled “Part I – Social norms | 2nd GAME” FOR THE 
FIRST SESSION AND COLLECT AFTER EVERYONE FINISHED WITH CROSSING THE 
BOXES] 
[Please make sure that each participants filled in his player number! Make sure that all columns 
and lines are filled out.] 
[Spite Game]  
[Present the Spite Game by showing the illustration of the two players participating in the 
game - each with a total amount of 200 PHP.] 
Now, we will turn to another game the others are currently playing. 
In this game, the participants are no longer in the group they have been playing previously. 
Now each of the participants does not know with whom he or she will be playing. Each of them 
has to make a decision on a decision sheet.  
Both receive 200 PHP in the beginning. In this game, they can decide to reduce or not to 
reduce the money of the other unknown player. However, the reduction of the other player´s 
income will cost them some money.  
[EXPLAIN AND SHOW WITH HELP OF TABLE THAT ILLUSTRATES THE OPTIONS] 
The participants can decide between three options, 1, 2 or 3, where they can either reduce the 
other player’s income by zero PHP at the cost of zero PHP (Option 1), reduce the other player’s 
income by 40 PHP at the cost of 10 PHP (Option 2) or reduce the other player’s income by 
160 PHP at the cost of 40 PHP (Option 3).   
They take their decisions at the same time. In any case, the decisions are anonymous and 
will be kept confidential throughout the whole game. 
Remember that both make decisions which influence each other’s income respectively. For 
example:  
[EXPLAIN AND SHOW THE PAYOUT MATRIX ON DECISION SHEET] 
If most of the participants choose Option 1: The unknown players, they are playing with 
earn 200 PHP but only if most of the unknown players choose Option 1 as well. The payoff for 
both remains PHP 200. Yet, the participants do not know which option their unknown partner 
might choose at the same time.  
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So let’s pick out one example: if a participant chooses Option 1 and the unknown co-player 
chooses Option 2, the participant will receive a payoff of 160 PHP, while the unknown player’s 
payoff will be reduced at the cost of PHP 10 to PHP 190. 
In case a participant chooses Option 1 and the unknown co-player chooses Option 3, the 
participants will receive a payoff of 40 PHP while the unknown player’s payoff will be reduced 
at the cost of PHP 40 to PHP 160. 
If most of the participants choose Option 2: This option costs the participants PHP 10 but 
with that they can reduce the unknown co-players’ income by PHP 40. So, for instance, in case 
the unknown co-player decides – at the same time – not to reduce the participant’s income by 
choosing Option 1, the unknown co-player ends up with PHP 160 and the participant with 
PHP 190.   
In case both Players – at the same time – choose Option 2, it both costs them PHP 10 but it 
reduces the other Player´s income by PHP 40. So both end up with PHP 150.  
As far as a participant chooses Option 2, while the unknown co-player chooses Option 3: the 
participant’s income will be reduced by PHP 160 and he or she will receive a payoff of 30 PHP. 
At the same time, the co-player’s payoff will be reduced by PHP 80 to PHP 120.  
If most of the participants choose Option 3, it costs them PHP 40, but with that they decide 
to reduce their co-player´s income by PHP 160. So how do both Players end up in the case, 
where the unknown co-player chooses Option 1? The unknown co-player’s payoff will be 
reduced to 40 PHP, while the participant will earn PHP 160. If the unknown co-player chooses 
Option 2 instead, it costs him/her PHP 10 but it reduces the other Player´s income by PHP 40. 
So the unknown co-player will end up with a payoff of PHP 30 and the participant’s income will 
be reduced to PHP 120.  
In case both Players choose Option 3, they decide to reduce the other Player´s income by 
PHP 160, which costs both of them PHP 40. The payoff for both is PHP zero then.  
[SHOW WITH HELP OF DECISION SHEET ON POSTER] 
Now, again, we want you to make a guess! Imagine the situation in the experiment that 
currently takes place in this Barangay. 
For this question, please only look at the left hand side of the table in your decision sheet. 
What do you believe most of the participants decide to do?  
 Please state which option most of the normal Barangay residents would choose in order 
to reduce or not reduce another unknown player’s income.  
 Which option would Barangay Council Officials choose.  
 Which option would a candidate that run for office in 2013 without being elected, choose?  
 Which option would people that were heavily affected by the typhoon Yolanda choose? 
Heavily affected means that their home and property were completely destroyed.  
 Which option would people choose if they were heavily affected by the typhoon Yolanda 
and if they received help by other neighbours and friends. This help can be related to 
reconstruction assistance and sharing of relief goods within the community.  
 Which option would people choose if they were heavily affected and if they received 
humanitarian aid by any organisation in the aftermath of the typhoon Yolanda. This help 
coming from outside the community can be related to financial and reconstruction 
assistance and the distribution of relief goods. 
Remember, you can gain an additional payout of 50 PHP, which will depend on whether or not 
your choice is consistent with the answers given by the participants in the other experiment. 
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[wait some minutes until all participants filled out the left side of the table. After everyone 
finished, inform the moderator and continue:] 
[SHOW WITH HELP OF DECISION SHEET ON POSTER] 
Now we would like to move to the right hand side of the table in your decision sheet. 
We would like you to state the option you would have expected most of the participants to 
choose instead – now from a socially correct perspective. Your payoff now depends on the 
actual option most of the participants in this room choose to be socially the most appropriate 
one. 
Please, once again, take each question seriously on its own, because it might be the 
one that is paid out. The best thing you can do to increase your payoff by PHP 50 is to 
truthfully state what you think most people in this Barangay would do or what you would 
have expected them to do from a socially correct perspective.  
In any case, your decisions will be kept in private.  
[EXPLAIN PARTICIPANT FORM – if necessary] 
[COLLECT AFTER EVERYONE FINISHED CROSSING THE BOXES] 
One final remark for your interest concerning the payout here:  
After you answered your questionnaire and participated in the discussions, we will need some 
time to check your answers in the questionnaire. Later this afternoon, you can come one by 
one to our colleague Lukas, who will hand out the show-up fee and the additional earnings, if 
any, and you sign the receipt. 
 
[PLEASE DRAW A BALL TO CHOOSE WHICH GAME WILL BE RANDOMLY SELECTED] 
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ID Number: _______   Barangay: ____________________________    Date: ____________ 
1st GAME 
The participants receive PHP 200 at the beginning of the game.  
The table below gives a list of the possible choices available to the participants in the 
experiment. They can decide to transfer one of the following amounts as a share of their initial 
endowment to an unknown player in their group. 
decision  
to transfer 
PHP 0 PHP 10 PHP 20 PHP 30 PHP 40 PHP 50 PHP 60 PHP 70 
 
 WHAT WOULD MOST OF THE PARTICIPANTS 
DECIDE TO TRANSFER  
 
IF THEY ARE... 
Guess of actual 
choice in the 
game (in PHP) 
 →  
Morally correct 
choice  
(in PHP) 
→  
o normal Barangay residents   
  
o Barangay Council Officials  
  
o candidates who run for office in past elections in 2013 but became not elected 
  
o people heavily affected by typhoon Yolanda (home and property completely destroyed) 
  
o 
people heavily affected by typhoon Yolanda and 
who received aid by others, friends, family, 
neighbours, in the Barangay (sharing relief goods 
and assistance with reconstruction within the 
community) 
  
o 
people heavily affected by typhoon Yolanda and 
who received humanitarian aid by any organisation 
(distribution of relief goods, financial and 
reconstruction assistance from outside the 
community) 
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2nd GAME [page in support of assistants only if further questions arise] 
Both players receive 200 PHP in the beginning. In this game, they can decide to reduce or not 
to reduce the money of the other co-player. However, the reduction of the other co-player´s 
income will cost him or her some money.  
Participants and their co-player can decide between three options, 1, 2 or 3, where he or she 
can either reduce the other player’s income by zero PHP at the cost of zero PHP (Option 1), 
reduce other player’s income by 40 PHP at the cost of 10 PHP (Option 2) or reduce other 
player’s income by 160 PHP at the cost of 40 PHP (Option 3). They take their decisions at 
the same time. 
 
Depending on the option each of them decide to make, the matrix shows you the payoffs for 
each player. The payoffs for the participant are marked in green, the ones for its unknown co-
player in blue.   
 
What role does the government play in the development of an MPA if it is community-based? 
 
 
 
Example: 
If both, the participant and its unknown co-player, decided not to reduce the other player´s 
income, each end up with a payoff of 200 PHP. If the participant decides to reduce its unknown 
co-player´s income by 40 PHP, this option 2 costs him/her 10 PHP. If at the same time, the 
unknown co-player decides to reduce the participant´s income by 160 PHP, this option 3 costs 
him/her 40 PHP. So the participant ends up with 30 PHP and the unknown co-player with 
120 PHP. Kindly note that this was only an example. 
 
  
The participants choose… Option 1 □ Option 2 □ Option 3 □ 
which costs them: 0 PHP  10 PHP  40 PHP  
which reduces the other co-player’s 
income by: 
0 PHP  40 PHP  160 PHP  
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ID Number: _______   Barangay: ____________________________    Date: ____________ 
2nd GAME  
Both players receive 200 PHP in the beginning. In this game, they can decide to reduce or not 
to reduce the money of the other co-player. However, the reduction of the other co-player´s 
income will cost him or her some money. They take their decisions at the same time. 
 WHICH OPTION WOULD MOST OF THE 
PARTICIPANTS DECIDE TO CHOOSE  
 
IF THEY ARE... 
Guess of actual 
choice in the 
game 
(Option 1, 2 or 3) 
 
Morally correct 
choice 
 
(Option 1, 2 or 3) 
 
→  
normal Barangay residents 
 
 
 
→  
Barangay Council Officials 
 
 
 
→  
candidates who run for office in past elections in 
2013 but became not elected 
 
 
→  
people person heavily affected by typhoon 
Yolanda (home and property completely 
destroyed) 
 
 
→  
people heavily affected by typhoon Yolanda and 
who received aid by others, friends, family, 
neighbours, in the Barangay (sharing relief goods 
and assistance with reconstruction within the 
community) 
 
 
→  
people heavily affected by typhoon Yolanda and 
who received humanitarian aid by any 
organisation (distribution of relief goods, financial 
and reconstruction assistance from outside the 
community) 
 
 
 
The participants choose… Option 1 □ Option 2 □ Option 3 □ 
which costs them: 0 PHP  10 PHP  40 PHP  
which reduces the other co-player’s 
income by: 
0 PHP  40 PHP  160 PHP  
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- B. PRA Tools – 
 
Time Line 
Now, we want to introduce the first discussion tool. Therefore, we would like to start with a 
small and simple example to illustrate how the tool actually works. 
Some of you might love CHICKEN ADOBO a lot. What is your usual lunch, dinner and 
breakfast time? [Wait a moment – mark “lunch”, “dinner” and “breakfast” in the timeline of the 
diagram] 
Now please remember yesterday and describe on a scale from “minus three” to “plus three” 
how much you would have liked to eat a chicken adobo at a point in time. Here, “zero” means 
“your hunger for a chicken adobo at 12 pm”, “minus three” means “not hungry for chicken 
adobo compared to 12 pm” and “plus three” means “very hungry for chicken adobo compared 
to 12 pm”. Please sketch in the development of your appetite during the past day. 
At what time yesterday did you feel like having or not having a chicken adobo relative to your 
hunger at 12 pm? [ Wait a moment] 
[Participants answer] 
Let us draw it in the graph. 
[Ask for their hunger at different points of time first. 
After they discussed and finally agreed on one rating: Please draw the line in the diagram] 
 
 
[assistants should assist the participants if necessary. 
One final remark: The sketching can be different. E.g. if thde person ate before 12 pm: the 
reference point would be not so hungry such that the line might be rather dropping. If person 
has not eaten yet at 12 pm: the line might be rather rising, as the person is getting hungry] 
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Chicken Adobo
Chicken Adobo
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Let’s move to the real question now.  
Therefore, we will form 3 groups, each consisting of 3 individuals. The first group consists of 3 
fishers, the second of 3 shop owners and the third of 3 further randomly chosen residents in 
this Barangay. [help them forming the groups]  
Please discuss and work together with your group. [Point again at the 3 groups]  
[PLEASE DISTRIBUTE THE SHEET/POSTER FOR SKETCHING] 
As you see, we again use a diagram which includes a timeline for the period between the 
harvest season in 2013 until today as well as a moment eventually next year which indicates 
your expectations of a future situation. [point at the timeline] 
01: First of all, we would like you to draw in all important key events you still remember due 
to a drastic change or impact on your and other residents’ livelihood, income, property 
and/or life stock in this Barangay. Please try to state all key events in a maximum of two or 
three words. 
[wait 10 minutes – after 5-10 minutes, assistants should inform them to finish] 
In the next step, we would like you to plot the income per capita in this Barangay in light of 
the changes occurring over time, for instance due to the mentioned key events. Please be 
aware that this plotting does not necessarily reflect the change in your income situation but of 
the villagers in your Barangay in general. 
02: On a scale from “minus three” to “plus three”: 
- where “zero” means “income of most of the Barangay residents at a moment during 
the harvest season in 2013 (September/October 2013)”. So the initial situation starts in 
point 0. 
- “minus one” means that the income situation of most of the people is worse compared 
to the initial situation. This includes that livelihood and property is worse off compared 
to the initial situation. 
- “minus two” means the income source, livelihood and property of most of the Barangay 
residents is partly lost compared to the initial situation. 
- “minus three” means the income source, livelihood and property of most of the 
Barangay residents is completely lost compared to the initial situation. 
 
- “plus one” means that the income situation of most of the Barangay residents is better 
compared to the initial situation. This includes that livelihood and property is better off 
compared to the initial situation. 
- “plus two” means the income source, livelihood and property of most of the Barangay 
residents increased by more than 50% compared to the initial situation 
- “plus three” means the income source, livelihood and property of most of the Barangay 
residents increased by more than 100% compared to the initial situation. 
Please use the blue permanent marker and sketch in the development of income 
situation in this Barangay relative to the situation during the harvest season 2013.  
[please fix the description of the income scale to the numbers: -3, 0 and 3] 
Kindly keep in mind that the corresponding points on the line should match with the dates. So 
please differentiate between a gradual or immediate impact of a key event. 
[wait 10 minutes] 
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After we discussed the income situation, we would now like to assess the humanitarian aid this 
Barangay potentially received.  
03: On a scale from “minus three” to “plus three”: 
- where “zero” means “humanitarian aid received by most of the Barangay residents at 
a moment during the harvest season in 2013 (September/October 2013)”. The initial 
situation again starts in point 0. 
- “minus one” means that the humanitarian aid received by most of the Barangay 
residents is lower compared to the initial situation. 
- “minus two” means that the humanitarian aid received by most of the Barangay 
residents is much lower compared to the initial situation. 
- “Minus three” means that the humanitarian aid received by most of the Barangay 
residents is insufficient in all needed areas compared to the initial situation. 
 
- “plus one” means that the humanitarian aid received by most of the Barangay residents 
is higher compared to the initial situation. 
- “plus two” means that the humanitarian aid received by most of the Barangay residents 
is much higher compared to the initial situation. 
- “plus three” means that the humanitarian aid received by most of the Barangay 
residents is excessive compared to the initial situation.  
Please use the black permanent marker and plot the receipt of humanitarian aid by means 
of financial compensation or assistance in this Barangay relative to the situation during 
the harvest season 2013. The humanitarian aid may be provided by the Local Government 
Unit, national government or any other agency or NGO in order to cope with the disaster loss 
caused by particular natural hazards.  
[please fix the description of the humanitarian aid scale to the numbers: -3, 0 and 3] 
[wait 10 minutes] 
Finally, we would like you to think about solidarity in this Barangay. Think of solidarity as 
willingness to help others who came to a much worse position. As how cooperative do you 
perceive others in this Barangay. Did solidarity and cooperation change over time or remained 
relatively constant? 
04: On a scale from “minus three” to “plus three”:  
- where “zero” means the prevalence of “solidarity in this Barangay at a moment during 
the harvest season in 2013 (September/October 2013)”. This is the initial situation in 
point 0. 
- “minus one” means that the solidarity level in the Barangay is lower than the initial 
situation. 
- “minus two” means that the solidarity level in the Barangay is much lower than the 
initial situation.  
- “minus three” means that most of the Barangay residents exhibit a spiteful behavior, 
where the solidarity level is considerably below the initial situation. 
 
- “plus one” means that the solidarity level in the Barangay is higher than the initial 
situation. 
- “plus two” means that the solidarity level in the Barangay is much higher than the initial 
situation. 
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- “plus three” means that most of the Barangay residents exhibit an extraordinary level 
of helpfulness and cooperativeness, where the solidarity level is considerably above 
the initial situation”.  
Please use the red permanent marker and sketch in the trend in solidarity in this Barangay 
relative to the situation during the harvest season 2013. . 
[please fix the description of the solidarity scale to the numbers: -3, 0 and 3] 
[wait 10 minutes] 
 
[Example:] 
 
Thank you for the great work. All the diagrams represent your personal perception and thus, 
are correct. However, we would kindly like to ask you to discuss the results within the whole 
group and pick the diagram which best suits the development in this Barangay. 
[wait 10 minutes] 
 
 
[The assistants should kindly ask questions when turning points occur, e.g. 
- Why did the line XY increase/decrease in a specific moment? 
- What made the difference between the different levels? 
- Why do you believe the forecasted development will be as shown? 
- What changed for you in this period? 
- How did you feel with the situation XY? 
- What should have been done to prevent a negative development? 
- Others: _________  
 
Please feel free to ask any further questions that fit in the respective illustration.] 
 
  
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
harvest
time 2013
Nov 13 Dez 13 Jan 14 Feb 14 Mai 14 Nov 14 Jul 16 2017
Income vs. humanitarian aid vs. solidarity
Average Income Average humanitarian aid Average solidarity
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Beneficiary Selection and Exposure Ranking   
 
In this part you are not in your group of 3, as we would like to you to discuss the following 
questions with all people in this room.  
 
05 Imagine another typhoon of the size of Haiyan hits the island. The government or 
international donors are willing to give money. In your opinion, how should they distribute the 
financial aid or relief and who should or should not receive the support? And how much 
relative to others?  
[Discussion for approx. 5 min]  
[Write down comments of participants on a board]  
 
[Move the tables aside if necessary to assure enough space for the following task] 
06 We already raised some thoughts about conventional and unconventional humanitarian 
practices of targeting or beneficiary selection by international donors, NGOs and the 
government after natural disasters.  
[Show all sheets of paper that list the following single beneficiary selection techniques on the 
floor and read them out loudly at the same time:]  
On the present sheets, we noted down several proposals, such as: 
- According to people’s exposure. The higher the suffering or damage, the higher 
the relief. 
- Egalitarian. This means all people from the Barangay receive the same amount of 
aid, regardless their losses. 
- Egalitarian towards exposed. This means all people that lost something because of 
the typhoon receive the same amount of aid, regardless if some suffered more or 
less. People whose property was not at least partly destroyed by typhoon 
Haiyan/Yolanda receive nothing. 
- Priority on highly vulnerable victims. These are disabled persons, female headed 
households and/or with majority elderly and children or households with single source 
of income which is based on a vulnerable industry, whose property was at least partly 
destroyed by typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda. 
- Priority on victims that prepared more for the typhoon than others. (i.e. 
particularly, only those victims who conducted all preparatory measures and who 
have not (re-)built their homes in high-risk areas and in less resilient kind or only 
victims with disaster insurance for their uninsured losses and whose property was at 
least partly destroyed by typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda.) 
- People whose property was at least partly destroyed by typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda, but 
who do not receive remittances. 
- First come, first serve approach, i.e. people, whose property was at least partly 
destroyed by typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda should receive aid in the order of their claims. 
- Personal relations to agency staff, local elites or authorities. 
- No-one receives aid. 
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[In case there are other points mentioned in the discussion and question 01, add them in in 
the blank sheet “others” – for the rest, try to incorporate them in the given criteria] 
[wait for additional remarks, add them to the blank sheet “others”, if applicable] 
[now ask participants:]  
Please rank the following practices and start with the one practice that should be primarily 
implemented. The practice you least want to be implemented should be placed below the other 
criteria. There can be only one criteria per row.  
 
[Let them discuss, wait a moment, and take a picture of the final result] 
[After completing the task, please provide them with the same set of sheets] 
07 Now please tell us which practice was actually used according to your opinion. Please 
rank the same practices based on their actual implementation. Start with the one that was 
primarily implemented. The last sheet reflects the least applied practice. There can be only 
one criteria per row. Please put away those practices which were not used. 
[Let them discuss, wait a moment, and take a picture of the final result] 
 
 
BENEFICIARY SELECTION  
 
DESIRED PRACTICE 
(…shall be… ) 
ACTUAL PRACTICE 
(…how it actually happened…)  
  According to people’s exposure. The higher the 
suffering or dam 
age, the higher the relief. 
 
  Egalitarian. This means all people from the Barangay 
receive the same amount of aid, regardless their losses. 
 
  Egalitarian towards exposed. This means all people 
that lost something because of the typhoon receive the 
same amount of aid, regardless if some suffered more or 
less. People whose property was not at least partly 
destroyed by typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda receive nothing. 
 
  Priority on highly vulnerable victims. These are 
disabled persons, female headed households and/or 
with majority elderly and children or households with 
single source of income which is based on a vulnerable 
industry, whose property was at least partly destroyed by 
typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda. 
 
  Priority on victims that prepared more for the typhoon 
than others. (i.e. particularly, only those victims who 
conducted all preparatory measures and who have not 
(re-)built their homes in high-risk areas and in less 
resilient kind or only victims with disaster insurance for 
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their uninsured losses and whose property was at least 
partly destroyed by typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda.) 
  People whose property was at least partly destroyed 
by typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda, but do not receive 
remittances. 
 
 First come, first serve approach, i.e. people, 
whose property was at least partly destroyed by 
typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda should receive aid in the 
order of their claims. 
 
 Personal relations to agency staff, local elites or 
authorities. 
 
  No-one receives aid. 
 
 
  Other (please specifiy): 
____________________________________ 
 
 
08 [ask participants:] Based on your experience after the typhoon Yolanda, please discuss 
what kind of people were the first who received humanitarian aid.  
 
09 [ask participants:] Based on your experience after the typhoon Yolanda, were there any 
people that received more or less humanitarian aid than others or were excluded? 
[PLEASE ASK WHY SOME RECEIVED LESS/MORE AND PARTICULARLY, WHY SOME 
WERE EXCLUDED FROM AID, IF APPLICABLE] 
 
For the following last group discussion, we will mix up the groups and each group will have 
the possibility to work on another task. Now, the groups are mixed up in a way that each 
group consists of one fisher, one shop owner and one other person. 
[wait until they changed their seats] 
[The first group is preparing a Venn Diagram] 
[The second group is preparing the SWOT Analysis] 
[The third group is preparing the Conflict Matrix] 
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Group 1: Venn Diagram (FAO)  
In the following, we would like you to create a map that shows all social relationships with and 
within people, groups and institutions. Think of the ones you value as important for your 
Barangay in connection with the assistance received after typhoon Haiyan hit the island.  
In order to represent the different kinds of actors or institutions and their relationship, you can 
use different utensils, such as a large sheet of paper, colored paper in different sizes and 
shapes. 
Firstly, here is a circle which represents your Barangay. Additionally, you receive other circles 
and triangles. The triangles can represent different individuals, such as neighbors or friends, 
while the circles represent, groups and institutions which helped you after Haiyan hit the island. 
Now, just write them down on the circles and/or the triangles which are available in three sizes. 
The biggest circle reflects the one most important to the people, meaning that they provided 
the greatest assistance. The medium circle reflects moderate assistance and the smallest 
circle reflects relatively little support.  
To pursue the task, you can ask yourself some simple questions. There is no need to answer 
all of them. It is just supposed to help you with the task. 
- Which organisations/institutions/groups are working in or with the community? 
- Which institutions/groups do you regard as most important, and why? 
- Who helped you during the storm? 
- Who helped you directly after the storm? 
- Who helped you during the reconstruction and recovery process? 
- Whose help do you perceive as most efficient? 
[wait 10 minutes until they finished the naming of all important actors] 
For the placement of the circles and triangles, your need to consider the following: As far as 
individuals or groups and institutions are part of this community, they should be placed inside 
the big circle which shows your Barangay. The circles and triangles representing actors from 
outside the Barangay are placed outside this Barangay circle. 
[point at the big circle] 
- Which organisations/institutions/groups are found in the Barangay and which other ones 
from elsewhere are working with the Barangay? 
 [wait 10 minutes until they finished the placement of all important actors] 
Furthermore, a little distance between the circles indicates the strength of the relation between 
the respective actors. Circles as well as triangles can also overlap. Whenever circles touch or 
overlap, interaction between the actors is shown.  
- Which organisations worked together?  
- What kind of assistance did exist among people? 
largely distanced circles: no or little contact or co-operation 
circles close to each other: only loose contacts exist 
touching circles:  some co-operation 
overlapping circles:  close co-operation 
[wait 10 minutes until they finished the placement of all important actors] 
Now, arrows [please draw  on a paper] can be drawn to show in that interaction took place 
mutually/reciprocally between the actors. Also, you can use flashes [please draw ‘flash’ on a 
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paper] to demonstrate conflicts between the actors or crosses [please draw —X-- on a paper] 
where no interaction took place between the actors even though it should have.  
- Are some particular social groups or kind of people excluded from being members of 
some groups or from beneficiary selection by certain organisations? 
- Between whom did conflicts occur  
Finally, were there any individuals, groups or organisations that did not assist you even though 
you wished them to do so? Here, you can use the triangles and circles coloured in blue to write 
them down and put them inside or outside the circle, which represents your Barangay. 
- From whom would you have expected some support, which was missing? 
 
Finally, please mark with an “X” who had a leading position in the decision making process of 
the provision of aid and help in general. 
- Who makes the important decisions?  
 
[Please ask the participants why decisions are made in a specific way. Let them explain why 
they consider one more important than the other and what kind of assistance was provided. 
Do not forget to ask for conflicts and missing help. 
 
The assistants should kindly ask additional questions to ascertain all aspects of the social map, 
e.g. 
- Why is the help provided by X-circle more important than by Y-triangle? 
- Why is the help provided by X-triangle more important than by Y-circle? 
- Why did you expect help from XY and why do you believe XY did not provide assistance? 
- What kind of conflicts occurred? 
- Where should corporation have taken place and what were the consequences of the 
lacking cooperation? 
- What kind of ways of assisting each other do exist among people? 
- In which way did you benefit from the different organisations? 
 
FURTHER QUESTIONS POSSIBLE 
 
Please feel free to ask questions whenever you feel that further explanation is necessary to 
understand the social relationships in and between the Barangay and others.] 
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Group 2: SWOT-Analyse  
Now we would like to know more about how you dealt with the destruction caused by the storm 
Yolanda in 2013.  
In case you were affected by Yolanda: Did you help each other or did you rely on external 
humanitarian aid- or both? Please reflect on your experience. What worked well, what did not, 
and why?  
In case your Barangay was not directly affected by Yolanda: How did you perceive, people 
in affected areas cope with the disaster loss? Did they help each other or did they rely on 
external humanitarian aid- or both? Please reflect on your memories and impressions. What 
worked well, what did not, and why? In a second step, imagine your Barangay would have 
been affected by the typhoon Yolanda. What do you believe would have been the situation in 
your Barangay? 
[Show Headings of the Table]  
We have prepared a table for you. One for self-help and one for external humanitarian help. 
Self-help can be defined as measures and mechanisms inside the Barangay to help each 
other. This help can relate to your family, your friends and neighbours as well as other 
Barangay residents or affected neighbouring Barangays. 
External humanitarian aid can be defined as help coming from outside the Barangay in 
terms of emergency aid, relief distribution, recovery or reconstruction assistance. This help 
can be provided by all kinds of organisations, such as the Local Government Unit, government 
agencies, NGOs, international aid agencies, foreign donors and others. 
[Point on S W O T in table]  
In particular, we would like to ask you to identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats resulting from the way you dealt with the disaster.  
In your opinion, what are strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and risks of each of the two 
forms of dealing after a typhoon? [wait some moments, let them comment] 
For a better understanding – let me briefly explain what we understand by strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and risks.  
 Strengths: Characteristics that worked well and/or had a positive impact on your 
Barangay in the past/present. 
 Weaknesses: Characteristics that worked badly and negatively affected your Barangay 
in the past/present. 
 Opportunities: Chances for improvement in the future and/or solutions to problems in 
the past.  
 Threats: Risks that might hinder solutions to problem in the future or resolution of past 
issue. 
In remembrance of the typhoon Yolanda in 2013, which experience or impressions do you 
remember?  
You can discuss this topic in your group.  
In the columns, please write down how you assess a) self-help and b) external humanitarian 
aid; try to allocate your ideas respectively.  
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Kindly note that we do not intend that you find points for all criteria given, meaning strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and risks for both, self-help and external humanitarian aid. We 
rather want you to stick to the facts:  
[AFFECTED BARANGAY:] What experience did you personally make in your Barangay?  
[NOT AFFECTED BARANGAY:] What impressions did you get from other affected areas? 
[Let them use another colour :] In a second step, imagine your Barangay would have been 
affected by the typhoon Yolanda. What do you believe would have been the specific 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in your Barangay? 
 
[wait some moments: If comments are made, ask them to allocate them into the table. 
Try to encourage them to tell their story. 
Otherwise continue with further questions, such as:]  
- Which issues occurred? 
- Which positive experience did you make? 
- Which negative experience did you make? 
- Were there any challenges? 
- What did not work at all? 
- Why did it not work? 
- Think also what impact either self-help or external help have on social interactions within 
your Barangay. Did your relationship to family, friends and neighbours change? 
- What type of help can government/foreign aid provide what you cannot?  
- Which impact did reconstruction assistance have? 
- Others. 
[please feel free to ask other questions as well] 
{AFTER HAVING COLLECTED SEVERAL POINTS:] 
 [Let group discuss, note down people´s comments in the columns] 
Self-help: Helping each other  
within the Barangay 
External humanitarian aid  
from outside the Barangay 
Strengths 
- … 
- … 
- … 
 
Weaknesses 
- … 
- … 
- … 
 
Strengths 
- … 
- … 
- … 
 
Weaknesses 
- … 
- … 
- … 
 
Opportunities 
- … 
- … 
- … 
 
Threats 
- … 
- … 
- … 
 
Opportunities 
- … 
- … 
- … 
 
Threats 
- … 
- … 
- … 
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Group 3: Conflict matrix (FAO)  
In this tool we are looking at conflicts. Conflicts can arise due to various reasons.  
[Show table] We prepared a table for you.  
[Point at axes] On the vertical axis, we listed various topics that might cause conflict: be it 
financial relief aid - for example, people who got more aid than others or were excluded from 
aid. On the horizontal axis, we listed the groups that might cause conflict: within the household, 
within the barangay, with neighbouring villages, with strangers or with the government. We are 
not concerned with particular cases of conflicts, but rather with the intensity of occurring 
disputes and how often they happen in this Barangay. 
Please rate on a scale from one to seven, how intense do you perceive the conflicts within 
this Barangay with reference to the typhoon Yolanda.  
One means that you perceived the conflicts as “not intense” and seven means you perceived 
the conflicts as “very intense” in your Barangay. 
The more intense the conflicts were, the higher the impact on the social relationship within the 
disputing group. The intensity does not necessarily need to correlate with the frequency 
conflicts occur. There could be a lot of small conflicts which correspond to a low intensity level 
rating. Whereas only one big conflict can correspond to a high intensity level rating.  
[let them discuss for 3 minutes] 
[let them fill in the rating in the column on the left hand side of the table “Intensity level of 
conflicts (Please rate from 1 to 7)”] 
[Based on their answer, hand out the following amounts of beans:] 
Let them choose one of the following 
rating (between 1 and 7) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Please distribute the corresponding 
amount of beans 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
You now receive the amount of beans matching your conflict intensity rating. 
[show box with the respective amount of beans] 
After selecting your perceived level of conflict intensity, you can now put beans in the columns 
based on the frequency that conflicts occurred in this Barangay. The more conflicts, the more 
beans you can put in the column. Kindly note we only look at how often the respective conflicts 
occurred.  
[Point out the respective categories whilst speaking] Conflicts can exist within the household 
or within the barangay or with neighbouring villages, with strangers or with the government.  
For example, if most of the conflicts were about topic “X” in any of the mentioned categories, 
put more beans inside this column compared to conflicts referred to as topic “Y” or another 
category. Few beans indicate that there are only few disputes, whereas many beans mean 
that there are many disputes.  
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In which areas or between which groups did most of the conflicts occur? 
Consider all variations of conflicts when allocating the beans. You have only the number of 
beans available that were given to you. So try to arrange the beans in a way that best reflects 
the occurrence of conflicts. 
Please ask additional questions: 
- What kind of conflicts did occur? 
- Which social groups were mostly involved in the conflicts? 
- Please describe the long-term effect of these conflicts? 
- Was there any chance to avoid this conflict? 
- How many residents were mostly involved? Most of the Barangay residents vs. only a 
few residents? 
- Which conflict did you perceive as the most intense? 
- Which conflicts were completely new to you? 
- Other? 
Please feel free to ask any further questions that might be interesting! 
 [Once matrix is completed] How did you resolve the disputes? Did it require intervention by 
village officials? Was it treated at a higher level?  
[Discussion among group members] 
[Please take notes of any comments regarding the matrix and conflict resolution 
Take a picture of the conflict matrix after completion of the task] 
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[THE FOLLOWING TABLE WILL BE PRINTED OUT ON A BIG SHEET AND GIVEN TO THE 
PARTICIPANTS OF GROUP 3.] 
Intensity level of 
conflicts 
(Please rate from 
1 to 7) 
___________ 
CONFLICT MATRIX 
Within the 
household 
in this 
village 
Within the 
Barangay 
members in 
this village 
With 
neighbouring 
villagers 
With 
strangers in 
this village 
With the 
state 
officials in 
this village 
Relief aid (e.g. 
food, water, etc.) 
          
Financial aid 
 
     
Reconstruction 
assistance and 
shelter 
 
 
          
Exclusion from 
aid 
 
          
Lack of 
Cooperation 
 
 
     
Other, specify: 
 
 
     
Other, specify: 
 
     
 
- Thank you - 
A13. KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW - BFARMC-LEADER INTERVIEW CHAPTER 7. APPENDIX
A13 Key informant interview - BFARMC-leader interview
CLXVIII
1 
 
Interview with the BFARMC Leader 
 
 
 
I. Coastal Area of Barangay  
 
a. General information about the coastal area of the barangay 
 
1. Is there a no-take zone (an area closed for fishing)?          □ Yes             □ No 
If yes,  
How far is the no-take zone from this barangay?   
 
In km ………………………      In travel hours by motor boat ……………………… 
 
2. The nearest MPA in the municipal water is  
□ In this barangay 
□ In the neighboring barangay 
□ In the neighboring barangay and also in ………. [number of] other barangay 
□ There is no neighboring MPA in the municipal water 
 
b. Management 
 
3. How many steering members does the BFARMC management council have?  
……….  men ……….  women  
 
4. How often does the BFARMC council organize meetings per year to discuss issues 
related to the management of municipal waters? …….. 
a. How many of them are held without the community …….. 
b. How many of them were open to the whole community ……. 
 
5. Does the BFARMC management council also mobilize fishermen for other activities? 
(e.g. political protests, community work, beach cleaning)   □ Yes                   □ No 
If yes, what kind of activities? 
□ Community work                  □ beach cleaning  □ other                  □ other 
  
Barangay Name 
 
……………………………………………… 
 
Name and function of interviewed person ……………………………………………… 
 
Number of fishers in this Barangay  
(registered and unregistered fishers altogether) 
 
……………………………………………… 
Number of boats in this Barangay (registered 
and unregistered) 
……………………………………………… 
2 
 
6. Besides the BFARMC Committee, which other organizations for management of marine 
resources exist in this barangay?  
Last column Decision making scale: If applicable, according to your opinion- on a scale from 1-4, 
how do these stakeholders participate in the decision making of how this coastal area is managed? 
1= no participation at all      2= only attendance of meetings 
3= attendance of meetings and voting power 
4= highest decision body: attendance of meetings, voting power and is consulted in every decision 
Type  No. organizations/ 
committees, 
groups etc.  
If yes, how do you as the BFARMC 
Committee cooperate with each of 
the organizations/ committees, groups 
Decision 
making  
scale 
 Yes No If 
applicable, 
Before 
MPA was 
set up 
Today   
 
 
 
 
Fishermen 
Organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Committee (MPA)  
related 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other 
□ Research/  
Academics 
□ NGO 
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7. To sum up the management section, please provide details…. 
 
… what works well within the BFARMC? … what works badly within the BFARMC?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
… what is needed for a better working BFARMC? 
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c. Rules  
8. Which of the following rules and regulations about fishing exist in the coastal area of 
your barangay?  
Are there other regulations in your community regarding fishing? If yes, please fill in 
others. 
 
[in 4th, 5th   & 6th  column: L= Local Ordinance, B= Barangay Ordinance, F= Fishermen] 
  
 
Formal Regulations 
  
 
 
Who was responsible for 
creating this rule? 
Did the number of rule 
breakings  
1= Decrease 
2= Remained the same  
3= Increase 
  Yes No L B F Immediately 
after 
typhoon 
Yolanda 
Today compared 
to the time before 
typhoon Yolanda 
 
a)  No Take Zone:  
Areas where you are 
not allowed to fish at all 
 
 
□ 
 
 
□ 
 
 
□ 
 
 
□ 
 
 
□ 
  
b) Not to use dynamite 
and cyanide for fishing 
□ □ □ □ □   
 
c)  Seasonal restrictions 
to fish 
□ □ □ □ □   
 
d)  Certain species you 
are not allowed to fish 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
□ 
  
e) Prohibited to use 
specific mesh size 
□ 
Please 
specify 
Size 
 
 
□ □ □ □   
 
Other  
………..………………. 
           
 
9. What are reasons for rule breakings? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Do fishers get convicted after rule breakings?     □ Yes   □ No 
If yes, please specify how often in a year: ……….. 
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Remember, the formal rules are: 
a: No Take Zone 
b:  Not to use dynamite and cyanide for fishing 
c: Seasonal restrictions to fish 
d: Certain species you are not allowed to fish  
e:  Prohibited to use specific mesh size)  
 
10. If a rule from question 1  
was given to the village by an outside authority 
(e.g. local government), did … 
 
…. the BFARMC Committee get  
 Yes No If yes, please specify 
rule (a, b, c, d, e) 
Freedom to adapt the rule to your needs □ □  
Training how to implement the rule    
Continuous technical support from the authority  for the how to 
implement the rule 
□ □  
Help in monitoring and enforcement   □ □  
Explanation why the rule is important □ □  
 
…. fishers get 
 Yes No If yes, please specify 
rule (a, b, c, d, e) 
Freedom to adapt the rule to your needs □ □  
Training how to implement the rule    
Continuous technical support from the authority  for the how to 
implement the rule 
□ □  
Help in monitoring and enforcement   □ □  
Explanation why the rule is important □ □  
 
11. Are there also informal/ traditional rules in the coastal area of your barangay? 
Informal rules are rules not written in an official document, rules fishers communicate 
with themselves.        □ Yes            □ No 
  
If yes, please name informal rules. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
d. Success Factors  
 
12. Please rank these items from 1-13 (1=most important, 13=least important) how the 
BFARMC Committee should prioritize their goals for a successful managed coastal 
area.   
 
 Rank 
Cooperation and coordination of fishing management  
(High attendance at meetings of BFARMC)  
 
Rules are enforced  
Catch is increased, also for sales   
Fishers have alternative source of income   
Whole community cooperation and coordination to reach inclusiveness   
Women and Children are empowered  
Disaster prevention and relief: The community has a better sense of greater 
security when there is a natural disaster 
 
Protection of the Environment  
Monitoring and Evaluation works well (Feedback)  
Good Data Collection and Recording   
Boundaries are clearly defined  
Fishers get continuous training on fishing techniques  
Enough fundraising from higher level of government, ministry or NGOs for 
projects, equipment etc.  
 
 
Are there any other points than listed in 1 that you would use to measure a successful 
managed coastal area?   □ Yes                                 □ No  
If yes, please specify and explain why? Which rank would you give these new points? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
13. Now comes a list of issues that may or may not affect fisheries in the coastal area of 
your barangay. For each, could you tell me if it is a problem, and if it is, how important 
is it?  
Problem Not a 
problem 
Almost not 
a problem 
Problem 
 
Important 
problem 
Very 
important 
problem 
Lack of clarity of rules □ □ □ □ □ 
Lack of monitoring □ □ □ □ □ 
Too many fishermen □ □ □ □ □ 
Some fishermen do not respect 
rules 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Lack of economic/income 
alternatives 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Lack of technical support □ □ □ □ □ 
Disputes among fishermen □ □ □ □ □ 
Stealing or vandalism e.g. 
destruction of fishing gear 
□ □ □ □ □ 
The impact of natural hazards □ □ □ □ □ 
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14. Out of the number of fishers in your barangay, how many… 
 
 If there is an MPA in 
municipal waters: Before 
the establishment of the 
MPA within municipal 
waters 
Today 
…  fishers in your barangay,  
had/have an alternative 
source of income 
  
 
15. What are alternative sources of income for fishermen?  
□ Construction             □ Drivers    □ Farmers          □ Government Employees  
□ Other …………………            □ Other …………………   □ Other ………………… 
 
16. How do you as the BFARMC leader perceive the future of fish catches? 
□ very negative      □ negative        □ no change     □ positive       □ very positive    
           Please explain, why? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
17. How do fishers in the coastal area of your barangay perceive the future of fish 
catches? 
□ very negative      □ negative        □ no change     □ positive       □ very positive    
           Please explain, why? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
Fishers have no voting power in 
the decision making of how the 
municipal water is managed 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Outside influence (e.g. 
politicians, NGO) 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Unclear responsibilities for 
management of fishery 
resources 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Fishermen have too little time to 
attend meetings 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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18. Over the last 4 years, how did the level of competition developed between…. 
 
 Got less                                  Remained
the same                          
Increased 
(a) … fishers in your barangay    
(b) …. fishers in your barangay and the ones 
from the neighboring barangay 
   
(c)….fishers in this barangay and unregistered 
fishers 
   
 
Do you think the MPA has an influence on the level of competition? 
□ Yes       □ No    
If yes, please explain and state between which actors (a, b, c). 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
19. What are consequences of more competition? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
20. Do fishermen perceive competition rather as a good or a bad thing? Please explain.  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
21. If there is a coral reef, did the area decrease, remained the same, increase over the 
last 4 years? 
 decrease                          remained the same     increase 
 
Are the corals protected by an MPA? □ Yes                      □ No 
 
22. If there are mangroves, did the area decrease, remained the same, increase over 
the last 4 years? 
 decrease                          remained the same     increase 
 
Are the mangroves protected by an MPA? □ Yes                      □ No 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
23. If there is an MPA within municipal waters: Please state if the following numbers 
decreased, remained the same or increased ever since the establishment of the 
MPA. In case of an increase or decrease, please specify after how many years. 
 
If there is no MPA within municipal waters: Please state if the following numbers 
decreased, remained the same or increased in the past 4 years? 
 1= decrease 
2= remained the same 
3= increase 
Households in your barangay, that depend on fishing 
as their main income source 
 
Number of different fish species   
Number of other species   
Number of average fish yield   
Number of illegal fishing   
 
 
 
If there was no increase in fish yields, what are reasons behind that?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
If there was no increase in fish species what are reasons behind that?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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24.  
If there is an MPA within municipal waters 
On a scale from 1 to 5 (1 = strongly 
not accepted, 2= not accepted, 
3=neutral, 4= accepted, 5= strongly 
accepted), how much is the MPA 
socially accepted within your 
barangay? 
 
Are there groups that oppose the 
MPA? 
 
□ Yes     
Please specify groups that oppose the MPA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What are their reasons for opposing the MPA? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
□ No         
 
If there is no MPA within municipal waters: 
On a scale from 1 to 5 (1 = strongly not accepted, 2= not 
accepted, 3=neutral, 4= accepted, 5= strongly accepted), 
how much would an establishment of an MPA be socially 
accepted within your barangay? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What are groups that would oppose the establishment of 
an MPA? 
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25. On a scale from 1-5 (1 =very bad impact, 2=bad impact  3= no impact,  
       4= good impact, 5 = very good impact) please rate  
If there is an MPA within municipal waters: to what extent the MPA has an impact on the 
coastal area in your barangay in terms of…  
If there is no MPA within municipal waters: to what extent you think an MPA would have 
an impact on the coastal area in your barangay in terms of…  
 Scale from 1-5 
More cooperation and coordination of fishing management     
(Higher attendance at meetings of BFARMC)  
 
Rules are enforced  
Catch/ Fish yields is increased, also for sales   
Fishers have more alternative source of income   
Better community cooperation and coordination to reach inclusiveness   
Women and Children are empowered  
Disaster relief: The community has a better sense of greater security  
when there is a natural disaster 
 
Better Protection of the Environment  
Monitoring and Evaluation works better (Feedback)  
Better  Data Collection and Recording   
Boundaries are clearly defined  
Fishers get more continuous training on fishing techniques  
More fundraising from higher level of government, ministry or NGOs for projects, 
equipment etc. 
 
 
26. Would you as the BFARMC leader want to establish an/another MPA in the coastal 
area of your barangay? □ Yes                   □ No 
 
Please give reasons for your decision. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
27. Would fishers in your community be willing to set up an/another MPA? 
□ Yes                   □ No 
 
Please give reasons for your decision. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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28. What extra support does an area with an MPA get compared to a Non-MPA Area?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
III. Fishery- Natural Disaster 
 
29. Compared to the neighbouring fishing community, were fishers in your barangay 
more/same/ less affected by typhoon Yolanda?  
□ More    □ Same    □ Less 
30. Which form of help after a typhoon as Yolanda do you consider as relatively more 
important for fishers in your barangay 
 
□ Self-help strategies   □ External financial humanitarian assistance? 
□ External technical humanitarian assistance 
 
Please explain why? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
31. Did your BFARMC Committee get any warning that typhoon Yolanda will occur?
        □ Yes                    □ No 
32. Did your BFARMC Committee use any preparatory measures before typhoon 
Yolanda hit the island?     □ Yes                    □ No 
 
If yes, please explain the preparatory measures. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
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33. Did your BFARMC Committee receive external financial aid from the 
government/foreign donors after typhoon Yolanda?          □ Yes             
□ No 
 
If yes, on a scale from 1 to 7 (1=very little, 7= a lot), how much did you get external 
financial aid from 
the government ………   NGOs/ foreign donors …… 
 
34. Did your BFARMC Committee receive external technical aid from the 
government/foreign donors after typhoon Yolanda?          □ Yes             
□ No 
 
If yes, which form of technical aid did you receive? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
If yes, on a scale from 1 to 7 (1=very little, 7= a lot), how much did you get external 
technical aid 
 
the government ……… from NGOs/ foreign donors …… 
 
35. Comments on Yolanda exposure and how fishers dealt with it  
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
A14. KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW - MPA-LEADER INTERVIEW CHAPTER 7. APPENDIX
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Interview with the MPA Leader 
 
Barangay Name ……………………………………………… 
 
Name of MPA ……………………………………………… 
 
Name and function of interviewed person ……………………………………………… 
 
 
I. General Information on this MPA 
 
1. When was this MPA established?  ………… 
 
2. The decision to start this MPA came from the   [multiple entries possible] 
 
 
3. Why was this MPA started? 
 
 
4. Please cross, what is the governance system of this MPA? 
Traditional 
Based on traditional ecological knowledge. Governance system has been 
existing for a long time 
□ 
Bottom- up 
Primarily led by fishers, generally small-scale 
□ 
Co- management 
Joint management by fishers and government 
□ 
Centralized 
Led by government agency, consultative with fishers 
□ 
Private 
Private sector (big fishing companies) led 
□ 
Other □ 
 
 
Government Level □ NGO 
 
□ 
Municipal Level □ Academic/ Research Institution □ 
Barangay captain □ Other …………………………………. □ 
Local Government Decision 
 
□ For Economic reasons  □ 
National Government Decision 
 
□ For Food Security □ 
Other 
…………………………………. 
□ Other …………………………………. □ 
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5. Is there any management council?  
□ Yes                     □ No 
 
6. Is there any management plan?   
□ Yes                     □ No 
 
Coming up with the management plan of the MPA: 
Was it participatory- such in that fishers in the community worked out together a 
management plan with authorities?               
□ Yes                     □ No 
 
7. Does the committee of this MPA get external financial or external technical 
support?       
□ Yes                     □ No  □ I don´t know 
 
If yes, please specify who provides financial and/or technical support and state specify the 
kind of support. 
 
 
8. Does the MPA Council have financial extra revenues? 
 
If yes, are the MPA financial revenues used for community development 
projects?  
□ Yes                       □ No 
 
If yes, please specify the kinds of community development projects. 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
9. Does the MPA council have exra technical equipement that all fishers can use? 
 
□ Yes                       □ No 
 
 
 Financial support Technical support 
  kind    kind  
Central Government □  
 
□  
Local Government  □  
 
□  
NGO □  
 
□  
Other 
……………………….. 
□  □  
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10. Please provide details,  
… what works well within the MPA? … what works badly within the MPA?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
… what is needed for a better working MPA? 
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II. Management 
 
 
11. How many steering members does the MPA management council have?  
……….  men ……….  women  
 
12. How often does the MPA council organize meetings to discuss issues related to the 
management of municipal waters? …….. 
a. How many of them are held without the community …….. 
b. How many of them were open to the whole community …….. 
 
13.  
 Out of 10 decisions, how 
many are made by …. 
 
Kind of decisions made…. How are the 
decisions made? 
 
1= Secret majority 
vote 
2= open majority 
vote  
3=consensus 
 
….  By MPA 
steering 
committee alone 
  
 
 
 
 
 
….with 
community/ 
fishermen  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. Does your MPA council cooperate with the council from the neighbouring MPA?
  
□ Yes             □ No 
If yes, please explain how you cooperate with the other MPA councils? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
15. Comments 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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 - Key Informant Interview – 
Approx. 2 h 
Date:_______________ Village:_______________________________________________ 
 
Name: ___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: 
Good morning / afternoon / evening.  
My name is Shiow Mie, I work for ………………., a private local research company that 
conducts all types of research. Today we are conducting research for Professor Björn 
Vollan’s research group from the Philipps-University of Marburg in Germany.  
 
[If asked to explain reason for interview, say:] Our company has been appointed by the 
research group of the Philipps-University of Marburg in Germany. The research team already 
conducted several research projects in the Philippines. In 2012, one of these projects was 
also conducted in cooperation with the Microinsurance Innovations Program for Social 
Security in this Barangay. 
The purpose of one of the activities is conducting periodical surveys. The other is to gain 
better understanding of the main problems that the Barangays in the Philippines are facing 
due to an increasing harassment by natural disasters. Currently, we are asking your opinion 
about the experience your Barangay made after the typhoon Haiyan hit the island in 2013. 
Therefore, we would like to conduct a brief survey and ask you some further questions in a 
following interview. 
 
The information you will give us is strictly confidential and no one will bother you in any way 
about what you say concerning the questions we ask you. All responses would be compiled 
in the form of numbers that will be published in such a way that it is impossible to trace 
these answers to a certain individual. So your name will not be shown in the final result. 
Thus, we ask you to give honest response.  
 
Do you mind me recording this session? The record will be used for personal purpose only 
and will be destroyed after the evaluation is completed. I can assure that all data will be 
handled strictly confidential. 
 
FIRST OF ALL, WE WOULD LIKE TO ASK SOME BACKGROUND QUESTIONS. Therefore, we 
would like to ask you to fill in a questionnaire first.  
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I. PRE-QUESTIONNAIRE (10 min) 
01  As far as you remember, how often did the following disasters affect your village in the last 
5 years? 
a. Floods _____times 
b. Typhoons _____times 
c. Earthquakes _____times 
d. volcanic eruptions _____times 
e. droughts _____times 
f. fire _____times 
g. other, please specify _____________________ _____times 
 
02  From your perspective, how strongly was your barangay damaged by the typhoon Haiyan 
(Yolanda)Please choose the degree of destruction on a scale from one to seven, where one 
means “not affected at all” and seven means “incredible damage”. 
Disaster 
Loss 
1 
 
Not affected 
at all/ 
no damage 
2 
 
Negligible 
damages  
(e.g. to 
houses and 
some crops, 
etc.) 
3 
 
Minor 
damages 
(e.g. to 
houses, 
significant 
damage to 
signs/trees, 
heavy 
damage to 
some 
crops, etc.) 
4 
 
Moderate 
damage 
(e.g. to 
some 
houses and 
structural 
damage, 
power 
failures, 
etc.) 
5 
 
Severe 
damage  
(e.g. most 
of the 
houses and 
infrastructu
re partly 
destroyed, 
widespread 
power 
failure, etc)   
6 
 
Devastating 
damage 
(e.g. 
significant 
house 
damage and 
structural 
damage in 
most of the 
area, injured, 
etc.)   
7 
 
Incredible 
damage  
(i.e. extremely 
dangerous with 
extreme, 
widespread 
destruction of 
houses, 
infrastructure, 
fatal casualties, 
etc.) 
Your 
barangay 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  
 
Would you like to emphasize specific aspects of the damage caused by the Typhoon? 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
03 If you compare the destruction in your barangay to that in other barangays, do you believe it was 
more or less damaged? 
□ More 
□ Same  
□ Less 
□ I do not know      
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04 We would like to get a better perspective on the damage caused by the typhoon. Could you 
please help us assess the various types of damages that may have occurred and how much time 
and money it took them to be repaired/recovered? Please answer the following questions to the 
best of your knowledge. [leave blank if the mentioned item was no there before the typhoon] 
 
05 The Barangay Development Council is responsible of the Mitigation, Preparedness, Response and 
Recovery if the Barangay is affected by a natural disaster. Do you receive an additional financial 
compensation for your efforts referring to your position as the Chairperson of the Council?  
□ Yes    [If yes:] a lump-sum?  □  Yes □  No 
□ No 
[If yes:] How much did you receive for your efforts referring to the typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda? 
 PHP ____________   
 
06 [If Q 05 no:] Would you say that no payment of a compensation was adequate?        □ Yes     □ No  
[If Q 05 yes:] Would you say, all things considered, that the compensation you received for your 
efforts as a chairperson in this Barangay was adequate? Please rate on a scale from 1 to 7, where 
one means “not adequately compensated” and seven means “very adequately compensated”. 
Compensation 
for efforts 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  
 damaged/ 
harmed 
[if yes:] How 
many days did 
it take to 
repair/recover 
 
Or: still 
ongoing? 
[if yes:] How 
much money 
(PHP) did it cost 
you to 
repair/recover?
[request 
documents if 
possible] 
[if yes:] Is 
this item 
from the list 
in the same 
or a better 
condition 
than before 
the storm 
roads in / and near the village □ Yes □ No     □ Yes □ No 
access to fresh water □ Yes □ No     □ Yes □ No 
access to food □ Yes □ No     □ Yes □ No 
access to pharmaceuticals □ Yes □ No     □ Yes □ No 
access to medical care □ Yes □ No     □ Yes □ No 
access to schools □ Yes □ No     □ Yes □ No 
access to cash/financial services □ Yes □ No     □ Yes □ No 
agriculture/fishery □ Yes □ No     □ Yes □ No 
electric infrastructure □ Yes □ No     □ Yes □ No 
access to internet □ Yes □ No     □ Yes □ No 
cellphone towers □ Yes □ No     □ Yes □ No 
telephone lines □ Yes □ No     □ Yes □ No 
other: ___________________ □ Yes □ No     □ Yes □ No 
other: ___________________ □ Yes □ No     □ Yes □ No 
other: ___________________ □ Yes □ No     □ Yes □ No 
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II. SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
[a. DISASTER LOSS (10 min)] 
01 We would like to get a better idea about how the situation looked like after the typhoon struck 
your barangay. In your own words, could you please describe to us what you believe to be the worst 
effects? Was there a certain pattern of destruction, e.g. houses next to the beach usually most 
affected? 
□ Barangay not highly affected at all: Please consider even small scale destructions: 
□ Barangay affected: 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
02 Please tell us a little bit more about what you believe to be the long-term impact of the typhoon 
on social relationships, households, buildings, community, etc.    
□ Barangay not affected at all: Please consider the potential effect that it might been caused 
□ Barangay affected: 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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[b. DISASTER LOSS MITIGATION AND RESPONSE (10 min)] 
01 Do you have any official documents (e.g. a Barangay Development Plan/Disaster Risk Reduction 
and Management Plan), according to which you performed all preparations before and the 
assistance after the typhoon Haiyan hit the island? [Please ask for documents] 
□ Yes 
□ No 
□ Any other official guidelines, specify _____________________________________________ 
[If no, move to the Q 02] 
01.a [If yes:] Were you able to put all instructions into actions referring to the typhoon Haiyan? 
□ Yes 
□ Partly 
□ No 
 
02 In detail, were any official preparatory measures taken before the typhoon in your area?  
□ Yes  
□ No  
[If no, move to the Q 03] 
[If yes:] 02.a Which one were taken? 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
[If yes:] 02.b Who was mainly responsible of the procedure? 
[tick off possible alternatives if applicable; otherwise comment below:  
□  national government,    □ NGO,    
□ LGU,     □ civil society organizations  
□ barangay council,    □ on individual level only] 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
03 Did an evacuation take place before the typhoon hit the island? 
□ Yes  
□ No 
[If no, move to the Q 04] 
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[If yes:] 03.a What type of organization carried out the evacuation? 
□ National government 
□ Local Government 
□ Barangay council 
□ Government agency, 
specify: 
□ NGO/multilateral agencies: 
□ Other, please specify: 
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________ 
[If yes:] 03.b Were all members of your community evacuated? 
□ Yes  
□ No     [If no:] How many?  _______ out of ________ . 
[If no:] 03.b.i Why not? [continue with question 03.b.ii f only specific groups were evacuated] 
[If no:] 03.b.ii Based on which selection criteria were the groups chosen? Who formulated 
the criteria and on which ground? [if applicable, request documents] 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
04 Did you provide any relief assistance?  
□ Yes 
□ No 
[If no, move to the next part: c. Financing the disaster loss] 
[If yes:] What was the focus of the relief response, e.g. food aid, shelter, health, nutrition or 
reconstruction in your Barangay and what are the particular risks associated with each area?  
[Please tick off, if applicable and make notes on risks] 
□ shelter |risks: __________________________________________________________ 
□ food aid  |risks: __________________________________________________________ 
□ health |risks: __________________________________________________________ 
□ nutrition |risks: __________________________________________________________ 
□ reconstruction |risks: __________________________________________________________ 
□ other: ________________________________  
 |risks: __________________________________________________________ 
□ other: ________________________________  
 |risks: __________________________________________________________ 
[in case he or she does not mention any risks, please ask once again more specifically for the 
risks, if any type of assistance was given]  
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[c. FINANCING THE DISASTER LOSS (10 min)] 
 
01 [documents to be requested:] How much humanitarian aid in cash or in kind was pledged and 
how much was finally received? referring to typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda referring to typhoon 
Haiyan/Yolanda, i.e. for recovery and reconstruction.  [use n/a, if not applicable] 
 Aid pledged (in PHP) Aid received (in PHP) [Additional comments]  
[Who received?]  
by the Barangay in total?    
by the Municipality in total?    
[Who provided?]  
from the government    
from foreign government    
from national | foreign NGO    
from private donors    
from barangay community    
from other, please specify 
____________________ 
   
 
[Continue with the next part: d. COOPERATION/COORDINATION BETWEEN AGENCIES AND NGOs, if 
Barangay was not affected at all [Q02 pre-Q] by the typhoon and no assistance obtained] 
 
02 [only if assistance:] Were you able to decide on the allocation of the budget for the purpose of 
a. evacuation? 
□ Yes 
□ No  
□ Partly 
□ n/a 
b. aid distribution? 
□ Yes  
□ No 
□ Partly 
□ n/a 
c. reconstruction 
□ Yes  
□ No 
□ Partly 
□ n/a 
d. Other: _________ 
□ Yes  
□ No 
□ Partly 
□ n/a 
[If no or partly:] 02.a If no, is the budget allocation determined by another agent? 
a. evacuation: 
□ NGO/donor 
□ Municipal Govt. 
□ Provincial Govt. 
□ Regional Govt. 
□ National Govt. 
□ ______________ 
b. aid distribution: 
□ NGO/donor 
□ Municipal Govt. 
□ Provincial Govt. 
□ Regional Govt. 
□ National Govt. 
□ ______________ 
c. reconstruction: 
□ NGO/donor 
□ Municipal Govt. 
□ Provincial Govt. 
□ Regional Govt. 
□ National Govt. 
□ ______________ 
d. Other: _________ 
□ NGO/donor 
□ Municipal Govt. 
□ Provincial Govt. 
□ Regional Govt. 
□ National Govt. 
□ ______________ 
 
03 Were funds reallocated from ongoing programmes to finance recovery and reconstruction 
assistance? 
□ Yes, please specify which:  ____________________________________________________ 
and why: __________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
□ No  
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04 Were funds reallocated from funds for recovery and reconstruction aid to finance other important 
programmes? 
□ Yes, please specify which:  ____________________________________________________ 
and why: __________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
□ No 
 
 
 
[d. COOPERATION/COORDINATION BETWEEN AGENCIES AND NGOs (20 min)] 
01 What are the main humanitarian actors in the crisis, in particular after Haiyan hit the island? 
Nationwide [if this Barangay was not affected] and more specifically, in this Barangay [if applicable]?  
[Nationwide] ______________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 [This Barangay, if applicable] __________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________  
 
02 Was the response dominated by international or national actors? 
Nationwide:     [if applicable:] More specifically, in this Barangay: 
□ International actors 
□ National actors 
□ International actors 
□ National actors 
 
03 How many NGOs and government agencies operated in your barangay/closest area in the 
aftermath of the typhoon? 
- International NGOs/multilateral organizations _____ 
- National/local NGOs ______ 
- Government agencies ______ 
- Civil Society Organisations ________ 
[If CSOs are operating:] 03.4 Which functions do CSOs fulfil in this Barangay? In particular, 
how did they respond to natural disasters, especially, after Yolanda hit the island?  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
[If the Barangay was not affected at all [Q 02 pre-Q] and no NGO or government aid agency was 
present in the Barangay and provided assistance, please move to Q 09] 
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04 What kind of assistance did these organisations/agencies provide in this Barangay? 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
05 [If there were more than two government agencies or non-governmental and multilateral 
organisations:] Do you feel they worked with each other or did it each of them focus on their own 
agenda without cooperating with each other at all? Did they work efficiently? 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
06 [if any humanitarian organisations, NGOs, government agencies present in the Barangay:] Did you 
appreciate working with local or international NGOs or government agencies? Please indicate your 
perception of working with different aid stakeholders on a scale from one to seven, where one 
means that your first-hand experience was “very bad” and seven means “very good”. 
Collaboration with 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 n/a 
National/local NGOs □  □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
Multilateral 
organizations 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
Government agencies □  □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
Other: _______________ □  □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
[n/a = not applicable, if the respective institutions were not present in the Barangay] 
 
07 [if any humanitarian organisations, NGOs, government agencies present in the Barangay:] Did 
these agencies or NGOs consulted with you and/or the community at any stage during the 
beneficiary selection and relief distribution process?    
□ Yes    
□ No 
[If yes:] 07.a Please state which efforts has been made:  
[or If no:] 07.a Please explain why: 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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08 Local leadership can be defined as the need to respect and support local capacity to deal with the 
disaster, ranging from an increased involvement of local actors, such as the affected population, to 
their capacity building in order to enhance and organize their systems, resources and knowledge and 
to perform functions, solve problems and achieve objectives, collectively.  
With reference to this Barangay, please indicate your perception of local leadership in humanitarian 
aid on a scale from one to seven, where one means “no involvement” and seven means “local 
empowerment”.  
Local leadership 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Involvement of Barangay council □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
Involvement of local community □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
 
08.a Please briefly explain why you chose these ratings. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
[Continue here (Q 09) if no NGOs or aid agencies present in this Barangay] 
09 Do you think that help was perceived differently by the local community if the assistance was 
conducted by “outsiders” or “strangers”? This can be related to the evacuation process, the relief or 
reconstruction aid. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
10 Please compare the governmental aid and the foreign aid provision: Which do you consider as 
…most effective and why? ____________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
…fairer and why? ___________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
…most transparent and why? __________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
…most community-based/sustainable and why?  __________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________  
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[e. BENEFICIARY SELECTION AND DISTRIBUTION (15 min)] 
 
[Please choose between Q 01.a or Q 01.b based on the situation in this Barangay:  
           - not affected/assistance not provided or  
           - affected/assistance provided.] 
 
01.a [If not applicable, i.e. if Barangay was not affected and/or relief was not provided:]  
Based on which beneficiary selection criteria should aid (relief, recovery, reconstruction assistance) 
be distributed and why? Who would be responsible of formulating the criteria and on which ground? 
01.b   [if applicable, i.e. if relief was provided in the Barangay:] // o  
Based on which beneficiary selection criteria did you distribute aid, i.e. relief, recovery, 
reconstruction assistance)? Who formulated the criteria and on which ground? 
 [documents to be requested, if applicable] 
 
 [Add the received information above or tick off the mentioned items, if applicable. Do not read 
the following suggestions:00 
□ formulated by LGU    □ beneficiary criteria: houses destroyed 
□ formulated by Barangay Council  □ beneficiary criteria: vulnerable groups 
□ formulated by Government aid agency □ beneficiary criteria: percentage of loss 
□ formulated by Barangay community □ beneficiary criteria: equal share to those affected 
□ formulated by NGOs]   □ beneficiary criteria: whoever registered] 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
[If not applicable, i.e. if Barangay was not affected at all [Q 02 pre-Q] and no assistance was 
provided, move to the Q 07.]  
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[questions 02-06 don’t need to be asked if no relief assistance provided and Barangay not affected:] 
02 Do you think it was a good decision to distinguish among the people for beneficiary selection? 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
03 How did you proceed to identify those people who were entitled for assistance in terms of relief 
goods or reconstruction based on the beneficiary selection criteria?  
□ Based on self-registration by the affected people 
□ Based on needs assessment by Barangay officials/LGU officials [door to door questioning] 
□ Based on needs assessment by NGO 
 [request all documents available and take pictures or make copies of them, such as  
- household-lists  
- lists which were compiled after the typhoon Haiyan hit the island (e.g. in order to record all 
completely/partly destroyed houses)  
- lists used for beneficiary selection after financial assistance was approved] 
 
04 Did you face any particular challenges or interference in the targeting and registration process? 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
05 How many people in your barangay received aid? Please specify 
05.a For relief assistance/goods: ____________ out of _______________ 
05.b For financial assistance:   ____________ out of _______________ 
05.c For reconstruction:   ____________ out of _______________ 
 
06 If there were some people who were deliberately excluded from the relief distribution process: 
Do you feel that they were disadvantaged? 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________  
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The following three questions should be answered based on the experience in this Barangay if the 
Barangay was affected and relief assistance was provided; otherwise based on your perception: 
Please indicate whether the following questions will be answered: 
□ based on your experience in this Barangay. 
□ based on your general perception, if this Barangay was not affected by the typhoon. 
07 Selective targeting in humanitarian assistance has the purpose to meet the needs of the most 
vulnerable. The targeting criteria is usually linked to the level or degree of vulnerability of a 
community, household or individual, e.g. female-headed households or households with many 
children, majority elderly people or disabled persons. Hence, assistance is provided based on the 
vulnerability and needs of individuals or groups affected by disaster. 
Did you perceive the selective targeting of relief distribution as generally fair, transparent or 
discomforting? Please indicate your perception of distribution selection on a scale from one to seven, 
where one means “I do not agree at all” and seven means “I completely agree”. 
Selective targeting 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I do not 
know 
Fair □  □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
Transparent □  □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
discomforting/uneasy □  □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
 
08 When you think of beneficiary selection in terms of fairness: Do you think that selective targeting 
leads to a potentially negative or positive social impact on the community? Please rate on a scale 
from one to seven, where one means “very negative impact”, four means “no impact” and seven 
means “very positive impact”.  
1 
(Very negative 
impact) 
2 
(negative 
impact) 
3 
(rather negative 
impact) 
4 
(No impact) 
5 
(rather positive 
impact) 
6 
(positive 
impact) 
7 
(Very positive 
impact) 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  
 
08.a Please explain your decision in more detail: 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
09 Did you perceive the distribution of humanitarian aid as transparent or hidden? Please indicate 
whether the beneficiary selection and the distribution of aid was visible/traceable for others (e.g. 
neighbours, friends) on a scale from one to seven, where one means “completely hidden” and seven 
means “completely transparent”.  
hidden vs. transparent  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Beneficiary selection □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
Distribution of aid □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
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[Please move to the next part g. Longterm Impact if Barangay was not affected [Q 02 pre-Q] and no 
assistance provided, continue with part f. Responsiveness otherwise:] 
 
[f. RESPONSIVENESS (5 min)] 
01 Were complaints and feedback actively requested from the villagers in your barangay?  
□ Yes [If yes, tick off those applicable:]     by □  Barangay Council/LGU 
□ No      □  Government agency [e.g. COA, CHR, etc.] 
□  National/local NGO 
□  International NGO/aid agencies 
 
□ Other approaches, specify ______________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
[If yes or other approaches:] 01.a How high was the response rate and what incidents were mostly 
reported? Which implications did those feedbacks have on your on-going work?   
[protocols to be requested and copies or pictures to be made:] 
[Response rate: tickle off those applicable:] 
□ Total amount of complaints: ___________________________ 
□ very high 
□ high 
□ rather high 
□ rather low 
□ low 
□ very low 
[incidents mostly reported:] ___________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
[implications on on-going work:] _______________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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[g. LONGTERM IMPACT (15 min)] 
01 On a scale from one to seven, where one means “I do not agree at all” and seven means 
“I completely agree”, how appropriate do you rate the following potentially changes in your 
Barangay after the typhoon: [please rather choose n/a if not applicable to this Barangay] 
“Build back better” 1 
I do not 
agree at 
all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
I 
completely 
agree  
I do not 
know or not 
applicable 
An effective response to Haiyan would have 
needed more financial aid before the storm. 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
The effective response to Haiyan would have 
needed more financial aid after the storm. 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
The reconstructed buildings and materials 
used are more resilient to natural disasters. 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
Houses were re-built at less vulnerable 
spots. 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
The standards according to which houses 
were rebuilt are lower than before (referred 
to size or material) 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
Philippines will remain vulnerable to natural 
disasters. 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
Local communities were strengthened in 
their capacity to respond to the next 
disaster. 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
More reconstruction/recovery aid is needed 
to cope with future natural disasters. 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
Better preparation in terms of education, 
training and resilient constructions is more 
important than foreign aid. 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
The reliance on external humanitarian aid is 
predominant when coping with disaster loss. 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
People have successfully employed self-help 
strategies to cope with the disaster loss. 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
 
01.a [You can ask additional questions if points appear irregular/remarkable/different from other 
Barangays or if you consider anything as added value information:]  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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02 Did you perceive the response in the aftermath of typhoon Haiyan as effective? What are the 
most significant reasons which explain a rather ineffective response to the crisis? 
[Do not read the following suggestions; instead tick off the mentioned items: 
□ The strength of the storm 
□ weak governance structure/institutions 
□ long-time neglect of basic infrastructure 
□ chronic underinvestment in armed forces  
□ deficiencies in development and disaster management planning 
□ patronage politics 
□ government corruption and negligence 
□ poor enforcement of public safety  
□ poor enforcement of environmental legislations 
□ poor construction of buildings which is not resilient  
□ other, _________________________________________________ 
□ other, _________________________________________________ 
□ other, _________________________________________________ 
□ other, _________________________________________________ 
 
□ Response was perceived as effective] 
[If “effective” chosen:] Please explain why you think that the response was effective. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
[Please choose between Q 03.a or Q 03.b based on the situation in this Barangay:   
        - affected or   
        - not affected.  
 
03.a [if affected by the storm]: How did the people in your barangay help each other after the 
typhoon hit the island? 
03.b [if not affected by the storm]: How did the people in your barangay help other people in 
affected areas after the typhoon hit the island? How did they show solidarity in this Barangay? 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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04 How did you perceive solidarity and helpfulness among people in other affected Barangays?  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
05 We would kindly like to know how the typhoon affected your social relationships. How large is 
your close personal social network in this Barangay, i.e. relatives, close friends:  
[If possible, let him tick off those households on the Barangay household list, to which he 
pursues a personal relationship, such as family and friends]  
[If possible, obtain a copy of the beneficiary list] 
[If no lists are available, ask:] 
05.a How large is your close personal network in this Barangay? __________________ 
 
05.b Were you able to actively support them? How many of those were able to receive aid 
after Haiyan? __________________ 
 
[Proceed with Q 08, if Barangay was not affected [Q02 pre-Q] by the storm] 
 
06 [if affected by the storm]: Did people from this barangay mainly tend to stay in 
shelters/evacuation sites or even in tent cities and bunkhouses until their homes were rebuilt or with 
host families/friends? 
□ Mainly in shelters/evacuation sites 
□ Mainly tent cities/bunkhouses 
□ Mainly with host families/friends 
□ n/a (provision of shelter was not necessary) 
 
07 [if affected by the storm]: How many of the completely destructed houses due the typhoon are 
rebuilt/repaired (out of 10)?  
________ out of _________ [or: _________ out of 10] 
 
08 Based on your overall perception, which kind of provided aid do you perceive as the most 
effective and which one as the one needed the most: financial aid, relief assistance or manpower? 
Please explain your choice. Differentiate between different stages of aid provision, if necessary. 
[Most effective:] ____________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
[Needed the most:] __________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________
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09 How were civil society organizations empowered in this Barangay?  
What are the challenges of a more participatory process and if power is respectively shifted to the 
community? 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
10 Do you believe you can contribute to an effective improvement in the Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Mitigation? 
□ Yes  
□ No 
[If no:] What are the severe challenges? 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
11 How many individuals/families decided to migrate from this Barangay to another since 2012? How 
many of these in the aftermath of the typhoon? [Please, let him tick off all leaving/migrated 
individuals/families on the household list 2012:]   
□ temporally:     _________________________   thereof after Haiyan: ___________________ 
□ permanently: _________________________   thereof after Haiyan: ___________________ 
□ No migration 
□ I do not know 
 
12 How many families migrated to this Barangay since 2012, if any? [Please, let him tick off all 
incoming/migrated individuals/families on the household list 2016:]   
□ temporally:     _________________________    
□ permanently: _________________________    
□ No migration 
□ I do not know 
Did you receive any individuals/families from affected areas in this Barangay in the aftermath of the 
typhoon?  
□ Yes.   If yes, how many?     _____________________________________ 
□ No 
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13 Are you aware of any cases, where people moved in this area in the aftermath of natural disasters 
due to the availability of aid assistance?  
□ Yes  
□ No 
 
14 Do people on Panay island still re-settle and live in vulnerable areas along the beach or move 
further inland as they should? 
□ tendency to move further inland 
□ tendency to re-settle along the beach 
□ other, specify _____________________________________________________________ 
□ no information available 
 
15 Have people been pushed to coastal areas because there was no other place or because other 
places were not affordable before and/or after typhoon? 
□ Yes  
□ No 
 
16 Were any no-build zones established, e.g. areas close to the beach, due to natural disasters? 
[documents to be requested:] 
□ Yes  
□ No 
 
17 Based on your overall perception, please rank these relief efforts according to their importance in 
the aftermath of the typhoon?  
__ community based self-help strategies 
__ funds and relief aid provided by government 
__ funds and relief aid provided by donor countries and international NGOs/agencies 
Please explain why you chose this order. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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[h. CORRUPTION (25 min)] 
In the last part we would like to talk about the issue of corruption. We are aware that this might be 
a very sensitive topic. However, we would kindly like to assure you that the information you will 
give us is strictly confidential and no one will bother you in any way about what you say 
concerning the questions we ask you. It will be impossible to trace these answers to a certain 
individual and your name will not be shown at any stage of the evaluation. Thus, we ask you 
to give honest response.  
Furthermore, we would like to assure you that the following questions have no purpose to expose 
corruption among the Barangay Council nor do they implicate any involvement of your person in 
corruption. 
We define corruption as an abuse of entrusted power for its private gain, financial mismanagement 
and fraud. Private gain might refer to persons but also to families, a village, groups of people and 
other actors, e.g. NGOs, aid agencies, private companies or any member of the village. Power can 
also be abused in many other ways, such as favouring family members, exploitation or giving aid to 
people that are not in need of it on purpose 
[1st part on individual’s perception] 
01 Are there particular examples of corrupt abuse of relief assistance that you have become aware of 
in your professional experience? Please exemplify. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
02 What do you feel are the three greatest risks of corruption in the humanitarian relief process? 
This can relate to particular sectors, stages in the project cycle or types of organisations. PLEASE TRY 
TO FORMULATE THE RISKS IN FEW WORDS ONLY. 
1. ____________________________________________ 
 
2. ____________________________________________ 
 
3. ____________________________________________ 
 
03 Have there been any known cases of misuse of power among the Haiyan affected neighbouring 
Barangay Councils and Municipal Councils? Please exemplify. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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04 [if applicable, i.e. if relief assistance provided:] Has anyone ever offered you a bribe payment with 
reference to the relief beneficiary selection and relief distribution and/or the reconstruction aid in 
the aftermath of the typhoon Haiyan? 
□ Yes   
□ No  
[If yes:] 04.a Who offered the payment? Yes No 
representatives of a Local Government Unit □ □ 
villagers in your community □ □ 
a government agency □ □ 
private firms □ □ 
a NGO/international agency □ □ 
 
[If yes:] 04.b Did you report the person offering the bribe to the authority? 
□ Yes  
□ No 
[If no:] 04.c Why didn’t you report it?  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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05 Please rate the likelihood of 
each of the following incidents to 
happen in this Barangay referring 
to the typhoon Haiyan (on a scale 
from 1 to 7) and whether this is a 
situation which is perceived as 
corruption as well as whether you 
have come across such an incident 
in your personal experience? 
Likelihood 1 to 7 
Rank how likely this 
is to occur: 
1 = never occurred 
2 = very unlikely 
3 = unlikely 
4 = possible 
5 = likely 
6 = very likely 
7 = occurred 
I do 
not 
know 
 
or 
 
n/a 
Do you perceive 
this as socially 
commonly 
accepted? 
Personal 
Experience 
a Bringing gifts to a meeting with 
public officials/government 
agencies/NGOs 
 □  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
b Government officials, local 
authorities or NGOs demanding 
bribes for making relief payments 
or to facilitate and speed things up 
 □  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
c Neighbouring Barangays offered 
unofficial payments or gifts to 
different actors, such as businesses 
or NGOs involved in the 
reconstruction or relief provision to 
‘get things done’  
 □  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
d Requirement to make unofficial 
payments or gifts to different 
actors, such as businesses and 
NGOs involved in the 
reconstruction or relief provision to 
‘get things done’ (in this Barangay) 
 □  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
e Additional payments made to 
Barangay Development Council to 
compensate for high efforts during 
the assistance period 
 □  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
f Anti-Corruption measures in 
humanitarian aid is a concept of the 
foreign organisations and slowed 
down the recovery and 
reconstruction in this Barangay 
 □  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
g The Barangay received less than it 
has been approved and allocated 
from higher government levels 
 □  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
h NGO or other organisations 
received funds/relief goods to 
provide humanitarian assistance in 
the Barangay but do not provide 
assistance (e.g. bogus 
NGO/organisation) 
 □  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
i With reference to the relief 
assistance, relatives/friends were 
hired based on social obligations or 
favours 
 □  □ Yes □ No □ Yes □ No 
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06 Please give some examples to those questions you rated with “possible, likely and very likely”:  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
[2nd part based on facts] 
07 How many alleged cases of corruption were reported in your Barangay? 
- with reference to the delivered emergency aid (November and December 2013) 
_______________ 
- with reference to the reconstruction (in 2014)? _____________ 
- average per anno in the three years before the typhoon hit the island?  _____________ 
- these days (in 2016)? ____________ 
 
[if no corruption was reported, please move on to Q 12] 
 
[If any:] 07.a What type of corruption and on which levels: [protocols to be requested]  
[tick off potential types of corruption if applicable:   tick off levels:
□ bribery,  
□ misallocation of relief aid,  
□ misappropriated funds,  
□ repackaging 
□ public sector,  
□ private sector,  
□ NGO, 
□ Individual level]
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________
08 [if corruption was reported:] How many police investigations/prosecutions/convictions followed 
in this Barangay? 
For the period investigations: prosecutions: convictions: 
November-December 2013    
2014    
2015    
2016    
Average per anno in the three years 
before the typhoon hit the island 
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09 [if corruption was reported:] How was this tackled by the Barangay Development Council, 
government agencies and NGOs/international agencies? 
[Development Council:] _______________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
[Govt. Agency:] _____________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
[NGO/international agency:] ___________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
10 Did you personally need to deal with cases of corruption? How did you handle it? 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
11 [If he needed to deal with corruption:] What could have prevented corruption in the first place? 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
[Continue here (Q 12) if no corruption reported] 
 
12 Who was tasked with monitoring and controlling corruption in your Barangay in the aftermath of 
the typhoon Haiyan? [if Barangay was not affected, the question can still be generally answered] 
□ Community-level monitoring/civil society 
□ Barangay Captain/Disaster Council 
□ Local Government Unit, please specify 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
□ National government 
□ Government agency [NDRRMC, COA, CHR and others], please specify 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
□ Media 
□ No one tasked  
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13 Were there any proactive measures in place to detect, assess and monitor bribery and 
corruption risks? This can relate to the allocation and use of public funds or the selection and 
distribution of aid in your Barangay? [documents to be requested, if any:] 
□ Yes  
□ No 
[If yes:] 13.a Which particular measures to minimise corruption risks did you perceive as 
particularly successful? [Please ask for the following examples in the end if not mentioned by 
interviewee: e.g. how often did audits take place and by which institution, what exactly was checked, 
how strong was media and civil society involvement, etc.]  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
[3rd part on overall perception] 
14 [applies to Q12 and Q13: who (institutions) and what (measures)] To what extent did those 
measures and/or institutions in charge successfully contain corruption? Please rate on scale from one 
to seven, where one means “Measures/institutions in charge failed to contain corruption, and there 
were no integrity mechanisms in place” and seven means “Measures/institutions in charge were 
successful in containing corruption, and all integrity mechanisms were in place and effective”. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I do not know 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
15 Please comment why this was the case. [If he rated 7, please let him also explain, why he does 
believe that this Barangay was more successful to tackle corruption than others.] 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
16 Please rate the following criterions based on your perception on scale from one to seven, where 
1 means “very weak for three or more years” and 7 means “very strong for three or more years”. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I do not 
know 
The accountability of the Mayor to 
oversight institutions and of local 
government employees for their 
performance 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
The access of Barangay villagers to 
information on public affairs 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
LGU capture by narrow vested interests □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
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17 To what extent are public officeholders who abuse their positions prosecuted or penalized? 
Please rate on a scale from one to seven, where one means “Officeholders who break the law and 
engage in corruption can do so without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity” and seven 
means “Officeholders who break the law and engage in corruption are prosecuted rigorously under 
established laws and always attract adverse publicity” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I do not know 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
18 The new president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, promised to fight crime and corruption. Do 
you believe he will be successful? What do you think about him? 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
19 Did you vote for him? 
□ Yes  
□ No 
□ Refused to answer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Thank you - 
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Philipps Universität Marburg
Working group sustainable use of natural resources
Am Plan 2
37035 Marburg
Germany
Phone : (+49)-6421 2823751
Fax : (+49)-6421 2823780
Invitation to economic games
Dear Sir/ Madam, 
My name is Lukas Kampenhuber and I am a researcher from
the  University  of  Marburg  in  Germany.  Me,  my  collegues
Tatjana and Trang, as well as assistants from [WIT], would
like to conduct a study in 30 Barangays across Panay Island
and Guimaras on behalf of the University of Marburg. 
We would hereby kindly invite you to join us to play some
economic games where you can earn some money as well.
The games last  about  four  hours.  You will  be  able  to  earn
between 50 and 400 pesos for your participation.
The game takes place in your Barangay on:
M M / D D / Y Y Y Y at 12:30 p.m.
At: __________________________
In the game you have to take decisions that will influence the
earnings of yourself and others. Before and after the game we
will  ask  you  a  couple  of  questions.  Independent  of  what
happens during the games you will receive a minimum of 50
Pesos if you participate. 
Your Household was randomly selected to take part  in this
games.  Only  the  head  of  the  household  or  the  spouse  are
invited to participate. You will also be asked by our assistants
to bring two persons along with you.  Those can be either
friends or relatives that do not live in the same household
with you or with each other.  The persons you bring along
will have to participate in the same games as you and will also
be able to earn between 50 and 400 pesos. One condition for
your participation is that you bring those two additional people
with you.
Since the game lasts four hours, we will serve drinks and some
snacks. 
The game is sponsored by the Robert Bosch Stiftung and there
is no commercial interest in it. Personal information will be
treated with confidentiality. We use these games and surveys
to collect data for research purposes only and will not hand
our information to third parties. 
Thank you for your time and we are looking forward to see
you for the games! 
Lukas, Trang and Tatjana.
Philipps Universität Marburg
Working group sustainable use of natural resources
Am Plan 2
37035 Marburg
Germany
Phone : (+49)-6421 2823751
Fax : (+49)-6421 2823780
Invitation to economic games
Dear Mr./Ms. _______________ , 
My name is Lukas Kampenhuber and I am a researcher from
the  University  of  Marburg  in  Germany.  Me,  my  collegues
Tatjana and Trang, as well as assistants from [WIT], would
like to conduct a study in 30 Barangays across Panay Island
and Guimaras on behalf of the University of Marburg. 
We would hereby kindly invite you to join us to play some
economic games where you can earn some money as well.
The games last  about  four  hours.  You will  be  able  to  earn
between 50 and 400 pesos for your participation.
The game takes place in your Barangay on:
M M / D D / Y Y Y Y at 12:30 p.m.
At: __________________________
In the game you have to take decisions that will influence the
earnings of yourself and others. Before and after the game we
will  ask  you  a  couple  of  questions.  Independent  of  what
happens during the games you will receive a minimum of 50
Pesos if you participate. 
You might remember having played games like this before in
August/September 2012. This time they will be very similar to
those you have played before. Last time you came to us with
Mr/Ms ______________________ and
Mr/Ms ______________________ .
We will try to contact both of them so that the three of you
come again. If one of those two persons is not available for
any reason, we would like to ask you to invite another person
instead. This can be a friend or a relative that does not live
in  the  same  household  as  you.  One  condition  for  your
participation would be that you show up in a group of three
people.
Since the session lasts four hours in total, we will serve drinks
and some snacks. 
The game is sponsored by the Robert Bosch Stiftung and there
is no commercial interest in it. Personal information will be
treated with confidentiality. We use these games and surveys
to collect data for research purposes only and will not hand
our information to third parties. 
Thank you for your time and we are looking forward to see
you for the games! 
Lukas, Trang and Tatjana.
Eidesstattliche Erklärung nach §9 Abs. (1) b) 
Promotionsordnung des Fachbereichs 
Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Philipps-Universität 
Marburg vom 8. Juni 2009 
 
Hiermit versichere ich an Eides statt, dass ich die vorgelegte 
Dissertation selbst und ohne fremde Hilfe verfasst habe, eventuelle 
Beiträge von Ko-Autoren dokumentiert habe, nicht andere als die in ihr 
angegebenen Quellen oder Hilfsmittel benutzt habe, alle vollständig 
oder sinngemäß übernommenen Zitate als solche gekennzeichnet habe 
sowie die Dissertation in der vorliegenden oder einer ähnlichen Form 
noch bei keiner anderen in- oder ausländischen Hochschule anlässlich 
eines Promotionsgesuchs oder zu anderen Prüfungszwecken 
eingereicht habe. 
 
Innsbruck, 23.07.2019 
 
____________________ 
Ort, Datum, Unterschrift 

